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Abstract 
The  theme  of  this  thesis  concerns  post-Soviet  Russian  foreign  policy  perceptions  of 
Belarusian and Ukrainian sovereignty between 1990 and 2008. In the thesis I argue that 
Russian perceptions became increasingly revanchist in nature during this period, and that we 
may distinguish between two different types of revanchism, the consequences of which for 
Belarusian and Ukrainian sovereignty are quite different. I argue that all Russian perceptions 
of  international  affairs  are  constituted  by  perceptions  of  Russia.  Thus,  perceptions  of 
Belarusian and Ukrainian sovereignty may be divided into three categories, or paradigms, 
each of which centres on a specific concept that legitimises the existence of Russia, and 
determines  how  Belarus  and  Ukraine  are  viewed.  The  three  central  concepts  are  the 
concepts  of  Law,  Power,  and  Nation,  respectively.  In  the  introduction,  I  outline  these 
paradigms, both in abstract terms and in relation to Russian foreign policy in general, as well 
as  Russian  foreign  policy  towards  Belarus  and  Ukraine.  Subsequently,  I  present  my 
methodology  and  my  literature  review,  together  with  a  discussion  of  the  theoretical 
assumptions, which provide the foundation for my argument. Then, I briefly outline Russian 
foreign policy making during the period relevant for my thesis, before the four main chapters 
of my thesis outline in roughly chronological fashion how the relative significance of the 
three paradigms has changed over time. Overall, I find that whereas the paradigm of Power 
has  generally  dominated  perceptions,  the  paradigm  of  Law  has  gradually  lost  influence, 
whereas the influence of the paradigm of Nation has gradually increased. Since I define both 
the paradigm of Power and the paradigm of Nation as “revanchist,” I conclude that Russian 
perceptions  of  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  sovereignty  between  1990  and  2008  gradually 
became more revanchist in nature. 4 
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Abbreviations 
 
BSSR: Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic 
CRA: Council for Religious Affairs of the Soviet Union 
CSCE: Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States 
CSTO: Collective Security Treaty Organisation 
FDI: Foreign direct investment 
GDP: Gross domestic product 
KGB: Committee for State Security of the Soviet Union 
LDPR: Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
OSCE: Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
RSFSR: Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic 
SCO: Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
SES: Single Economic Space 
START: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
UkSSR: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic 
UN: United Nations 
USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
VAT: Value added tax 
WTO: World Trade Organisation 
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Transliteration 
 
In this thesis, transliteration from Russian follows the United States Library of Congress 
System. All Russian words, including names of persons and places have been transliterated 
following  this  system,  apart  from  the  cases  where  anglicised  spelling  has  become  the 
academic norm; for instance, I write “Moscow” instead of “Moskva.” 
 
Names of Belarusian persons and places have mostly, but not exclusively been presented in 
their  Russian forms,  since  Russian  is  one  of the  official  languages  in Belarus.  Names of 
Ukrainian  persons  and  places,  on  the  contrary,  have  been  presented  in  their  Ukrainian 
forms,  since  only  Ukrainian  is  official  language  in  Ukraine.  For  reasons  similar  to  those 
described above, a few cases of anglicised spelling have been preserved. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Argument 
In  this  thesis,  I  argue  that  Russian  perceptions  of  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  sovereignty 
between 1990 and 2008 were significantly influenced by what I term “revanchism.” Below, I 
shall elaborate my argument, outlining how I demonstrate that revanchism has or has not 
been present in specific issues. First, though, I must define “Russians,” and “Belarusians” 
and “Ukrainians,” for that matter. In short, I define actors according to their self-definition. 
Thus, if an actor implicitly or explicitly defines him- or herself as “Russian” in a given text 
(whether  by  using  rossiiskii,  russkii  or  some  other  label)  he  or  she  is  Russian  for  my 
purposes. In themselves, ethnicities or citizenships are therefore not relevant here; thus, if 
an individual in Ukraine without Ukrainian citizenship defines himself as Ukrainian he is 
Ukrainian for my purposes. Two caveats are in order, though: first, actors’ self-definitions 
might change over time and within different issues; second, if the above-mentioned self-
defined Ukrainian is viewed as Russian by others I cannot ignore their perceptions in favour 
of his choice. Ultimately, therefore, my analysis seeks to be highly alert to the constitutive 
development of actors’ self-definitions within a social context. 
 
With this in mind, I argue that Russian perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian sovereignty 
between 1990 and 2008 were increasingly marked by revanchism. Russian perceptions may 
be divided into three categories, or paradigms, all constituted by perceptions of Russian 
sovereignty.  Each  of  these  paradigms  centres  on  a  specific  concept,  respectively  Law, 
Power,  and  Nation.  Within  each  of  these  paradigms  a  specific  worldview  of  Russia,  of 
Belarus and Ukraine, and of the international system at large exists. The claim that Russian 9 
 
perceptions were revanchist implies that they were mostly influenced by the paradigms of 
Power, that the paradigm of Law had increasingly less ability to challenge the paradigm of 
Power, and that the paradigm of Nation was increasingly able to do so. Since both the 
paradigms of Power and of Nation were revanchist in nature Russian perceptions overall 
became  increasingly  revanchist.  However,  by  distinguishing  between  the  paradigms  of 
Power  and  Nation,  I  argue  that  two  quite  different  types  of  revanchism  existed,  an 
observation that existing scholarship, in my opinion, has not acknowledged. 
 
I shall now summarise the three paradigms. For each paradigm I shall begin by highlighting 
its internal logic in abstract terms. Then, I shall relate the paradigm to Russian foreign policy 
in general, presenting my assumptions of how Russian foreign policy would be conducted if 
the given paradigm was dominant. Finally, I shall show how Russian foreign policy towards 
Belarus and Ukraine would be conducted if the given paradigm dominated foreign policy 
thinking.  Subsequently,  in  the  main  parts  of  my  thesis  I  shall  analyse  developments  in 
Russian  foreign  policy  towards  Belarus  and  Ukraine,  evaluating  to  what  extent  each 
paradigm held significance at given times and within given issues. 
 
Paradigm of Law: assumptions 
As in the other two paradigms, perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian sovereignty in the 
paradigm of Law are constituted by perceptions of Russian sovereignty, of what “Russia” 
really is. The paradigm of Law equates “Russia” with the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic (RSFSR) until 1991, and subsequently with the Russian Federation. Furthermore, 
just like in the other two paradigms, within the paradigm of Law a specific view of the past, 
the present, and the future of Russia exists. Here, it is argued that Russia originated as a 10 
 
deliberate construction; that it should aim for stability at present; and that it should seek to 
become normal in the future.  
 
I shall now present the assumptions that perceptions within the paradigm of Law would 
hold regarding aspects of Russian foreign policy. In my thesis, I focus on four groups of 
issues, of a political, military, economic and cultural nature.
1 Political issues can be divided 
into issues concerning territory, governance and ideology, respectively. I would assume that 
if perceptions from the paradigm of Law dominated Russian foreign policy thinking, there 
would be a general understanding that current borders of Russia were new; that they 
should nevertheless only be changed through peaceful means; and that all changes should 
take  place  within  the  norms  generated  by  the  international,  generally  Westernised 
community. For instance, the May, 1997, Russia-Ukraine Friendship Treaty between Russia 
and Ukraine  demonstrated Russian willingness to discuss territorial matters peacefully. 
Within issues of governance, a dominant paradigm of Law would lead me to assume that 
Russians would consider Imperial and Soviet governance to have been misguided; that 
democratisation of Russia should now be pursued; and that a democratic Russia should be 
the ultimate aim. For example, the extent to which democracy  was sometimes an ideal for 
Russian  policy-makers  may  be  gauged  from  how  foreign  leaders,  such  as  Aleksandr 
Lukashenko of Belarus, was officially criticised as undemocratic. Finally, within issues of 
ideology, a dominant paradigm of Law would lead me to assume that Russians would 
consider Imperial and Communist ideologies to have been misguided, similarly to what was 
the case with governance above; that Russians would endeavour to construct a civic identity 
                                                           
1 This division is inspired by B. Buzan, People, States and Fear: an agenda for international security in the 
post-cold war era (2
nd ed.), Harlow: Longman, 1991, esp. pp. 19-21 11 
 
for their state at present; and that the eventual outcome being sought was a civic Russian 
state marked by loyalty to the post-Soviet entity. For instance, I show how the right of 
Belarusians and Ukrainians to independently construct their civic statehood was repeatedly 
acknowledged by leading Russians during Boris El’tsin’s presidency. 
 
Following this summary of political issues, I turn to military issues. Military issues can be 
divided into issues concerning Belarusian and Ukrainian military forces, NATO, and Russian 
military forces stationed in Belarus and Ukraine, respectively. I would assume that if the 
paradigm  of  Law  dominated  Russian  foreign  policy  thinking,  there  would  be  a  general 
understanding that sovereign Belarusian and Ukrainian forces had not existed before the 
Soviet collapse; that such forces consequently ought to be built now; and that the aim 
would  be  to  have  developed,  fully  independent  military  forces  in  the  two  states.  For 
example,  Russian  leaders  allowed  sovereign  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  forces  with  some 
significant capabilities to be constructed following the Soviet collapse. In relation to NATO, a 
dominant  paradigm  of  Law  would  indicate  that  Russians  might  now  view  the  Western 
organisation as a security community; that NATO and Russia should work towards mutual 
friendship;  and  that  Russia,  and  other  post-Soviet  states,  might  seek  to  eventually  join 
NATO.  For  example,  during  the  1990s  Russian  military  elites  began  to  engage  in  joint 
exercises with NATO and Ukraine. Finally, concerning Russian troops stationed in Belarus 
and Ukraine, I would assume that if the paradigm of Law dominated Russian perceptions, 
Russian troops in the two former Soviet republics would have previously been occupiers; 
that Russian troops should now mostly return to help policing the Russian Federation; and 
that a complete remodelling of the Russian forces towards such aims should take place. An 
example of this is shown with the naval agreements between Russia and Ukraine from May, 12 
 
1997, in which Russian leaders officially accepted that the Black Sea Fleet had to return to 
Russia. 
 
Following this summary of military issues, I turn to economic issues. Economic issues can be 
divided into issues concerning Belarusian and Ukrainian economic actors, concerning energy 
such as oil and natural gas, and concerning Russian economic actors in Belarus and Ukraine. 
If  the  paradigm  of  Law  dominated  Russian  foreign  policy  thinking  I  would  assume  that 
Russians would have seen Belarusian and Ukrainian economic actors as having previously 
been exploited by all-Union structures, and perhaps even by economic actors in the RSFSR; 
that Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian actors alike should now enter the world market; and 
that a future ideal would see them all embedded there. Such developments might even 
happen  contrary  to  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  wishes.  For  example,  during  the  1990s 
members of the Russian government resigned in protest against further subsidisation of the 
Belarusian economy. On the issue of energy, I would assume that a dominant paradigm of 
Law  would  indicate  that  Russians  accepted  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  actors  should  be 
allowed to develop their own resources if possible; that energy relations between Russia 
and its neighbours should take place on market conditions; and that Belarus and Ukraine 
should  be  allowed  to  gain  energy  from  non-Russian  sources  if  they  so  wished.  As  an 
example, I describe how a bilateral Russo-Ukrainian agreement from 2000 codified mutual 
principles for energy relations. 
 
Finally, on the issue of Russian economic actors in Belarus and Ukraine I would assume that 
a dominant paradigm of Law would indicate that Russians accepted that their economic 
actors had exploited Belarusians and Ukrainians in the past; that interaction now had to 13 
 
take place on world market conditions; and that Russian actors would eventually have to be 
operating outside Russia according to internationally recognised rules and norms. For an 
example, I show how Russian leaders already in 1991 openly recognised the harmful nature 
of previous economic activity imposed on Belarusians and Ukrainians. 
 
Following this summary of perceptions within the paradigm of Law relating to economic 
issues, I finally turn to cultural issues. Cultural issues can be divided into issues concerning 
history,  language,  and  religion,  respectively.  If  the  paradigm  of  Law  dominated  Russian 
foreign policy perceptions I would assume that Russians accepted they had previously acted 
as a colonial power in Belarus and Ukraine; that Russians now sought to make amends for 
previous  transgressions  against  their  neighbours;  and  that  Russians  ultimately  sought 
forgiveness.  For  instance,  understanding  that  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  nationalism  had 
been provoked by Russians appeared during the 1990s. On the issue of language, I would 
assume that if the paradigm of Law dominated Russian foreign policy thinking there would 
be a recognition that imposition of Russian language had previously been overbearing; that 
the presence of Russian language in Belarus and Ukraine should now be scaled back; and 
that Russian language should not enjoy any special rights within these states. For instance, 
Vladimir Putin promised in 2006 to support all languages in Russia, Ukraine, and other post-
Soviet states. Finally, on the issue of religion I would assume that Russian perceptions in a 
dominant paradigm of Law would acknowledge that many religions, and not just the Russian 
Orthodox Church, had been unnecessarily suppressed in the Soviet Union; that religious 
liberalisation was now overwhelmingly needed; and that the aim should be that inhabitants 
of Belarus and Ukraine could freely choose between the Russian Orthodox churches, their 
indigenous churches, and other options. For instance, I highlight how the right to freedom 14 
 
of conscience was emphasised by the Russian Orthodox leadership from the outset, in a 
direct break with Soviet suppression. 
 
Paradigm of Power: assumptions 
With the assumptions of the paradigm of Law thus outlined in detail, I shall now summarise 
the paradigm of Power. This paradigm equates “Russia” with the Russian Empire and the 
Soviet Union. Russia is here seen as originating in history; at present Russia should seek to 
widen its sphere of influence; and the aim should be achieve and retain great power status 
for Russia again in the future.  
 
If we apply this paradigm to Russian foreign policy in relation to political issues, I would 
assume that Russians would perceive borders as legitimate or not depending on whether 
they had existed in the past; that the function of borders at present would be seen as 
inclusive, facilitating the incorporation of neighbouring areas under Russian sovereignty; 
and that in future borders should help retain a number of regions together, regions together 
capable  of  balancing  the  capabilities  of  outside  great  powers,  such  as  the  USA  and, 
potentially,  the  EU  and  China.  For  example,  the  Russo-Belarusian  Union  state  gradually 
became enmeshed in opposition to the USA. I would furthermore assume that perceptions 
within  a  dominant  paradigm  of  Power  would  view  past,  centralised  governance  as 
fundamentally  correct;  that  Russians  holding  such  perceptions  would  aim  for  increased 
centralisation again at present; and that the re-establishment of an imperial administration 
would be the eventual aim. For example, the early Putin administration saw fit to order the 
removal of leading Ukrainian officials. In the case of ideology, I would similarly assume that 
Russian perceptions within the paradigm of Power would view ideologies of the past as 15 
 
fundamentally correct, despite their twentieth century Socialist twist; that such perceptions 
would want an imperial ideology to reappear; and that the aim would be a multinational 
state led by the Russian primus inter pares. For an instance of this, in the mid-1990s the 
El’tsin  government  introduced  a  strategy  for  the  post-Soviet  region  displaying  imperial 
ideology. 
 
Moving to military issues, I would assume that Russian perceptions within the paradigm of 
Power  would  contend  that  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  forces  had  previously  been  solidly 
integrated in Russian-led forces; that Belarusian and Ukrainian forces should now regain 
their former strength since they were allies of Russia; and that future re-integration of these 
forces  should  be  the  aim.  Certainly,  during  the  entire  period  surveyed  bilateral  and 
multilateral  formal  steps  were  taken  to  reintegrate  Belarusian  forces  in  a  Russian-led 
military  framework.  In  the  case  of  NATO,  I  would  assume  that  perceptions  within  the 
paradigm of Power would view NATO as having been an adversary during the Cold War; that 
NATO remained an adversary of Russia and other post-Soviet states; and that the recreation 
of a balance of power between a Russia-led bloc and NATO should be the aim. Indeed, 
Russia  and  Belarus  cooperated  in  the  Union  Shield-2006  exercise,  intended  as  defence 
manoeuvres against attacks from NATO. Finally, in the case of Russian forces stationed in 
Belarus and Ukraine I would assume that they were perceived as previously having been 
defenders against non-Soviet attacks; that their mission was now to regain former positions 
of strength in their host states; and that these forces should entrench themselves further in 
Belarus and Ukraine in future. For example, Putin’s government throughout highlighted the 
importance of retaining the Black Sea Fleet on Crimea as a defence against foreign attacks. 
 16 
 
In the case of economic issues, I would assume that perceptions within the paradigm of 
Power would argue that Belarusian and Ukrainian economic actors had previously been 
successfully integrated in the Soviet infrastructure; that efforts should now be made to 
reintegrate such actors in Russia-led infrastructure; and that complete integration in such an 
infrastructure should be the eventual aim. The inauguration and development of the Single 
Economic Space is an example of this. In matters of energy I would similarly assume that 
perceptions  within  the  paradigm  of  Power  looked  back  to  seemingly  successful  Soviet 
integration; that they wanted to maintain and re-develop such integration at present, not 
least through use of subsidies; and that they intended to eventually achieve full integration 
of the energy sectors in Russia and other post-Soviet states, let alone further abroad. As an 
example  of  this,  Putin’s  first  term  witnessed  Russian  attempts  to  acquire  energy 
infrastructure  in  Belarus  and  Ukraine.  Finally,  in  matters  concerning  Russian  economic 
actors abroad in the post-Soviet space I would assume that perceptions within the paradigm 
of Power argued that Russian actors had previously functioned as integrators within the 
Imperial and Soviet space; that they should seek to regain this role; and that an integrated 
economic  space  was,  once  more,  the  aim.  I  thus  discuss  the  programme  of  economic 
cooperation between Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian businessmen in the late 1990s. 
 
Finally, in the case of cultural issues I would assume that perceptions within the paradigm of 
Power would argue that Russia had historically been a benefactor of Belarus and Ukraine; 
that its historical mission was to support and guide its neighbours; and that Russia again 
should  become  their  “elder  brother”  in  future.  As  an  example  of  such  perceptions,  I 
demonstrate how Putin during his second presidential term denounced the Soviet collapse 
as a catastrophe. Concerning language issues I would assume that perceptions within the 17 
 
paradigm  of  Power  would  argue  that  Russian  language  had  previously  been  a  practical 
support to integration between Russia and its neighbours; that Russian language should 
thus be  assisted during  the turbulent  first post-Soviet  years; and  that  Russian  language 
should  eventually  regain  its  prior  dominance  in  neighbouring  states.  Thus,  I  show  how 
official Russian programmes to disseminate Russian-language materials within Belarus and 
Ukraine were introduced by Putin’s government. Finally, in relation to issues of religion I 
would assume that perceptions within the paradigm of Power would argue that religion had 
historically unified Russia and neighbouring states; that religion could thus help unify the 
post-Soviet region in the turbulent post-Soviet period; and that religion, including Russian 
Orthodoxy, could become a motor of integration in the region in future. Indeed, belief in an 
Orthodox  community  was  overtly  present  at  the  inauguration  of  Russo-Belarusian 
integration in 1996. 
 
Paradigm of Nation: assumptions 
With  the  assumptions  of  the  paradigm  of  Power  thus  outlined  in  detail  I  shall  now 
summarise the paradigm of Nation. This paradigm equates “Russia” with the Russian nation, 
understood partly but not exclusively in an ethnic sense. Russia is here seen as originating in 
a  mythical  past;  at  present  Russia  should  be  revanchist,  that  is  delimit  sovereign  areas 
perceived as belonging to the Russian nation; while the eventual aim should be to achieve 
purity, namely a condition in which Russia is populated only by Russians and influenced only 
by the interests of Russia. Only some international actors are seen as legitimately sovereign; 
this legitimacy is based on their foundation in a nation. Thus, the sovereign status of Belarus 
and  Ukraine  in  their  current  form  is  perceived  to  be  illegitimate,  with  parts  of  the 
sovereignty of these states to be included in Russian sovereignty, with the rest perceived as 18 
 
legitimate, sovereign entities. Still, though, even truncated Belarus and Ukraine are enemies 
of Russia due to the fact that sovereignty claimed by these three actors partly overlap. 
 
If we apply this paradigm to Russian foreign policy in relation to political issues, I would 
assume that perceptions within the paradigm would view Russian borders as having an 
ahistorical legitimacy; that Russian borders were to have a primarily exclusive function; and 
that they were supposed to eventually be returned to their original state. Certainly, Russian 
statements concerning the Crimean peninsula already from the early 1990s demonstrated 
this. In regards to issues of governance I would assume that governance in Russia would be 
seen as having been correct once in a non-specific past; that governance should now focus 
on  defence  of  the  rights  of  Russians  abroad;  and  that  a  dictatorship  of  the  nation, 
discriminating in favour of Russians should be established throughout Russian sovereign 
lands. As an example of this, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev stated that Russia 
would defend its people abroad, including in Belarus and Ukraine, with all means necessary. 
Finally, on issues of ideology I would assume, too, that ideology in Russia would be seen as 
having been correct in a non-specific past; that a national ideology concerned with Russians 
only should now be re-introduced; and that the establishment of a Russian nation-state 
should  be  aimed  for.  Thus,  Russian  commentators  following  the  Ukrainian  presidential 
election in 2004 argued that Russians in Ukraine should repel West Ukrainian attempts to 
impose their leadership in the state. 
 
If we then apply the paradigm of Nation to Russian foreign policy in relation to military 
issues, I would assume that Belarusian and Ukrainian forces were thought to have been kept 
in check by Russians in the past; that these forces now had to be repulsed to prevent them 19 
 
from preying on Russia; and that their capabilities in future should be diminished. As an 
example, the Russo-Ukrainian naval treaties from 1997 significantly limited the capabilities 
of  the  Ukrainian  navy.  Concerning  NATO,  I  would  assume  that  perceptions  within  this 
paradigm would view the Western organisation as having always presented a dangerously 
alluring alternative to Russia; that NATO was now used as an excuse by neighbouring states 
to oppose Russia; and that the aim in future should be to prevent neighbouring states from 
facilitating  the  entry  of  NATO  in  Russian  areas.  As  an  example,  the  Ukrainian-led 
organisation GUAM, later GUUAM, was perceived by Russian observers from 1997 onwards 
as an attempt to introduce NATO to Russian lands. Finally, in relation to Russian forces 
stationed abroad I would assume that perceptions within the paradigm of Nation would 
view said forces as having long defended local Russians; that the forces were now supposed 
to challenge local, anti-Russian administrations; and that their ultimate aim was to defeat 
such  administrations.  Notably,  the  first  post-Soviet  Russian  military  doctrine  explicitly 
highlighted  discrimination  against  Russians  in  Belarus,  Ukraine  and  other  neighbouring 
states, as a threat that could be dealt with by Russian military forces. 
 
Subsequently, if I apply the paradigm of Nation to economic issues, I would assume that 
economic actors from states neighbouring Russia would be perceived as having exploited 
Russia in the past; that such actors were now to be challenged by Russia; and that their 
economies ought eventually to be undermined by Russia. To provide an example of this in 
relation to Belarus and Ukraine, in Putin’s second presidential term punitive import duties 
were imposed on goods from these states. In relation to energy issues, I would assume that 
perceptions  within  this  paradigm  would  similarly  argue  that  neighbouring  areas  had 
exploited Russia in the past; that these areas should now be challenged as Russia regained 20 
 
its energy clout; and that the energy sovereignty of these states ought eventually to be 
undermined by Russia. In relation to this, a decade and a half after the Soviet collapse the 
Russian natural gas company Gazprom repeatedly disconnected gas deliveries to Belarus 
and Ukraine, while simultaneously seeking to charge the latter state higher prices than it 
charged Western customers. Finally, within the issue concerning Russian economic actors 
abroad I would assume that perceptions within this paradigm would argue that Russian 
actors had long been exploited by neighbouring states; that these states should now be 
challenged  by  Russian  actors;  and  that  these  Russian  actors  should  eventually  seek  to 
undermine the economies of neighbouring states. In the case of Belarus and Ukraine, El’tsin 
by 1994 ordered Russian security services to force access for Russian economic actors onto 
the Ukrainian market. 
 
Finally, in cultural matters I would assume that perceptions within the paradigm of Nation 
would argue that neighbouring states had historically taken advantage of Russia in general; 
that Russia should presently aim to publish its version of history; and that the aim would be 
fulfilled when lies of the past had been disproven. For example, a decade and a half after 
the Soviet collapse significant Russian actors still claimed that Ukrainian accusations against 
Russia connected to the famine of the 1930s simply constituted anti-Russian propaganda. In 
issues of language I would assume that perceptions within this paradigm would argue that 
Russian-speakers’  rights  had  previously  been  endangered  by  neighbouring  nations;  that 
Russian-speakers  should  consequently  now  be  defended;  and  that  the  position  of  the 
Russian  language  in  areas  rightfully  belonging  to  Russian  sovereignty  should  eventually 
become entrenched. Examples of this were the numerous official Russian complaints of 
linguistic  discrimination  directed  against  Ukraine  during  the  1990s.  Finally,  in  issues  of 21 
 
religion I would assume that perceptions within the paradigm of Nation would argue that 
Russian Orthodoxy had previously been undermined by other religions near the outer edges 
of Russian sovereign territories; that Russian Orthodoxy now had to be defended against the 
encroachment of other religions; and that the aim should be to ensure total domination for 
Russian Orthodoxy within the Russian sovereign area. Thus, Russian political commentators 
saw the Uniate Church in Ukraine as attacking the presence of the Russian Orthodox Church 
there. 
 
Influence of the paradigms 
Having thus summarised the three paradigms that I seek to understand in this thesis, and 
how they relate to Russian foreign policy in general, and particularly towards Belarus and 
Ukraine, the final part of my argument is as follows: although all three paradigms had some 
influence on Russian perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian sovereignty between 1990 
and  2008,  and  thus  on  policy  derived  from  these  perceptions,  their  influence  overall 
differed. In general, it may be stated that the paradigm of Power consistently dominated 
Russian perceptions; that the paradigm of Law had significant influence at first on Russian 
perceptions, but that this gradually waned, whereas the paradigm of Nation conversely was 
not very important in the beginning, but grew steadily in influence. Why this difference in 
the relative influence of the paradigms? The paradigm of Law was weakened due to the fact 
that it was built only on a foundation of freedom from the Soviet Union; on its negation, but 
often  lacking  much  positive  content  of  its  own.  The  paradigm  of  Power,  in  contrast, 
benefitted from being built on the foundation of the order of recent and distant history, an 
order in which not only Russians, but also Belarusians and Ukrainians remained enmeshed. 
And the fact that the paradigm of Nation retained and in parts even increased its influence 22 
 
during the period surveyed was due to a lingering feeling of injustice harboured both by 
Russians and by their neighbours; a feeling that the others had cheated or betrayed them 
within the Soviet Union and after its demise. Finally, in this context it is important to stress 
that  the  persistent  influence  of  the  paradigm  of  Nation  cannot  solely  be  attributed  to 
Russians’  actions,  but  that  this  instead  remained  and  was  reinforced  due  to  mutual 
accusations and suspicions traded between Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians alike.  
 
Methodology 
This thesis employs a qualitative methodology, it is primarily concerned with the use of 
written sources, and it emphasises the need for primary language-sources, primarily but not 
exclusively in Russian language. Based on these methodological choices, I shall evaluate the 
relative influence of each of my paradigms in the main chapters of the thesis. Before doing 
so, though, I shall briefly discuss my methodological choices, using some existing literature 
to  help  me  explain  why  I  have  taken  these  choices.  Most  importantly,  the  thesis  is 
qualitative as opposed to quantitative in its methodology. Thus, I intend to return to a 
classical,  inductive  methodology  within  the  discipline  of  international  relations;  a 
methodology out of favour in the discipline for several decades before again being espoused 
by scholars such as Hedley Bull. It stems from the disciplines of history, law and philosophy 
and ultimately relies on the ability of the scholar to make qualified judgements, as opposed 
to finding truth,
2 which beyond Bull has been the quantifiable aim of most scholars within 
international  relations,  Kenneth  Waltz   foremost  among  them.
3  By  choosing  against 
quantitative methods I do not claim that these are of little use; they undoubtedly offer 
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many research possibilities within international relations. Indeed, on some occasions my 
own argument does seek the support of other scholars’ quantitative work. But since sound 
research relies on making the methods fit the subject matter, rather than the reverse,
4 I 
myself see no choice but to approach perceptions through qualitative studies. The problem 
in quantitative methods for my purposes lies in their inherent tendency to deductive 
reasoning and law-like generalisations. It is problematic to apply such deduction to historical 
developments,  no  matter  how  recent,  since  the  use  of  independent  variables  risks 
preventing an understanding of how such variables were themselves products of other 
variables in their day.
5 Furthermore, since perceptions are by their very nature subjective it 
is counterproductive to place them a priori within unyielding categories; such categories 
should appear solely based on my inductive research. Indeed, what is required for the type 
of research I shall undertake is an analytic narrative, which is capable of including the 
“stories, accounts and context” of the developments it seeks to understand.
6 
 
Yet even with qualitative methods chosen, a faultline remains between the use of written 
and oral sources. In this thesis, I have almost exclusively chosen in favour of the former, 
even though I conducted a few interviews to assist my research. As far as I can see, the main 
problem  with  the  use  of  oral  sources  concerns  researcher  bias.  In  part,  nondirective 
methods can circumvent this problem, making clear to the respondent that he is responsible 
for  whatever  he  states,  and  allowing  him  to  approach  the  matter  as  he  pleases.
7  And 
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although such precautions can mostly satisfy the worries of many political science scholars, 
who  consequently  believe  that  interviews  are  almost  always  an  appropriate  research 
method,  within  international  relations  practical  problems  appear.  Even  more  so  that  in 
domestic politics, relevant respondents might here be difficult to engage meaningfully with. 
And at the same time, the so-called transactional nature of the interview process, where 
interviewer and respondent both have an influence on the interview, remains an inevitable 
methodological  problem.
8  In  recognition  of  this  problem,  I  have  primarily  used  my 
interviews and other conversations with Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians and others in an 
indirect fashion, to expand my understanding of the topic and receive feedback on whether 
my research concerns were academically fruitful. Written sources have been used more 
directly in the thesis, even though they, too, present their own kind of methodological 
concerns. Indeed, whenever written materials are chosen for research there is always a risk 
of unwarranted selectivity and bias. Regarding primary sources it is important to recall that 
any sample chosen might differ in important respects from the entire body of sources 
available. This problem is partly overcome by triangulation of different types of primary 
sources. Secondary sources must similarly be dealt with in a careful fashion, especially when 
they are uncorroborated by other sources and to the extent they are influenced by the 
political, organisation and disciplinary culture within which the author of the given source 
operates.
9 Nevertheless, if such precautions are taken meaningful qualitative research can 
be conducted. 
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A final methodological issue that deserves mention concerns the use of primary-language 
sources. In this thesis, such sources would be mainly Russian-language, although Belarusian- 
and Ukrainian-language sources are relevant, too. I am convinced that when perceptions 
from the three post-Soviet states are researched, use of such primary-language material is 
essential.  Otherwise,  my  research  could  fall  prey  to  flawed  translations,  and  to 
interpretations  by  non-Russian  speaking  observers,  and  would  in  general  be  arbitrarily 
limited in the sources it could choose from. Nevertheless, even when primary-language 
sources are used some limitations are necessary, since a topic such as mine would otherwise 
have an almost innumerable amount of sources to choose from. How broad a range of 
sources should be consulted? This depends on the argument proposed; for some studies it 
would  be  wholly  appropriate  to  consult  only  official  documents  or  statements  by  state 
leaders.  This  has  often  been  done  fruitfully  in  the  case  of  Russia,  with  its  relatively 
hierarchical policy-making. Two reasons, however, made me consult sources from a wide 
array of Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian actors. First, Russian foreign policy making is not 
as unambiguously hierarchical as it has often been portrayed; something I shall demonstrate 
below. Second, it appears to me that induction must involve the non-theoretical recording 
of identities, whenever possible, must contextualise the meanings of identities in given texts 
and relate them intertextually.
10 Thus, by limiting the choice of consulted texts to tho se 
produced by the most powerful policy-makers, the researcher loses a context that is often, 
if not always, crucial to understanding how identities develop in domestic and international 
interaction between all types of actors. 
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I have now summed up the methodological background for my research. But, at a perhaps 
more practical level, how shall I evaluate the relative influence of my paradigms within the 
main  body  of  the  thesis?  I  assume  that  the  existence  of  a  specific  paradigm  may  be 
discerned within each specific text I have chosen; thus, not only are all my chosen texts 
relevant for the purpose of presenting paradigms, but I assume that only one paradigm is 
discernible in each text. Given such assumptions, the question remains: what makes a given 
text, broadly understood, significant for my purposes? It seems to me that three criteria 
must apply to such an evaluation.
11 First, I must consider the  policy-making importance of 
the Russian actor presenting the text, an importance I shall outline below in the chapter on 
foreign policy making. Thus, texts presented by El’tsin and Putin are, everything else equal, 
more important than texts presented by Vladimir Zhirinovskii and Aleksandr Dugin. Second, 
I must consider the influence the given text has had, or has not had, on other texts relevant 
to my argument. Such influence is often difficult to perceive, yet could for instance be seen 
in the mutual and escalating recriminations concerning energy issues between Russians and 
Belarusians. Third, I must consider the influence the text had on practical policy relevant to 
my  argument.  For  instance,  El’tsin  did  not  just  claim  that  Russia  respected  Ukrainian 
territorial integrity; he ensured this respect was formalised in the 1997 Friendship Treaty.  
 
Below,  I  shall  present  an  entire  chapter  on  Russian  foreign  policy  making,  which  shall 
therefore not be detailed here. However, as a rough generalisation Russian foreign policy 
actors may be said to have been of greater importance between 1990 and 2008 the more 
closely  connected  they  are  to  the  Russian  President  of  the  day.  Concentric  circles  of 
influence thus emanated from El’tsin, then Putin, empowering members of government, 
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other  actors  employed  by  the  Russian  executive,  actors  opposed  to  the  executive,  and 
finally Russian actors with no direct political influence on Russian policy, living inside and 
outside Russia. Such influence was often, but not exclusively, wielded ex officio. Thus, when 
President Putin, for example, in 2008 threatened that the inclusion of Ukraine in  NATO 
might result in Russian territorial demands on Crimea, this carried much more weight than 
repeated threats to the same effect uttered by Russian academics such as Aleksandr Dugin. 
Although distribution of influence was often roughly similar in Belarus and Ukraine, this is of 
less direct importance to my argument, since this only considers Belarusian and Ukrainian 
texts that constituted Russian perceptions.  
 
The actor presenting the text certainly matters, but it cannot be denied that the same actor 
might over time have presented texts belonging to different paradigms. El’tsin is a case in 
point, having vigorously supported post-Soviet democratic developments as commensurate 
with  the  paradigm  of  Law,  before  he  deplored  Western  interference  in  post-Soviet 
governance, as commensurate with the paradigm of Power, or even warned Belarusians and 
Ukrainians  not  to  infringe  on  the  rights  of  local  Russians,  as  commensurate  with  the 
paradigm of Nation. Therefore, envisaging a more autonomous existence for individual texts 
is methodologically necessary. Hence I introduce the second criterion on which the relative 
influence of the paradigms might be evaluated. Whether a given text has influenced other 
texts relevant to my argument is partly a matter of evaluation. Yet, texts will often, directly 
or  indirectly  refer  back  to  texts  they  agree  or  disagree  with;  the  more  a  single  text  is 
referred  to  thus,  the  greater  its  influence.  My task  as  a  researcher  is  to  highlight  such 
connections between texts, in order to establish inter-textual narratives developing over 
time. For example, I show the link between Russian scholars and members of the legislature 28 
 
in mid-1992 advocating the construction of an internationally recognised Russian sphere of 
influence, or “Monroe Doctrine,” and its espousal by El’tsin in the beginning of 1993. In a 
case such as this, it seems to me reasonable to accept the narrative of text in question 
almost as an autonomous actor, gaining a life of its own. Yet the appearance of texts within 
a given paradigm is in itself rarely sufficient reason to claim that the paradigm significantly 
influenced Russian foreign policy thinking of the day. Indeed, a third criterion is even more 
important for such an evaluation: whether the text or texts in question influenced Russian 
foreign policy more materially. For example, it is one indication for Putin to state that Russia 
might wish to become member of NATO; it is quite a different, ultimately more significant 
indication  when  the  Russian  and  Belarusian  military  conducted  several  exercises 
unequivocally  directed  against  a  potential  future  threat  from  the  Western  military 
organisation.  I  do  not  argue  that  Putin’s  statement  here  should  be  ignored,  or  even 
necessarily dismissed as less important than the military exercises, which are, after all, a sort 
of text, too. Nevertheless, I do believe that in order to properly evaluate the significance of 
the  paradigms  of  Law,  Power  and  Nation  on  Russian  foreign  policy  at  any  given  time, 
incorporation  of  material  policies  espoused  by  Russia,  Belarus,  and  Ukraine  shall,  more 
often than not, be most fruitful. 
 
Literature review 
I  have  thus  presented  my  methodological  assumptions  and  preferences.  Within  this 
introduction it remains for me to outline where I position my thesis in the substantial body 
of literature on Russian foreign policy. Below, I shall highlight the most significant parts of 
this literature, and I shall seek to demonstrate how, in my opinion, most scholars have so far 29 
 
tended to unquestioningly describe Russian foreign policy, towards Belarus, Ukraine and 
other  international  actors,  within  one  of  the  three  paradigms  I  highlight,  without 
acknowledging the significance of these paradigms together. Before doing so, however, I 
shall begin by highlighting two studies, one mainly theoretical and one mainly empirical, 
which  more  than  any  other  works  inspired  the  argument  of  this  thesis,  even  if  this 
ultimately  disagrees  with  these  forebears.  The  two  studies  in  question  are  Alexander 
Wendt’s  Social  Theory  of  International  Politics,
12  and  Margot  Light’s  chapter  “Russian 
Foreign  Policy  Thinking”  in  Neil  Malcolm,  Alex  Pravda,  Roy  Allison  and  Margot  Light’s 
Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy.
13 Wendt’s seminal book convincingly established 
the theoretical foundations for a multifaceted international system where quite varied types 
of interactions were possible between the actors; my work is heavily indebted to Wendt in 
this regard. However, I also argue that Wendt’s categorisation of potential systems is too 
rigid. Wendt outlines “three...structures at the macro-level” of the international system; 
structures  centred  on  enmity,  rivalry,  or  amity,  which  characterises  international 
interaction, and which may be reified through force, material gain, or an inherent belief in 
its  legitimacy.
14  My  paradigms  do  bear  a  passing  resemblance  to  his  structures; 
nevertheless, fundamental differences persist. While my paradigms of Law and Nation can 
partly find common ground with Wendt’s structures of amity and enmity, respectively, my 
paradigm of Power has little to do with his structure of rivalry. More fundamentally, my 
paradigms  are  much  more  intertwined  than  Wendt’s  structures;  although  each  of  my 
paradigms stands alone complete, all of them can exist within the same polity during the 
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same years, which does not seem to be the case for Wendt. Similarly, my ambition is much 
more circumscribed than Wendt’s; he seeks to explain the international system as such, 
whereas I seek to understand a specific part of it at a specific time. Ultimately, therefore, I 
depart from Wendt’s work on epistemological grounds; a topic I shall return to in the next 
chapter.  
 
Margot Light’s analysis of Russian foreign policy thinking inspired me differently. Analysing 
Russian  foreign  policy  thinking  during  the  early  1990s,  she  refers  to  a  continuum  of 
perspectives held by significant Russian political actors, with extremely pro-Western views 
at one end of the spectrum and extremely xenophobic, revanchist views at the other. The 
former  group,  favouring  a  market  economy,  are  referred  to  as  Liberal  Westernisers, 
whereas  the  latter  group,  “who  combined  extreme  nationalism  with  antipathy  towards 
economic reform,” are labelled Fundamentalist Nationalists. These categories bear a passing 
resemblance to my paradigms of Law and Nation, respectively, but significant differences 
persist. First, in the context of Russian perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian sovereignty a 
category such as Liberal Westernisation that is primarily Western-centric needs substantial 
modification to become applicable. Second, I argue that perceptions within the category of 
Fundamentalist Nationalism were much more widespread in Russia than Light seemingly 
indicates,  both  during  and  after  the  period  she  analyses.  Nevertheless,  these  are  not 
fundamental differences between Light and me. Such a difference appears, however, with 
her  category  of  Pragmatic  Nationalism.  According  to  Light,  this  category  contains  those 
Russians who split from the ranks of the Liberal Westernisers in early 1992 and “proposed a 
more independent policy vis-à-vis the West and a more integrationist stance towards the 31 
 
other successor states.”
15 However, to me this category does not appear to have been fully 
conceptualised by Light; it almost becomes a residual category for any perceptions that do 
not  fit  in  elsewhere.  It  is  never  clear  to  me  what  is  meant  by  “pragmatic,”  beyond 
perceptions that are neither friendly, nor overly hostile to the West; that simply disagree 
with the West/us in a way that is acceptable. Although Light thus frees her analysis from 
overly constraining categories, a freedom I support in principle, I believe that “pragmatism” 
is  too  blurred  a  concept  to  be  of  much  analytical  use;  the  basic  motivations  for 
“pragmatists” remain unclear. Consequently, as I outlined above in my argument, I believe 
that  introducing  categories,  or  paradigms,  which  are  fundamentally  distinct  from  each 
other,  rather  than  relative  degrees  of  something  mutually  comparable  (i.e.  attitudes 
towards the West) is more analytically fruitful. 
 
Beyond Wendt and Light my research has drawn on a substantial amount of scholarly works, 
since  Post-Soviet  Russian  foreign  policy  has  already  been  the  subject  of  much  debate. 
Robert Donaldson and Joseph Nogee’s The Foreign Policy of Russia
16 remains perhaps the 
one work touching on all aspects of the topic, while Nicolai Petro and Alvin Rubinstein’s 
Russian Foreign Policy,
17 as well as Bobo Lo’s Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era
18 
and  Vladimir  Putin  and  the  Evolution  of  Russian  Foreign  Policy
19  have  been  helpful 
concerning the first half of the period I researched. And although most research focused on 
Russian policy towards the West, analyses of Russian policy towards post-Soviet states were 
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widespread, too. Apart from the above-mentioned books, this was visible in Martha Olcott, 
Anders Åslund and Sherman Garnett’s Getting it Wrong,
20 in Graeme Herd and Jennifer 
Moroney’s  edited  volume,  Security  Dynamics  in  the  Former  Soviet  Bloc,
21  and  in  Bertil 
Nygren’s  The  Rebuilding  of  Greater  Russia.
22  On the question of  Russian relations with 
Belarus and Ukraine, it would also be necessary to recognise the central importance held by 
Mikhail Molchanov’s Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations,
23 
Ruth Deyermond’s “The State of the Union,”
24 as well as her Security and Sovereignty in the 
Former Soviet Union,
25 and, albeit from a slightly more journalistic angle, Anatol Lieven’s 
Ukraine & Russia.
26 
 
Theory and practice 
Yet despite the undoubted merits of these works, it would be problematic to view them as 
simply adding to existing knowledge of the subject, in pursuit of complete understanding of 
pre-given truth. Indeed, as I demonstrate below existing literature on Russian foreign policy 
has tended, mostly unwittingly, to argue that Russian perceptions existed solely within one 
of  the  three  paradigms  I  identify.  And  in  doing  so,  such  literature  has  at  times  even 
constituted  Russian  foreign  policy  through  praise  or  criticism.  That  academia  might 
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indirectly influence policy processes has unnerved some scholars, who fear the erosion of 
the comparative advantages held by the profession by its insertion in a political process.
27 
Some academics openly disagree that even state-funded academia should provide clear-cut 
advice and training of personnel to state a dministrations, ministries etc.
28 Most academics 
are more relaxed, or even wholly supportive of such an influence, though. Sometimes, an 
input into the policy debate is very hands-on, with scholars attempting to map out precisely 
the steps their political elite should take.
29 Within international relations Philip Zelikow, for 
one, outlined a framework for politicians to follow.
30 Certainly, for Zelikow and others such 
prescription appeared to be an almost moral obligation.
31 Their position was emboldened 
by the introduction of many academic terms, such as deterrence, balance -of-power, and 
interdependence in policy-makers’ vocabulary during the Cold War,
32 just as the theory of 
the democratic peace was employed by American President Bill Clinton and others as one 
justification for supporting democratic developments in the former Soviet region.
33 
 
I outline this background of the sometimes troubled relations between academia and policy-
making in order for the reader to understand the importance and even possible danger of a 
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deficit in existing academic literature. As I mentioned above, this literature has generally 
tended to view Russian foreign policy perceptions as static in nature, whereas my research 
intends  to  highlight  the  simultaneous  existence  and  varying  influence  of  what  I  call 
paradigms. In the following I shall thus outline some of the most prominent scholarly works 
that  have  viewed  Russian  perceptions  within  paradigms  of  Law,  Power  and  Nation, 
respectively (although the scholars in question were mostly unaware of this and seldom if 
ever wrote of paradigms and the like), stressing as I go along why such approaches are 
insufficient for the purposes of my research. 
 
Law 
I  shall  first  present  texts,  which  implicitly  argue  that  Russian  foreign  policy  perceptions 
mainly existed within the paradigm of Law. Russia emerged from the ashes of the Soviet 
Union and a new, Western-dominated law-governed world appeared, or so many wanted to 
believe. In the early 1990s, academics interested in facilitating Russian cooperation with the 
West needed a Russian government to support such efforts. And even Russian scholars such 
as Aleksei Arbatov, who were slightly critical of the West, outlined their own position more 
efficiently by emphasising a Westernised Russian leadership. Thus, Arbatov categorically 
stated that  “One group, headed by foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev, is characterized by 
conspicuously pro-Western policies, with a heavy tilt towards economic determinism and 
universal  democratic  values...Kozyrev’s  principal  support  has  come  from  President  Boris 
Yeltsin...”
34 Western observers were happy to accept Arbatov’s claim. Subsequently, during 
El’tsin’s second presidential term, Ustina Markus remained unconvinced that the Russian 
leadership sought reintegration of former imperial lands, including Belarus. Convinced that 
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Russians still wanted to adopt Westernised international laws and norms, she wrote in 1997 
that “…the Kremlin has often behaved as if integration with Belarus would be more of a 
liability than a boon...Yeltsin and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin are known to hold 
*Lukashenko+ personally in disdain. The Belarusian president’s repressive domestic policies 
have  made  it  increasingly  difficult  for  Moscow  to  stand  by  its  smaller  neighbor...”
35 
Contemporary and subsequent events did not reflect this, nor did they support Michael 
McFaul the following year as he stated: “Though challenged at several critical junctures, 
Russian liberals – defined here most minimally as those committed to markets, free trade, 
individual rights, and democracy – have defeated their illiberal opponents during most of 
Russia’s volatile regime transition. Their victories, in turn, have ensured that Russia has 
pursued  peaceful,  integrationist  policies  with  all  democratic  states...”
36  The  division  of 
Soviet spoils was hardly commensurate with a market economy, and democracy remained 
mostly elusive, in Russia as well as in Belarus and Ukraine, although Western scholars often 
appeared unconcerned with conditions in non-Russian post-Soviet states. An overt, even 
exaggerated focus on Russia became even clearer following the terrorist attacks on the USA 
in September, 2001, which Putin immediately used to express his support for the West. As a 
result of this, Oksana Antonenko soon after stated that “...Putin took a major gamble after 
11 September, setting aside all outstanding strategic disagreements and offering full Russian 
support to the [USA]-led coalition against terror...Putin has played his diplomatic game with 
a great deal of skill, not explicitly linking Russia’s support to concessions on other issues.”
37 
However, Putin’s support was certainly indirectly linked to such concessions, many of which 
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concerned the post-Soviet region. But even as this became clear through Putin’s increasingly 
strident tone over the coming years, many Western observers sought succour in the fact 
that  an  allegedly  vibrant  Russian  foreign  policy  debate  retained  spokespersons  for 
rapprochement  with  the  West.  Indeed,  several  works  had  previously  highlighted  how 
average  Russians’  foreign  policy  perceptions  often  differed  from  those  of  their  political 
representatives. For the El’tsin presidency as a whole William Zimmerman had thus found 
that “Not only were Russian mass publics in the aggregate rational in their foreign policy 
postures, they were by and large prudent in their policy responses concerning the use of 
force in general...”
38 And under Putin few Russian experts on foreign policy were more 
prominent than Dmitrii Trenin, who in his seminal The End of Eurasia made clear that “The 
only rational option is to fully stress Russia’s European identity and engineer its gradual 
integration into a Greater Europe...a clear pro-Europe choice would facilitate the country’s 
modernization, its adjustment to the 21
st century world.”
39 If this lucid vision had little place 
in Putin’s worldview its usefulness was limited; thus many Western scholars argued that 
Putin, despite his strident statements to the contrary, had been misunderstood and was 
really becoming increasingly civilised. Thus, Tor Bukkvoll acknowledged in 2003 that while 
many Russian interest groups distrusted the West “...Putin...has had a personal revision of 
thought...it  is  more  a  question  [for  Putin]  of  occasionally  putting  aside  personal 
inclinations...there  seems  to  have  been  a  development  in  Putin’s  geopolitical 
thinking...towards  a  cautious  pro-Western  position  that  came  into  full  bloom  after 
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September 11.”
40 Other scholars argued Putin’s support for the rule of law had much older 
origins. Samuel Charap delved into the President’s background within the former mayor of 
St Petersburg, Anatolii Sobchak’s, administration, since Sobchak had been known for his 
Westernised policies: “Putin...eschews ideology in favor of an emphasis on practical results. 
He  believes  that  foreign  policy  should  serve  the  end  of  modernizing  the  country...To 
advance Russia’s economic interests, Putin has stressed the need for Moscow to integrate 
itself into Western institutions and to attract Western investment.”
41 In his analysis Charap 
ignored  Russian  views  of  Belarus  and  Ukraine,  the  fates  of  which  he  seemed  to  find 
irrelevant. Maybe they were irrelevant; other scholars were convinced that Belarusians and 
Ukrainians  might  by  now  seek  law-governed  sovereignty  by  themselves.  Grigory  Ioffe 
certainly  thought  that  Belarus  increasingly  embraced  their  full  sovereignty  and  only 
temporarily sought assistance from Russia: “...the number of converts to the nationalist 
[Belarusian]  cause  has  been  growing  slowly  but  steadily...The  broad  masses  are  in  fact 
patriotic...Belarusian  technocrats  value  Belarus’  sovereignty  much  more  than  most 
Lukashenka supporters...That these people reach out to Russia for help is not surprising, as 
it is the only place where they could possibly count on being helped.”
42 On a similar note, 
Margarita  Balmaceda  was  convinced  that  influential  members  of  the  Ukrainian  energy 
sector wanted full Ukrainian sovereignty and distance from Russian competitors, in order to 
maximise their income: “...the competition and struggle between economic groups over 
energy  business  and  over  the  distribution  of  economic  gains  (and  losses)  from  energy 
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trade...played a central role in influencing political elites in Ukraine.”
43 Russians might find it 
costly to openly resist neighbouring states strengthening their sovereignty. Christian Thorun 
argued  that  “...the  Russian  leadership  was  confronted  with  a  stark  choice  between 
confronting the Western states and cooperating with them...the Russian leadership reacted 
in  a  risk-averse  manner  and  chose  cooperation  rather  than  confrontation.”
44  Although 
Thorun did not focus on Russian relations with Belarus and Ukraine, his understanding that 
Russian  behaviour  was  constituted  by  the  international  environment  indicated  a  Russia 
slowly becoming enmeshed in a Law-governed world. 
 
Power 
Now, I shall present texts, which implicitly argue that Russian foreign policy perceptions 
mainly  existed  within  the  paradigm  of  Power.  Although  the  above-mentioned  optimism 
concerning Russian international behaviour was not unfounded, it was difficult to ignore the 
historical heritage encumbering Russia; a heritage centred on empire and on international 
great power status. Already in 1992 Roman Solchanyk warned that for many Russians in the 
late Soviet period “‘Russianness,’ or Russian national identity, is inconceivable outside the 
imperial context.”
45 Solchanyk was certainly correct to note that Russian state-building had 
a hollow core, yet his defeatist claim risked appearing self-fulfilling. His claim also needed to 
be more detailed; this problem was recognised but seldom overcome by other scholars. In 
1995, David Kerr claimed that: “The rise of geopolitics in Russian foreign policy at present is 
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being driven partly by the conditions of post-communism...the need to construct a foreign 
policy consensus around a concept which has deep roots in Russia’s political culture and 
national  psyche...For  Russians,  the  concept  of  Eurasia  remains  rooted,  as  it  has  been 
historically, in control and defence of territory.”
46 Kerr never explained what he meant by 
“geopolitics,” and any claims about “roots in the national psyche” seemed unhelpful. Still, 
Kerr’s arguments were influenced by the theory of Realism in the discipline of international 
relations,  and  this  theory  had  a  respectable  academic  pedigree,  even  though  it  was 
unavoidably  vague  on  some  issues.  In  1997,  Stephen  Walt  highlighted  this  point  in  the 
context  of  Russia:  “...realism  is  not  a  theory  about  the  causes  of  internal  decline  or 
disintegration. Put differently, realism simply does not say very much about how a state will 
behave when it is coming apart at the seams.”
47 Walt succeeded in defending Realism as a 
theory,  but  by  his  own  admission  Realism  and  claims  of  great  power-thinking  was 
insufficiently  relevant  for  post-Soviet  Russian  foreign  policy,  since  Russia  in  many  ways 
continued to come apart at the seams.  
 
Yet  with  the  introduction  of  Putin’s  vigorous  leadership,  some  scholars  thought  this 
disintegrative  process  had  stopped.  In  2000,  John  Dunlop  claimed:  “The  new  imperial 
project sponsored by the Putin regime will once again witness ethnic Russians seeking to 
impose their will on non-Russians...The de-facto ideology of the Putin regime seems to be 
Russian imperial nationalism with accretions of pan-Orthodox Slavism...”
48 Perhaps Dunlop’s 
analysis could be relevant in some contexts, but the non-Russians that would have pan-
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Orthodox  Slavism  imposed  on  them  were  not  Belarusians  and  Ukrainians,  who,  in  fact, 
appeared to be ignored by Dunlop in the context of relations between Russia and the West. 
Flemming Splidsboel-Hansen wrote in 2002: “Post-Soviet Russia...is striving to change the 
international power distribution and to challenge the present European order...Russia is 
implementing a foreign policy which is first and foremost designed to support the domestic 
restructuring...”
49 However, what would the alternative have been? Might Russians have 
ignored  domestic  weakness,  aggressively  promoting  international  expansion?  Splidsboel-
Hansen’s account might not tell us much in the context of relations between post-Soviet 
states. A focus on such relations did not necessarily solve the problem. Alex Danilovich 
stated that “The issue of Russian-Belarusian unification was used by the Russian leadership 
to  promote  its  domestic  agenda.”
50  This  appeared  to  promise  an  analysis  delving  into 
motivations for Russian policy. Yet subsequently Danilovich merely offered: “What has been 
done in the reintegration business has been nothing more than unscrupulous exploitation of 
the natural attraction of the two closely related peoples to each other.”
51 The argument 
that natural interests facilitated Russo-Belarusian integration was analytically sterile, and 
left little room for introducing competing Russian foreign policy perspectives. Maybe this 
was the point; maybe Danilovich and other scholars believed in a natural order of Russian 
foreign policy? In 2001, Allen Lynch correctly challenged the assertion that Russian foreign 
policy under Andrei Kozyrev and Evgenii Primakov had been fundamentally different. He 
argued: “‘Liberal Russia’ discovered very early, as had the ill-fated Provisional Government 
of 1917 and the Bolsheviks by 1921, that the structure of the international political system 
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tended  to  undermine  the  transformative  claims  of  ideology,  whether  it  be  liberal  or 
communist.”
52 Yet surely the great power aims followed by Russians were ideological, too. 
In  2005,  Robert  Donaldson  and  Joseph  Nogee  also  described  great  power  policy  as 
commonsensical: “...as a general rule of statecraft, Russia has pursued balance-of-power 
policies...balance-of-power policies are the measures taken by governments whose interests 
or security is threatened, to enhance their power by whatever means are available...The 
enduring goals pursued by Russia through its foreign policy have placed primary emphasis 
on  ensuring  national  security,  promoting  the  economic  well-being  of  the  country,  and 
enhancing national prestige. In this respect, Russia’s behavior is not markedly different from 
that of most great powers...”
53 Indeed, or from any other conceivable state, for that matter. 
During  the  same  year,  Thomas  Ambrosio  only  marginally  expanded  such  analysis  as  he 
examined whether Russian elites had balanced or bandwagoned with the USA following the 
Cold War. He concluded: “The fundamental question of Russia’s post-Soviet foreign policy 
remains...how can Russia play a great power role despite its overall relative weakness in 
relation  to  all the  other  real  or  potential  great  powers?”
54  That  Russian  aims  might be 
incompatible with great power-status was not considered by Ambrosio. From an economic 
angle,  Andrei  Tsygankov  provided  a  similarly  incomplete  analysis:  “Rather  than  being 
involved in an empire-building project, the Kremlin seeks stability and security in the former 
Soviet region...Although the Kremlin’s interests do not always coincide with those of the 
West,  Russia’s  use  of  soft  power  may  be  generally  compatible  with  the  objectives  of 
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Western nations...”
55 However, post-Soviet stability and security implied an empire-building 
project, since Russian elites argued that instability had emerged with Soviet disintegration. 
Tsygankov’s  book  on  Russian  foreign  policy  and  national  identity  suffered  from  similar 
contradictions. Tsygankov began by outlining that “In the field of international relations, the 
perspective  that  begins  the  analysis  by  asking  what  ‘national’  is  and  that  exposes  the 
‘nation’  to  various  meanings  and  interpretations  is  called  social  constructivism...”
56 
However,  such  a  perceptive  did  not  inform  his  book,  which  instead  depicted  a  simple, 
power-focused  Russian  foreign  policy  during  most  of  the  post-Soviet  period.  Tsygankov 
distinguished between “great power balancing” and “great power pragmatism,” but the 
distinction remained artificial in relation to other post-Soviet states: “In the former Soviet 
Union...Great  Power  Pragmatism  implied  an  abandonment  of  *Great  Power  Balancing’s+ 
integration project in favour of less costly and mutually advantageous bilateral relations. In 
re-establishing  bilateral  ties  consistent  with  his  belief  in  economic  modernization,  Putin 
reasserted control over many of the ex-republics’ strategic property and transportation, 
particularly electricity and energy pipeline facilities.”
57 Thus, Putin’s political strategy was 
only  “mutually  advantageous”  for  Belarus  and  Ukraine  given  the  assumption  that  Putin 
knew best what would benefit the economies of these neighbouring states. That Russians 
might disagree with developments in neighbouring states was subsequently understood in 
Ambrosio’s book from 2009, Authoritarian Backlash, which concluded: “The Kremlin clearly 
absorbed the lessons of the color revolutions [in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan] and took 
preventive steps to weaken internal democratic forces and undermine external democracy 
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promotion *in Russia+.”
58 Nevertheless, again the account was focused on consequences for 
the West. Russian hostility towards Belarusians and Ukrainians might have been implied, but 
it was not highlighted. 
 
Nation 
Finally, I shall present texts, which implicitly argue that Russian foreign policy perceptions 
mainly  existed  within  the  paradigm  of  Nation.  Above,  I  mentioned  how  some  Western 
observers implied hostility between Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians. Sometimes, these 
observers might inadvertently increase post-Soviet tensions. This was certainly a risk carried 
by John Mearsheimer’s statement from 1993 that: “A nuclear Ukraine makes sense...it is 
imperative to maintain peace between Russia and Ukraine. That means ensuring that the 
Russians, who have a history of bad relations with Ukraine do not move to reconquer it.”
59 
Mearsheimer’s logic was almost irresponsible, and it was obvious that he did not live in 
either Russia or Ukraine. Similarly, the Ukrainian and Polish diaspora in the West happily 
chided Russia from afar: “Ukraine watches the nationalist turn in neighboring Russia with 
unease  bordering  on  alarm.  Much  of  the  Russian  political  spectrum,  obsessed  with 
reclaiming great power status and reuniting the former Soviet republics, recognizes that 
Ukraine  is  the  key  to  its  plans  and  openly  espouses  reabsorption.  President  Boris 
Yeltsin...has, in his quest for votes, absorbed much of the nationalist agenda...”
60 This strong 
allegation was never properly supported in Jonathan Mroz and Oleksandr Pavliuk’s article. 
In 1998, A. James Gregor was more meticulous as he outlined diverse Russian nationalist 
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groupings. Still, depicting the leader of the oppositional Communist Party Gennadii Ziuganov 
as  spokesman  for  Russian  great  power  status  in  the  Soviet  mould  sat  uneasily  with 
observations that Ziuganov “...has called upon the nation’s sons and daughters to restore 
and  protect  the  spiritual  and  cultural  heritage  of  the  Russian  empire.”
61  What  Gregor 
discerned here and elsewhere was the substantial influence that nation-centred revanchism 
had on Ziuganov’s policies. Other scholars emphasised that such a focus on nation, and even 
race, had been latent in Soviet Russia, especially among the opposition, whose writings 
influenced post-Soviet Russian identity. Thus, Nathan Larson claimed that “...most shades of 
Russian nationalism are not readily imbued with tolerance for Jews...because many Jews are 
seen as refusing to assimilate into the ethnic community of a given nation.”
62 Although the 
Jewish  question  is  not  central  to  Russo-Belarusian  or  Russo-Ukrainian  relations  Larson’s 
stress on a fixed, pure Russian nation certainly is. Similarly, an article by Meredith Roman on 
Russian  perceptions  of  the  Caucasus  understood  how  “Moscow  was  able  so  quickly  to 
portray and conceive their former little brothers [in the Caucasus] as criminals and parasites 
because, according to the logic of the official Soviet script, non-Russians’ foolish secession 
from the system in which they were the chief beneficiaries simply meant their degeneration 
to their uncivilized pre-Soviet existence.”
63 
 
Such comments were certainly relevant, too, for Belarusians and Ukrainians, who sought to 
distance their newly sovereign states from Russia, even if Russia officially had accepted 
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disintegration of an overarching Soviet sovereignty. Indeed, as Thomas Parland warned in 
2005: “In Putin’s Russia...Officially, rightist extremism has been banned by law. On the other 
hand,  certain  state  structures,  in  particular  the  repressive  ones,  are  still  perceived  as 
hotbeds of racism...”
64 Parland also noted “...the general tendency of a steadily growing 
conservative mood against Westernisation. Pure nationalism seems to get the upper hand in 
state and society. The changed political climate improves Putin’s possibility to be re-elected 
President in 2004.”
65 Nevertheless, Ziuganov, Putin and other members of the Russian elite 
underestimated the extent to which nationalist rhetoric complicated bilateral post-Soviet 
relations, a development identified by Jan Adams already in 2002: “The relations between 
Russia and Ukraine reveal...Ukraine’s resentment of Russia [was] rooted in the conviction 
that the nation was viciously exploited by the Soviet regime and that Russia’s policies are 
still  dominated  by  an  imperialistic  mindset.”
66  Thus,  relations  were  complicated  by 
increased  Ukrainian,  as  well  as  Russian  hostility.  The  Russo-Belarusian  relationship  was 
similarly  troubled  and  discord  was  detected  by  Ruth  Deyermond  in  2004:  “Russian-
Belarusian  relations  have  experienced  periodic  cooling  throughout  the  period  since  the 
break-up of the USSR, particularly since Putin became President of Russia. Even allowing for 
this cycle of warming and cooling relations, however, it appears clear that relations between 
the two states have become distinctly strained...it appears that the close linkage of  the 
[Russo-Belarusian]  union  with  Lukashenka...is  viewed  as  an  obstacle,  even  an 
embarrassment  by  the  Russian  administration  and  its  supporters.”
67  Conversely,  David 
Marples noted how Belarusians might also be losing faith in the goodwill of the Russian 
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leadership:  “Subjected  to  a  barrage  of  official  propaganda  for  the  past  thirteen  years, 
Belarusians  seem  to  have  concluded  that  their  quiet  backwater  with  a  strategically 
important location must be preserved as a sovereign and independent entity...Alyaksandr 
Lukashenka began his presidency by advocating a return to the Russian fold, but his image 
of Russia did not correspond with the reality of a rapidly changing quasi-capitalist state with 
a booming economy.”
68 Similarly, the fact that relations between Russia and Ukraine also 
deteriorated following the election of Viktor Iushchenko as Ukrainian President in 2004 was 
emphasised  by  some  Western  observers.  Yet  accusations  against  Russians  were  often 
unsubstantiated. After Iushchenko had been controversially poisoned before his election, 
Taras Kuzio noted: “The dioxin probably came from laboratories in Russia once controlled by 
the Soviet KGB and now by the [FSB]. The timing of the poisoning suggests an element of 
panic on the part of [Ukrainian President Leonid] Kuchma’s supporters.”
69 Kuzio’s article did 
not further support the charge, and thus seemed to unnecessarily poison Russo-Ukrainian 
relations. And poisoned they were, as Ruth Deyermond later pointed out, partly due to 
“...two distinct models of sovereignty, Soviet and Western [which] can be identified in the 
bilateral and multilateral interactions between the states of the CIS. Soviet understanding of 
the  term...which  is...constrained  to  the  point  where  it  ceases  to  have  any  practical 
meaning...In contrast, significant sections of the Ukrainian...elites have...[proceeded] from a 
Western  understanding  of  the  term  sovereignty...”
70  Deyermond’s  distinction  between 
freedom-seeking Ukraine and encroaching Russia was perhaps insufficiently nuanced, but 
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highlighting  different  Russian  perceptions  of  sovereignty  significantly  advanced  the 
academic debate. 
 
As I have sought to demonstrate, existing literature has mainly focused on Russian foreign 
policy relating to the West. Thus, existing literature failed to fully illuminate how strands of 
foreign policy thinking constantly interacted with each other, with material circumstances, 
and with developments in Belarusian and Ukrainian perspectives. Thus, what this thesis 
adds  to  existing  knowledge  is  an  elaboration  of  the  understanding  that  many  types  of 
Russian  behaviour  exists;  that,  “Russian”  behaviour  is  what  Russians,  Belarusians, 
Ukrainians, and other international actors make of it. On the one hand, this is an optimistic 
message: when tension rises in the post-Soviet region it will not inevitably escalate. Nor, for 
that matter, can we be certain that tension will reappear in future. However, the paradigm 
of Nation, as I have labelled it, has proven very persistent and not substantially weaker 
towards the end of Putin’s presidency, compared to the late Soviet period, no matter the 
issue area. This is worrisome, for the Russian paradigm of Nation has no plans for coexisting 
peacefully with a sovereign Belarus or a sovereign Ukraine in their current form; and it may 
well grow more significant in future. 
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Chapter 2: Theory: assumptions of the argument 
Before  I  present  the  main  parts  of  my  thesis,  however,  I  must  present  the  theoretical 
assumptions  that  support  my  argument.  As  I  outlined  in  the  introduction,  I  argue  that 
significant Russian perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian sovereignty between 1990 and 
2008 may broadly be divided into three paradigms, centred on the concepts of Law, Power, 
and  Nation,  respectively.  Furthermore,  I  argue  that  perceptions  within  the  paradigm  of 
Power  were  generally  most  prominent;  that  perceptions  within  the  paradigm  of  Law 
became gradually less important over time. 
 
With this in mind, I now intend to demonstrate the epistemological, ontological and levels-
of-analysis assumptions that support my argument. These three types of assumptions exist 
in any analysis of international relations, although, as my literature review indicated, most 
existing analyses of Russian foreign policy have presented their assumptions in insufficient 
detail. In this thesis, on the contrary, I shall not only make my theoretical assumptions 
explicit, but I shall demonstrate that synthesis between seemingly opposed standpoints is 
both possible and fruitful in the context of my argument. I show that the paradigms may be 
read  as  narratives,  each  with  its  past,  present  and  future  as  I  previously  stated;  I 
demonstrate that Russian foreign policy perceptions cannot be satisfactorily understood by 
changes in either the ideational environment, or in material circumstances, but must be 
viewed within the context of both. Finally, I argue that neither Russians, nor Belarusians and 
Ukrainians, can be held exclusively responsible for the influence of various paradigms, but 
that such influence waxed and waned due to changes both within Russia and within its 49 
 
international  environment,  particularly  Belarus  and  Ukraine.  Thus,  I  contend  that 
developments in perception and policy were due to constitutive, not causal effects. 
 
Epistemology: narrative as synthesis 
Epistemology is the study of how we can claim to know something; it concerns our theories 
of knowledge. Traditionally, epistemological disagreements relate to whether the aim of 
research should be explanation or understanding. However, as I shall demonstrate in the 
following, a narrative epistemology can overcome such disagreement and in the process 
significantly enrich my argument. 
 
Explanation: the ideal of objective knowledge 
An explanatory, or positivist, epistemology aims to establish objective knowledge, aims to 
establish  truth.
71  Thus, it is problematic to explain perceptions of any sort, since such 
perceptions are by their very nature subjective. When dealing with articulated perceptions, 
and their influence on policy, as I do in this thesis, objective categorisation is not impossible 
a priori. Yet it is difficult to argue that such categories are facts that can be observed.
72 And 
such an argument appears to be necessary for an epistemological position that has aims 
similar to those of natural science, which only ascribes objec tive meanings to the world.
73 
Thus, positivist epistemology mostly appears in theories concerned with the influence of 
material, measureable factors. However, theories concerned with perceptions, such as 
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constructivism,  sometimes  employ  positivism.  The  argument  goes  that  even  the  most 
influential subjective perceptions cannot change some objective, material parameters of the 
world within which all actors exist.
74 Certainly, Russians would have had no choice but to 
take notice if Belarus and Ukraine had aimed  nuclear-armed missiles at Moscow. But this 
does not mean that epistemological issues can be ignored;
75  the futile search for an 
objective Russian national interest has shown this. 
 
Understanding: the ideal of subjective knowledge 
Therefore, an epistemology focused on understanding, so-called post-positivism, might be 
expected  to  be  more  fruitful  for  my  purposes.  Notably,  such  an  epistemology  enables 
debate of how perceptions appear and how they change,
76 issues of direct relevance to my 
argument. It also provides a helpful reminder that analytical categorisation of perceptions 
must be postponed for as long as possible since imposed categorisation means perceptions 
stop having their previous meaning, while perceptions that cannot be categorised may be 
needlessly  ignored.
77  As  I  showed  previously,  such  caution  has  had  important 
methodological consequences for my research. Yet there is a tendency for post -positivist 
epistemologies  to  exaggerate  the  autonomy  of  perceptions  from  external  social  and 
material circumstances,
78 which can in practice become ossified and highly constraining. 
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Such  constraints  are  often  unintentional,  though,  and  therefore  difficult  to  categorise. 
Indeed, I argue that post-Soviet Russian foreign policy perceptions cannot be viewed as 
mere instruments of elites, who had hidden, unchanging agendas, for such agendas were 
constantly  in  flux,  too.
79  Eventually, though, my argument has to be able to categorise 
following some unquestioned assumptions; if any Russian perception is relevant, none is 
relevant.  Here  meta -perceptions,  or  paradigms,  become  useful.  In  the  course  of  my 
research, a number of meta -perceptions were both outlined and discarded by me, but 
others  eventually  turned  into  coherent,  enduring  narratives.  Potentially,  innumerable 
narratives  could  have  been  found .  Yet,  within  each  of  these  narratives  a  strict  logic 
operates, which prevents them from being free in the sense that anything goes.
80 
 
Narrative 
Thus, narrative combines different epistemologies. Indeed, volitional acts must by necessity 
be viewed in connection with some degree of mechanistic processes.
81 Russian perceptions 
may have changed and developed between 1990 and 2008, but they followed specific, 
internally consistent trajectories. Thus, perceptions within the paradigm of Law were mostly 
tolerant of Belarusian and Ukrainian sovereignty because of underlying assumptions that 
sovereignty as an attribute was constantly in flux. The Law narrative did not assume 
sovereignty was legitimised through existence in ancient history; there fore, Belarusian and 
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Ukrainian sovereignty could be accepted. This example indicates the central components of 
a narrative. First, there must be a central character; in my thesis this is sovereign Russia. 
Second, there must be a plot relating to this character with a beginning, middle and end. 
Here the plot concerns the development of Russian sovereignty: where it came from, how it 
is best supported at present, and what it should eventually become. The resulting logic and 
dynamic of the narrative is furthermore constituted by Russian perceptions of Belarusian 
and Ukrainian sovereignty.
82 This implies that Russians’ perceptions of the world depend on 
the  perception  of  Russians  held  among  Belarusians,  Ukrainians,  and  others,  including 
Western actors.
83 And the heterogeneity and malleability of narratives is visible during so -
called formative moments, when  old identities break down and new ones are created in 
their place. At this time, meanings are disputed and fought over by different actors, who 
attempt to fundamentally change the nature of the narratives and thus of the characters, 
too,
84 even if these actors are not always clear on the narratives they themselves would like 
to establish. I contend that this is exactly what happened in post-Soviet Russia, Belarus and 
Ukraine; with the Soviet Union in ruins the field was open for protracted fundamental 
debate between arguments relating to ultimately incompatible narratives. And in order to 
analyse the significance of narratives my use of texts links my epistemologic al argument in 
favour of narrative to my ontological argument highlighting the importance of both material 
and ideational factors. Texts present ideas; thus we may conclude a preference for empire 
through  Russian  governmental  texts  extolling  the  virtues  of   unification  with  Belarus. 
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However, such texts also constitute material fact in the shape of practice, for by simply 
appearing they reify the narrative they favour.
85 I shall expand on this topic in the following 
section. 
 
Ontology: ideas in a material world 
Ontology is the study of what the world consists of; it is the study of the nature of being. 
Traditionally, ontological disagreements relate to whether events are primarily influenced 
by material factors or by ideas, and thus to whether material factors or ideas should be the 
subject of research. However, as I shall demonstrate in the following it might be possible to 
combine  the  two  ontological  approaches  and  in  the  process  significantly  enrich  my 
argument. 
 
Material factors 
It  would  seemingly  be  problematic  to  focus  on  the  influence  of  material  factors  in  an 
analysis concerned with perceptions, which are certainly non-material in nature. Indeed, I 
could  only  employ  a  materialist  ontology  if  I  argued  that  Russians’  perceptions  had 
remained  unchanged,  constantly  aiming  for  international  power,  for  instance.  Even  this 
might not have paved the way for a materialist ontology, since “power” remains a nebulous 
concept.
86 And even if this ambiguity was overcome, other values, perhaps motivated by a 
search for legitimacy, could still motivate Russian elites as long as relative international 
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power, and perhaps security, had been obtained.
87 Yet, maybe these aims could never be 
reached. In an anarchic international system, with no governing structure existing above the 
sovereign state, it could conceivably be argued that the constant possibility of interstate 
violence might motivate Russian elites to constantly focus on how the power of their state 
could  be  increased.
88  Indeed,  given  the  traumatic  Soviet  collapse,  Russia ns  might  be 
expected to prefer the simplification that follows categorisation into friend and enemy. The 
need to create an in-group identity might be so fundamental to leaders of Russia that their 
overwhelming focus in foreign policy would be on a few, fundamental interests.
89 Still, there 
is no inherent reason why Russians should count Belarusians and Ukrainians within the in -
group or outside it for that matter. Thus, assuming that material factors motivated Russian 
foreign policy, with interests being fixed, does not tell us much about Russian foreign policy 
in this context. Nevertheless, scholars focusing on material factors are correct in arguing 
that a focus on ideas ought not to ignore material factors;
90 as mentioned before, Russian 
political  and  milita ry  leaders  could  not  have  ignored  the  build -up  of  Belarusian  and 
Ukrainian nuclear forces, for instance. 
 
Ideas 
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Yet most scholars focusing on the influence of ideas would not disregard material factors, 
but simply demand that the role of ideas in international relations be taken seriously;
91 
would insist that a given actor’s interest was not fixed, but determined by intangible norms. 
And, indeed, as I already indicated it is unfruitful to view Russian perceptions as motivated 
simply by power or security, since post-Soviet Russia was never under imminent, existential 
threat.  In  order  to  understand  Russian  foreign  policy  perceptions  any  analysis  would 
therefore have to engage with the formation of interests, with the mutual constitution of 
interests and identities.
92 At the same time, it is also  noteworthy which interests remained 
mostly absent, and why they did so;
93 thus, I analyse how each of the paradigms I identified 
waxed  and  waned  in  relative  influence.  Why  they  did  so  is  again  dependent  on 
developments appearing in the interaction between Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, rather 
than in domestic factors within either of these states; in other words, perceptions were 
interpellated rather than articulated.
94 And whereas a materialist ontology would have had 
to understand developments through logics of consequence, according to which Russia 
subsidised energy deliveries to Belarus in order to retain its political loyalty, for instance, 
interpellation could only be understood through logics of appropriateness, for inst ance 
emphasising that Russians subsidised their neighbours because this was appropriate to the 
role in which they saw themselves.
95 
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Ideas in a material world 
However, it can be difficult for a study focusing on ideas to demonstrate that policies are 
followed due to logics of appropriateness, as opposed to logics of consequence.
96 Especially 
if Russians assumed that it was their duty to subsidise Belarusians, they might not even 
consider openly espousing advocating subsidisation. If so, only the facts of subs idisation 
would remain, which could just as well be explained through materialist ontology. And yet, 
Russian interests changed over time; while subsidisation could hardly be explained by an 
interest in gaining economic wealth, decisions to terminate moneta ry cooperation with 
Belarus  were  motivated  by  interest  in  economic  gains.  With  material  circumstances 
remaining relatively similar, materialist ontology would find it difficult to explain these 
observable policy differences. Nevertheless, materialist ontol ogy might help to show the 
tactics by which formulated interests could be advanced; how networks and resources were 
employed by actors to reach their objectives.
97 It therefore seems appropriate to say that 
intangible ideas and norms are constituted by tang ible environments; that they do not 
“exist  in  a  material  vacuum.”
98  Furthermore,  processes  of  social  construction  do  not 
necessarily  appear  earlier  in  time  than  processes  of  strategic  bargaining.
99  Post-Soviet 
Russian  elites  might  well  have  subsidised  the  Be larusian  economy  out  of  a  sense  of 
obligation, but this feeling only appeared after leaders in Moscow during years of empire 
and Soviet centralisation subsidised Belarusians and other Soviet peoples for instrumental 
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reasons, such as ensuring domestic stability. Conversely, after El’tsin decided for various 
reasons  to  preserve  a  Russian  naval  presence  in  Sevastopol’,  many  of  his  actions  to 
accomplish this could well be analysed through theories of rational choice. It must therefore 
be admitted that no unidirectional relationship existed between preferences and outcomes, 
which instead constituted each other in an ever-changing context.
100 Hence, throughout this 
thesis material as well as ideational factors will be relevant for my analysis. 
 
Levels of analysis: constitution, not causation 
The  issue  of  levels  of  analysis  relate  to  how  events  may  be  analysed  most  profitably; 
whether events should be understood through a structural, top-down approach, or through 
an  agent-centred,  bottom-up  approach.  Do  the  properties  of  agents  cause  a  specific 
structure to form, or does a specific structure constrain agents, causing them to behave in 
specific ways? However, as I shall demonstrate below, the opposition of these levels is less 
analytically fruitful than their combination, just as causation is less analytically fruitful than 
constitution. 
 
Agent 
Agent-centred analyses of international affairs argue that the actions of states, or other 
international  actors,  are  motivated  by  developments  in  their  domestic  politics,  such  as 
bargaining between various interest groups in society.
101 For example, Russian attempts to 
entrench the Russian Orthodox Church abroad might be viewed as the result of domestic 
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lobbying  by  church  representatives.  The  influence  of  domestic  interest  groups  could  in 
principle cover all issues, apart perhaps from when the state was under imminent threat of 
war. And rational calculations are not the only medium through which domestic influences 
may have international influence. As the above discussion on ontology indicated, apart from 
rational bargaining domestic social conventions and other ideational constraints might also 
influence  state  behaviour;  thus,  Russian  resistance  to  democratisation  in  Belarus  and 
Ukraine  might  stem  more  from  perceived  illegitimacy  of  such  governance  than  from 
international  consequences  of  democratisation.  Furthermore,  leaders’  psychology  could 
also  come  into  play.
102  For  instance,  Russian  attempts  to  retain  territorial  unification 
between Russia, Belarus and Ukraine could be understood through reference to El’tsin’s and 
Putin’s  experience  in  the  political  and  security structures  of  the  Soviet  Union,  with  the 
implicit  assumption  that  leaders  reaching  maturity  after  the  Soviet  collapse  might  have 
conducted a different policy. Finally, an agent-centred analysis might focus not on society as 
whole,  or  on  leaders’  psychology,  but  on  the  in-between,  the  society  that  is  a  given 
government
103 and, perhaps, its accompanying bureaucracy. Indeed, during the early 1990s 
turf wars between the Russian Foreign and Defence ministries might explain rapid foreign 
policy changes veering between international accommodation and aggression. To sum up, 
therefore,  agent-centred  approaches  contain  the  belief  that  domestic  tangible  and 
intangible  structures  create  the  framework  within  which  foreign  policy  may  be 
conducted.
104 
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Structure 
Yet even though my examples have shown how a focus on agents can explain parts of 
Russian foreign policy, many of its aspects would be more fruitfully explained by a focus on 
the structure of the international system, and the influence of this structure on agents 
embedded in it. The analytical advantage of such an approach is one of parsimony, allowing 
researchers  to  highlight  useful  generalisations  and  comparisons.
105  In this way, Russian 
opposition to NATO-enlargement into the former Soviet space might be viewed through the 
prism  of  great  power  balancing  with  the  USA;  balancing  induced  by  an  anarchically 
structured system that, as mentioned earlier, induces all states to be wary of other sta tes 
gaining too much relative power.
106 Such simplified analysis is not unproblematic. Structural 
analysis of international relations normally includes an a priori claim that states are the 
main international actors. However, although this assertion may be c hallenged states 
undoubtedly  continue  to  exert  a  dominating  international  influence,  even  given  an 
increasing array of significant non -state actors.
107  And the assumption that a state is a 
unitary actor often seems apposite for Russia, the foreign policy making of which was quite 
centralised, as I shall expand on in the next chapter. Certainly, the classical definition of the 
state as the only legitimate exerciser of violence
108 would often fit Russia, and thus be 
relevant for analysing its military policy. Indeed, within military issues the scope of action for 
non-state Russian actors was often negligible, with the government and president largely 
handling the stationing of Russian troops in Belarus and Ukraine, for instance. Extrapolating 
from a statist monopoly on legitimate violence might not be similarly relevant for economic 
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issues. But it is important to remember that a structural analysis of international relations 
does  not  necessarily  have  to  keep  states  as the  unitary  actors  in  question.
109  Thus, for 
instance, to the extent that all significant Russian energy companies might be seen as having 
similar interests in dealings with other post-Soviet states, they together could constitute a 
unit relative to the EU and the USA. 
 
Constitution, not causation 
Overall, therefore, it seems that persuasive arguments favouring structural, as well as agent-
centred  analyses  of  international  relations  exist.  Such  analyses  need  not  be  mutually 
exclusive, however. Post-Soviet Russian international behaviour was long constrained by the 
need to rebuild a shattered economy, but the need to please international investors and 
minimise Western pressure on a weakened military also influenced Russian perceptions and 
behaviour.
110 So rather than favouring one level of analysis it seems more useful to analyse 
how different levels may be understood as part of all Russian foreign policy activities.
111 This 
is done, as indicated earlier, by focusing on constitution instead of causation. When Putin in 
2008 threatened Ukrainian territory in case  of Ukrainian membership of NATO, he did not 
do so due to innate Russian aggressiveness, or to Ukrainian betrayal of Russian goodwill, but 
because of the constitutive repercussions of prior Russian and Ukrainian actions. An analysis 
of  this  provides  a  pictu re  encompassing  the  dynamism  and  change  of  the  bilateral 
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relationship;
112 a relationship shaped by changing individual and collective identities, which 
constituted state interaction.
113 Should such constitution be overlooked, analyses of post -
Soviet relations risk becoming blame games, as I highlighted in the previous chapter. Yet 
such blame games presuppose inherent, immutable natures of the states concerned, and 
such assumptions are both unrealistic and analytically useless. What is instead necessary is 
recognition of how social environments, outside and inside states, and agency, by states and 
other actors, constantly created, reproduced and changed each other.
114 
 
Conclusion 
My theoretical assumptions are therefore as follows: (1) although I do not believe that any 
truth concerning Russian foreign policy perceptions may be found, nor that a search for 
generalisable  laws  would  be  fruitful,  I  believe  it  is  worthwhile  to  identify  groups  of 
perceptions,  or  paradigms,  which  each  contain  an  internally  coherent  narrative  that  is 
fundamentally different from those of the other paradigms; (2) although I do not believe 
that Russian foreign policy perceptions had a constant focus, and that their development 
might  thus  be  understood  exclusively  through  changes  in  material  circumstances,  I  do 
believe  that  such  material  changes  cannot  be  excluded  as  part  of  the  constraints  that 
ensured some of the paradigms were more important at some times than at others; (3) 
although I do not believe that Russian foreign policy perceptions may be understood solely  
through  the  changing  configuration  of  domestic  conditions,  nor  exclusively  through  the 
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anarchically structured international system, I do believe that both these levels of analysis 
had  significant  influence  on  the  development  of  Russian  foreign  policy  perceptions 
concerning  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  sovereignty.  Yet  even  with  these  theoretical 
assumptions in place, I still have to explain how I define “sovereignty” itself, as this will be of 
central  importance  to  my  argument.  It  should  perhaps  be  expected  from  my  other 
assumptions that I do not consider the nature of sovereignty as either fixed or constant, but 
instead see it as constantly reinterpreted.
115 Yet it is necessary to have a core around which 
this reinterpretation can take place; thus, sovereignty always has to do with the recognised 
right of a political entity to be the ultimately authoritative entity concerning its own 
affairs.
116 No doubt this is a minimal definition, but nothing more precise can be stated 
before my research  has been carried out. This is because knowledge of and practice 
exercised through sovereignty are mutually reinforceable;
117  by defining the concept in 
more  detail,  I  would  not  be  able  to  completely  analyse  the  ways  in  which  Russian 
understandings of Belarusian and Ukrainian sovereignty changed between 1990 and 2008. 
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Chapter 3: Russian Foreign Policy Making, 1990-2008 
 
As I have now presented the theoretical assumptions guiding my research in this thesis, I am 
almost ready to engage with the main parts of my analysis. Before doing so, however, my 
methodology, as outlined in chapter 1, requires me to identify the main Russian foreign 
policy  makers  between  1990  and  2008.  On  the  whole,  I  contend  that  many  different 
domestic actors influenced Russian foreign policy during this period. I only highlight the 
most important actors in this chapter, but I shall demonstrate the diffusion of influence 
throughout my analysis, making clear that an exclusive focus on the Russian  Presidents’ 
influence or even on the influence of the executive in general would be overly simplistic. 
 
1990-93 
Yet, it is certainly possible to argue that El’tsin was the most significant Russian foreign 
policy-maker from the outset. During the first part of 1990, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev 
remained  sufficiently  powerful  to  dominate  relations between  the  Soviet  republics,  and 
between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world, but this changed not least after El’tsin’s 
political capital increased with the RSFSR declaration of sovereignty in mid-1990. During late 
1990,  El’tsin  then  became  outspoken  concerning  Russian  relations  with  other  Soviet 
peoples, before he used the failed Soviet coup in August, 1991 to seize the policy-making 
initiative  on  behalf  of  the  RSFSR,  especially  by  advocating  a  much  looser  structure  to 
supplant the now moribund Soviet Union. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 
appearing in December, was much less ambitious in its policies of integration than El’tsin 
would have preferred, but still represented the final collapse of the Soviet Union and the 64 
 
triumph  of  his  personal  diplomacy  and  connections  with  other  post-Soviet  leaders.
118 
Throughout 1992, El’tsin remained determined to be involved in the foreign policy of his 
new  state,  and  already  in  February  he  made  certain  that  members  of  the  presidential 
administration would closely monitor the Foreign Ministry,
119 a policy that gradually became 
institutionalised.
120 El’tsin subsequently took important foreign policy decisions, including 
the withdrawal of troops from the Baltic States in October, 1992, and the sanctioning of 
NATO expansion into Central Europe in August, 1993, without consulting his government.
121 
Throughout 1993, as domestic dispute with the Russian parliament sharpened, El’tsin was 
careful not to relinquish control of foreign policy to any rivals, and continued to effectively 
employ members of the presidential administration to determine foreign policy.
122 
 
But it would nevertheless be mistaken to ignore the input into Russian foreign policy that 
was provided by El’tsin’s government. Two actors, having directly opposed political agendas, 
dominated  the  scene:  Foreign  Minister  Andrei  Kozyrev  and  Vice-President  Aleksandr 
Rutskoi. Kozyrev was particularly important until the end of 1992; during the first half of 
1992 he ensured that formal and informal consultations had been held with all neighbouring 
states  and  partners  of  Russia.  At  the  same  time,  Kozyrev  was  instrumental  in  the 
formulation of many ambitious principles and guidelines for Russian foreign policy more 
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generally, thus helping to establish the state on the international scene.
123 Most of these 
policies, however, suffered from persistent opponents,
124 often including Rutskoi. The highly 
decorated military man, renowned for his exploits in Afghanistan,  had originally been co-
opted by El’tsin, who strove to gather members of the Russian military and security services 
behind his struggle with the Soviet centre. After the latter had de facto collapsed in August, 
1991,  however,  Rutskoi  swiftly  used  the  opportunity  to  promote  his  belligerent  foreign 
policy agenda, often directly contradicting El’tsin and Kozyrev. As I shall demonstrate in the 
next chapter, during 1992 animosity between Russia and other post-Soviet states was often 
due to Rutskoi’s aggressive rhetoric, although Rutskoi’s prominence abated as he gradually 
became just one of many politicians opposed to El’tsin. Still, by the second half of 1993 the 
nationalist rhetoric that Rutskoi had promoted more than anyone continued to influence 
Russian foreign policy to the extent that high-profile negotiations with Japan concerning 
territorial disagreements and a potential peace treaty formally concluding the Second World 
War were scuppered,
125 despite the best efforts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whic h 
remained loyal to El’tsin. A couple of other members of government had also shown some 
influence  on  foreign  policy:  acting  Prime  Minister  Egor’  Gaidar  sometimes  moulded 
economic foreign policy in the months after his appointment in June, 1992, while Defence 
Minister Pavel Grachev in the second half of 1993 remained one of the few prominent 
politicians still strongly supportive of El’tsin, and supported by the President in turn. 
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The legislature of the newly sovereign Russia did not change with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, but still retained formal power to challenge the executive at home and abroad.
126 
The inability of parliamentarians to organise in unison limited their collective influence on 
foreign  policy,  though,  while  El’tsin  openly  rewarded  his  parliamentary  supporters  with 
good positions in his administration,
127 thus co-opting some potential challengers and, at 
first, partly succeeding in dividing the parliament. Mostly, therefore, it was left to individual 
parliamentarians to make their foreign p olicy mark. Vladimir Lukin, an experienced Soviet 
scholar and former Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, headed the parliamentary Committee 
for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations from June, 1990, and from the 
outset of 1992 used this platform to advocate Russian international prominence, not least in 
the post-Soviet region. His posting from February, 1992, to September, 1993, as ambassador 
to the USA could be seen as both recognition of Lukin’s political skill, and as a means to 
prevent  him  from  challenging  executive  control  over  Russian  foreign  policy.  With  Lukin 
gone, other parliamentarians were either mostly interested in domestic politics or found it 
difficult to distinguish their foreign policy messages from those of the legislature as a whole. 
A partial exception was Evgenii Ambartsumov, member of the parliamentary Committee for 
Interrepublican  Relations  and  the  successor  to  Lukin’s  Committee  chair.  Ambartsumov 
gained  particular  prominence  during  the  second  half  of  1992,  but  subsequently  his 
individual standpoints disappeared in the context of executive-legislative strife, as we also 
saw above concerning Rutskoi. 
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Away from state-level politics few politicians marked themselves as important in the foreign 
policy debate, although the Mayor of Leningrad (and subsequently St Petersburg), Anatolii 
Sobchak,  was  among  the  most  active,  and  best  known,  Russian  politicians  on  the 
international scene in the immediate aftermath of the failed Soviet coup in August, 1991. 
Yet actors more formally embedded in a centralised state structure had better possibilities, 
in the longer run, to make their opinions count. In economic affairs, the state-owned natural 
gas company Gazprom became the main case in point. During 1993, leaders of the company 
began to exploit its dominant position within the post-Soviet energy market to influence 
developments that, in the longer term, would consolidate the control of Gazprom in the 
region. In political and military affairs, some organisations, such as the Council for Foreign 
and Defence Policy, were ostensibly not part of the state, but still contained members from 
the presidential administration.
128 Although the Council did not immediately benefit from 
this, it would gain influence as the 1990s progressed. Other Russian actors hoped to benefit 
in a similar fashion from connections to the Russian state. During 1990, the Patriarch of the 
Russian Orthodox Church, Aleksii II, deftly exploited widening freedoms of expression 
without overtly siding either with the Soviet centre  or the Russian challenge, leaving the 
Patriarch  free  to  subsequently  ally  with  the  Russian  victors.  A  number  of  individual 
commentators also achieved or regained prominence in the foreign policy debate. Aleksei 
Arbatov was active in both Russian and Western media, while Kseniia Mialo became one of 
the first advocates for a new Russian ideology. More traditionalist arguments came from the 
famous novelist Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who had been expelled from the Soviet Union two 
decades before, but whose writings were now officially allowed to re-enter Russia in one of 
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the most prominent examples of Gorbachev’s policy of openness. Aleksandr Tsipko, on the 
other hand, was notable for having been able to both be published in the late Soviet years 
and remain important to the foreign policy debate after 1991. Finally, even though Russian 
public  opinion  never  acquired  decisive  influence  on  foreign  policy  it  still  contributed  to 
constructing the framework, within which policy perceptions existed, particularly during and 
immediately after the Soviet collapse in December, 1991, while the Russian elites remained 
uncertain of the post-Soviet international position they sought for Russia. Subsequently, 
however, in the context of a worsening economic crisis public opinion gradually became 
moulded by political elites, who had understood how to respond to public dissatisfaction 
with post-Soviet reality.
129 
 
1993-99 
Following  his  violent  dispersal  of  the  Russian  parliament  in  October,  1993,  El’tsin  soon 
ensured  that  his  policy-making  powers  would  be  formally  strengthened.  Thus,  when  a 
popular  referendum  in  December,  1993,  formally  approved  the  President’s  new 
constitution, El’tsin’s position was strengthened by an unprecedented amount of formal 
responsibilities and powers. Article 86 simply stated: “The President of *Russia+: (a) will lead 
the foreign policy of [Russia]; (b) will conduct the negotiations and sign the international 
treaties  of  *Russia+;  (v)  will  sign  documents  of  ratification...”  Furthermore,  article  87 
installed the President as Head of the Russian Armed Forces.
130 To specify and solidify his 
powers, El’tsin then, in January, 1994, issued a decree stating that the Foreign Ministry, 
Defence  Ministry,  Foreign  Intelligence  Service  and  Federal  Border  Service  would  all  be 
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subordinated directly to him, not reporting to the president via the prime minister, as was 
the  case  with  other  ministries.  Furthermore,  the  new  constitution  had  made  the 
government as a whole primarily accountable to the president, since the latter could dismiss 
the  prime  minister  or  any  other  cabinet  member  without  risking  his  own  office.
131 
Subsequently, it became clear that El’tsin intended to take full advantage of these powers, 
particularly concerning political and military issues. He refused to allow the introduction of a 
supra-ministry  that  might  coordinate  activities  of  the  government  at  its  discretion,  and 
instead ensured that individuals, whom he trusted, liaised for him with the other executive 
bodies,
132 which he also controlled through the Security C ouncil.
133 Nevertheless, during 
1996, the year of his presidential re -election,  it  became  clear  that  El’tsin’s  control  was 
diminishing in practice, not least due to his increasing health problems. Power struggles 
formed within his entourage, and it was not until 1997 before El’tsin regained a modicum of 
foreign policy control thanks to the support of a few, trusted individuals.
134 
 
One of these was Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, who never indicated any displeasure 
with the decrease of his formal powers over foreign policy that El’tsin, as mentioned above, 
ensured in 1994. Indeed, while Chernomyrdin’s remit was formally centred on economic 
issues, during the first half of this period he showed a remarkable ability to go beyond this 
brief  in  relation  to  other  post-Soviet  states.  Chernomyrdin  benefitted  from  his  Soviet 
background as manager of Gazprom, a post that had provided him with vital insight into 
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policy-making in the entire region and had provided him with useful contacts within as well 
as beyond Russian borders. That the Prime Minister’s foreign policy influence waned after 
mid-1997, culminating in his sacking in early 1998, was due to a number of reason, not least 
the fact that Chernomyrdin seemed an increasingly unlikely heir to El’tsin, unable as he 
seemed to recreate Russian strength at home and abroad. Other members of government 
had  already  been  dismissed,  despite  having  previously  served  El’tsin  well.  Gaidar  never 
overcame his connections with the highly unpopular economic reforms in 1992 and, after 
his relative failure at the 1993 parliamentary elections soon disappeared from the political 
scene. Grachev was another case in point. The Defence Minister had staunchly supported 
El’tsin during the 1991 as well as 1993 armed challenges to the latter, and until being sacked 
in the middle of 1996 Grachev’s political influence was significant. However, it was his ill-
fated support for the first military operation in Chechnia, beginning in December, 1994, and 
his  inability  to  defeat  Chechen  resistance  thereafter,  that  saw  Grachev’s  policy-making 
power plummet. Kozyrev was not similarly compromised by the Caucasus, and until the 
middle  of  1995  he  remained  at  the  centre  of  foreign  policy.  Subsequently,  though,  his 
perceived submissive stance towards the West became derided among both supporters and 
opponents of El’tsin to the extent that the President in January, 1996, could sacrifice him in 
an  attempt  to  gain  momentum  for  a  then  seemingly  hopeless  re-election  campaign. 
Kozyrev’s political demise did not spell the end of influence for his Ministry, however, which 
for at least a couple of years remained central to foreign policy decisions. This was not least 
due to the capabilities of Kozyrev’s successors, Evgenii Primakov and Igor’ Ivanov. Primakov 
came  from  a  background  as  head  of  the  Russian  Foreign  Intelligence  Service,  having 
previously been prominent in Soviet academic, secret service and political circles. Primakov 
had by 1995 helped to ensure that the Foreign Intelligence Service regained a prominent 71 
 
position in the former Soviet region,
135 and as Foreign Minister Primakov’s influence on 
Russian foreign policy was prominent during late 1996 and 1997, while El’tsin recovered 
from his election campaign.
136 After Primakov became Prime Minister in September, 1998, 
he  increasingly  focused  on  domestic  politics  and  the  struggle  to  succeed  El’tsin.  His 
replacement, Igor’ Ivanov, did not have Primakov’s abilities or prominence, but during late 
1998  he  still  managed  to  consolidate  Russian  international  importance  in  the  chaotic 
aftermath  of  the  economic  collapse  that  initiated  his  tenure.  However,  Ivanov  had  to 
contend  with  significant  competition  from  inside  the  executive.  Even  after  Grachev’s 
dismissal, the Ministry of Defence continued to have a substantial influence on military 
issues  right  until  El’tsin’s  final  year  as  president.  Statements  from  members  of  the 
presidential  administration,  such  as  presidential  spokesman  Sergei  Iastrzhembskii  and 
Human Rights Commissioner Oleg Mironov, also became more important during the late 
1990s that would have been the case with a vigorous president, while Putin during a short 
tenure  as  Prime  Minister  in  the  second  half  of  1999  exploited  policy  successes  and  an 
upsurge in public support to speak authoritatively on foreign policy. 
 
The legislature, at the same time, had unexpectedly regained a prominent place in foreign 
policy  debates.  In  December,  1993,  following  the  violent  dissolution  of  the  Soviet-era 
parliament,  a parliament  critical  of  the  executive  and  its  policies  had nonetheless  been 
victorious. Yet the fact that the tenure of this parliament was only two years, at the same 
time as memories of the executive clampdown on the legislature remained fresh, at first 
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prevented the new parliament from dominating the foreign policy debate. However, as the 
Duma elections in late 1995 again resulted in a parliamentary majority critical of El’tsin, the 
scene was set for harsh debates on domestic and foreign policy both before and after the 
unsuccessful attempt to dethrone El’tsin in mid-1996. With formal powers so unequivocally 
residing  with  the  executive,  parliamentarians,  freed  from  policy  responsibility  became 
increasingly outspoken in their foreign policy suggestions from mid-1997 onwards. Nobody 
exemplified this better than Konstantin Zatulin, who until electoral defeat in 1995 exploited 
his position as parliamentary chairman of the Committee for the CIS to promote highly 
assertive,  even  aggressive  policies  towards  neighbouring  post-Soviet  states,  not  least 
Ukraine as I shall show later. Outside parliament, Zatulin did not cease his foreign policy 
activism and eventually in 1998 became a co-founder of the prominent Fatherland party 
bloc. While still in parliament Zatulin employed scholar Andranik Migranian as an adviser to 
his committee; subsequently Zatulin and Migranian collaborated on articles highly critical of 
Russian  foreign  policy.  Finally,  special  mention  must  be  reserved  for  the  leader  of  the 
Russian Communist Party, Gennadii Ziuganov.
137 Although Ziuganov in his serious challenge 
to El’tsin during the 1996 presidential campaign mainly focused on domestic affairs, he had 
for  years  advocated  Russian  international  prominence  vis-à-vis  the  United  States,  in  his 
efforts to re-introduce his party to the centre of political debate. That Ziuganov’s tactics 
were  quite  successful  is  indicated  not  only  by  his  ability  to  force  El’tsin  to  a  second 
presidential election round in 1996, but also by the way in which the executive co-opted 
many Communist foreign priorities, up to and including hiring Primakov as Foreign Minister 
in a move intended to placate Communist parliamentarians. 
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Beyond the central executive and legislative institutions a substantial number of actors now 
influenced foreign policy debates and activities. The Mayor of Moscow, Iurii Luzhkov, was 
particularly important. He had been appointed by El’tsin in June, 1992, but it was only after 
his popular election, when he officially achieved almost unanimous support, four years later 
that he began to make his mark in the foreign policy debate. Subsequently, as leaders of 
other Russian regions were appointed by the presidential administration, Luzhkov was able 
to  portray  himself  as  having  a  unique  legitimacy  among  politicians  outside  the  central 
executive  and  legislature.  Concerning  economic  issues,  the  leadership  of  Gazprom 
continued to strengthen its position in the decision-making process. Especially in the years 
following El’tsin’s presidential re-election, with its assurance that a Communist purge of 
state companies would not take place, actors within Gazprom felt sufficiently emboldened 
to directly influence most international energy agreements involving Russia. On a smaller 
scale such policies were pursued by private energy companies, too, with Vagit Alekperov’s 
LUKoil especially prominent. Some individual businessmen benefitted from the fact that 
they had ensured El’tsin’s re-election through financial and logistical support. The leader of 
these so-called “oligarchs,” Boris Berezovskii, wanted not only benefits for his companies, 
but to become directly involved in politics. For a short time he was deputy secretary of the 
Security Council,
138 and then executive secretary of the CIS, involving him formally in the 
state foreign policy  process,  before he  entered  the Duma in December,  1999.  Other 
people’s foreign policy influence was narrower, but still important to my topic; people such 
as  Admiral  Viktor  Kravchenko,  commander  of  the  Black  Sea  Fleet  stationed  in  Ukraine. 
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Kravchenko’s importance was linked to his position, rather than his person, but he also 
benefitted from membership of a military to which El’tsin continued to owe loyalty after its 
support in 1991 and 1993,
139 while the think-tanks that it supported were highly active in 
asserting the rights of Russia abroad.
140 In religious affairs the President still had the support 
of Aleksii II, whose endorsement of El’tsin’s foreign and domestic policies in early 1996 
provided  important  assistance  to  the  President.  Among  political  think-tanks  the  above-
mentioned Council for Foreign and Defence Policy had the executive’s attention throughout 
this  period  and  helped  detailing  El’tsin’s  broader  visions.  Particularly  important  in  this 
process was the head of the Council, Sergei Karaganov, who used the turbulent political 
situation  just  before  and  after  El’tsin’s  re-election  to  forward  his  agenda  together  with 
Primakov. Among other scholars, Solzhenitsyn did not command the audience of the past, 
yet he retained a core audience to his frequent sojourns into foreign policy matters; as did 
Aleksandr Dugin, who became a leader among so-called Eurasianists, seeking to re-grow the 
strength of a Russian-centred Eurasia, “geopolitically” opposed to an American Atlanticist 
bloc. In the beginning of this period, Arbatov was able to counter such visions through 
advocacy of dialogue with the West, but apart from a subsequent position as adviser to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs he failed to set the debating agenda as he had previously done. 
To a large extent the same happened for general public opinion, although the deflation of 
political hostilities between El’tsin and the legislature from 1997 onwards allowed for a 
more permissive, wide-ranging discussion in society of the international place of Russia. And 
although direct foreign policy-making influence from the public was difficult to see, it can be 
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argued  that  the  government  often  ignored  belligerent  parliamentary  advice  in  the 
knowledge that the Russian public supported peace.
141 
 
2000-04 
El’tsin had gradually regained much of his policy-making influence towards the end of his 
second presidential term, but after Putin became acting President from the onset of 2000 all 
policy making seemed to centre on him throughout this period. Putin quickly embarked on a 
number of international visits, including within the CIS. The President used his significant 
control over the legislature to pursue several aims, notably ratification of the Strategic Arms 
Reduction (START) II treaty, previously agreed with the USA.
142 Indeed, Putin quickly became 
Russian foreign policy, not least because he took a keen interest in foreign policy details, 
making sure policy was implemented as part of a strategic whole. The influence of the 
President was visible on several occasions, not least in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks 
on the USA in September, 2001, when Putin unequivocally offered the support of Russia in 
the battle against terror. It is important to note, though, that while the President controlled 
foreign policy, he also delegated responsibility to a number of trusted individuals,
143 many 
of whom had years of political experience. 
 
One of the most important of these, at least in relation to Ukraine, was perhaps surprisingly 
Chernomyrdin, called back from the political exile his dismissal in 1998 had constituted. 
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After he was appointed as Ukrainian ambassador in May, 2001, Chernomyrdin soon found 
use for his ability to negotiate post-Soviet politics, and not only in the economic sphere that 
had been his remit at Gazprom and, formally at least, as Prime Minister. Foreign Minister 
Igor’  Ivanov,  on  the  other  hand,  often  found  himself  sidelined  by  the  presidential 
administration and especially by Putin himself, but at times Ivanov’s diplomatic experience 
and contacts were still called upon, just as was the case for his Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
This ministry no longer suffered overly from competition by the Ministry of Defence, per se, 
yet  the  Minister  of  Defence  himself  was  a  different  matter.  Sergei  Ivanov  had  been 
appointed Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service by Putin in August, 1998, and it 
was therefore hardly a surprise that he was promoted again by the President in March, 
2001, to Defence Minister. Already he had used his position as Secretary of the Security 
Council  to  advocate  an  assertive  Russian  foreign  policy,  which  showed  in  the  national 
security concept and military doctrine of 2000,
144 and from 2001 Sergei Ivanov seemed to 
become the somewhat hard-line alternative to his namesake Igor’, the two of whom formed 
acceptable opposites for governmental foreign policy. In the middle of this stood Mikhail 
Kas’ianov, who had replaced Putin as Prime Minister from May, 2000, and partly continued 
the tradition begun by Chernomyrdin and Primakov of a Prime Minister active in foreign 
policy,  although  Kas’ianov’s  remit  was  mostly  economic  in  nature  until  his  dismissal  in 
February, 2004. Another notably active individual at the outset of Putin’s term was Pavel 
Borodin. As State Secretary of the Russia-Belarus Union, Borodin was highly active from the 
beginning of Putin’s presidency in his quest to promote integration in the post-Soviet region 
whenever possible. Certainly, Borodin’s aim was shared by Putin, but already in 2001 the 
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State Secretary was arrested in the USA on suspicions of money-laundering that sidelined 
Borodin in the struggle for influence within the Russian executive. Ironically, it was precisely 
law officials of the state, in the form of the Russian State Prosecutor’s office that during the 
following years gained prominence in foreign policy making, being especially useful as a tool 
to challenge foreign political actors critical of Russia. A similar instrumental role continued 
to be held by Mironov, whose duties seemed to be increasingly intertwined with interests of 
the Russian state, despite his official status as ombudsman.  
 
Russian  parliamentarians’  foreign  policy  activities,  on  the  other  hand,  were  much  less 
noticed than they had previously been, for two main reasons. On the one hand, the upper 
chamber,  or  Federation  Council,  still  consisted  of  representatives  of  local  governments, 
which were increasingly dependent on the goodwill of the central state administration. This 
followed legal amendments in July, 2000, which forced governors to abandon their double 
mandate encompassing their home seats as well as seats in the Federation Council, enabling 
Putin to gradually ensure the election of parliamentarians loyal to him. One might assume 
that  the  parliamentary  lower  chamber,  or  Duma,  would  have  become  more  actively 
involved in the foreign policy debate. Not only had this previously been the case, but at the 
elections in December, 1999, the oppositional Communist Party once more acquired the 
largest number of votes. Yet, although Duma members showed some foreign policy activity 
during the first half of this period, the sudden rise of the executive-supported party “Unity,” 
which acquired almost as many votes as the Communists, ensured that the possibility of a 
coherent  policy  challenge  by  the  legislature  was  much  diminished.  Outside  parliament, 78 
 
Putin’s reforms ensured that only a few republics, such as Tatarstan,
145 retained any foreign 
policy significance, while even Luzhkov was somewhat quiet in the foreign policy debate 
during Putin’s first term, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the parliamentary and 
presidential elections. Luzhkov’s problem was that he had supported Primakov’s aborted 
attempt to participate in the  presidential campaign, and he now needed to keep a low 
profile for a time in order to avert executive wrath. 
 
In the sphere of economics, the leadership of Gazprom could feel much more confident 
following Putin’s election. The new President was willing and able to empower the state-
controlled energy company a strong say in Russian international economic resurrection and 
expansion, and the opinions and actions of Gazprom were visible throughout this period in 
relation  to  the  post-Soviet  region.  As  one  Russian  scholar  put  it  to  me  in  May,  2007, 
Gazprom  still  remembered  being  “a  state  within  the  state”  during  Soviet  times,  and 
continued to interpret sheer size and market control as intrinsic goals.
146 Private energy 
companies including LUKoil also benefitted from the relative strengthening of the Russian 
economy and at times used their clout abroad,  sometimes in cooperation with Gazprom 
such as in the Caucasus in the first half of 2000,
147 even while no private energy company 
dared challenge the state directly following Mikhail Khodorkovskii’s arrest in 2003 and the 
dismantling of his oil company.
148 A similar tendency to state control could be seen in other 
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economic  spheres,  not  least  relating  to  the  defence  industry,
149  which  benefitted 
substantially from state goodwill concerning arms sales to states such as Iran.
150 Finally, a 
surprising  actor  influencing  foreign  economic  policy  was  Anatolii  Chubais,  who  had 
previously been widely vilified as responsible for the harsh and corrupted Russian economic 
reforms during the 1990s. But from 1998, when he became head of the state -owned 
electrical power monopoly Unified Energy Systems, Chubais was again allowed a significant 
say in domestic and foreign policy debate. From the religious sphere, Putin proved just as 
apt as El’tsin in retaining and exploiting Aleksii II’s support. Although the new President’s 
daughter had been baptised in 1985, Putin could hardly claim a background as an Orthodox 
believer.  Nevertheless,  he  seemed  to  have  no  problem  combining  a  centralised  state 
ideology with a religious element in a step not too different from Imperial policies in the 
19
th century. Certainly, Aleksii II only remained outspoken because Putin could trust the 
Patriarch; within the media sphere, too, it became increasingly noticeable that only sources 
controlled by the executive could be noticeable in the foreign policy debate. This was the 
case for state television channel ORT, as well as the formerly highly independent NTV, after 
it became formally controlled by Gazprom from April, 2001. A few, isolated foreign policy 
observers were still capable of influencing the foreign policy debate, but even the most 
ardent of these such as the resilient Aleksandr Tsipko were unable or unwilling to directly 
contradict official policy. This did not mean that no foreign policy debate took place; Putin’s 
administration remained determined to build up support for domestic and foreign policy 
                                                           
149 R. Stowe, “Foreign Policy Preferences of the New Russian Business Elite,” Problems of Post-
Communism, 48 (3), 2001, pp. 53-56 
150 T. Bukkvoll, “Arming the Ayatollahs: economic lobbies in Russia’s Iran Policy,” Problems of Post-
Communism, 49 (6), 2002, p. 38 80 
 
initiatives from the general public, the indirect influence of which could therefore not be 
dismissed. 
 
2004-08 
During Putin’s second presidential term the mechanisms of policy-making mostly remained 
as they had developed during the first term. If anything, policy making seemed to be even 
more controlled by the President than had previously been the case. This was first indicated 
by the parliamentary election in December, 2003, which was won by Kremlin-supporting 
parties. Putin’s re-election the following spring bore the marks of a coronation, and the 
President finally took advantage of the hostage-taking crisis in Beslan in September, 2004, 
to introduce presidentially appointed regional governors and exclusively national party-list 
competitors  for  the  legislature.
151  Moreover, Putin ensured more streamlined, effective 
governance than El’tsin by building better personal relations with his government and the 
parliament. This advantage increased during Putin’s second term when the El’tsin period 
had eventually moved so far into the past that personnel from his time had been replaced 
by Putin’s own people. Furthermore, Putin had by now convinced his domestic audience of 
the viability of his strategic plans for Russia and of the fact that internal dissent might 
damage the new-found strength shown by the Russian state.
152 
 
Away  from  the President’s  direct  control,  Sergei  Ivanov  became  even  more  active  than 
previously on the domestic and foreign policy scenes. It was now openly debated that the 
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Defence Minister was one of the frontrunners to succeed Putin; particularly during the first 
half of this period Sergei Ivanov conducted a vigorous defence of an assertive, security-
conscious Russian foreign policy with clear support from large parts of the military and the 
security services. Nobody assumed that Igor’ Ivanov might become President, and on the 
whole his transfer from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Secretary of the Security Council in 
March, 2004, appeared to many as a demotion. Still, Ivanov tried to remain relevant in the 
foreign  policy  debate  until  his  resignation  in  July,  2007.  On  the  whole,  however,  Igor’ 
Ivanov’s  successor  as  Foreign  Minister,  Sergei  Lavrov,  benefitted  from  being  Putin’s 
appointee  and  from  the  experience  gathered  during  his  decade-long  tenure  as  Russian 
representative to the United Nations. Finally, although his influence was increasingly felt in 
an  indirect  manner,  Chernomyrdin  remained  pivotal  in  the  increasingly  complex  Russo-
Ukrainian  relations,  where  he  repeatedly  showed  himself  as  loyal  towards  the  Russian 
central leadership. 
 
As mentioned above, Duma elections in December, 2003, had been convincingly won by the 
Kremlin-supported “United Russia” party, with its 38% of votes representing more than 
three times as many as those gathered by the next party, the Communists. Consequently, 
the Duma now seemed completely unwilling to challenge policy presented by the executive, 
and  the  only  function  of  the  lower  parliamentary  chamber  was  now  as  presenter  of 
potentially contentious policies that the executive might not wish to be directly associated 
with.  As  for  the  upper  chamber,  as  I  also  mentioned  above,  direct  appointments  of 
governors  by  the  President  diminished  the  incentive  for  almost  any  local  challenge. 
Nevertheless, one exception to this rule was Luzhkov who seemed to have regained his 
belief that the central leadership would not, or perhaps could not, dismiss him. For sure, the 82 
 
Moscow Mayor never challenged the state executive directly, yet Luzhkov seemed perfectly 
willing to stir up trouble abroad, such as in relation to Ukraine, even when Putin might have 
wished  for  bilateral  reconciliation.  Although  such  initiatives  could  not  directly  challenge 
major objectives of Russian state foreign policy, they could direct the latter on issues where 
it was still unclear.
153 
 
In the business world the leadership of Gazprom was buoyed by its increasing dominance of 
the natural gas market at home and abroad, and from the knowledge that the Kremlin 
would support it against any domestic or foreign competition. Indeed, clear signs appeared 
that Gazprom was becoming an increasingly important means by which Putin could force 
post-Soviet and even Western states closer to Russia, and any foreign policy statements 
presented by leaders of Gazprom thus became noteworthy. Another  state company that 
retained a place in the foreign policy debate was ORT as the Russian leadership increasingly 
appeared to favour the use of television in its media campaign to control domestic and 
foreign policy debates. In this campaign private assistance was also accepted, however, and 
one of the most effective PR managers used in the process was Marat Gel’man, whose 
activities in Ukraine became quite important for the bilateral relationship. Of the relatively 
independent foreign policy observers that remained, few were important, with Tsipko again 
being one of the few scholars to be noted in the debate. More generally, it may be argued 
that  members  of  Russian  academic  circles  retained  a  little  significance  in  foreign  policy 
debates, but mostly in the fashion seen with the Duma above; as advocates for embryonic 
state policies.  
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As  I  have  intended  to  show  in  this  short  chapter,  Russian  foreign  policy  making  was 
influenced by a number of actors throughout El’tsin’s and Putin’s presidencies. It cannot be 
denied that the presidents and other members of the executive mostly dominated foreign 
policy making, partly due to their vigorous attempts to retain control, and partly due to the 
quite hierarchical institutional framework for Russian policy making inaugurated with the 
constitution of December, 1993. Consequently, these actors’ perceptions will be the focus 
of much of my attention in this thesis. However, the specific permutations of the foreign 
policy making mechanism at a given point in time was perhaps not so important overall as 
the fact that neither presidents, nor governments or other state-affiliated actors, nor even 
non-state actors could be dismissed as wholly insignificant at any point during the four 
periods covered by this thesis. Thus, I have chosen in the following to consult sources from a 
large amount of highly different actors. 
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Chapter 4: Imagining sovereignty (1990-1993) 
Imagining political sovereignty 
Territory 
Law: Treaty on inviolable borders 
With the founding treaty between the RSFSR and UkSSR from November, 1990, Russians for 
the  first  time  accepted  Ukrainian  territorial  inviolability.  The  two  republics  pledged  to: 
“...recognise  and  respect  the  territorial  integrity  of  *each  other+  within  their  currently 
existing borders...”
154 A similar treaty was unnecessary between the RSFSR and the BSSR. A 
study of the RSFSR borders in March, 1991, concluded that the BSSR was the only republic 
with  which  a  sovereign  Russia  could  have  no  territorial  disagreements.
155  This did not 
change with the Soviet collapse. Although the CIS was formed as a successor organisation to 
the Soviet Union in December, 1991, Russian governmental Deputy Chairman Gennadii 
Burbulis’  immediately  sought  to  dilute  the organisation by  inviting  Bulgaria,  Poland  and 
other  interested  states  to  join,
156  even though such a widened union would never be 
capable of deepened territorial integration. Burbulis’ and his Russian colleagues knew that 
forced integration would not be widely approved. In mid-1992, 65% of respondents in a 
survey opposed Russian-sponsored violence even in the most controversial territorial issue 
of Crimea, while only 19% felt otherwise.
157 More importantly in July, 1993, El’tsin professed 
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to be ashamed over claims by the Russian parliament on Ukrainian territory,
158 while he also 
refused to veto a formal Ukrainian appeal against Russian pretentions to the UN Security 
Council.
159 El’tsin appreciated that the Ukrainians had responded to Russian threats not by 
threats of their own, but by seeking recourse to international law. 
 
Power: A Russian Union and joint stabilisation of borders 
Yet, territorial integration and expansion traditionally characterised the Russian state, which 
successfully integrated Belarusians and Ukrainians. In the all-Soviet census of 1989, 22% in 
the UkSSR had declared themselves Russians, who constituted 80% of all non-titulars in the 
republic and constituted the largest number of Russians in any republic bar the RSFSR.
160 
And Russian leaders equated Russian and Soviet greatness. In April, 199 0, the Russian-born 
Soviet leader Gorbachev contested Lithuanian independence, stressing that Russia, not the 
Soviet Union, had advanced for centuries towards the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda for 
centuries.
161 From the political opposition, Solzhenitsyn in September suggested forming a 
Russian Union (in a multinational,  rossiiskii form), uniting the territories of the RSFSR, the 
BSSR and the UkSSR based on popular referendums.
162 It was likely that El’tsin and his 
supporters might also equate Soviet and Russian territory. Despite the importance of the 
November, 1990, treaty, it only supported territorial inviolability “...within the framework of 
the  USSR.”
163  This  suited  many  inhabitants  of  the  UkSSR  well,  and  of  the  BSSR,  too. 
Traditionally, some of the most loyal Soviet subjects lived here. In an all-Union referendum 
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of March, 1991, 83% of voters supported the continued existence of the Soviet Union; the 
highest proportion of any republic.
164 Territorial sovereignty was reluctantly embraced by 
the BSSR leadership af ter the failed Soviet coup in August. Belarusian leader Stanislav 
Shushkevich remained so eager to reintegrate with Russia that  Ukrainian President Leonid 
Kravchuk eventually complained that a Russo-Belarusian alliance was pushing Ukraine into a 
new union.
165  The Russian government broadly supported this. Even Kozyrev,  generally 
promoting post-Soviet Russia, in late 1991 advocated continued territorial unity to non -
Russian  republican  leaders.
166  However,  Ukrainian  independence  had  broad  domestic 
support, and Kozyrev was rather echoing concern felt by many in the RSFSR regarding 
Ukrainian independence.
167 Yet soon such concern spread to inhabitants of economically 
troubled Ukraine. By March, 1992, 35% condemned the Soviet liquidation, as did 60% late in 
that year.
168  Popular opinion could not reverse the declaration of independence, but it 
confirmed for Russians that reintegration would be a natural development. By June, 1992, 
Kozyrev still predicted that Belarus, Ukraine and other post-Soviet states would soon return 
to Russia, despite a slight delay.
169 The CIS could facilitate this. In October, 1992, Belarus 
joined the CIS agreement on cooperation on stability along borders with non -participating 
states, which stated: “In order to support stable relations along external border the Parties 
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will conduct all-round cooperation...”
170 This allowed Russian security services to control 
Belarusian borders. El’tsin approved of this. While the domestic parliamentary challenge 
persisted  he  had  rarely  advocated  reintegration,  to  avoid  providing  support  for  his 
opponents’ arguments. By October, 1993, though, El’tsin had prevailed in Russia and in the 
ancient Russian city of Iaroslavl openly called for a gathering of all Russian lands.
171  
 
Nation: Recent territorial transfer 
Such a gathering was not meant to endanger Ukrainian sovereignty, although a potential 
dispute might concern Crimea. The peninsula had been transferred from the RSFSR to the 
UkSSR in 1954, despite connections to Russia through history and population.
172 In 1989, 
Gorbachev had warned that a territorially sovereign Ukraine might lose Crimea,
173 yet few 
listened to him, or to other fading elites such as the Russian Colonel Dmitrii Volkogonov who 
in late 1990 threatened Ukrainians with territorial revanchism.
174 When 93% of Crimeans in 
January, 1991, supported “reinstating” a status of union republic for Crimea, which it had 
never  had,
175  the gesture was also without influence on power struggles in Moscow. 
Following the failed Soviet coup in August, 1991, El’tsin’s spokesman Pavel Voshchanov 
stressed that the RSFSR reserved the right to renegotiate existing borders through all means 
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necessary  if  neighbouring  republics  pursued  full  sovereignty.
176  But  this  was  only  a 
precaution to avoid chaotic belligerence from neighbouring states. F urthermore, Ukrainian 
Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk and his colleagues soon called the Russian bluff, when they 
mentioned they might ask for RSFSR territories, including Kuban.
177 This never happened, 
and the Belarusian Popular Front was ultimately also unwilling to pursue claims for Briansk, 
Pskov and Smolensk in the RSFSR.
178 In January, 1992, Russian Foreign Ministry officials 
allegedly challenged  Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea, but this   and  reputed Ukrainian 
protests  remained  unconfirmed.
179  In  January,  1992,  Vladimir  Lukin’s  Supreme  Soviet 
Committee for International Affairs declared the Crimean transfer to the UkSSR null and 
void,  as  did  the  entire  chamber  in  May.
180  But  that  forced  El’tsin  to  defend  Ukrainian 
territorial sovereignty against his parliamentary enemies. 
 
Governance 
Law: Democratic sovereignty 
During  1990,  several  republican  leaders,  including  El’tsin,  challenged  Soviet  central 
governance by openly calling for democratisation. In November, 1990, his joint statement 
with  Kravchuk  suggested  gradual  democratisation  replacing  outdated  Soviet  totalitarian 
structures.
181  Similarly, after  the  provisional declaration of independence in Ukraine in 
August, 1991, Mayor of Leningrad Anatolii Sobchak visited Kyiv and afterwards told the 
                                                           
176 Molchanov, p. 251 
177 Ibid, p. 220 
178 D. Trenin, “The Changing Geopolitical Realities in Europe” in A. Arbatov, K. Kaiser and R. Legvold, eds., 
Russia and the West: the 21
st century security environment, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999, p. 164 
179 Kuzio, “Russia,” p. 171 
180 Ambrosio, Challenging, p. 56 
181 Nahaylo, p. 329 89 
 
USSR Supreme Soviet that Ukrainians had a right to choose independence.
182 When that was 
completed  in  December,  1991,  El’tsin’s  stated:  “The  Russian  leadership  declares  it 
recognises the independence of Ukraine in correspondence with its people’s democratic 
expression  of  its  will.”
183  In  return,  Ukrainians  had  to  uphold  new  demands  for  good 
governance, but they accepted this. In January, 1993, Russian offers to relieve Ukraine of 
governing responsibility were rejected with the message that a supra-state “drill sergeant” 
was not required.
184 
 
Power: Absorbed by the Soviet Union 
Still,  Russians  had  traditionally  offered  supranational,  centralised  Eurasian  governance. 
Unlike  the  case  in  other  Soviet  republics,  many  institutions  did  not  exist  in  the  RSFSR 
separately from all-Union institutions. This included the Communist Party (until 1990), the 
KGB, and the Academy of Sciences,
185 while Moscow was both republican and union capital. 
Also, Russian interference might not imply complete Belarusian and Ukrainian lack of 
control, for these three  nations had been overrepresented within Soviet state as well as 
Communist  party  structures.
186  Ukrainian  elites  supported  Muscovite  rule  under  long -
reigning  CPUk  First  Secretary  Volodymyr  Shcherbyts’kyi  and  his  replacement,  Leonid 
Ivashko.  Even  Rukh,  the  UkSSR  nationalist  party  battling  for  power  devolution,  only 
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appeared in 1989.
187 Rukh became established in Ukrainian politics, yet suffered from poor, 
mismanaged  post-independence  Ukrainian  realities.  Belarusians,  too,  hardly  benefitted 
from the Soviet collapse. Belarusians reluctantly declared independence only after the failed 
Soviet  coup  in  August,  1991 .
188  Afterwards,  Russians  unsurprisingly  took  Belarusian 
compliance for granted. Similarly, in August, 1991, Sobchak, as already mentioned, might 
have  accepted  Ukrainian  independence,  but  only  after  failing  to  convince  Ukrainian 
parliamentarians to remain united with Russia.
189 By July, 1992, El’tsin was using tension 
between Ukraine and Crimea to discuss possible dual citizenship for Crimeans, with him as 
inter-ethnic protector.
190 Inhabitants of Ukraine, having been told independence would be a 
panacea, considered this option; in June, 1993, striking Russian miners in Donbas even 
advocated increased governance from Moscow.
191  
 
Nation: Russian nomenklatura 
The miners did not want to join Russia, though, and the danger of other Russians in Ukraine 
seeking this was remote. During 1990-91, some Russians in twelve eastern and southern 
UkSSR regions constructed Interfront movements, accusing west Ukrainians of mistreating 
Russians, drawing them away from Russia.
192 However, the post-1991 context was wholly 
different.  Most  Russians  advocating  that  Russia  take  control in  eastern  and  southern 
Ukraine were inconsequential. Rutskoi might have been the exception; in May, 1992, he 
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dismissed  Ukrainian  independence  as  local  Communists’  attempt  to  stay  in  power. 
Nevertheless, he was not suggesting just Russians in Ukraine might be ruled from Moscow; 
he wanted Moscow to rule everyone in Ukraine.
193 Allegedly, in mid-1992, a report by the 
Institute of Europe in Moscow advised spreading the image of an authoritarian -nationalist, 
neo-Communist Ukraine, which might become internationally isolated and allow Russian 
governance over its mistreated Russians.
194 Still, even if this report really existe d, nobody 
heeded it. Apparently, domestic Ukrainian strife had little impact, either. In January, 1993, 
when Kravchuk unilaterally extended presidential rule over Crimea,
195 El’tsin answered local 
protests  by  merely  asking  Kravchuk  to  stay  out  of  Crimean  affairs.
196  When the above-
mentioned Donbas miners then appealed to Russia,
197 they knew El’tsin’s assistance would 
be limited.  
 
Ideology 
Law: Ukrainian statehood congratulated 
El’tsin promoted a multinational ideology, using rossiiskii and not the ethnically determined 
russkii for Russians, who were thus identified with the new Russian Federation, rather than 
the Russian nation or empire. Correspondingly, Russian and Ukrainian sovereign ideologies 
might  co-exist,  and  in  August,  1990,  RSFSR  and  UkSSR  parliamentarians  issued  a  joint 
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statement supporting new, harmonious Russo-Ukrainian interactions.
198 And in December, 
1991,  El’tsin  swiftly  congratulated  Ukraine  on  its  independence,  stressing  that  Russians 
wanted to inaugurate a bilateral relationship based on mutually agreed principles.
199 He 
used such a relationship to stabilise the region; in July, 1992, Russia and Ukraine became 
joint guarantors of the Moldovan -Transnistrian ceasefire.
200 Some Ukrainians still feared 
Russian intentions, but Russian First Deputy Foreign   Minister, Fedor Shelov-Kovediaev, 
plausibly argued that Russia had assisted Ukrainian statehood and that Ukrainians should 
stop seeking the “image of Russia as an enemy.”
201 Agreeing, Ukrainian Culture Minister 
Ivan Dziuba emphasised late that year how the  new Ukrainian nation should centre on 
citizenship,  not  ethnicity;  a  welcome  message  for  Russians.
202  Internationally,  Dziuba’s 
colleagues, and the Belarusian government, too, understood they could no longer hide as 
Russian appendages, but had to promote their states as fully sovereign and European.
203  
 
Power: Imperial law 
However, official ideologies had hitherto united Russians and their neighbours. Before the 
Soviet Union, the Russian Empire centred on a core nation of legally equal Great Russians, 
White  Russians,  and  Little  Russians.
204  Here, though, and within the Soviet Union, too, 
Russians were portrayed as first among equals. Witness a text from 1979 stating that the 
blossoming of a nation in the Union was especially achieved by “the Russian people, who by 
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right  occupy  first  place  among  equals  in  the  Soviet  community  of  nationalities.”
205  The 
Soviet leadership also never hesitated to evoke imperial ideologies to gain inter-republican 
cohesiveness. In 1985, Gorbachev mentioned that the Soviet Union covered the territory of 
Imperial  Russia,
206  emphasising a supranational link between the two states. The link 
between stability and supra-nationalism was often used against El’tsin’s separatism; in May, 
1990, Tsipko warned that a sovereign Russian ideology might prompt sovereign ideologies in 
other republics, too.
207 At the time, this seemed questionable, though. In the BSSR,  the 
nationalist Belarusian Popular Front was founded only in 1989 and won a mere 11%, or 37 
of 345 seats, in the 1990 republican legislature.
208 In Ukraine, nationalist Rukh fared little 
better, and loyalty to empire remained among ordinary Ukrainians. Thus, in November, 
1990, when El’tsin arrived in Kyiv to sign the RSFSR-UkSSR treaty, Ukrainians shouted “Glory 
be to El’tsin!” imitating past greetings to the emperor.
209 El’tsin believed a sovereign Russia 
would be the centre for Belarusians and Ukrainians, too, and even by November, 1991, he 
could “not envisage a future Union on post-Soviet territory without the participation of 
Ukraine.”
210  Subsequent  confirmations  of  Ukrainian  and  Belarusian  independence 
undoubtedly  disappointed  El’tsin,  who  nonetheless  had  grounds  for  hoping  such 
independence would be a temporary phenomenon. As Ukrainian Prime Minister Kuchma 
said  early  in  1992,  Belarus  and  Ukraine  were  not  awaited  in  the  West,  and  prosperity 
seemed only possible through participation in a Russia-dominated CIS.
211 In Russia, Rutskoi 
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wanted to encourage such opinions, and in 1992 he formed the Civic Union party, aiming to 
regain  Belarus  and  Ukraine;
212  the  party  soon  dominated  Russian  debate.  During  the 
following year, economic turmoil convinced many ordinary Ukrainians and Belarusians, too, 
that  attachment  to  Russia  would  be  beneficial.  Thus,  by  April,  1993,  impoverished 
inhabitants of Belarus were ready to al ly with Russia and forget constructing a sovereign 
state ideology if this could improve material conditions.
213  
 
Nation: Subversive ideologies 
Conversely,  Russian,  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  ideologies  were  seldom  opposed  to  each 
other. In the 1930s, Ukrainian nationalism had been vilified and combated in the Russia-
dominated Soviet Union,
214 while Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 might partly 
have been motivated by fears that Ukrainians there could transfer the subversive “Socialism 
with a human face” into the UkSSR and beyond.
215 Still, by the 1980s Russians, Belarusians 
and Ukrainians were consistently presented as friends, central to the Soviet Union. This 
meant that the Belarusian Popular Front and other republican dissident movements sought 
some distance from Russia,
216 yet there was little hostility towards Russians in the BSSR. 
Following the Soviet collapse, a few Belarusians denounced Russians as cultural occupiers, 
while some Russian organisations in Belarus denied the existence of a separate Be larusian 
nation,
217  yet they gained no support from significant actors. The  situation  in western 
Ukraine might become more contentious. By 1991, 59% of Russians in Galicia claimed 
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Ukrainians’ attitudes towards them had worsened, while 82% daily witnessed ethnic enmity. 
Ominously,  38%  believed  such  enmity  was  the  policy  aim  of  Kravchuk’s  republican 
leadership.
218 Yet there was little basis for the latter allegation. In April, 1992, Rukh did 
advocate both the immediate termination of Ukrainian membership in the C IS, allegedly 
aimed to resurrect the Russian empire to the detriment of Ukraine, and the establishment 
of Ukrainian citizenship around the Ukrainian nation,
219 yet Rukh spoke from the opposition. 
Rukh might gain power, and in December, 1992, Kozyrev stressed that Russia might defend 
the rights and lives of ethnic Russians living in non -Russian post-Soviet states with any 
means necessary.
220 Yet his aim was primarily to pacify belligerent Russian parliamentary 
deputies, who sometimes accused Ukrainians of treaso n,
221 but who ultimately had little 
influence on Russian international affairs. 
 
Conclusion 
Between  1990  and  1993,  the  paradigm  of  Power  dominated  Russian  perceptions  of 
Belarusian and Ukrainian political sovereignty. In territorial matters, the Soviet Union united 
the  RSFSR,  BSSR  and  UkSSR  until  1992.  Afterwards,  Russia  and  Belarus  agreed  on  joint 
border protection. El’tsin advocated the gathering of Russian lands, while Kozyrev predicted 
the  return  of  Belarus  and  Ukraine.  Rhetorically,  Soviet  and  post-Soviet  documents 
distinguished between unimportant internal borders between Russia and its neighbours, 
and external borders to the rest of the world. In matters of governance, the RSFSR was 
institutionally intertwined with the Soviet Union, while governance in the BSSR and UkSSR 
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was  subservient  to  central  Muscovite  institutions.  Subsequently,  Russo-Ukrainian 
negotiations contemplated dual citizenship for Russians in Ukraine, which would partly have 
subordinated Ukrainian governance to Russia. Both members of the Russian executive, such 
as Rutskoi, and members of the opposition, such as Sobchak, supported Russian governance 
of Belarus and Ukraine, while Belarusians and Ukrainians had good memories of relative 
overrepresentation among Soviet elites. In matters of ideology, both the Russian Empire 
and  the  Soviet  Union  centred  on  a  core  nation  consisting  of  Russians,  Belarusians  and 
Ukrainians, but with Russians as “first among equals.” Furthermore, Gorbachev referred to 
Soviet and Imperial borders as essentially Russian borders, while El’tsin wanted Ukraine in 
any  conceivable  union.  Rhetorically,  there  was  a  link  between  Soviet  rhetoric  naming 
Russians as “first among equals” and the Ukrainian shout of “Glory be to El’tsin!” which 
greeted the visiting Russian leader like an emperor.  
 
The paradigm of Law also significantly influenced Russian perceptions of Belarusian and 
Ukrainian political sovereignty. In territorial issues, the 1990 RSFSR-UkSSR treaty existed 
within a Soviet framework, but still contained the first territorial guarantees shared by these 
republics. Russians did not expect Belarusian and Ukrainian independence to last, yet they 
still congratulated their neighbours, just as El’tsin allowed the UN to help Ukrainians against 
Russian  territorial  revanchism.  Throughout  this  period,  “recognition  and  respect”  for 
existing borders was mentioned. In issues of governance, the joint RSFSR-UkSSR statement 
from November, 1990, was a democratic challenge to the allegedly totalitarian Soviet Union. 
And even if El’tsin did not wish that democracy might take Russians and their neighbours 
apart, he still explicitly recognised Ukrainians’ choice of independence. References to the 
democratic will were present, if not dominant, in Russian and Ukrainian rhetoric throughout 97 
 
this period. Finally, although the Russian government hardly invited sovereign Belarusian 
and Ukrainian ideologies, these were co-opted to establish and preserve regional peace, 
notably  in  Moldova.  El’tsin  championed  the  idea  of  “rossiiskii”  statehood;  this  did  not 
necessarily preclude incorporation of Belarusians and Ukrainians, but it did preclude their 
alienation. Rhetorically, Russians stressed Belarusians and Ukrainians should not have the 
“image as an enemy” of them.  
 
The  paradigm  of  Nation  was  insignificant.  In  territorial  matters,  even  Crimea  was  not 
contested.  In  matters  of  governance,  the  Russian  government  was  unwilling  to  defend 
Russians  abroad,  despite  rhetoric  to  the  contrary.  Finally,  in  matters  of  ideology  El’tsin 
championed the concept of “rossiiskii,” which was anything but directed against Belarusians 
and Ukrainians. 
 
Imagining military sovereignty 
Forces of Belarus and Ukraine 
Law: Creating new forces 
As RSFSR leader, El’tsin understood that the republics could not take sovereignty from the 
Soviet centre without securing the support of troops in the republics. In November, 1990, he 
admired the decision by the UkSSR leadership to retain local military recruits within the 
republic,  and  El’tsin  noted  that  the  RSFSR  would  have  to  keep  up  with  this  display  of 
sovereignty.
222  This  might  mean  decreased  RSFSR -UkSSR  military  cooperation,  too.  In 
October,  1991,  El’tsin  cut  ties  with  research  and  development  establishments  in  other 
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Soviet  republics,  including  the  Ukrainian  Iuzhnoe  missile  production  facility,  to  avoid 
technical dependency on non-Russian actors.
223 Maybe Ukraine did not need to cooperate, 
though, for it retained many Soviet military assets, including 25 -30% of heavy Soviet 
armaments west of the Urals, 700,000 personnel, over 6,300 modern tanks, between 1,100 
and 1,900 airplanes, and more than 300 helicopters, together constituting the second -
largest European army and the third -largest air force in the world.
224  El’tsin  could  only 
abandon all this equipment given respect for sovereign Ukrainian forces. The Black Sea Fleet 
and nuclear arms were not so easily surrendered. However, on the former question Russia 
and Ukraine agreed to disagree, while on the latter Kravchuk and Shushkevich accepted that 
nuclear  arms  could  be  in  Russia,  if  inter-governmental  control  of  their  use  was 
established.
225 By 1993, all tactical nuclear weapons had been transported from Belarus and 
Ukraine  to  Russia.  Russian  commentators  such  as  Aleksei  Arbatov  applauded  this 
development as it prevented uncontrolled nuclear proliferation. Otherwise, Arbatov had no 
wish to obstruct the formation of sovereign Belarusian and Ukrainian forces, let alone to see 
Russia pay for such forces.
226  Belarusian legislators concurred, and in February, 1993, 
ratified the START I treaty on nuclear disar mament and the accompanying Lisbon Protocol 
from 1992 without preconditions while endorsing the accession of Belarus to the Non -
proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state, an accession subsequently completed in July.
227 
With this status confirmed, Belarusian forces might finally be constructed. 
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Power: Dispersed nuclear arms in a joint strategic space 
Whether Belarusians wanted wholly sovereign forces remained doubtful, though, as the 
BSSR benefitted from Soviet military infrastructure. The Belorussian Military District, the 
territory of which corresponded to the BSSR, consistently received some of the best Soviet 
military units and equipment.
228 Furthermore, the BSSR, the UkSSR and the RSFSR were all 
enmeshed in the nuclear infrastructure. Short-ranged tactical weapons were placed in nine 
different republics, including these three .  The BSSR  also  held 54 warheads for strategic 
weapons, while the UkSSR held more than 1,500 such, deployed in silos, road - and rail-
mobile  vehicles  and  aircrafts.
229  Establishing  complete  sovereignty  of  Belarusian  and 
Ukrainian forces would necessarily take time and be poorly understood by Russians in the 
Soviet military. In December, 1990, the chief of the Soviet general staff, General Mikhail 
Moiseev, equalled Soviet and Russian military aims, arguing in the UkSSR that a centralised 
Soviet army was necessitated by the interests of the Russian ( rossiiskogo)  state.
230  As 
indicated above, El’tsin agreed, at least concerning nuclear weapons. In August, 1991, he 
announced that Ukraine could not keep control over nuclear arms, since they had officially 
declared the UkSSR and Ukraine as non-nuclear. Control of nuclear weapons should thus 
transfer to Russia straightaway.
231 In December, El’tsin did allow CIS-accords to confirm 
that: “*The participants] of the [CIS] shall preserve and support a joint military-strategic 
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space under unified command...”
232 but Russians intended to control such a joint space. And 
whereas Ukraine might disagree, Belarus happily agreed if Russia paid the bill. In November, 
1992,  Shushkevich thus  declared that  nuclear weapons  were  under  Russian  jurisdiction, 
should be returned to Russia, and, effectively, were the problem of a military union financed 
by Russia.
233 Shushkevich had no hope of Western military assistance. In early 1993 both he 
and Kravchuk tacitly accepted warnings from senior Russian governmental officials to 
representatives of the Central European Visegrad organisation against forming any sort of 
military union with Belarus and Ukraine, since the latter states alle gedly fell within the 
Russian sphere of influence.
234 Arbatov and other liberal Russian commentators, including 
Grigorii  Berdennikov  and  Vladimir  Dvorkin,  would  generally  not  go  so  far  concerning 
Belarusian and Ukrainian forces, but certainly did so in the c ase of nuclear weapons. The 
extent to which all Russian commentators failed to consider Ukrainian wishes on nuclear 
disarmament was remarkable.
235  Yet eventually Ukrainians became convinced that the 
Russian government effectively offered to take a problem of f their hands. By April, 1993, 
most members of Kravchuk’s administration understood that retaining sovereign nuclear 
forces was a costly business, which their rapidly impoverished state could hardly afford.
236 
 
Nation: Incompatible understandings of “strategic” 
Ukraine and Belarus could certainly not afford military tension or conflict, either. In 1990, 
Rukh  parliamentarian  Serhii  Holovaty had  admittedly  stated that  European  security  was 
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threatened by the retention of totalitarian, Russian-led Soviet forces,
237 but this argument 
withered  after  1991.  Any  remaining  tension  was  latent;  existing  for  instance  in  the 
December, 1991, founding treaty of the CIS, which stated: “*Russia, Belarus and Ukraine+ 
will jointly guarantee...the preservation of strategic armed forces”
238 without agreeing what 
“strategic” meant. Ukraine and even Belarus did temporarily refuse to transfer nuclear arms 
to Russia,
239 and later sought financial compensation, but they could hardly have retained 
the weapons. Similarly, Ukraine was unprepared to maintain the Black Sea Fleet, and Lukin’s 
January, 1992, threat of territorial and economic sanctions if the Fleet was not returned to 
Russian control
240 seemed redundant. El’tsin had to take the initiative back from parliament 
and in April, 1992, demanded “The transfer of the Black Sea Fleet under the jurisdiction of 
*Russia+...” from Kravchuk.
241 Yet El’tsin had been pushed into this position by parliamentary 
activity and his own prior inactivity; not by hostility to Ukrainian forces. Kravchuk soon 
called the bluff, warning CIS leaders that: “Lately, the situation in Crimea and concerning the 
Black Sea Fleet has significantly worsened [due to] continued interference in the domestic 
affairs  of  Ukraine  by...the  leadership  of  *Russia+.”
242  El’tsin,  wanting  Russia  to  be  the 
responsible post-Soviet leader, retreated and subsequently kept disputes over the Fleet to a 
minimum. Nuclear weapons could not be similarly abandoned, given the fear of nuclear 
proliferation. Yet on this issue, Russia had Western opinion on its side. By September, 1993, 
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when strategic nuclear weapons remained in Ukraine and Belarus, despite official transfer 
agreements, Russian Defence Minister Grachev demanded that Ukrainians act responsibly 
and respect previous agreements to abandon their SS-24 strategic missiles.
243 Grachev knew 
this  challenge  was  a  temporary,  but  necessary  step  that  might  embarrass  Ukrainians 
internationally, but would soon be forgotten. 
 
NATO 
Law: Cordon sanitaire 
Immediately before and after the Soviet collapse, Soviet-NATO detente became increasingly 
obvious. While no Soviet republican leaders contemplated closer relations with NATO, they 
could advocate neutrality between the two blocs. In July, 1990, the UkSSR parliament thus 
declared the “intention *of the UkSSR+ to become a permanently neutral state...”
244 El’tsin 
did not protest against this or a similar BSSR declaration the following year. By January, 
1993,  though,  the  continued  existence  of  NATO  as  a  military  organisation  did  worry 
Russians. To reduce tension, the leader of the Belarusian Popular Front, Zianon Pazniak, 
suggested forming an association of neutral states, including Belarus and Ukraine, between 
the  Baltic  and  Black  seas  to  keep  Russia  and  NATO  at  bay.
245  That summer, Ukrainian 
Foreign Minister Anatolii Zlenko presented a similar suggestion, albeit with Ukraine as the 
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lynchpin  of  the  association.
246  The  Russian  government  did  not  comment  on  these 
suggestions, but might have welcomed the chance to keep NATO at a distance. 
 
Power: Collective defence 
Yet Russian elites needed Belarusian and Ukrainian military assistance to counter NATO. By 
1992, Belarus alone hosted 23 missile bases and 42 military airfields, leaving 10% of the 
state under military jurisdiction.
247 If Russia allowed Belarus to remain neutral, NATO might 
take Belarus by force. Thus, in May, 1992, Russia and Belarus were among the founders of 
the Collective Security Treaty, where article 4 stated: “If one of the state-parties suffers 
aggression by any state or group of states, it will be perceived as aggression against all state-
parties  to  this  Treaty.”  This  deliberately  mirrored  NATO  statutes
248  and  signalled  that 
renewed divisions were taking place, with Belarus firmly entrenched on the Russian side. 
 
Nation: Foreign peacekeepers 
Although Ukraine did not join the Collective Security Treaty, Russians did not consider that 
Ukraine or Belarus might ally with NATO. Any worries came from third parties, such as 
Poland, where commentators in October, 1991, and again in February, 1992, argued that 
Belarus, Ukraine and Lithuania could resolve an old Polish security problem by blocking 
Russian access to Central Europe.
249 Nothing indicated Belarusians and Ukrainians listened 
to this, though. It did annoy Russians when Zlenko in August, 1992, suggested that NATO 
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and  other  Western  international  organisations  could  provide  peacekeeping  forces 
throughout Eurasia, without any participation by the CIS or Russia,
250 but Russians accepted 
that Zlenko wished Russia no harm and did not see NATO as an ally against Russia. 
 
Forces of the Russian Federation in Belarus and Ukraine 
Law: Nuclear veto 
As already seen, Russian elites did not want nuclear weapons controlled by Belarus and 
Ukraine. However, by advocating for the return of the weapons to Russia, Russians showed 
they did not see nuclear weapons as a pretext to strengthen control over facilities outside 
Russia. In December, 1991, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, together with Kazakhstan, agreed 
that:  “Until  nuclear  weapons  on  the  territories  of  *Belarus+  and  Ukraine  have  been 
completely removed, decisions concerning their use are taken...on the basis of procedures 
agreed between the participating states.”
251 The equal status of these states was confirmed 
in May, 1992, when El’tsin agreed to establish Russian forces separate from the CIS. He 
understood it would be futile to impose supranational military solutions on neighbouring 
states.
252  Elites in Ukraine were mostly pleased with this, wanting to construct military 
sovereignty without an overbearing Russian presence. In August, 1992, a sugge stion by 
Kozyrev’s Foreign Ministry for a friendship treaty was thus dismissed since it allowed Russia 
to retain military bases in Ukraine within a united framework.
253 Belarusian leaders might 
have been more receptive, and Belarus hosted proportionally more  Russian troops than 
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Ukraine did. Yet, public opinion did not want this to continue, as shown by widespread 
support for Belarusian neutrality in opinion polls from March, 1993.
254 
 
Power: Russian military succession and the CIS Charter 
Notably,  though,  military  personnel  in  Belarus  and  Ukraine  were  often  keen  to  retain 
Russians in bases near them; unsurprisingly when considering that forces in the RSFSR, BSSR 
and UkSSR had mixed Belarusians, Ukrainians, and Russians. Thus, in August, 1991, the new 
pro-Russian Republican Movement of Crimea consisted mainly of former KGB officers and 
Afghan veterans,
255 who supported local Russian troops. Post-Soviet Russian military forces 
also had much to offer neighbours. Russia retained all paratroopers, and four out of six fully 
combat-ready divisions, leaving two divisions to be shared by Belarus and Ukraine.
256 In 
May, 1992, Shushkevich furthermore admitted that professional training of the Belarusian 
army would depend on Russian soldiers with whom Belarusian soldiers had used  to train 
and on whose equipment they still relied.
257  Russian parliamentarians hoped that such 
dependence  would  allow  Russian  forces  to  dominate  the  region.  Following  Andranik 
Migranian,  in  August,  1992,  the  head  of  the  Russian  parliamentary  Commission  on 
International  Affairs  and  Foreign  Economic  Ties,  Evgenii  Ambartsumov,  called  for 
international recognition of a Russian doctrine, akin to the American Monroe Doctrine, that 
would designate the post -Soviet region as a sphere of exclusive Russian interest and  
influence.
258 The CIS Charter from January, 1993, facilitated this, stating: “If threats to the 
sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of one or some of the participants appear...this 
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will immediately lead to joint consultations [among the parties] with the aim of...taking 
steps...including  peacemaking  operations  and,  if  necessary,  the  employment  of  Armed 
Forces...”
259  Having  negotiated  the  Charter,  El’tsin  could  in  February,  1993,  claim  the 
“Russian Monroe Doctrine” as his own idea, when he sought special powers from the UN to 
Russia as guarantor of peace and stability in the post-Soviet region.
260 This initiative gained 
widespread  support  from  the  Russian  military  after  recent  years  of  hardship  and 
humiliation. Poignantly, in April, 1993, 80% of the Russian-dominated Black Sea Fleet raised 
the Tsarist St Andrew’s flag, showing allegiance to empire and forcing Kravchuk to seek talks 
with Moscow and to mollify the sailors.
261  
 
Nation: Military doctrine 
Neither El’tsin nor the Russian sailors intended to threaten Ukraine, though. In October, 
1991, El’tsin had clumsily heightened Russo-Ukrainian tension, following rumours that the 
Russian elite had discussed a potential nuclear strike against Ukraine. Without considering 
the consequences, El’tsin admitted the discussions; that he mainly wanted to stress such an 
attack was technically impossible
262 hardly reassured Ukrainians, who in return temporarily 
withheld Russian funding for the Black Sea Fleet. With this misunderstanding cleared up, 
Lukin and the Supreme S oviet did, as already mentioned, claim the Black Sea Fleet in 
January, 1992. The Supreme Soviet hinted of potential violence if Ukrainians did not 
comply,
263 but without support from the Fleet or the executive. In April, El’tsin’s negotiator 
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on the Fleet, Iurii Dubynin, did complain that “the Ukrainian delegation insists discussing the 
question without consideration for the agreements that have earlier been reached within 
the framework of the CIS,”
264 yet no potential repercussions against Ukraine appeared. That 
the governments of Ukraine and Belarus wanted all Russian troops to leave eventually had 
less to do with fear of Russian aggression, and more, as declared in August by Belarusian 
Defence Minister Pavel Kozlovskii, to the fact that the prioritised development of a new 
army,
265  would  only  succeed  if  Belarusians  could  learn  to  operate  without  Russian 
support.
266 Admittedly, some Ukrainian nationalists impatiently awaited the troop removal. 
After Fleet commanders invited radical Russian parliamentarians to Sevast opol’  in  May, 
1993, a “Congress of Ukrainians,” also held in Sevastopol’, demanded immediate division of 
the Fleet and the withdrawal of the Russian half from Ukraine.
267 Yet neither side in this 
dispute had governmental support. Few signs indicated such sup port might be given in 
future, although the Russian military doctrine from November, 1993, allowed Russian forces 
to defend Russian citizens abroad, if their rights were infringed on.
268 
 
Conclusion 
Between  1990  and  1993,  the  paradigm  of  Power  dominated  Russian  perceptions  of 
Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  military  sovereignty.  In  matters  concerning  Belarusian  and 
Ukrainian forces, the CIS established supranational command over nuclear arms and other 
“strategic” equipment. El’tsin announced immediately after the failed Soviet coup in August, 
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1991, that nuclear weapons should ultimately be controlled from Moscow, while Central 
European states were subsequently warned by the Russian administration against military 
alliances  with  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  forces.  In  matters  concerning  NATO,  Belarusian 
military assets were substantial in both quantity and quality, making their incorporation in 
Russian-led forces a necessity if Russia was to challenge the regional supremacy of NATO. 
Furthermore,  such  a  Russo-Belarusian  challenge  seemed  the  primary  purpose  of  the 
Collective Security Treaty from 1992, in which both Russia and Belarus participated, and the 
provisions of which closely mirrored NATO provisions of collective defence against attacks 
by third parties against any participating state. Finally, in matters concerning Russian forces 
in Belarus and Ukraine, the CIS Charter from January, 1993, facilitated multilateral military 
cooperation, with Russian troops moving to neighbouring states. El’tsin’s advocacy for the 
designation of the post-Soviet region as an UN-recognised Russian sphere of influence and 
peacekeeping provided a similar impression. Also, the fact that this initiative was compared 
in Russia to the Monroe Doctrine showed a belief that Russia was an international great 
power just like the USA had been a century before.  
 
The paradigm of Law also significantly influenced Russian perceptions of Belarusian and 
Ukrainian  military  sovereignty.  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  forces  were  allowed  to  retain 
surprising amounts of military equipment after 1991, even if Russians expected to soon 
control  these  forces  again.  El’tsin  admired  and  emulated  Ukrainian  attempts  to  control 
military forces on its territory, and he cut military research and development links between 
Russia  and  Ukraine  so  that  forces  in  the  two  states  could  learn  to  handle  themselves. 
Concerning NATO, the Russian leadership allowed and supported Belarusian and Ukrainian 
declarations of neutrality, while subsequent suggestions from Minsk and Kyiv that a belt of 109 
 
neutral states might be constructed to keep Russia and NATO away from each other were if 
not  embraced  then  at  least  accepted  in  Moscow,  showing  Russians  did  not  expect 
Belarusians and Ukrainians to secretly cooperate with NATO. Finally, in matters concerning 
Russian  forces  in  Belarus  and  Ukraine,  early  CIS-accords  showed  that  the  Russian 
government  refused  to  use  nuclear  and  other  weapons  in  these  states  as  a  pretext  to 
impose a military presence on neighbouring states. El’tsin confirmed this policy when he 
established  Russian  forces  separately  from  the  CIS,  acknowledging  that  Russian  soldiers 
would not be accepted abroad as representatives of a multinational force. 
 
The paradigm of Nation was insignificant. Nuclear disputes were solved, while ownership of 
the Black Sea Fleet was peacefully discussed. Russians disliked that Zlenko invited NATO 
peacekeepers, but mainly ignored his empty gesture. Finally, although the Russian Military 
Doctrine  allowed  Russian  troops  to  fight  for  Russians  in  Belarus  and  Ukraine,  nothing 
indicated this might happen. 
 
Imagining economic sovereignty 
Economies of Belarus and Ukraine 
Law: Abandoning monetary union 
In 1990, Western studies indicated that the UkSSR might be the Soviet republic gaining most 
economically  outside  the  Soviet  Union.  Traditionally,  the  republic  had  provided  many 
agricultural  products  for  other  republics  and  even  foreign  states.  After  1991  Ukraine 
inherited 70% of the lucrative Soviet defence industry and 79% of the production of finished 110 
 
goods.
269 The economy of the BSSR had also been relatively strong, this continued in 1992, 
when inhabitants of Belarus were better off than those in Russia and Ukraine. Russians in 
Belarus noticed this tendency and refrained from returning to Russia.
270 Still, leaders in 
Russia knew the economic capacity of their state would eventually prove much larger than 
that of other post-Soviet states. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Russian government soon 
began to disassociate the Russian economy from that of Belarus and Ukraine. In early 19 93 
Russia thus abandoned monetary union with Belarus to avoid converting Belarusian to 
Russian roubles at a ratio of 1:1.
271 This was not done to undermine Belarusian economic 
sovereignty, per se, but to wean Belarus off economic support.  
 
Power: Dependent republics and economic union 
Not all Russians supported this strategy, though, since Belarusian and Ukrainian economic 
assets could benefit Russia for some years to come. Traditionally, the UkSSR mining industry 
had  been  profitable,  as  had  the  fact  that  20%  of  all  Soviet  consumer  goods  had  been 
produced in the UkSSR.
272 The BSSR had also been one of the most economically developed 
Soviet republics, even if its manufactured products were often marketable only within the 
Union and income from inter -republican trade constituted as 29% of its GDP by 1988.
273 
Similarly, in 1992,  exports to post-Soviet republics constituted a third of Belarusian GDP 
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with Russia being the primary destination.
274 Such dependence on Russia  could not end 
simply because of unilateral policies from Moscow. This was the case for Ukraine, too. By 
mid-1991, inter-republican trade accounted for 84% of UkSSR exports, most of which went 
to the RSFSR. The following year, independent Russia financed 22% of the Ukrainian GDP 
through subsidised credits,
275 without which the economic crisis facing Kyiv would have 
been much worse. Still, for some time Ukrainians continued to believe independence would 
bring  self-sufficiently,  partly  based  on  the  Western  calculations  mentioned  above. 
Belarusians were less opt imistic  and  in  July,  1992,  acting  Russian  Prime  Minister  Egor’ 
Gaidar and his Belarusian counterpart Viacheslau Kebich agreed on economic cooperation. 
Gaidar described this as a first step toward confederation and an example to follow for 
other  states.
276  He, as well as Russian commentators, continued to see supranational 
economic  cooperation  as  rational,  unlike  the  allegedly  emotional  foundations  of  a 
nationalist economy.
277 Russians therefore expected that Ukrainians would soon be sensible 
and join Russo-Belarusian cooperation. This would necessitate accepting Russian control. In 
May, 1993, El’tsin emphasised that Russo-Ukrainian economic alliance required a uniform 
economic  space,  including  coordinated  strategies  for  reform,  currency  union,  customs 
union,  removal  of  all  barriers  to  economic  movements,  and  an  alignment  of  prices.
278 
Ukrainians mostly accepted this. As Prime Minister Kuchma stated Western markets would 
be closed for Ukraine, since no state would abandon market shares in its favour,
279 while 
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Russia continued to occupy Western attention and aid. Consequently, a few months later 
Russia, Belarus and Ukraine agreed in principle to re-establish an economic union.
280  
 
Nation: Local currencies 
However,  the  Russian  leadership  had  no  interest  in  crudely  dominating  Ukrainians  and 
Belarusians for this might provide an economically harmful backlash such as the 1989 strike 
by UkSSR miners, which had contributed to a fall in Soviet GDP of at least 4%.
281 When 
Russians were subsequently perceived to economically exploit  Ukrainians, therefore, this 
did not reflect intentions in Moscow. During 1992, the Russian government suggested that 
Russia inherit all Soviet assets and debts. This would almost certainly have benefitted all 
other post-Soviet states, yet Ukrainians alone refused the offer, demanding Russia inherit 
the debts, while sharing assets with Ukraine.
282 Although Russians might well feel aggrieved 
over this, the dispute remained muted if not resolved. Another disagreement seemed 
possible when Russian attempts to include Belarus and Ukraine in a rouble zone controlled 
from Moscow frightened Belarusians and Ukrainians, who quickly established their own 
currencies.
283 However, the Russian government welcomed this, since it meant that Russia 
would not have to support Belarusian and Ukrainians currencies. 
 
Energy 
Law: World market prices 
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The Soviet energy infrastructure had closely connected the republics through deliveries of 
oil  and  natural  gas.  To  decentralise  such  connections,  in  March,  1992,  Ukrainian  Prime 
Minister  Vitol’d  Fokin  travelled  to  western  Siberia  to  negotiate  direct  deals  with  local 
energy-producers and secured 6 million tonnes of Tiumen’ oil to be delivered in the coming 
months.
284 This oil still had to be transported through pipelines controlled by the Russia n 
state. Yet, Russia, too, depended on Ukraine. By 1992, 94% of all Russian gas exports to 
Western Europe passed through Ukraine, while an additional 3% passed through Belarus.
285 
If Ukraine could furthermore acquire energy supplies outside Russia, complete  energy 
sovereignty might be ensured. During 1992, possibilities of pipelines carrying Middle Eastern 
oil to Ukraine around Russia were only prevented by its $3 billion price -tag.
286  Russian 
energy companies did not want to become redundant in Belarus and Ukraine, but leaders of 
Gazprom were happy if energy subsidisation of neighbouring states could be terminated. 
Russians did not want to force this through, but wanted to gradually introduce bilateral 
agreements to this effect. Therefore, when Belarus by 1993  had payment arrears of $100 
million Gazprom reduced supplies until repayments had been agreed.
287 
 
Power: Limited reserves and bilateral transit prices 
Nevertheless,  it  was  unlikely  that  Belarus  and  Ukraine  would  become  completely 
independent of Russian energy deliveries. RSFSR natural gas had become the main energy 
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source for the BSSR in the 1970s. By 1990-91, without this gas and UkSSR nuclear energy the 
BSSR could only cover 10% of its energy consumption.
288 The UkSSR had long subsisted on 
its large coal deposits. Yet from the 1970s onwards the Soviet regime substituted coal with 
natural gas, which the UkSSR had to import from the RSFSR and other republics. Eventually, 
the  UkSSR  imported  approximately  75%  of  natural  gas  from  outside  its  borders.
289 
Consequently, between 1975 and 1995 the energy production of the UkSSR and Ukraine fell 
by two-thirds.
290 Neither Belarusians nor Ukrainians were therefore able to quickly escape 
energy dependence on Russia. Stanislav Bogdankevich, chairman of the Belarusian National 
Bank,  emphasised  in  1992   that  the  Belarusian  state  was  doomed  to  work  in  close 
cooperation with other post-Soviet states given strong dependence on imports of energy 
from Russia.
291 Similarly, in January, 1993, Ukrainian Prime Minister Kuchma noted the irony 
that the first year of Ukrainian independence  had brought an increased awareness of the 
energy  dependence  of  Ukraine.
292  Predictably,  the  following  June  a  Russia -Ukraine 
agreement on energy deliveries and transit was struck, ensuring that “The parties will take 
appropriate measures to secure the stable operation of [transit pipelines] crossing their 
territory.”
293 As long as energy subsidisation was necessary, leaders in Gazprom wanted 
energy  assets  inside  Belarus  and  Ukraine  in  return.  Thus,  during  1993  Gazprom 
unsuccessfully offered to rent the assets of Beltransgaz in return for guaranteed gas supplies 
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to  Belarus,  irrespective  of  Belarusian  debts.
294  Russian commentators found it fair that 
Russian companies would profit most from such arrangements.  In 1993, journalist Aleksei 
Pushkov commented that it was natural  if Russia acted as the economic nucleus for states 
such as Ukraine that depended heavily on its energy resources.
295  
 
Nation: Reducing deliveries 
Belarusians and Ukrainians seldom complained, as they needed to salvage their economies 
however possible. Previously, one energy initiative originating in Moscow had been hugely 
damaging, though: the Chornobyl’ nuclear power plant that in 1986 caused unprecedented 
nuclear pollution in the UkSSR and BSSR. Resultant protests in these republics sometimes 
aimed  at  the  RSFSR
296  and  in  1988  the  student  organisation  Hromada  and  the 
environmental group Green World Association gathered 10,000 people in Kyiv to form the 
Ukrainian Popular Front, or Rukh, opposing nuclear power  allegedly imposed by Russian-
dominated authorities.
297 Nevertheless, these protests primarily aimed at the Soviet Union 
and could not survive the Soviet collapse. In January, 1992, Lukin’s above-mentioned threat 
of  energy  pressure  against  Ukraine
298  might have provoked anger against Russia if the 
parliamentarian had been able to carry out his threat. As it w as, Russian oil companies did 
only deliver half the amount promised to Ukraine during 1992, but although Ukrainian 
authorities claimed this was caused by Ukrainian rejection of various CIS agreements
299 the 
explanation was more likely a chaotic Russian energy sector. In January, 1993, Russians 
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again refused supplying more than half the oil requested by Ukraine, and announced a raise 
in gas prices, Ukraine retaliated by raising the gas transit tariff to over twice the average 
international  level,
300  but this was only reasonable considering that Gazprom charged 
Ukrainians more than other foreign customers. By June, 1993, Ukraine had to pay  $80 per 
1,000 cubic metres of gas; much higher than the $60 to $66 subsequently paid in 1995 by 
richer Hungary, Poland and Slovakia,  calculated after fees for transit through Ukraine had 
been deducted.
301 However, this was not an attack on Ukraine. Gazprom had to gain income 
from somewhere, and Central European states would be more able than Ukraine to gain 
energy supplies elsewhere, while they also had more of a tendency to mistrust Russia. 
Furthermore, Ukraine was not required to pay the  requested price, but was allowed to 
accrue substantial debts that other customers would not have been permitted. El’tsin did 
sometimes seek to trade the debt for Ukrainian assets. In September, 1993, Kravchuk was 
told that Russia might forgive the $2.4 billion  energy debt in return for concessions on 
military  equipment.
302  Russians could have done more to prevent Ukraine becoming so 
indebted  in  the  first  place,  but  under  the  circumstances  El’tsin’s  suggestion  was  a 
reasonable quid pro quo. 
 
Economic actors of the Russian Federation in Belarus and Ukraine 
Law: Monetary exchange 
In  December,  1991,  El’tsin,  Shushkevich  and  Kravchuk  understood  that  Muscovite 
investments had not always been popular in the republics, notably in the above-mentioned 
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case of Chornobyl’. Consequently, while Russians were unwilling to take responsibility for a 
Soviet-engendered  nuclear  catastrophe,  El’tsin  still  agreed  to:  “...recognise  the  global 
character of the Chernobyl catastrophe and pledge to unite and coordinate their forces in 
order  to  minimise  and  overcome  its  consequences.”
303  This  portrayed  Russia  as  a 
responsible economic actor. Still, even a responsible actor had to consider its economic 
fortunes and the Russian executive was unprepared to scupper its investments abroad out 
of considerations for neighbouring states. In 1993 Russia conducted the above-mentioned 
monetary  exchange,  stabilising  the  rouble,  but  complicating  investments  in  Belarus  and 
Ukraine  and  abandoning  Ukrainians  with  rouble  savings.
304  This signalled that Russian 
investments abroad might not focus on Belaru s and Ukraine, yet this was not necessarily 
harmful for these states, where indigenous industries had to be built anyway. Already by 
late 1993, Ukrainian optimism  grew  and  the Chairman of the Committee on Economic 
Reform in the Ukrainian parliament, Volodymyr Pylypchuk, expected a future when Ukraine 
could afford to buy Russian goods at world market prices.
305 
 
Power: Gateway of trade and closer monetary ties 
Pylypchuk’s expectations might partly be fulfilled, yet in certain industries the UkSSR had 
long  depended  thoroughly  on  the  RSFSR.  For  instance,  the  local  chemicals  industry 
depended on RSFSR oil to operate.
306 There were also some non-energy requirements from 
which Ukraine could hardly extract itself; including many industrial components on which 
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production lines of 80% of UkSSR enterprises depended.
307 The BSSR had been even more 
dependent.  Consequently,  in  December,  1991,  Russian  First  Deputy  Governmental 
Chairman,  Gennadii  Burbulis’,  and  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  Prime  Ministers  Viacheslav 
Kebich  and  Vitol’d  Fokin,  advocated  “...*refraining+  from...activity  that  could  lead  to 
economic losses by each other...construct economic relations based on...the rouble...[and] a 
*unified+ customs policy...” This helped Russian companies remain the dominant foreign 
investors  in  Ukraine
308  to  the  particular  satisfaction  of  the  Russian  military -industrial 
complex. As indicated earlier, much of the Soviet defence sector remained in Ukraine and 
Russian companies consequently sought cooperation with Ukrainian companies.
309 Russians 
also needed Ukraine to trade further abroad; the port of Odesa was a notable gateway to 
world markets for Russian goods. Together with Kaliningrad, Odesa and a few other south 
Ukrainian cities constituted the only post -Soviet European ports, give and tak e volatile 
Caucasian ones, from where Russian goods could easily move abroad all year round.
310 
Furthermore, as Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin argued in July, 1993, 
successful Russian investments in Belarus and Ukraine could persuade other p ost-Soviet 
states, too, to allow increased Russian access.
311 The Ukrainian government was happy to 
comply and in August, 1993, pledged to eliminate all Ukrainian VAT on intra -CIS trade, 
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potentially  exposing  Ukraine  to  a  large  influx  of  goods  either  produced  in  Russia  or 
transferred through that state.
312 
 
Nation: Demands for hard currency payments 
It was unlikely that such Russo-Ukrainian cooperation would be obstructed. In the Soviet 
Union,  a  few  Ukrainians  in  the  diaspora,  had  claimed  that  Russia  historically  hindered 
Ukrainian economic development. Russia was allegedly destined to remain a producer of 
primary goods, as stated in 1941 by Iurii Lypa, who dismissively predicted that the main 
sources  of  Russian  foreign  revenue  would  always  come  from  raw  materials,  from 
“export...of wood and oil.”
313 Lypa and others in the diaspora hardly influenced debates in 
the UkSSR, although their animosity towards Russian investments did gain some supporters 
in the late 1980s following Chornobyl’.
314 Again, this animosity did not survive the Soviet 
collapse and new disputes were short-lived. In June, 1992, the head of the Russian Federal 
Migratory  Service,  Tatiana  Regent,  did  warn  that  Russian  companies might  not  want to 
invest in Ukraine, if Russians there were mistreated.
315 No significant Russian companies 
agreed, however, and Regent’s threat could be easily dismissed. Belarusians and Ukrainians 
listened much more attentively in November, 1992, when El’tsin declared that any state 
leaving the rouble zone, and the resultant Russian monetary control, would have to pay for 
Russian  goods  in  hard  currency.
316  However,  once  more  El’tsin’s  demand  was  hardly 
unreasonable, especially to Belarusians and Ukrainians who wanted economic sovereignty.  
                                                           
312 R. Abdelal, “Interpreting Interdependence: national security and the energy trade of Russia, Ukraine, 
and Belarus” in R. Legvold and C. Wallander, eds., Swords and Sustenance: the economics of security 
in Belarus and Ukraine, Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2004, pp. 110, 111 
313 I. Lypa, Rozpodil’ Rossii, L’viv: NAN, 1995, p. 65 
314 Deyermond, Security, p. 87 
315 Chinn and Kaiser, p. 279 
316 Nahaylo, pp. 448, 449 120 
 
 
Conclusion 
Between  1990  and  1993,  the  paradigm  of  Power  dominated  Russian  perceptions  of 
Belarusian and Ukrainian economic sovereignty. The Belarusian and Ukrainian economies 
remained highly dependent on Russia, not least since this provided the only market for 
many  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  goods,  for  which  the  West  showed  little  interest.  This 
dependence was only set to increase with the economic union that was agreed in principle. 
El’tsin had  long  suggested  such  a  union to  Ukrainians,  while  Gaidar had  praised  Russo-
Belarusian economic cooperation as the beginning of Russian control with neighbouring 
economies. As for energy relations, the Soviet Union had ensured that the BSSR and UkSSR 
became highly dependent on the RSFSR, and thus the Union, even though the UkSSR, at 
least, had previously been somewhat self-sufficient. After 1991, dependence on Russia was 
so pronounced, though, that Ukraine could not even exploit its position as transit land for 
Russian energy, but signed transit agreements on Russian terms, while in Belarus leaders of 
Gazprom tried to directly control Beltransgaz. Finally, Russian companies wanted to invest in 
Belarus and Ukraine not least since these states were gateways to trade elsewhere in the 
world, most prominently in the case of the port of Odesa. Russian interest only increased 
when the customs agreement was reached. Shokhin and other members of government saw 
Russian investments in Belarus and Ukraine as stepping stones to investments elsewhere in 
Eurasia, for many different Russian companies, especially including the powerful military-
industrial complex. 
 
The paradigm of Law also significantly influenced Russian perceptions of Belarusian and 
Ukrainian  economic  sovereignty.  The  Russian  government  sent  a  powerful  signal  that 121 
 
Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  economies  would  not  be  supported  unquestioningly,  when  it 
rejected monetary union as long as this was not accompanied by necessary Belarusian and 
Ukrainian reforms. El’tsin’s and his ministers knew that uniting with unreformed Belarusian 
and Ukrainian economies would be highly damaging for Russia. In energy issues, Russian 
companies and the Russian state insisted in principle that Belarus and Ukraine pay world 
market prices. Even if this was not always the case in practice, the demand was a strong 
signal that unlimited Soviet subsidisation had gone. The refusal in Gazprom to provide gas to 
Belarus until existing debts had been settled sent a similar signal. Finally, Russians accepted 
that their investments in Belarus and Ukraine had not always been beneficial and early on 
showed sympathy, if not quite responsibility for the Chornobyl’ disaster. On the other hand, 
Russian investors insisted they should gain from trade in Belarus and Ukraine as much as 
locals should; a sentiment that the subsequent monetary exchange was an example of.  
 
The  paradigm  of  Nation  was  insignificant.  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  currencies  were 
introduced, but this benefitted both these states and Russia. Some Russian energy deliveries 
were reduced, but for reasons quite consistent with normal business practice. Similarly, it 
was quite reasonable that El’tsin would ask Belarus and Ukraine to pay for Russian goods in 
hard currency.   
 
Imagining cultural sovereignty 
History 
Law: Ukrainian heroes 122 
 
Soviet authorities sometimes recognised the importance of Ukraine in times of crisis. In 
1941,  Nikita  Khrushchev  rallied  Ukrainians  against  German  invaders  by  highlighting 
Ukrainian historical heroes such as Prince Danylo of Galicia, who founded L’viv, and Bohdan 
Khmelnitskii’s Cossacks.
317 Such heroes were part of the background on which Ukrainians 
could build their sovereignty from 1990, and El’tsin did his best to help. In November, 1990, 
he went to Kyiv to sign the treaty on RSFSR-UkSSR relations. Thereby, El’tsin became the 
first leader from Moscow who had gone to Kyiv in three centuries to explicitly recognise the 
equal status of Russia and Ukraine.
318 Many Russian commentators were pleased, and tried 
disentangling  Russia  further  from  Kyivan  Rus’  and  Ukraine.  In  1992,  Kseniia  Mialo 
abandoned Kyiv as the origin of Russia, claiming instead that Russia began in Novgorod and 
its  partial  democracy  between  the  12
th  and  15
th  centuries.
319  Belarusians also tried re -
discovering their own history, and in January, 1993, Shushkevich stressed that Belarus had 
to revive local traditions and cultural monuments in order to resurrect its nation, although 
good relations with neighbouring states should be retained.
320 This pleased local Russians, 
who in Ukraine were happy to renew Ukrainian historical traditions, even after there 
appeared other types of tension with Ukrainians and the Ukrainian government.
321 
 
Power: Motherland and belief in historical union 
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Nevertheless, it would be difficult to renew such historical traditions after Soviet attempts 
to mix its peoples. This was the case with Belarusians. After the Second World War, when 
Kaliningrad was to be repopulated following expulsion of Germans, Belarusians were chosen 
as  the  only non-Russians  to  widely participate,
322  so that Belarusian and Soviet identity 
could be intertwined. This worked: in 1979, BSSR and UkSSR opinion polls showed that half 
of local ethnic Russians considered their republics native land
323 and could not even see 
them as different to the RSFSR. In 1981, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev reinforced the 
impression  by  inaugurating  the  Kyivan  museum  complex  commemorating  the  Great 
Fatherland War, with a metallic statue symbolising the Motherland, meaning Russia and 
Ukraine,
324 although Russia was the most important part. Dmitrii Likhachev thus argued that 
although Russian history was intertwin ed with Belarusian and Ukrainian history, Russia 
represented a higher unity of the three peoples.
325 BSSR and UkSSR leaders agreed, at least 
until the failed Soviet coup in August, 1991. As late as July, 1991, Kravchuk even emphasised 
that Russians in the UkSSR were indigenous residents, who had lived locally for hundreds of 
years.
326 And when the Soviet Union was dissolved, Soviet interpretations of history proved 
subversively successful. The founding of the CIS was legitimised in the statement: “We, 
[Belarus,  Russia  and  Ukraine]  as  founder-states  of  the  USSR...establish  that  the 
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USSR...ceases to exist.”
327 Even in death, the Union legacy was pervasive. And if parts of the 
Soviet heritage were unpalatable, the imperial heritage could motivate Russians, too. As 
mentioned previously, in March, 1992, El’tsin decreed the imperial St Andrew’s flag hoisted 
over the Black Sea Fleet, connecting current Russo-Ukrainian disputes with memories of 
supra-nationalism.
328  El’tsin  meant  to  include  Ukrainians  in  this  imperial  vision,  as  did 
Ambartsumov and others in November, when complaining that the current borders of the 
Russian Federation had no historical legitimacy and should be replaced with a union.
329 This 
would be more successfully advanced to inhabitants of Belarus, though. A 1993 opinion poll 
indicated that one-third of all respondents considered the histories of Belarus and Russia to 
be the same, while an even higher proportion knew nothing of an indigenous Belarusian 
history.
330  
 
Nation: Destroying Cossack history 
It was therefore unlikely that Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians would seriously disagree 
on historical topics. Ukrainians remembered the Holodomor, or forced collectivisation and 
famine in the early 1930s,
331 yet while a few blamed Russians most accepted that sim ilar 
crimes had taken place in Russian and Kazakh parts of the Soviet Union and that the culprits 
included Ukrainians and other non -Russians, too. Further back in history, Russians and 
Ukrainians had also disagreed on their Cossack past. Notably, in 1970 a n unpublished book 
by UkSSR Communist Party leader, Petro Shelest, glorified the Cossack origins of Ukrainians 
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and underlined a difference to an autocratic Russia. Sensing danger, Soviet decision-makers, 
led by Leonid Brezhnev, born on the territory of what later became the UkSSR, destroyed his 
book.
332 Still, ordinary Ukrainians never heard of this, and thus did not feel suppressed. In 
the late 1980s, the Soviet centre allowed Russian Cossacks to display pride over service to 
the Russian Emperor since the Pe reiaslav Treaty of 1654, although this was anathema for 
Ukrainian Cossacks.
333 Yet while Cossacks might squabble, the vast majority of Russians and 
Ukrainians found such historical debates peripheral. In the 1980s, Belarusians paid more 
attention to the discovery of Soviet mass graves, containing Belarusian military officers and 
suspected traitors from the 1930s-1940s. Nevertheless, although this discovery prompted 
the foundation of the Martyrology of Belarus, later the Belarusian Popular Front,
334 and 
distanced the republic from the Union and the RSFSR, mostly Soviet authorities successfully 
dismissed the mass executions as yet another Stalinist crime, not a Soviet or Russian one. A 
few Russian nationalists were unwilling to accept even such criticism, though,  steadfastly 
claiming that Russians saved the Soviet Union during the Second World War, despite 
sabotage  from  Fascist  Belarusians  and  Ukrainians.  National  Bolshevik  Eduard  Limonov 
argued this in January, 1992. He also argued that just as contemporary German  help to 
Croatians against Serbians was similar to Nazi help to Croatian Fascists during World War 
Two Germany would soon assist Western Ukrainians, too, who were as fascist as their 
predecessors had been 50 years before.
335 However, Limonov was a loud-spoken, ultimately 
peripheral Russian politician that few listened to. El’tsin had no time for Limonov, but El’tsin 
increasingly needed to deflect blame on someone else for the chaos that had followed 
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Soviet collapse. Many parliamentarians were blaming El’tsin for the collapse, and by mid-
1992 he had to claim that Russia never abandoned the Union, but had been forced to join 
the CIS by the actions of other Soviet republics, including the BSSR and UkSSR.
336 El’tsin did 
not want to blame Minsk or Kyiv, but Limonov and some parliamentarians did. This had little 
impact now,  yet  Belarusian  thoughtlessness  could  change  this.  In  September,  1992, the 
military thus pledged allegiance to Belarus on  the 500-year anniversary of the battle at 
Orsha, in which the Lithuanian Grand Duchy had defeated Russian forces.
337 This event was 
mostly ignored in Russia, but those, who noticed it, found the Belarusians provocative. Two 
months  later,  Ukrainian  Dmytro  Pavlychko  provoked  even  more,  when  distinguishing 
civilised Ukraine from allegedly barbaric, Tartar Russia, founded by Genghis Khan. Pavlychko 
then claimed that Ukraine, but not Russia should be accepted by the West.
338 Russians knew 
Kravchuk’s  government  did  not  listen  to  Pavlychko,  and  they  bore  his  attack,  yet  the 
possibility for future tension existed. 
 
Language 
Law: Official rights 
Russian  was  the  language  of  Soviet  inter-ethnic  communication,  yet  in  the  late  1980s 
Gorbachev’s administration understood republican dissidents increasingly criticised this. To 
partly accommodate them, in 1987 a Moscow conference organised by the Academy of 
Sciences  of  the  USSR  and  the  journal  Istoriia  SSSR  witnessed  several,  mainly  Russian 
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participants re-evaluating linguistic relations between the Soviet peoples.
339 In 1989, the 
UkSSR  witnessed  a  practica l  consequence  of  this,  when  Volodymyr  Ivashko,  speaking 
Russian and Ukrainian equally well, was elected leader of the Ukrainian Communist Party.
340 
Ukrainians, conversely, showed tolerance towards Russian language in their 1990 language 
law, which potentially provided Russian language with official status equal to Ukrainian; the 
status  differing  from  region   to  region  within  the  UkSSR,  depending  on  the  linguistic 
preferences of locals.
341  The intention was also visible in the CIS founding treaty from 
December, 1991, when Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian administrations pledged to “assist 
the expression, preservation and development of...the linguistic...originality of their national 
minorities...”
342 This was hardly a problem in Belarus, where the endangered language was 
Belarusian, not Russian. Nevertheless, although Belarusian in February, 1993, became the 
only state language, to be introduced in public and educational affairs by 1995 and 2000, 
free  use  of  Russian  was  guaranteed  by  law,  as  was  the  right  to  Russian-language 
education.
343  
 
Power: Russian dominance 
It would have been difficult for the Belarusian authorities to limit the Russian language, 
though.  As  mentioned  above,  Russian  was  officially  used  for  Soviet  inter-ethnic 
communication, as First Secretary G. Markov at the plenum of the USSR Union of Writers in 
1988 reminded Belarusians.
344 Russian language was certainly prominent in the BSSR. In a 
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1989 census, two-thirds in the BSSR considered Belarusian their mother tongue; however, 
83% claimed fluency in Russian, opposed to 78% in Belarusian. Furthermore, in Minsk 20% 
saw themselves as ethnically Russian, but 53% regarded Russian as their mother tongue.
345 
Belarusians in other republics also spoke Russian: in the 1989 census over half of UkSSR 
Belarusians claimed that Russian, not Ukrainian or Belarusian, was their native tongue.
346 
For most Ukrainians in eastern UkSSR the situation was similar. When cooperating in the 
CIS, post-Soviet leaders therefore wanted to use the language they all spoke, and in January, 
1993, article 35 of the   new  Charter of the CIS  stated:  “The  working  language  of  the 
Commonwealth shall be Russian.”
347 This was popular in Crimea, where, by early 1993 all 
cultural life, including education, continued to be almost exclusively conducted in Russian
348 
with no signs that the Ukrainian leadership in Kyiv could change this. Similarly, Belarus as a 
whole faced a significant task if Belarusian was to dominate education. By 1993 the great 
majority  of  educational  textbooks,  especially  in  natural  sciences,   remained  written  in 
Russian. If the Belarusian authorities did not allow use of Russian, they either had to 
introduce  new  textbooks  in  Belarusian  very  quickly,  or  su ffer  a  substantial  fall  in 
professional standards.
349  
 
Nation: Rights of Russian-speakers  
Under these circumstances, linguistic disputes had barely appeared in Belarus and Ukraine. 
In principle, it might have been arrogant that only 27% of Russians living in the BSSR claimed 
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fluency  in  Belarusian,
350  even  though  this  language,  like  Ukrainian,  was   hardly  much 
different from Russian. Likewise, in the UkSSR only a third of Russians claimed command of 
a Ukrainian language they still saw as uncouth.
351 Yet, Russians did not intend to insult 
titulars, and many of the latter primarily spoke Russian, anyway . It did not help   when 
Gorbachev in January, 1990, complained that Ukrainian nationalists had presented the idea 
of spreading Ukrainian language in their republic without considering the rights of Russian 
majorities in the east and south of the republic.
352 At the time the spread of Ukrainian was 
limited,  and  Gorbachev’s  worries  unnecessary.  Following  the  Soviet  collapse,  a  few 
Ukrainians did attack Russian language; notoriously, the director of public education in L’viv, 
Iryna Kalynets, in 1992 decided to close local Russian-language schools and declared that 
Russian should be taught like any other foreign language.
353 Yet, Kalynets was not supported 
from  Kyiv  and  even  in  L’viv  her  plans  were  mostly  not  carried  out.  Similarly,  in  1993 
suggestions  that  Belarusian  language  development  was  hampered  by  the  dominance  of 
Russian  language  remained  in  obscure  academic  debates,
354  since  Russian  language 
remained a very useful tool for inhabitants in Belarus and Ukraine. 
 
Religion 
Law: Freedom of conscience 
Having traditionally been denounced by the Communist Party and the Soviet state, religious 
institutions were still integrated through the Council for Religious Affairs (CRA), which was 
controlled  by  the  Soviet  authorities  and  generally  not  represented  at  republican  level. 
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However, as exceptions to this, the UkSSR had its own CRA, as did the RSFSR from 1986.
355 
Thus,  by  the  late  1980s  religious  authorities  in  these  republics  were  relatively  less 
constrained than in neighbouring republics. The Russian Orthodox Church and the G reek 
Catholic, or Uniate, Church had competed among Ukrainians in the Russian empire and the 
early Soviet decades, but they might now become useful allies to each other against the 
Soviet centre. In June, 1990, the new Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Chu rch, Aleksii II, 
thus offered that parishioners in western UkSSR should freely choose their allegiance if this 
could be done in an orderly and legal fashion.
356 In return, by 1991 the UkSSR leadership 
allowed freedom of conscience by law, while the Uniate Church in May regained recognition 
as an independent entity, following subordination to the Russian Orthodox Church for half a 
century.
357 
 
Power: Common religion 
The Russian Empire had strongly furthered the  similarity of Orthodoxy among Russians, 
Belarusians and Ukrainians, though. Indeed, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church 
was absorbed into the Russian Orthodox Church by the late seventeenth century,
358 and 
thus now had little  independent tradition to go by. Indeed, the four Soviet republics that 
had specifically shared Russian Orthodoxy included the RSFSR, BSSR and UkSSR,
359 together 
with the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, while Armenian Monophysite Orthodoxy and 
Georgian Orthodoxy followed somewhat different denominations and the other republics 
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had  Muslim,  Protestant  and  Catholic  traditions.  If  religion  was  to  flourish  again,  most 
Russians believed Russian Orthodoxy should dominate among Ukrainians, and Belarusians, 
too.  In  1988,  even  the  Soviet  leadership  marked  the  millennium  of  the  adoption  of 
Christianity by Kievan Rus’ with a focus on Russia, paying little attention to Ukraine.
360 Most 
Russians  did  not  even  consider  religion  to  be  an  issue  distinguishing  Ukrainians  from 
Russians. By the late 1980s only 9% of Russians distinguished Ukrainians by religion, as 
opposed  to  36%  who  distinguished  Central  Asians.
361  Aleksii II exploited such elite and 
popular Russian sentiments in December, 1990, in an open letter to Gorbachev. The 
Patriarch called on Gorbachev to clamp down on republican separatism,
362 not least in the 
UkSSR, where many more Orthodox churches remained than in the RSFSR. And following 
independence, Russians outside the church acknowledged the need to retain religious 
bonds, too. In April, 1992, a meeting between prominent Russian and Ukraini an academics 
easily identified a common Orthodox Christianity among factors that could reunite their 
peoples.
363  
 
Nation: Property disagreements 
By the early 1990s it was therefore unlikely that religion would split Russians from their 
neighbours. Admittedly, following centuries of Polish and Habsburg domination in western 
Ukraine most west Ukrainians remained Uniates,
364 who were dissatisfied that the Russian 
Orthodox Church was well positioned to take advantage of newfound liberties, while the 
                                                           
360 Kubicek, History, p. 125 
361 N. Dinello, “Religious Attitudes of Russian Minorities and National Identity” in V. Shlapentokh, M. 
Sendich and E. Payin, eds, The New Russian Diaspora: Russian minorities in the former Soviet 
republics, Armonk, NY, and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1994, p. 199 
362 P. Duncan, Russian Messianism: third Rome, revolution, communism and after, London: Routledge, 
2000, p. 127 
363 I. Leonov, “Rossiia i Ukraina posle gibeli SNG,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 18.4.1992 
364 Kolstoe, p. 172 132 
 
Uniate Church had to overcome decades of subjugation.
365 Dissatisfaction did breed a few 
disputes between the churches, and in January, 1990, the Russian Orthodox Metropolitan 
Kirill of Leningrad even accused the Uniates of using violence in the context of the numerous 
property disputes developing between the churches.
366 The Metropolitan exaggerated the 
problem, and he received little attention from wider society. Yet certainly many Russians 
would like to use Russian Orthodoxy to promote Russian interests.
367 In early 1992 Rutskoi 
even used religious terminology against Ukrainian sovereignty, proclaiming that no Russian 
would ever abandon sacred Russian soil.
368 In theory, such use of religion could hurt Russo-
Ukrainian  relations,  and  in  July,  1992,  the  Ukrainian  parliament  poin tedly  refused  to 
recognise the Russian-backed deposition of Metropolitan Filaret of Kyiv as head of the 
Ukrainian  branch  of  the  Russian  Orthodox  Church.
369  However,  for  most  Russians, 
Ukrainians and Belarusians religion remained irrelevant after years of official persecution. 
 
Conclusion 
Between  1990  and  1993,  the  paradigm  of  Power  dominated  Russian  perceptions  of 
Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  cultural  sovereignty.  Concerning  perceptions  of  history,  Soviet 
authorities consistently presented Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians as belonging to the 
same Motherland. Subsequently, this cohesiveness even showed as the CIS replaced the 
Soviet Union. Having defeated the Soviet centre, however, El’tsin had to seek legitimacy 
elsewhere in history and thus chose the Russian Empire and its St Andrew’s Flag. Similarly, 
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Ambartsumov longed for Imperial Russian borders rather than a Soviet union of peoples, 
but the fundamental idea was similar. Concerning perceptions of language, Russian was 
wholly dominant within the RSFSR, BSSR and UkSSR, both officially and in practice, and it 
was unsurprising that Russian was chosen as the official language of the CIS. It was seen 
almost as a higher form of communication than local languages; a perception enforced by 
the use of Russian for the sciences and in official contexts. Russian language symbolised 
inter-ethnic accord, and Russians could thus see nothing wrong in regions such as Crimea 
where the language dominated. Finally, in matters concerning religion, Imperial practice had 
united Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians through Russian Orthodoxy for centuries, and 
Soviet practice, somewhat surprisingly, did this, too, in its institutionalisation of religious 
affairs, and in historical celebrations. Russian religious leaders such as Aleksii II had a vested 
interest in retaining joint adherence to Russian Orthodoxy, and he and his church managed 
to convince Russian scholars similarly, to the extent where religion once more became an 
element in Russian great power thinking. 
 
The paradigm of Law also significantly influenced Russian perceptions of Belarusian and 
Ukrainian  cultural  sovereignty.  Concerning  perceptions  of  history,  the  Soviet  Union  had 
periodically  hailed  the Ukrainian  historical  contribution,  and  El’tsin,  too,  highlighted the 
historical  importance  of  Kyiv  by  visiting  it  for the  1990  RSFSR-UkSSR  treaty.  Post-Soviet 
Russia, however, needed a new beginning and in the widespread nation-building debates 
some  suggested  that  Russians  should  look  to  Novgorod  as  their  ancestral  city,  just  like 
Belarusians  thought  of  liberation  from  their  Kyivan  origins.  Concerning  linguistic  issues, 
Gorbachev’s administration understood that it might be helpful, but not too dangerous to 
accommodate republican dissidents, while republican leaders for their part ensured that 134 
 
inter-ethnic  disputes  would  not  arise  by  ensuring  expansive  legal  rights  for  the  various 
linguistic  groups.  Although  in  practice  the  preservation  and  spread  of  titular  languages 
remained limited, the CIS, too, openly promoted such rights. Finally, in matters of religion, 
all religious communities were united in their struggle against Soviet domination and at 
times enforced atheism. If anything, the Russian Orthodox and Uniate Churches had less 
reason to worry about each other than about the widespread religious apathy that was 
bound to persist after many decades of Soviet rule. 
 
The paradigm of Nation was insignificant. Historical disputes remained obscure for the vast 
majority of Russians, Belarusians and Ukraine. Linguistic disputes were hardly possible while 
Russian language so overwhelmingly dominated. Finally, in religious matters the various 
parties had to reconsolidate their organisations independently of the Soviet Union, before 
they could truly compete. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 135 
 
Chapter 5: Constructing sovereignty (1993-1999) 
Constructing political sovereignty 
Territory 
Law: The Friendship Treaty 
Belarusians and Ukrainians now argued that integration should be mutually beneficial. In 
September, 1994, Belarusian President Lukashenko insisted that Russo-Belarusian territorial 
integration depended on Russian economic subsidies.
370 Similarly, the May, 1997, Friendship 
Treaty between Russia and Ukraine was a treaty between equal parties, which “respect the 
territorial unity of each other and confirm the inviolability of their mutual borders.”
371 This 
constituted the first post-Soviet territorial confirmation of shared borders. Russian public 
opinion  approved:  an  opinion  poll  from  that  summer  showed  that  only  13%  supported 
recreating the USSR, while 34% directly opposed Russian mergers with any neighbours.
372 
The  combination  of  the  Friendship  Treaty  and  lack  of  Russian  interest  in  territorial 
revanchism allowed Ukrainian Foreign Minister, Hennadii Udovenko, in February, 1998, to 
state  that  Russo-Ukrainian  territorial  disputes  could  not  exist.
373  Russian  ministers 
understood  that  Ukrainians  would  not  allow  territorial  disputes  to  resurface,  and  in 
December, 1998, Foreign Minister Igor’ Ivanov persuaded the Russian parliament to ratify 
the Friendship Treaty, warning that failure would strengthen those Ukrainians seeking to 
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move away from Russia.
374 Nevertheless, Ivanov wanted to reintegrate with Ukraine; he just 
understood that overt pressure would be counterproductive. Similarly, in  his subsequent 
memoirs El’tsin seemed to have lost his principled support for the territorial status quo. 
While praising the territorial guarantees, El’tsin now did so because this outcome assisted 
economic and other negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.
375 Territorial guarantees had 
become a means with which Ukrainians could be appeased in order to acquiesce to what 
were allegedly more important agreements. 
 
Power: Formalising Russo-Belarusian cooperation 
El’tsin expected Ukraine and Belarus to rejoin Russia in the near future, anyway. By 1994, 
only about one-third of respondents in Ukraine identified with the state they resided in, 
while half would have voted for continued union and against Ukrainian independence in a 
new referendum.
376 Russians understandably remained reluctant to demarcate borders with 
Ukraine, which might return to Russia at any moment.
377 This might even begin a more 
widespread process.  In October,  1995,  military commander and  soon-to-be  presidential 
candidate Aleksandr Lebed’ stated confidently that: “the nearest future will witness the 
unification of the former Soviet republics, which will hand over their authority to a central 
power...”
378 The founding of the CIS signalled this and in April, 1996, territorial reintegration 
moved decisively forward with the Russo-Belarusian Community, which led to the Charter of 
the Union of Russia and Belarus. This Charter facilitated developing joint institutions, union 
citizenship  and,  especially:  “the  voluntary  unification  of  the  member-states  of  the 
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Charter...”
379  Lebed’  and  other  members  of  the  Russian  military  strongly  supported  the 
process, remaining convinced that Belarusian borders should be protected against foreign, 
Western,  incursions.
380  Lukashenko, too,  rejoiced  in September, 1996,  that  the Russian 
government now recognised the western border of Belarus as being the western border of 
Russia.
381  Importantly,  El’tsin  agreed.  In  January,  1997,  the  re-elected,  reinvigorated 
President even suggested to Lukashenko that their states should hold a referendum  on 
complete reunification.
382 According to El’tsin, as he put it in April, 1997, “The purpose of 
forming the [Russo-Belarusian] Union was simply to create new conditions for the fruitful 
rapprochement of the states...”
383 His government concurred. In May, 1997, Chernomyrdin 
remarked  that  “the  Union  agreement]  will  allow  the  brotherly  [Russian  and  Belarusian] 
peoples to begin a new level of intergovernmental relations [including] in the sphere of 
cooperation  on  border  issues.”
384  Soon,  Primakov  endorsed  unification,  too:  “...the 
agreement on [a Russo-Belarusian Union]...is an exceptionally important mechanism on the 
road  to  unification.”
385  Primakov  wanted  similar  unification  with  Ukraine.  Despite  the 
Friendship Treaty, he noted about Russo-Ukrainian border demarcation in August, 1997, 
that: “To put it mildly, this is not a question for today.”
386 Similarly, in one 1997 survey, 44% 
of Russians in Ukraine and 31% of Ukrainians agreed that the restoration of the USSR was 
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possible “in principle.”
387 Leaders in Moscow and Minsk agreed and focused on the benefits 
that unity might bring. In January, 1999, Lukashenko stated to the joint Russo-Belarusian 
parliamentary assembly that the Russo-Belarusian union might become the core of a Slavic 
civilisation, counteracting Western international unipolarity.
388 This process seemed to have 
reached its apex in December, 1999, when the Union State of Russia and Belarus was 
created; a State in which “The member states shall ensure the unity and inviolability of the 
territory  of  the  Union  State.”
389  Integration  would  most  likely  continue  after  El’tsin;  in 
December, 1999, Prime Minister Putin confirmed that relations with Belarus constituted the 
most important level of integration for Russia within the CIS.
390  
 
Nation: Unaccepted borders at land and at sea 
However, it remained doubtful whether integration with Ukraine would be equally dynamic. 
Latent potential for trouble remained, exemplified in September, 1994, when the Russian 
government only pledged to respect mutual borders, while Ukrainians wanted Russians to 
accept them.
391 Evidently, Russians did not want the borders to become permanent, and 
this worried the Ukrainian leadership. In May, 1995, Ukrainian President Kuchma referred to 
Russia when opposing alleged desires to rearrange the political map by force.
392 Presently, 
the neighbours of Russia had no real cause for concern, but anxiety  grew even in Belarus, 
where the April, 1996, agreement to form a Russo-Belarusian community triggered massive 
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street protests in Minsk, quickly and violently suppressed.
393 It would be misleading to state 
that Russians actively stoked such concerns, yet by October 1996 Chernomyrdin refuse d to 
defend Ukrainian territorial integrity against claims advanced by the Russian Duma, arguing 
that the problem was Ukrainian procrastination in dividing Soviet  assets.
394 The territorial 
guarantees provided by the Friendship Treaty in May, 1997,  did not include sea borders, 
leaving Ukraine unable to drill for undoubtedly significant gas reserves in the Black Sea shelf 
and thus becoming an energy exporter, instead  of remaining dependent on Russia.
395 
Ukrainians also noted that El’tsin’s domestic opponents continued promoting revanchism. In 
1997, Aleksei Mitrofanov, member of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and 
Chairman of the Duma committee on geopolitics, thus stated: “...the separation of...Galicia 
[from  the  rest  of  Ukraine]  is  self-evident...the  aspiration  of  inhabitants  of  Crimea  and 
Donbas to unite with ethnically related Russia is an objective fact...reunification of Volyn’ to 
the  Russo-Belarusian  union  is  an  inescapable  fact...”
396  These  comments  were  not 
challenged by El’tsin. Successful, mutually beneficial integration between Russia and Belarus 
might have allayed Ukrainian fears, but by September, 1998, Igor’ Ivanov complained: “I 
think that neither we nor the Belorussian side are satisfied with what has been achieved. I 
believe that we have got a long way to go.”
397 Did Belarusians want to go that way? Did 
Russians care what Belarusians wanted? The Ukrainian government was not waiting to find 
out, but allowed its border troops to cooperate with Azerbaijani and Georgian colleagues, 
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the latter contemplating resisting Russian assistance to local, secessionist movements.
398 
Similar assistance seemed impossible in the case of Crimea following Russian parliamentary 
ratification of the Friendship Treaty in December, 1998, yet Luzhkov  claimed that “up to 
80%  *of  Russians+  are  opposed  to  this  treaty,”  while  other  commentators  complained: 
“ratification does not improve relations with Ukraine. Russia will lose Sevastopol’, Crimea 
and the possibility to use the Kerch Strait for free.”
399 The treaty did not reflect this, and the 
Russian  government  seemed  reasonably  satisfied  with  the  status  quo.  But  territorial 
disputes had certainly become a salient issue in Russian politics. In July, 1999, a worried 
Lukashenko threatened alliance with the West if Russians disagreed with unification on his 
terms,
400  and  in  October  he  complained:  “It  seems  as  if  it  is  necessary  to  play  the 
Belorussian card before the elections in Russia. But nobody will be allowed to treat our state 
in that fashion.”
401 It remained to be seen whether Putin agreed. 
 
Governance 
Law: Cooperation and Partnership 
The absence of a powerful, authoritarian opponent began to diminish Russian support for 
Ukrainian  democracy,  yet  most  Ukrainians,  despite  post-independence  difficulties,  knew 
that Russia could hardly fundamentally challenge their democratic governance. In February, 
1995, the bilateral draft Russo-Ukrainian Cooperation and Partnership treaty worried some 
Ukrainians seeing the draft as leading to the loss of Ukrainian independence. Yet even the 
new,  Russia-friendly  President  Kuchma  accepted  he  had  been  elected  President  of  an 
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independent state, which he would defend.
402 Russians knew this, and official criticis m of 
Ukrainian  governance  on  behalf  of  Russians  in  Ukraine  refrained  from  challenges  to 
Ukrainian sovereign governance.  For his part, in August, 1995,  Kuchma emphasised that 
Ukraine was capable of protecting the Russian diaspora and their rights.
403 Increasingly, the 
Russian government tried to elicit a similar reaction from Belarus. In March, 1997, Russians 
sharply criticised a Belarusian crackdown on local and Russian journalists and opposition 
forces,  while  El’tsin’s  adviser  Sergei  Iastrzhembskii  expressed  deep  concern  regarding 
Belarusian media treatment in general, thus following Western criticism of Lukashenko.
404 
Similarly, when El’tsin criticised Ukrainian and Belarusian governance, he often did so based 
on internationally recognised norms. Following the signing of the Union Treaty with Belarus 
in May, 1997, El’tsin emphasised provisions on freedom of speech and the press, political 
party activity, property rights and a market economy.
405 Unlike Lukashenko, El’tsin’s circles 
wanted to restore the international reputation of Russia, having suffered deeply during the 
first Chechen campaign. Without doing so, as Solzhenitsyn noted in 1998, Russia could not 
credibly defend Russian minorities abroad.
406 Lukashenko resented the criticism, but did not 
in return attack Russians resident in Belarus. Instead, he attempted to engage with Russian 
regional leaders, showing El’tsin that Russia should embark on decentralisation, too.
407  
 
Power: Presidential backing and parallel centralisations 
                                                           
402 I. Sokolovskaia, “Ukraina budet sotrudnichat’ s Rossiei, no ne tak, kak Belarus’ i Kazakhstan,” Izvestiia, 
10.2.1995 
403 Molchanov, p. 217 
404 Markus, p. 60 
405 M. Polezhaev, “Soiuz usiago,” Kommersant, 24.5.1997, p. 1 
406 A. Solzhenitsyn, Rossiia v obvale, Moscow: Russkii put’, 1998, p. 81 
407 N. Petrov, “The Implications of Centre-Region politics for Russia’s North-west Border Regions” in O. 
Antonenko and K. Pinnick, eds., Russia and the European Union: prospects for a new relationship, 
London and New York: Routledge and IISS, 2005, pp. 142, 143 142 
 
Yet the Russian executive wanted to persuade, but seldom force neighbouring states back to 
centralised governance. To succeed, Russians had to ensure that administrations in Minsk 
and Kyiv listened to Russian advice, and here Shushkevich and Kravchuk were sometimes 
found wanting. Thus, El’tsin allegedly ensured that Lukashenko became Belarusian President 
in July, 1994, informing Lukashenko: “We congratulate you...Information has already come 
from the Kremlin. You are President. We are certain about the results. The Kremlin does not 
want to be mistaken in you.”
408 While such blunt intervention was not alleged in Ukraine, 
El’tsin openly supported Kuchma’s campaign and even appeared on Ukrainian television to 
support Kuchma.
409 After Kuchma’s victory, Russians could expect a more Russia-friendly 
Ukraine, since elites in Ukraine, including Deputy Chairman of parliament Vladimir Grinev, 
Defence Minister Konstantin Morozov, and Prosecutor General Viktor Shishkin, were often 
Russian.
410 Belarusian loyalty was further ensured i n September, 1996,  when Lukashenko 
visited Moscow and then made exaggerated claims of Russian backing for him and his plans 
for  an  extended presidential term. Soon his opponent, Deputy Parliamentary Speaker 
Henadz Karpenka, was likewise seeking Russian assistance.
411 At the same time, tradition of 
intervention did not prevent the Russian government from telling third parties to stay away. 
In January, 1997, when Belarusian membership in the Council of Europe was suspended, a 
Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman called the decision rash,
412 since only Russians reserved 
the right to influence Belarusian and Ukrainian politics from the outside. This position was 
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strengthened  when the  EU  introduced  sanctions  against  Belarus  and Lukashenko.
413  Yet 
Russians  hardly cared about Lukashenko and Kuchma as   individuals; support was only 
provided to them at politically critical junctures,  including  elections. Otherwise, Russian 
interest  in  perceived  provincial  politics  was  limited.  B y  mid-1997  few  thought  about 
corruption scandals surrounding previous Ukrainian Prime Minister, Pavlo Lazarenko, while 
some parliamentarians allegedly confused Lazarenko’s predecessor, Evhen Marchuk, with 
Vitol’d  Fokin,  Prime  Minister  between  1990  and  1992.
414  This  mostly  detached,  but 
periodically  highly  active  approach  served  Russia  well.  Whereas  Russia-sceptic  political 
oppositions in Belarus and Ukraine were disenfranchised, the Russian leadership could still 
benefit from their dissatisfaction. The Ukrainian parliamentary election in 1998 witnessed a 
70%  turnout.  However,  among  those,  who  voted,  66%  professed  little  trust  for  the 
politicians they voted for.
415 Kuchma thus had limited options of building a domestic popular 
coalition loyal to him, possibly allowing Russians to magnify Ukrainian dissatisfaction with 
Kuchma, if needed. A similar lack of alternatives to Russian assistance allowed Russians to 
ignore promises of assistance to local administrations in Belarus and Ukraine , such as in 
October, 1998, when the city council of Sevastopol’ complained that Luzhkov had neglected 
promises to support the local budget and treated the city as part of an unimportant Russian 
province.
416  Lukashenko,  too,  did  not  get  all  the  assistance  he  wanted  from  Russo -
Belarusian integration. Yet, in 1999, when  Lukashenko successfully extended his term until 
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2001, El’tsin duly met with Lukashenko and supported him.
417 The Russian governmental 
newspaper, Rossiiskaia gazeta, also stated: “In Belarus has appeared a new version of the 
state Constitution, approved by referendum in 1996 and the legitimacy of this Basic Law 
does not need to be supported and recognised abroad.”
418 At least while the Basic Law 
corresponded to Russian wishes, including in economic issues. Echoing developments five 
years before, persistent rumours suggested that Berezovskii was involved in ensuring TV 
support for Kuchma’s presidential re-election campaign in 1999.
419 The Russian government 
wanted this to continue. Following ratification of the Russo -Belarusian Union Treaty i n 
December, 1999, Prime Minister Putin claimed that integration was inevitable, that interest 
in integration would increase, and that the Union remained open to Ukraine.
420  
 
Nation: Defence of diaspora and the danger of Lukashenko 
Yet internal disputes in Ukraine might conversely force Russians to intervene. In January, 
1994, relations between Kyiv and Crimea worsened when Crimean President Iurii Meshkov 
partly succeeded in boycotting national elections, while securing a majority of seats in the 
Crimean parliament.
421 A local referendum two months later approved Crimean autonomy, 
dual  citizenship  and  widening  of  Meshkov’s  powers.
422  Although  not  openly  suggested, 
Meshkov could potentially promote closer connections with Russia, where parliamentarians 
contemplated  how  to  protect  Russians  outside  Russia.  This  prospect  frightened 
neighbouring legislatures and in December 1994 Belarusian Parliament Speaker Miacheslav 
                                                           
417 V. Panfilova and N. Pulina, “Rossiia i Ukraina podderzhivaiut belorusskogo prezidenta,” Nezavisimaia 
gazeta, 22.7.1999 
418 “Belorussiia,” Rossiiskaia gazeta, 23.7.1999 
419 A. Budberg, “Rokovaia rokirovka,” Moskovskii komsomolets, 6.3.1999 
420 L. Nazarova, “Rossiisko-belorusskii soiuz,” Moskovskaia pravda, 14.12.1999 
421 V. Pasiakin, “Inaguratsiia pervogo prezidenta Kryma,” Krasnaia zvezda, 5.2.1994 
422 Sasse, p. 88; S. Prokopenko, “Novyi parlament na staroi tiage,” Krasnaia zvezda, 30.3.1994 145 
 
Hryb  protested  against  a  suggestion  from  the  Duma  that  the  parliaments  hold  a  joint 
session,  even  deeming  the  suggestion  unconstitutional.
423  However,  Lukashenko hardly 
supported Hryb and bilateral tension was minimised. Russo-Ukrainian relations, conversely, 
worsened after Kuchma as mentioned imposed presidential rule on Crimea. In March, 1995, 
El’tsin’s aide Dmitrii Riurikov reacted to the annulment of the Crimean constitution with 
threats: “Moscow views the decision of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine as a serious legal 
step, which will...have repercussions for the inhabitants of Crimea....The Russian leadership 
would  prefer  that  in  the  aftermath  of  similar  decisions  there  would  not 
appear...consequences, the regulation of which Russia would...have to become involved in 
due to well-known circumstances.”
424 Such threats would probably not be carried out, but in 
April  El’tsin  postponed  a  visit  to  Kyiv,  declaring  this  would  take  place  when  he  was 
convinced  that  relations  between  Kyiv  and  Simferopol’  were  not  developing  in  a  way 
detrimental to Crimea, since Russia worried for the Russian majority there.
425 Not too much 
should be read into this; El’tsin would have discussed the long-mooted Friendship Treaty 
during the visit, and it might have been embarrassing to acknowledge that limited progress 
was being made.  
 
Yet El’tsin certainly had domestic support for defending Russians in Ukraine. In May, 1995, a 
Duma  statement  denounced  the  annulment  of  the  Crimean  Presidency  as  violating 
Crimeans’  will.  Parliamentary  committee  chair  Zatulin  deplored  an  allegedly  imminent 
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dismantling  of  the  Russian  presence  on  Crimea,
426  while  Deputy  Speaker  Aleksandr 
Vengerovskii of the LDPR compared the situation to that in Yugoslavia and “longed to teach 
a  lesson”  to  the  Ukrainians.
427  This did not reflect official foreign policy, although  in 
September, 1995, a document concerning the strategic course of Russia towards CIS-states 
stressed:  “In  the  case  of  violation  of  the  rights  of  Russians  [rossiian]  in  the  CIS-states, 
possible  avenues  of  pressure...[concern]  financial,  economic,  military-political  and  other 
types  of  cooperation  between  Russia  and  the  state  in  question...”
428  The  government 
wanted to be capable of intervening abroad in future, if necessary. El’tsin also wanted to 
signal to Lukashenko, Kuchma and others that he would be prepared to avenge outside 
intervention in Russian governance. Although a somewhat remote possibility, by the mid-
1990s  Russian  governance  was  in  turmoil,  with  a  weakening  President,  a  vociferous, 
somewhat  reactionary  parliamentary  opposition,  and  a  number  of  pretenders  to  the 
presidency  among  other  actors,  too.  It  was  thus  not  impossible  that  Belarusians  and 
Ukrainians might become involved in domestic Russian politics. Lukashenko had become so 
popular in the Russian provinces by October, 1997, that the Kremlin at one point took the 
highly controversial step of banning airports in Iaroslavl and Lipetsk from accepting any 
plane with Lukashenko on board.
429 No real tension developed, but it was unsurprising that 
the El’tsin administration suspected Lukashenko of preying on Russian weakness, for this 
was done by Russian politicians abroad. In August, 1998, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry 
openly  accused  Luzhkov  of  interfering  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Ukraine,  and  of  lacking 
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respect towards its sovereignty, after he had denied the possibility of Ukrainian governance 
over  Crimeans  and,  especially,  Sevastopol’:  “...Sevastopol’  –  that’s  a  special  city  on  the 
whole...it  was  always  an  independent  administrative  entity...If  Ukraine  doesn’t  return 
Crimea and Sevastopol’...*Russians+ will undoubtedly remember that *Ukraine+ unjustly rules 
this territory, these cities...”
430 Belarus was not targeted by such criticism, but in September, 
1999, Lukashenko did complain that the Russian media regularly dismissed him and his 
administration  as  provincial  nobodies,  who  only  wanted  to  exploit  Russian  goodwill; 
Lukashenko’s fear that such rhetoric might eventually undermine Belarusian governance 
was understandable.
431 By October, 1999, the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy feared 
an authoritarian Belarus formally united with Russia might influence the latter, since “...the 
Russian elite do not want to take the chance that the exit of B. El’tsin can result in the 
presidency of A. Lukashenko.”
432 
 
Ideology 
Law: Peacemakers 
Even after he had lost the Ukrainian presidency, by January and again by October, 1995, 
Kravchuk continued to highlight that a sovereign Ukrainian state ideology was necessary, 
not to defend Ukraine against Russian advances, but simply because a post-Soviet Ukraine 
had to be able to stand on its own in the international environment.
433 And, indeed, if 
Russian attitudes threatened Belarus and Ukraine they  mostly seemed to do so through 
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neglect.  Russian  ignorance  of  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  affairs  became  increasingly 
widespread, leading analysts in Russia to complain about “...the loss of initiative, of the 
strategic position of Russia not only in the post-Soviet, but in the East European region, as 
well.”
434  But  such  statements  only  highlighted  that  Russian  disengagement  from  the 
neighbourhood increased. Lukashenko understood this development and was prepared to 
construct a sovereign ideology for Belarus, too. Already in October, 1995, he stated his 
intent to loosen CIS integration, arguing that the organisation should take more inspiration 
from the EU than from state-building measures.
435 At the same time, with the ability of 
Russian nationalists to challenge  El’tsin steadily decreasing, he had little need to favour 
imperial slogans, but was free to construct a normal state, following prevalent, Western 
international norms.
436 Additionally, El’tsin had partly bound his legitimacy together with an 
internationally  responsible  Russia  and  often  prevented  the  domestic  opposition  from 
scuppering  useful  cooperation  with  Ukraine.  In  November,  1997,  he  even  warned  self-
ascribed Russian patriots against fomenting strife in this bilateral relationship,
437 when this 
could damage cooperation on issues such as the continued prevention of civil war in 
Moldova, which was focused on by Russia and Ukraine during 1998 and 1999.
438  
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And yet, El’tsin would find it natural to advocate well-known supranational ideologies. In 
July, 1994, he certainly used Kuchma’s and Lukashenko’s elections as Presidents to state 
that  this  demonstrated  the  Russophile  aspirations  of  Ukrainians  and  Belarusians.
439  The 
aspect of potential Eurasian unison was wholeheartedly taken up by t he Russian political 
opposition, too.  Communist  leader  Gennadii  Ziuganov  described  “Great,”  “White”  and 
“Little  Russians”  as  the  Slavic  core,
440  that  could  promote  a  general-Eurasian  Russian 
ideology based on “the tolerance and indifference to ethnicity of the Russian people.”
441 
That neighbouring peoples should be convinced, not forced to once more ally with Russia 
was  presidential  policy,  too.  In  September,  1995,  El’tsin’s  decree  outlining  the  strategic 
course  of  Russia  towards  the  CIS  emphasised:  “Special  attention  must  be  given  to 
establishing Russia as the main educational centre on post-Soviet territory with a concern 
for the necessity of educating the young generation of the CIS-states in a spirit of friendly 
relations with Russia.”
442 From Minsk, Lukashenko wholeheartedly agreed to these aims, 
perhaps being slightly jealous that his state did not receive the same attention as Russia. In 
October,  1995,  Lukashenko  emphasised  that  his  state  had  to  gain  wider  international 
influence through Russia, since only Russia could facilitate the building of relations between 
CIS states.
443 The Russian government did not want foreign interference in Belarus, either. In 
June, 1997, in the words of ministerial spokesman Gennadii Tarasov, the Russian Foreign 
Ministry once more highlighted that Ukraine and Belarus were prioritised by Russia and that 
actors from outside the region therefore had no right to try and usurp Russian influence 
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there.
444 At the same time, Kuchma’s and Lukashenko’s administration, although intent on 
constructing some sort of sovereign ideology, could not ignore that many of their citizens 
were closely linked to Russia. Thus, by 1997, 57% of Russians in Ukraine were born in the 
UkSSR or Ukraine. The Russian diaspora could therefore champion closer links to Russia, 
while legitimately demanding recognition as an indigenous people in Ukraine.
445 This helped 
El’tsin, in November, 1997, to stress that no one could or should set Russia and Ukraine 
against  each  other.  Both  states  could  rejoice  in  the  successes  of  each  other
446  and, it 
appeared, could conversely not rejoice in successes that harmed the other state. Certainly, a 
majority of titulars in Belarus and Ukraine believed Russia would try  to gain control of their 
state; by the late 1990s this was  believed by 85% of Belarusians and 91% of Ukrainians.
447 
Yet despite El’tsin’s efforts, some Russian commentators still feared that the United States 
could lure Ukraine away from Russia; a development that was seen to spell the end of 
Russia  itself.  In  1998,  Solzhenitsyn  accused  America  of  using  independent  Ukraine  to 
weaken and eventually “disintegrate” Russia according to plans inspired by old German, 
geopolitical strategies.
448 Nevertheless, as it turned out, many in Ukraine identified with 
Russia.  As  late  as  during  the  parl iamentary  elections  of  1998 -99,  the  policy  of  the 
Communist  Party  of  Ukraine,  easily  the  political  party  in  Ukraine  with  the  largest 
membership, still remained “the voluntary creation of an equal Union of fraternal peoples” 
on formerly Soviet territory.
449 
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Nation: Dual citizenship 
It was increasingly possible that Russian action could undermine such prospects, though. 
El’tsin’s government had long resisted vilifying Belarusians and Ukrainians, but following the 
parliamentary  election  in  December,  1993,  which  was  a  partial  success  for  Vladimir 
Zhirinovskii’s  strident  nationalist  rhetoric,  and  a  failure  for  parties  endorsed  by  the 
government,  Foreign  Minister  Kozyrev  did  try  to  reclaim  popular  support  from  the 
nationalists by taking some of their ideology.
450 Most likely, Kozyrev did not believe in the 
rhetoric himself, but the Ukrainian  government was worried since the Russian citizenship 
law from November, 1991, still allowed any Soviet citizen to receive Russian citizenship, 
irrespective of residence. Belatedly, Ukrainian protests managed to have the law modified in 
June, 1994, thus reducing the risk of hosting disloyal residents,
451 but the success was short-
lived. Indeed, in April, 1995, El’tsin threatened that Russia would not be able to sign the 
long-awaited Friendship Treaty with its various territorial and other guarantees, as long as 
Ukraine  did  not  allow  for  dual  citizenship.
452  He  probably did not intend to undermine 
Ukraine from within, but he wanted the formal right to protect Russians in Ukraine against 
official discrimination. By November, 1995, Russians and Russian-speakers in Ukraine feared 
that the Ukrainian political elite might be on the way to constructing an ethnic state identity 
in a misguided attempt to disassociate the state from the CIS and Rus sia.
453 Such fears 
mostly  proved  unfounded  and  were  almost  absent  in  relation  to  Belarus.  Yet,  some 
Belarusians continued espousing  ideologies distancing  Belarus  from Russia. Before the 
signing of the Union Agreement in April, 1996, thousands protested in Minsk, fearing for the 
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political sovereignty of their state. Only violence and mass arrests stopped them.
454 Still, it 
was  clear  by  now  that  neither  Lukashenko  nor  Kuchma  wanted  to  alienate  Russia. 
Furthermore, as the political fortunes of the Russian oppositi on waned after the 1996 
presidential  election,  El’tsin’s  administration  had  less  reason  to  criticise  ideologies  of 
neighbouring states. However, other prominent politicians continued doing so. In July, 1997, 
Luzhkov  thus  appraised  the  Russo-Ukrainian  Friendship  Treaty  in  a  negative  light, 
complaining  that  insufficient  regard  was  given  to  the  interests  of  mighty  Russia  by 
subversive Ukrainian elites.
455 And by the last years of the 1990s, there were signs that  
Russians and Ukrainians  continued to have problems coexisting, not only in the western 
regions where Ukrainian ideologies had always been prominent, but in central Ukraine, too. 
Here less than 19% of inhabitants described themselves as ethnic Russians, not much higher 
than the 10% who did so  in the West.
456 This could indicate that previously self -defined 
Russians had begun to identify with the Ukrainian state, but it was more likely that they felt 
pressured into doing so; certainly, the proportion of self-ascribed ethnic Russians had fallen 
dramatically  in  central  Ukraine  during  the  1990s.  Conversely,  though,  some  Russian 
commentators were equally uncomfortable with Ukrainians openly subscribing to Russian 
state ideology. For these Ukrainians might really be working for the West, as  an “Atlanticist 
Trojan Horse,” in the words of prominent Russian commentator Aleksandr Dugin, willingly 
assisting the undermining of Russian great power ideology on behalf of the West.
457  
 
                                                           
454 P. Truscott, Russia First: breaking with the West, London: I.B. Tauris, 1997, pp. 60, 61 
455 S. Appatov, “Ukraine and the Atlantic Community: problems of security and development” in D. 
Albright and S. Appatov, eds., Ukraine and European Security, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999, p. 235 
456 M. Beletskii and A. Tolpygo, “Natsional’no-kul’turnye i ideologicheskie orientatsii naseleniia Ukrainy,” 
Polis, 4, 1998, pp. 76, 77 
457 A. Dugin, Osnovy geopolitiki (2
nd ed), Moscow: Arktogeia, 1999, p. 799 153 
 
Conclusion 
Between  1993  and  1999,  the  paradigm  of  Power  continued  to  dominate  Russian 
perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian political sovereignty. In territorial issues, this was 
visible in relations between Russia and Belarus, which signed a Community Treaty, a Charter 
of a Union State, and finally a Union State agreement. El’tsin promoted this development 
strongly, suggesting for instance a referendum on full integration in 1997, and his successor 
Putin also emphasised the importance of Russo-Belarusian integration. There was a marked 
sense  of  inevitability  in  Russian  rhetoric:  Lebed’  expected  neighbouring  states  to  “hand 
over” their territories, while Primakov talked about a specific “road to” full integration. In 
matters of governance, Russians were present in the Ukrainian government and helped 
secure  loyalty  there  towards  Russia.  Belarusian  loyalty  was  acquired  through  Russian 
support for Lukashenko’s election and extension of presidential term. Similarly, in Ukraine 
El’tsin personally supported Kuchma in 1994, while Putin supported increased integration of 
Russian and Belarusian governing structures. Russian rhetoric emphasised centralisation: 
officials allegedly told Lukashenko his election had been confirmed in Moscow, while the 
Russian state newspaper later noted that changes to the Belarusian constitution had “no 
need for recognition abroad.” Finally, in matters of ideology the Strategic Concept for the 
CIS  produced  in  1995  centred  on  the  idea  that  Russia  was  a  great  power  that  should 
centralise the post-Soviet region around itself. El’tsin repeatedly argued that this was what 
Belarusians and Ukrainians wanted, too, when they, for instance, elected Lukashenko and 
Kuchma in 1994, or agreed on Friendship and other treaties that allowed them to rejoice in 
Russian success. Russian rhetoric emphasised the “tolerance” of a Russian supranational 
ideology, as opposed to the “disintegration” imposed from the outside. 
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The  paradigm  of  Law  continued  to  have  some  influence  on  Russian  perceptions  of 
Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  political  sovereignty.  In  territorial  issues,  the  Russo-Ukrainian 
Friendship Treaty provided post-Soviet territorial guarantees, yet the support for this treaty 
from  both  El’tsin  and  Igor’  Ivanov  was  half-hearted,  as  means  to  the  end  of  keeping 
Ukrainians  close,  so  that  integration  might happen in future.  In  matters  of  governance, 
El’tsin strongly criticised the Belarusian administration for failing to ensure free speech in 
Belarus, while members of El’tsin’s administration expressed their concern for free media in 
Belarus. Yet such statements seemed short-lived, prompted by the Chechnia debacle, and 
were  not  followed  by  action.  Finally,  in  matters  of  ideology  Russia  continued  to  use 
sovereign Ukraine to legitimise peacekeeping in Moldova. The themes of peace and stability 
were  also  present  when  El’tsin  berated  domestic  opposition  for  fomenting  strife  with 
Ukraine,  yet  he  took  this  step  only  after  the  opposition  had  lost  the  1996  presidential 
election using such rhetoric. 
 
The paradigm of Nation remained the least important one, although its influence grew. In 
territorial  matters,  Russo-Ukrainian  sea  borders  had  still  not  been  agreed  and  official 
acceptance  of  land  borders  was  long  obstructed  by  the  parliaments.  In  matters  of 
governance, protests from the Russian executive on behalf of freedom of speech and media 
in Belarus barely camouflaged its reality as defence of the Russian diaspora, which could 
theoretically lead to armed intervention. Finally, in matters of ideology El’tsin advocated 
dual citizenship for Russians in Ukraine. He did not want to govern part of Ukraine, but to 
send a signal to Kyiv that Ukrainian state-building was moving in a problematic direction. 
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Forces of Belarus and Ukraine 
Law: Freedom to act 
In  January,  1994,  Russian  leaders  officially  accepted  the  sovereignty  of  a  non-nuclear 
Ukrainian military. If nuclear weapons were surrendered: “...Russia and the USA are ready to 
offer Ukraine security guarantees [and confirm] their obligation...to refrain from economic 
pressure, intended to subordinate *Ukrainian+ interests to its own...”
458 Many Ukrainians did 
not really believe in Russian guarantees, just as Arbatov’s opinion in December, 1994, that 
Russia should simply have close relations with a neutral Ukraine, receiving further security 
assurance from both East and West and thus abandoning any potential hostility towards 
Russia,
459 was in a minority. Yet it was undoubtedly true that Russian elites were happy to 
avoid the financial burden of keeping non -Russian forces up to date, in Ukraine and 
elsewhere. In February, 1996, the Ministry of Defence cancelled a programme training CIS 
officers in military colleges, as participating states were unwilling to pay for it, and Russia 
was unable to do so.
460 At the same time, Kuchma had no need to refuse Russian security 
guarantees, even if they were fe eble. In  December, 1996,  he stressed how international 
guarantees  for  Ukrainian  military  security  provided  by  the  January,  1994,  trilateral 
agreement between Ukraine, Russia and the USA, provided valuable input for a European 
security  system  and  for  constructing  Ukrainian  military  sovereignty  specifically  and 
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Ukrainian sovereignty more generally.
461 With this clever rhetoric, Kuchma had ensured that 
any future Russian attempt to challenge Ukrainian security could be seen as dangerous to 
Europe as a whole. This was valid in the case of the Black Sea Fleet, which El’tsin now knew 
Ukraine would not relinquish without compensation. The naval treaties from May, 1997, 
provided this, and El’tsin later admitted that the stability ensured in and around Crimea as a 
result of these agreements had been worth the price paid to Ukraine, which among other 
boons  saw  its  energy  debt  to  Russia  significantly  reduced.
462  As for nuclear weapons, 
Belarus and Ukraine had returned their last stockpiles to Russia by 1996, not least since  
administrations in Minsk and Kyiv had no funds to maintain the missiles. Belarus did retain 
some 370kg weapons-grade enriched uranium by the end of the decade,
463 but despite the 
poor reputation of the Lukashenko regime neither Russia nor the West disputed  that this 
uranium was being handled responsibly. 
 
Power: Principles for military construction and a military union 
Nevertheless,  Russians  accepted  this  containment  of  uranium  since  they  expected  it  to 
become available to Russia before long. In 1995 Russians managed to include Ukraine in the 
CIS Air Defence Agreement. Ukrainians thus secured funds for much-needed upkeep of local 
air defence military equipment. However, since they retained some of the best air defence 
military equipment from Soviet days, Ukrainian participation was also a significant boon for 
Russia.
464 At the same time, any construction of military forces without Russia was only an 
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emergency  solution  for  the  Lukashenko  administration.  In  May,  1996,  Russian  and 
Belarusian Defence Ministers Pavel Grachev and Leonid Maltsau duly agreed “...developing 
a joint defence policy [and] plan joint initiatives [to establish] military infrastructure in the 
interest of ensuring regional security...”
465 Russian scholars approved, not least since such 
infrastructure could be the beginning of more wide-ranging projects to come. In May, 1996, 
a study under Sergei Karaganov gave military reintegration with Belarus and Ukraine top 
priority: “From a geopolitical point of view...Belarus...is a ‘bridge’ between Russia and the 
West...The outlooks for a Russian-Ukrainian strategic union will to a large extent depend 
on...our relations with Belarus and Kazakhstan.”
466 The Belarusian government was happy 
with such a place in the integration. In April, 1997, Defence Minister Aleksandr Chumakov 
rejoiced: “...more than twenty normative-legal documents concerning the area of defence 
have already been signed by our governments and military services...by creating the Union 
of Belarus and Russia we will move along the path of even more in-depth cooperation.”
467 
Ukrainian military assets would be of more use to Russia, though. Russia did receive the 
lion’s  share  of  the  May,  1997,  naval  treaties,  yet  37%  of  former  Soviet  ship-repairing 
facilities,  which  were  crucial  for  the  upgrading  and  development  of  the  Russian  navy, 
remained in Ukraine, at Nikolaev, Kherson, Kyiv and Kerch.
468 Thus, the Russian intent was 
that  upgrading  of  Belarusian  forces  would  appeal  to  decision -makers  in  Kyiv  by 
demonstrating how integration under Russian supremacy was  immediately profitable for 
them  and  their  forces .  Russian  observers  continued  to  expect  imminent  Ukrainian 
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understanding of this and recommended that Russia began promoting such cooperation 
straightaway in a voluntary manner.
469 After all, Ukrainians could  only look to the Russia-
Belarus Union budget from December, 1997, in which ample Russian funds were ensured for 
Belarusian military and other security forces: “...the largest sum shall be given to the joint 
activity of the [Interior Ministry], border and tax troops (42.1% of the...budget). Military-
technological  cooperation  shall  receive  17.1%...”
470  Belarusian  approval  of  military 
cooperation might also evoke Russian support in non-military issues. Thus, despite repeated 
egregious  violations  of  human  rights  by  the  Lukashenko  regime,  in  January,  1999,  Oleg 
Mironov,  El’tsin’s  human  rights  commissioner,  underlined  how  Russia  might  gain 
geopolitically  and  strategically  through  a  Russia-Belarus  union;
471  subsequently Mironov 
argued that an “...almost ideal *regime of ] rule-of-law” existed in Belarus.
472 In return, 
during June and August, 1999, Belarus contributed the largest non-Russian contingent of 
military personnel to participate first in the West-99, and then the Military Commonwealth-
99  exercises  in  western  and  southern  Russia,  respectively.  These  exercises  were  of 
unprecedented size and Belarusian participation showed that  its military leadership was 
prepared to integrate further into the Russian structures in the coming years.
473  
 
Nation: A decimated Ukrainian navy and dissatisfaction with treaties 
However, in the case of Ukraine the Russian military for some time worried that Kyiv might 
never return its nuclear weapons. In February, 1994, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian 
                                                           
469 A. Zagorski, “Regional Structures of Security Policy within the CIS” in R. Allison and C. Bluth, eds., 
Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia, London: RIIA, 1998, p. 292 
470 “Podschitali svoi biudzhet,” Sankt-peterburgskie vedomosti, 16.12.1997 
471 Ambrosio, Challenging, p. 105 
472 “Rossiiskii ombudsmen Mironov schitaet, chto segodnia v Belorussii pochti ideal’naia pravovaia 
situatsiia,” Novye izvestiia, 10.11.1999 
473 S. Babichev, “I prikrytie, i karaiushchii mech,” Krasnaia zvezda, 25.6.1999; V. Boltikov, “Boevoe 
sodruzhestvo,” Na boevom postu, 26.8.1999 159 
 
Strategic Missile Forces had warned that the unilateral appropriation by Ukraine of local 
nuclear weapons prevented Russia from ensuring the safety of these and vetoing possibly 
unsanctioned  use
474  thus  implying  that  Ukrainians  could  not  be  trusted.  Somewhat 
surprisingly, though, Belarusian fo rces were not all that reliable, either. Although the 
remaining  nuclear  weapons  were  sent  to  Russia  during  1996,  in  June  the  Belarusian 
authorities  had  briefly  stopped  the  transfer  without  explanation.  Russian  government 
officials complained: “...all deadlines that had been agreed...were broken...[The Belarusians] 
did not even answer the note, which was sent to the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
by the leader of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”
475 This did not bode well for future 
military cooperation between the states, and, indeed, Belarus eventually turned out to be 
slower  than  Ukraine  and  Kazakhstan  to  return  nuclear  weapons.
476  Ukrainians, on the 
contrary, had not really proved troublesome since receiving the 1994 security guarantees, 
but according to  Ukrainian National Security Council Secretary Volodymyr Horbulin   in 
February, 1997, this did not prevent Russians from repeatedly deceiving Ukraine:  “As soon 
as [Russia and Ukraine] agreed on something, the [Russian] State Duma or some other state 
institution in Russia immediately produced a ‘smoking gun’ after which it began to roll away 
from already existing Ukrainian-Russian agreements.”
477 Maybe Horbulin exaggerated the 
problem, but certainly the Russian government had only looked out for Russia in the May, 
1997, naval treaties. Russia gained most of the Black Sea Fleet; the rump Ukrainian navy was 
confined to the useless Strilets’ka Bay, and concerning Russian rents for Ukrainian facilities: 
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“*Russia+ shall compensate *Ukraine+...with altogether $526.509 million to be deducted from 
Ukrainian debts...of $3,074 million...”
478 So the Ukrainian budget did not receive any funds 
in  return  for  the  Fleet.  It  was  neither  unusual  nor  perhaps  unreasonable  that  Russian 
government  ministers  looked  out  for  their  own  state  first  in  these  critical  negotiations. 
However,  disappointed  Ukrainians  did  consider  seeking  military  support  elsewhere.  In 
October, 1997, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova formed the organisation GUAM, 
which was led by Ukraine and aimed to “...strengthen international and regional security 
and stability...” rivalling Russia. Subsequently, in April, 1999, the inclusion of Uzbekistan, 
arriving from the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty into what now became GUUAM, 
signalled the wish, if not quite the potential for the Ukrainian military to resist Russian 
wishes.
479 Ukrainian forces were not about to pose a military threat to Russia, but Ukrainian 
military personnel and parliamentarians were dissatisfied with the naval treaties of 1997, 
and wanted to signal this. The Russian Duma in turn used Ukrainian procrastination on the 
naval treaties as an excuse to postpone  Russian ratification of the Friendship Treaty;  the 
connection between the two treaties was made especially clear by members of the Duma in 
May, 1998.
480 By the end of the year, both treaties had been ratified by both states and 
Ukrainians  mostly  le t  the  Russian  Black  Sea  Fleet  operate  in  peace.  Yet  Kuchma’s 
government still chose to conduct military exercises in April, 1999, within the GUAM forum, 
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just before Uzbekistan joined, even though this resulted in loud protests from Moscow,
481 
where it was well understood that GUAM united several states in the region with a grudge 
towards Russia. These states could do little direct harm to Russia, but their cooperation did 
challenge accounts of the region as a “security belt” for Russia. 
 
NATO 
Law: Joint naval exercises 
By April, 1995, there remained signs that Belarusians did not want to choose sides between 
Russia  and  NATO.  Mecheslau  Hryb,  Chairman  of  the  Belarusian  Supreme  Soviet 
acknowledged that practical attempts to promote the international neutrality of the state 
and  to  seek  widespread  integration  with  all  military  alliances  would  benefit  Belarusian 
military security.
482 It was furthermore understood in Belarus and Ukraine that these states 
could not exist in a vacuum, but also had to consider Russian and Western anxieties. In 
February, 1997, rumours that NATO would soon station nuclear weapons in Poland led Boris 
Oliinyk, Ukrainian parliamentary committee chair for foreign relations, to prefer a general 
European security arrangement including all states within NATO and within Russian -led 
security arrangements, too.
483 Such a scheme would undoubtedly have been favoured by 
the Russian government, which understood that Russia was presently in no position to 
challenge NATO outright. An example of this came in the summer of that year, when NATO 
and Ukraine together conducted the naval exercise Sea Breeze ’97 near Crimea. The Russian 
government did officially protest, but allowed Russian vessels to participate in exercises the 
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following year in what appeared to be a genuine attempt by Russians and Ukrainians to 
compromise, while preserving Ukrainian military sovereignty.
484 
 
Power: Defence against expansion and West-99 
Temporary acceptance of Ukrainian neutrality did not imply that Russians did not want 
Ukraine and Belarus to assist them as soon as possible against NATO. Already in May, 1994, 
the influential non-governmental Council for Foreign and Defence Policy issued its Strategy 
for Russia, mentioning NATO expansion as a major threat to the international position of 
Russia that could only be countered by post-Soviet integration, especially with Ukraine.
485 
El’tsin, however, knew that Lukashenko’s Belarus would be easier to cooperate with. In 
September, 1995, El’tsin even threatened the West that tactical nuclear warheads might be 
deployed in Belarus. This was an attempt to deter decision-makers in NATO from continuing 
with  plans  to  enlarge  eastwards  and  the  threat  was  regularly  reiterated  although  the 
process of enlargement continued.
486 Lukashenko agreed with El’tsin, due to alleged NATO 
plans to position nuclear weapons in Poland; in November, 1996, Lukashenko complained of 
double standards when the West demanded a non-nuclear Belarus, and he suggested that 
Russian and Belarusian military forces had to unite since only the latter could secure the 
western flank of Russia.
487 At the time, NATO enlargement into the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland was debated and before these states could be formally invited in July, 1999, by 
April plans had been announced for a joint Russo -Belarusian Air Force exercise that was 
specifically meant to prepare contingency plans related to the eastward movement of 
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NATO.
488 Ukraine would not participate in any Russian -dominated forces, but the Russo -
Ukrainian Friendship Treaty signed in May nevertheless enabled closer relations between 
the two states and thus, as acknowledged by Iastrzhembskii, minimised any opportunities 
for NATO in  Ukraine.
489  Russian nationalist parliamentarians were not satisfied, though; 
Zatulin and Migranian subsequently complained that the actions of their government were 
weakening the position of Russia: “The May *1997+ agreements with NATO in Paris and with 
Ukraine in Kyiv constituted the largest strategic defeat for Russian foreign policy in recent 
years.”
490 Yet this complaint seemingly overlooked the fact that the Russo-Ukrainian naval 
agreements, also signed in May, almost constituted a military alliance; a point not lost on 
Ukrainian parliamentarians, who feared that Ukraine now had to abandon neutrality and 
closer alliance with NATO, at least until Russia itself might participate in NATO.
491 With such 
an  agreement  in  place,  Lukashenko  no  longer  needed  to  fear t hat Belarus  might be 
encroached on by NATO and its allies. However, the border with Poland was still vulnerable 
and the Belarusian leader had increasingly constructed a Belarusian international image as a 
staunch ally of Russia. In October, 1997, his former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei 
Sannikov ironically described Lukashenko’s self-appointed role as “threatening to defend 
poor Russia from that monster,” i.e. NATO.
492 The Russian government was happy to feed 
Lukashenko’s  apprehension.  Thus,  in  December,  1997,  Russian  Defence  Minister  Igor’ 
Sergeev denounced the destabilising effect of NATO expansion, which allegedly threatened 
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Russian and Belarusian security.
493 Admittedly, the leaders of NATO did partly push Belarus 
and Ukraine towards Russia, too. Notably, the 1999 bombings of Yugoslavia were deeply 
unpopular  in  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  societ ies.  Consequently,  in  March,  1999,  the 
Ukrainian  parliament  summoned  up  an  unexpectedly  large  majority  of  231  to  46 
condemning NATO bombings in connection wit h the Kosovo crisis.
494 Subsequently, when 
Belarusian forces in June, 1999, joined the West-99 military exercise, they joined the largest 
post-Soviet  Russian exercise  ever,  in what was  a response to the  recently concluded 
bombardments by NATO in Yugoslavia .  Unprecedentedly, manoeuvres included  unified 
Russian-Belarusian forces, which responded to attack from an “unspecified” military alliance 
to the west.
495  
 
Nation: Insidious breezes 
It was important for Belarusians and Ukrainians alike to remember, however, that Russians 
might easily  suspect their  neighbours of  secretly  wanting  to  cooperate  with NATO.  The 
background to Lukashenko’s overt courting of Russia against NATO had been his short-lived 
suggestion in April, 1995, of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Central Europe, separating 
Russia and NATO. Undoubtedly, Lukashenko wanted to ally with Russia, but some Russians 
still worried this might be a ploy to ease NATO expansion.
496 Such worries were short-lived, 
and NATO in general remained distrusted in Belarus. Although a couple of surveys taken in 
Belarus in 1996 and 1998 showed an increase from 31% to 62% of respondents viewing 
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NATO in a positive light,
497 most observations hardly supported this impression. Ukraine was 
a different matter. Although the Kuchma government mostly favoured Russia, in December, 
1996, Oliinyk  did  say that  parliamentarians  favoured joining NATO as the most reliable 
guarantor of European security.  More ominously, at an  Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) summit Ukrainians supported a NATO expansion that Russia 
alone opposed.
498  The OSCE would not be able to truly influence NATO -expansion, and 
El’tsin knew this, thus refraining from overt criticism of the Ukrainian stance. In February, 
1997, Russian Security Council Secretary Ivan Rybkin was less forgiving. Following debates in 
NATO concerning partnership with Ukraine, Rybkin essentially declared that a pre-emptive 
nuclear strike could be carried out against Ukraine if the latter joined NATO.
499 Rybkin did 
not receive any support for this stance from the government, yet his anger was mirrored in 
the  Russian  navy.  In  March,  1997,  the  Russian  Black  Sea  Fleet   commander,  Admiral 
Kravchenko,  stated:  “...it  is  precisely  the  Pentagon  that  is  this  summer  financing  “Sea 
Breeze,” the joint exercises of the navies of NATO and Ukraine. Doesn’t this appear to be a 
repeat of the Anglo-French blockade of Sevastopol’ in 1854?”
500 Worries that Ukraine might 
help NATO to occupy what was seen as essentially Russian soil on Crimea only grew in the 
context of Sea Breeze ’97. Protests by governmental and non-governmental Russian actors 
alike could not halt the exercise and although Russians were allowed to participate in 1998, 
as mentioned above, they did so simply to keep an eye on the ships of Ukraine and NATO.
501 
The Duma strongly opposed the exercises. In a statement from September, 1997:  “...the 
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State  Duma  considers  the  participation  of  Ukraine  and  Georgia,  as  well,  in  the  NATO-
exercise  “Sea  Breeze-97”  on  the  Crimean  soil  that  is  sacred  to  any  Russian  as  a  highly 
unfriendly act toward Russia.”
502 For now, the Russian executive did not view Ukrainian 
cooperation with NATO in such an unflattering light, yet Ukrainian ministers might bring 
such  criticism  on  their  state.  In  April,  1998,  Ukrainian  Foreign  Minister  Tarasiuk  thus 
repeated that NATO was the only security structure capable of creating and ensuring long-
lasting peace throughout Europe. The fact that he also pronounced the western alliance to 
be “good for everyone”
503 hardly calmed his Russian detractors. Officials in the Defence 
Ministry  worried  about  Ukraine;  unsurprisingly  so,  considering  the  military  stance.  In 
February,  1999,  following  the  announcement  that  NATO  would  use  testing  grounds  in 
western  Ukraine,  ministerial  officials  warned:  “...the  Ukrainian  ground...can  become  the 
base of the North Atlantic Alliance, which is closest to Russia” even though “The wider 
Ukrainian  public  perceives  the  policy  towards  closer  relations  with  NATO  in  a  negative 
light.”
504  
 
Forces of the Russian Federation in Belarus and Ukraine 
Law: Naval agreements 
As  President  from  mid-1994  Kuchma  was  on  the  whole  more  pro-Russian  than  his 
predecessor and was not about to ignite a dispute to force Russian forces out. Nevertheless, 
the conflict in Chechnia from December, 1994, did place the Russian military in a poor light. 
Kuchma  immediately  advocated  that  troops  from  the  Conference  for  Security  and 
Cooperation  in  Europe  (CSCE),  not  Russia,  conducted  post-Soviet  peacekeeping;  while 
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Ukrainian parliamentarians joined international condemnation of Russian activities in the 
Caucasus.
505 It was clear, nevertheless, that Ukrainian criticism had been mostly provoked 
by a belief that Russian forces had not lived up to required standards, not by inherent 
Ukrainian animosity towards Russia. Only half a year later, in June, 1995, El’tsin and Kuchma 
amicably discussed the idea of paying for the leasing by Russia of the Sevastopol’ base of the 
Black Sea Fleet with the help of energy supplies and forgiveness of Ukrainian debt; an idea 
that was agreed to in principle.
506 The Belarusian government also accepted that Russian 
forces might remain in Belarus for years to come, but wanted the details formally agreed. In 
April, 1996, Defence Minister Leonid Maltsau thus  argued that permitting Russian military 
bases in Belarus was legally complicated and might escalate tensions with Poland.
507 Such 
hesitation was meant to send a message to Russian elites, not that Russian bases would not 
be allowed, but that Russians should not take  Belarusian compliance for given if turmoil 
resulted from the upcoming Russian presidential election. After El’tsin had been successfully 
re-elected, however, he was mostly willing to detail the provisions for the stationing of 
Russian forces in Belarus. Concerning Ukraine, with the agreement on the Black Sea Fleet 
from May, 1997, Russia formally acknowledged the right of Ukraine to the constant right of 
consultation regarding the stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet on Crimea: “In order to 
solve  disputes  concerning  the  interpretation  and  application  of  this  Agreement  a  Joint 
commission  shall  be  established...”
508  This  naval  treaty  appeared  to  have  regulated 
disagreement concerning the Black Sea Fleet once and for all. 
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Power: Renting military bases and joint military infrastructure 
Still,  signing  military  treaties  with  Belarus  and  Ukraine  hardly  meant  that  the  Russian 
military prepared to leave these states in the near future, for a presence outside Russia was 
required if El’tsin’s great power ambitions in Eurasia were to prosper. In this context, the 
election of Lukashenko in the summer of 1994 was a boon for Russia. Russian Defence 
Minister Pavel Grachev immediately contacted the new President, who afterwards stated 
contentedly that he had “already spoken on the telephone with...Grachev, who expressed 
readiness  for  the  closest  possible  joint  activity  within  all  aspects  of  [military] 
cooperation.”
509 In Minsk, the subsequent Russian debacle in Chechnia was ignored, and in 
January, 1995,  Russia  and  Belarus  signed  a  25-year  leasing  arrangement for the use by 
Russian troops of the Baranovichi and Vileika military facilities. All this was explained by the 
Belarusian government within the framework of integration.
510 Ukrainians did not go so far. 
However, by selling a number of intercontinental  missiles and bombers to Russia in 1995, 
Kuchma’s  government  potentially  made  it  easier  for  Russian  troops  to  operate  within 
Ukraine  and  in  close  cooperation  with  Ukrainians  if  this  eventually  should  become 
necessary.
511 The formalised integration of Russia  and Belarus inaugurated in April, 1996, 
demonstrated to Ukraine the military benefits with which Russia might be able to provide its 
partners. Lukashenko was certainly pleased to be allied with Russia; by November, 1996, he 
had (unsuccessfully) offered Russia that their nuclear weapons could remain stationed in 
Belarus,  and  Lukashenko  had  also  amended  the  agreement  on  the  Russian  lease  of 
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Belarusian  military  facilities  from  the  previous  year,  so  that  Russia  could  now  use  the 
facilities free of charge.
512 Evidently, Lukashenko expected energy subsidisation and other 
boons in return, but he was satisfied with the Russian presence. Surprisingly, as military 
integration proved to be the only real success in Russo-Belarusian integration over the rest 
of the 1990s, even members of the liberal opposition in Russia joined the project. F ormer 
Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Boris Nemtsov, who had earlier been highly critical of any 
notion that Russia should strengthen its military presence abroad to the detriment of 
economic modernisation, conceded in January, 1999, that unification with Belarus would  
provide Russia with important geopolitical advantages.
513 That similar advantages would be 
even more significant in the case of Ukraine was highlighted a couple of months later, when 
the  Black  Sea  Fleet   reconnoitred  in  the  Balkans  contemplat ing  disruptions  of  NATO 
bombardments  in  Yugoslavia.  As  a  further  consequence  of  these  events,  the  above -
mentioned West-99 exercise included  use of the Fleet in the Balkans  while the Caucasus, 
too,  witnessed the Fleet conducting allegedly  defensive manoeuvres nearby.
514  In the 
Russian  Duma  such  manoeuvres  provided  a  template  for  future  naval  activities.  The 
Western bombardment of Yugoslavia in connection with the Kosovo crisis had provoked 
very strong reactions among Russian Communist and Liberal Democrat deputies, who had 
advocated use of the Black Sea Fleet to attack NATO, as well as the  return of  nuclear 
missiles to Belarus.
515 El’tsin had no intention of following this advice, but subsequently 
                                                           
512 V. Ermolin, “Aleksandr Lukashenko vystupil v Gosudarstvennoi Dume Rossii,” Krasnaia zvezda, 
14.11.1996; Abdelal, p. 114 
513 Ambrosio, Challenging, p. 105 
514 Deyermond, “State,” p. 1193; also S. Novoprudskii, “Milliard tuda, milliard siuda,” Izvestiia, 20.7.1999 
515 M. Iusin, “Rossiiskikh politikov zakhlestnuli emotsii,” Izvestiia, 26.3.1999, p. 1; also G. Ziuganov, 
“Ostanovit’ agressiiu,” Sovetskaia Rossiia, 27.3.1999, p. 1 170 
 
admitted that retaining military facilities in Belarus and, especially, for the Black Sea Fleet in 
Ukraine had helped project Russian influence abroad, increasing its international prestige.
516  
 
Nation: Retaining Sevastopol’ 
For the most part, Belarusian and Ukrainian opposition to a Russian military presence was 
muted during the 1990s and could normally be solved by Russian payments or subsidisation. 
Shushkevich had become a very vocal opponent to a Russian military presence in Belarus, 
yet this had partly been the reason why he had been ousted as Chairman of the Parliament 
in  February,  1994.
517  In Ukraine, on the contrary, Kuchma partly continued objections 
previously advanced by the Kravchuk administration. As already mentioned, i n December, 
1994,  Kuchma  asked  that  international  peacekeepers  within  Abkhazia  in  Georgia  and 
Nagorno Karabakh in Azerbaijan should be from the CSCE, not from Russia or  the CIS. In 
itself, this could be seen as a simple rebuke to Russia following the bloody clashes in 
Chechnia; Kuchma’s signal to the Russian government that the Russian military should be 
reined in. However, Kuchma three years later, after a peace agreement had been struck in 
Chechnia, Kuchma repeated his support for OSCE peacekeepers in the post-Soviet region.
518 
Such peacekeepers would not necessarily oppose Russia, but their presence might make it 
more difficult for Russia to defend Russians abroad with military means, as Kozyrev had 
warned  in  April,  1995.
519  Certainly,  Kozyrev’s  threat  had  been  vague,  and  he  never 
suggested  Russian  forces  should  attack  Ukrainians  or  Belarusians.  Nevertheless,  for 
Ukrainians the damage had been done and by October, 1996, the Ukrainian government 
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asked troops from Russia to leave shortly. Russia would only be allowed to rent facilities at 
Sevastopol’ for five years, which was allegedly sufficient time to construct a replacement 
base in Novorossiisk. The Russian government, though, demanded a lease of 99 years, as 
well as the use of bases in Feodosia and Kerch.
520 Then, in November, 1996, the commander 
of  the  Russian  Black  Sea  Fleet,  Admiral  Kravchenko ,  stated  that:  “...on  May  29  this 
year...B.N. El’tsin presented the commander of the Black Sea Fleet with the following task: 
‘Do not surrender anything in Sevastopol’.’”
521 Even if this was untrue, Kravchenko’s threat 
was obvious. The naval treaties and the Friendship Treaty from May, 1997, defused the 
situation  before  Kravchenko  could  garner  support  in  the  Russian  government.  Yet,  the 
following years would show an increasing amount of ambiguity in these treaties, not least in 
relation to Russian payments for the lease. This suddenly became an issue in Belarus, too. 
By April, 1998, the Belarusian government claimed that Russia pay $400 million per annum 
to site air defence systems there. Lukashenko did not hide the fact that the demands only 
appeared in response to what were perceived to be unfair Russian demands that Belarus 
began to pay off its substantial, and increasing, energy debts.
522 Retaliation indicated that 
the dispute could be solved, but Lukashenko was hardly proving a model partner for Russia. 
In the meantime, Russia was having no success extending its lease on Crimea. Despite 
Russians repeatedly stressing that they expected the 1997 treaties to be extended, in 
February, 1999,  Kuchma’s presidential aide Oleg Soskin  once and for all confirmed that 
Ukraine had no interest in an expansion of the Russian presence on Crimea, and that Russia 
was  still  expected  to  have  removed  all  Russian  troops  from  the  peninsula  by  2017  as 
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previously agreed.
523 It was not so much that Kuchma feared that El’tsin might unfairly 
exploit the naval bases to put pressure on Ukraine, but that Moscow might lose control with 
its badly paid, badly disciplined troops. To underline this danger, during the same year three 
Russians tried to smuggle 20 kilograms of processed natural uranium to the West through 
Ukraine. Even though complicity by Russian military personnel stationed in Ukraine was not 
proven, such smuggling indicated the danger that rogue military elements could create.
524 
 
Conclusion 
Between  1993  and  1999,  the  paradigm  of  Power  continued  to  dominate  Russian 
perceptions  of  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  military  sovereignty.  In  matters  concerning 
Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  military  forces,  Russian  subsidisation  of  Belarusian  forces 
constituted a central part of the Union budget, while even Ukraine joined a Russian-led air 
defence  agreement.  El’tsin’s  ombudsman  Mironov  ignored  Belarusian  human  rights 
violations  in  favour  of  Belarusian  military  assets,  which  Karaganov’s  think-tank  had 
previously praised. Russian rhetoric emphasised the benefits of integration for “regional 
security,” and claimed an inevitable “moving along the path” towards military unification. In 
matters  concerning  NATO,  Russians  and  Belarusians  agreed  to  oppose  the  continued 
existence and expansion of the organisation. When completed in 1999, NATO enlargement 
was  answered  with  Russo-Belarusian  air  force  exercises,  and  the  Western  bombings  of 
Yugoslavia in March, 1999, motivated Russo-Belarusian exercises in the summer against an 
“unspecified” aggressor from the west. Already in 1995, El’tsin had threatened deployment 
of  nuclear  missiles  in  Belarus  in  answer  to  NATO  enlargement,  and  Sergeev,  too,  later 
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highlighted NATO as a threat to Russia and Belarus, alike. Finally, in matters concerning 
Russian forces stationed in Belarus and Ukraine, the Russian military was given long basing 
leases for free in Belarus, and also retained a twenty-year lease for the Black Sea Fleet in 
Ukraine. Russia was even able to use its Ukrainian Fleet bases to conduct reconnaissance in 
the  Balkans  during  the  NATO  bombardment  there.  El’tsin  could  consequently  say  that 
acquiring the Fleet and its base on Crimea would enhance Russian prestige as a great power, 
to which even liberal Russian Nemtsov had to agree.  
 
The  paradigm  of  Law  continued  to  have  some  influence  on  Russian  perceptions  of 
Belarusian and Ukrainian military sovereignty. Russians were willing to trade the return of 
Belarusian and Ukrainian nuclear weapons for security guarantees not only from Russia, but 
from  the  USA,  too,  thus  formally  allowing  outsiders  to  become  involved  in  post-Soviet 
affairs. Concerning NATO, Russians highly opposed NATO-Ukraine exercises in 1997, but in 
1998 Russians believed in Ukrainians’ non-aggressive intentions to the extent that Russian 
vessels  participated  in  repeated  naval  exercises.  In  return,  Ukrainians  showed  some 
consideration for Russian concerns regarding NATO and denounced nuclear weapons being 
placed in former Socialist states. Finally, Russians did consult Kyiv on the bases Russian 
troops leased in and near Sevastopol’, and, importantly, such consultation was promised for 
the  future,  too.  Regarding  the  Black  Sea  Fleet  it  should  also  be  noted  that  Russia  was 
prepared to pay Ukrainians quite well for the basing lease, albeit primarily in forgiveness of 
debt. 
 
The paradigm of Nation remained the least important one, although its influence grew, 
particularly relating to Ukraine. In the 1997 naval treaties Ukraine lost not just most of the 174 
 
Fleet, but the useful naval mooring places, too. Russian military elites partly ensured this to 
prevent Ukrainian ships from letting NATO-vessels moor permanently on the peninsula, just 
as  Russian  vessels  partly  participated  in  the  Ukraine-NATO  exercises  of  1998  to  spy  on 
enemies. Finally, indications existed that Russia was not going to leave Sevastopol’ when the 
20-year basing lease expired; indeed, increasingly Russians stressed that Sevastopol’, being 
rightfully theirs, would never be abandoned. 
 
Constructing economic sovereignty 
Economies of Belarus and Ukraine 
Law: Solid foundations for trade 
Previously, the Russian government had sought to terminate some of its subsidies for the 
Belarusian  economy.  This  policy  partly  continued  during  1994.  Although  by  this  time  a 
worryingly vague Russo-Belarusian Agreement on Monetary Union without a timetable had 
been agreed, in April former Prime Minister Egor’ Gaidar and Finance Minister Boris Fedorov 
both  resigned in protest.  This  was  a notable  sign  of  dissatisfaction  with  the dependent 
Belarusian economy, and even Chernomyrdin subsequently voiced economic concerns to 
Lukashenko  during  that  summer.
525  Furthermore,  in  June  the  Russian  government 
welcomed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Ukraine, 
indicating that the economic problems of Ukraine, and other post -Soviet states, should in 
future be dealt with by the EU, with which Russia also signed an agreement.
526 The new 
                                                           
525 Markus, p. 56; V. Ermolin, “V Gosdume krepnut dobrye chuvstva – k pravitel’stvu i prezidentu,” 
Krasnaia zvezda, 2.4.1994 
526 M. Smith and G. Timmins, “Russia, NATO and the EU in an Era of Enlargement: vulnerability or 
opportunity?” in A. Dawson and R. Fawn, eds., The Changing Geopolitics of Eastern Europe, London: 
Frank Cass, 2002, p. 81 175 
 
Belarusian and Ukrainian Presidents would happily tie their economies closer to the EU. In 
November,  1995,  Lukashenko  renounced  the  possibility  of  monetary  union  and  other 
integration with the Russian economy. Instead, he claimed that Belarus and Russia were by 
now simply seeking to establish a payments union similar to that existing within the EU.
527 
Many Ukrainians were similarly anxious to diminish their economic dependence on Russia, 
since the Russian government had repeatedly used this dependence to receive Ukrainian 
concessions on military and other issues. Partly, this problem was sol ved for Ukraine 
through the May, 1997, Friendship Treaty and the treaties concerning the Black Sea Fleet.
528 
Subsequently, this foundation was used to  pave way for the basic trade agreement that 
appeared the following year. It seemed, on the other hand, that  the Russian government 
were somewhat reluctant to lose their economic levers on neighbouring states. Maybe, 
though, a new generation of Russian politicians would accept that the economies of Belarus 
and Ukraine could not be salvaged by Russia, particularl y after the economic crash of 
August, 1998. Indeed, in July, 1999, prominent opposition politician Grigorii Iavlinskii openly 
denounced the idea of a Russo-Belarusian union as a “thoughtless political adventure” and 
was convinced that: “Political integration cannot leave the economic [aspects] behind,”
529 
fearing that Russia could simply not afford integration with its neighbour.  
 
Power: Unifying economic systems and drop in production 
On the contrary, though, Belarus could hardly afford not integrating its economy with that 
of Russia, since the Belarusian economy remained relatively unreformed during the 1990s. 
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As  I  mentioned  above, in  April,  1994,  members  of  the  Russian  government  resigned  in 
protest when the Russian and Belarusian Prime Ministers Chernomyrdin and Kebich signed a 
treaty unifying the economic and monetary systems of their states.
530 By now, the standard 
of living was already higher in Russia than in Belarus and Ukraine
531 and this tendency would 
only increase, thereby undermining one of the most  potent arguments for Belarusian and 
Ukrainian  independence.  El’tsin  knew  this,  and  in  February,  1995,  argued  that  the 
construction of joint enterprises between Russia and Belarus would be a major step on the 
way to eventual reunification of the two states, and would in the meantime diminish the 
rise  in  food  prices  in  Belarus.
532  The  leadership  of  Ukraine  could not  afford  ignoring 
integration, since their economy, as already indicated, was dependent on Russia, too. By 
early 1996, Kuchma even had to worry about  the defence industry that had traditionally 
constituted one of their prime assets, but which remained 80% dependent on the supply of 
Russian components.
533 El’tsin’s government worked to provide benefits for Belarus that 
would  entice  Ukrainians,  too.  This  was  the  motive,  in  December,  1996,  when  Russian 
Minister for CIS Affairs Aman Tuleev discussed the need for a single budget and taxation 
system  with  Belarus.
534  Then,  by  May,  1997,  the  president  of  the  Russian  Union  of 
Industrialists  and  Entrepreneurs  pointed   out  that  the  Ukrainian  economy  had  been 
relatively reliant on Russia during 1996: the share of Ukraine in the foreign trade turnover of 
Russia was 13%, but the share of Russia in that of Ukraine was 47%.
535 Decision-makers in 
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Moscow, Minsk and Kyiv easily began to draw favourable parallels with Soviet economic 
centralisation. Market patterns reinforced the impression. By 1997, Russia was buying over 
90%  of  high  value-added  Ukrainian  goods;  consequently,  when  Russian  interest  slowed 
down Ukraine witnessed a 97-99% drop in the production of industrial machines with digital 
control  systems,  televisions,  tape  recorders,  excavators,  cars  and  trucks.
536  Under such 
circumstances, the Ukrainian and Belarusian economies could not allow other post -Soviet 
states to gain much Russian attention. Lukashenko was particularly jealous at a CIS summit 
in 1997: “Many people cannot help but notice that Aleksandr Lukashenko is jealous of his 
colleague  from  Kazakhstan’s  project  *for  economic  integration+...If  you  add  to  this  the 
Belarusian President’s ambition to be the ‘prime integrator’...”
537 El’tsin and his ministers 
were,  self-evidently,  pleased  to  be  the  object  of  such  competition.  In  February,  1998, 
Belarusians were lured even closer when El’tsin decreed that an expert coordinating council 
of Justice Ministry representatives from Russia and Belarus should be set up with a view to 
legal unification on tax and customs provision.
538 Unification would be a cornerstone in the 
provision of funds to the Belarusian economy, and from Ukraine Kuchma wanted to be part 
of  the  development,  too.  In  April,  1998,  after  Russia  seemed  to  have  weathered  a 
burgeoning economic crisis, Kuchma sent an open letter to El’tsin: “*The economy+ is the 
most basic foundation. If we arrange cooperation...based on equality and equal gains in this 
sphere, we can take an important step in the direction of extracting our economies from the 
crisis.”
539 Later that year the Russian economic collapse prevented any sort of integration 
with the Belarusian and Ukrainian economies for the time being. This delay was hardly the 
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fault of the Russian executive; nevertheless, the Communist parliamentary faction blamed 
the  government  for  not  having  already  completed  economic  integration.  In  September, 
1999,  Oleg  Stepanenko  even  argued  that  Russian  leaders  had  operated  under  Western 
diktat when repeatedly refusing monetary union with Belarus; a sign of unpatriotic, fifth-
column activity.
540  
 
Nation: Tax war and opposed deliveries 
Stepanenko might also have accused some Belarusians and Ukrainians for the imperfect 
economic integration that had taken place. Until late 1993 Belarusians had hardly ever felt 
the need to defend their  economy  from  Russia.  In  the  run-up to  the 1994 presidential 
election, though, the Belarusian parliamentary opposition claimed that Belarusian economic 
sovereignty  was  being  undermined  by  foreign,  meaning  Russian,  intelligence  services,  a 
charge which was repeated at the end of the year in a formal, written statement.
541 In the 
Russian government, such accusations were disliked, but a more substantial worry seemed 
to be Lukashenko’s tireless attempts to gain Russian subsidies, despite periodic rhetoric to 
the contrary. In 1995, Chernomyrdin notably rejected the idea of monetary union between 
Russia and Belarus, complaining that Belarus was using its status as partner with Russia to 
circumvent the need for radical economic changes.
542 At least Belarusians did not actively 
seek to damage the Russian economy, though. Mostly, Ukrainians did not do so, either, 
although  in  1996  a n  acrimonious  tax  war  broke  out,  instigated  by  the  Ukrainian 
government, which began making  exports to Russia tax-free, while  VAT was imposed on 
imports from Russia. El’tsin’s government in return placed a 20% VAT on Ukrainian goods 
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and  imposing  an  import  quota  on  sugar,  which  was  vital  for  any  Ukrainian  economic 
revival.
543 This dispute was relatively quickly solved, yet before that had happened many 
Ukrainians had taken the opportunity to blame the Russian leadership for provoking  the 
dispute.
544 The economic policies of the two states might also conflict outside the region. In 
March, 1997, Russia had acquired some economic links with India, whereas Ukraine had 
promised to sell Soviet-designed tanks to the primary regional rival of India, Pakistan, for a 
considerable profit. Since the military balance in South Asia was fragile at the time, the 
Indian government put pressure on El’tsin to prevent the sale to Ukraine of key Russian-
made components for the tanks, and El’tsin acquiesced.
545 A parallel situation appeared in 
Russo-Belarusian relations three months later, when Belarusian elites reportedly grabbed an 
export contract for MiG-29 jet airplanes to Peru. This inflicted a serious economic blow to 
the already ailing Russian defence industry, which, in turn, refused to sell necessary spare 
parts for the aged airplanes.
546 Yet although these examples did challenge the image of 
increased  economic  integration  between  the  states,  the  behaviour  of  the  post -Soviet 
leaders did not go beyond what might be seen as normal eco nomic competition, which 
would not do long-term damage. Indeed, already in October, 1997, managed to deliver its 
tanks to Pakistan, while Russian anti-tank weapons, such as KA-50 Black Shark helicopters, 
became attractive for India.
547 More ominously, though, the Ukrainian military-industrial 
complex sought to get back at Russia by increasing cooperation with NATO. By December, 
1997, the elite began to explore how the existing Partnership for Peace agreement between 
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Ukraine and NATO could form the basis for Ukrainian exports to the Western alliance.
548 
Even if this effort was fruitless, a warning had been sent to Russia. Russo -Belarusian 
disputes became a little more personal, too, when Russian Deputy Prime Minister Nemtsov 
in September, 1997, accused Lukashenko of using economic cooperation with Russia as a 
political  game.  Allegedly,  integration  was  mooted,  but  juridical,  administrative  and 
economic  obstacles  were  presented  whenever  the  Belarusian  economy  had  received 
requested  benefits without committing to int egration.
549  Following Nemtsov and other 
liberals’ ouster from government, they continued their attacks on Lukashenko from the 
opposition. By January, 1999, they argued that the state-run Belarusian economy would 
burden the Russian economy and give the authoritarian Lukashenko undue influence in 
Moscow,
550 something that could damage the Russian state economically. 
 
Energy 
Law: Payments and lower consumption 
During the early 1990s attempts to lower dependence on Russian energy had been much 
more prominent in Ukraine than in Belarus. This did not mean that no Belarusians thought it 
a good idea, but even before Lukashenko’s presidency the Belarusian National Front, which 
advocated  market  reforms  to  increase  Belarusian  energy  efficiency,  held  only  9%  of 
parliamentary  seats.
551  Not  that  some  Russian  elites  would  not  have  welcomed  a 
responsible Belarusian industry. In July, 1997, Russian commentators pointed out that 
Gazprom was under pressure to contribute to the Russian state budget and thus could not 
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long afford Belarusian and Ukrainian refusals to pay energy debts.
552 There was little hope 
that  Belarus  would  begin  doing  so,  even  though  continued  economic  crisis  and 
corresponding decreased production, did have the  unintentional  effect of Belarusian oil 
consumption falling by 50% during the 1990s.
553 In Ukraine, however, in  January, 1998, 
Prime Minister Valerii Pustovoitenko did insist that: “We must develop our own oil and gas 
industry...The other possibility is to diversify the sources of energy delivery…During one of 
the very next meetings of the government we will look at the possibility of cooperation with 
Azerbaijan.”
554 The problem was that Pustovoitenko’s words were not followed by action; 
indeed, theft of Russian transit gas increased in Ukraine. Remarkably, however, Gazprom 
tried to solve the problem through international law, even though cruder pressure could 
easily  have  been  used  against  Ukraine.  In  November,  1998,  the  Russian  company  thus 
signed an insurance policy covering deliveries through Ukraine. Following continued thefts, 
the insurance company filed suit in the International Commercial Arbitration Court, which 
ordered Ukraine to pay all costs or suffer legal confiscation of assets abroad.
555  
 
Power: Dominating energy needs and energy-intensive economies 
This  episode  did,  nevertheless,  prove  to  something  of  anomaly  during  the  1990s,  with 
energy cooperation increasing. As Prime Minister Kebich explained the situation in April, 
1994, before losing the presidential election to Lukashenko, it was rational for Belarusians 
to  agree  to  Russian  terms,  since  Russia  remained  the  only  source  to  satisfy  Belarusian 
energy needs.
556 Russian leaders for their part wanted to keep Belarusians satisfied as an 
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example to the less loyal Ukrainians. In February, 1996, Russia thus wrote off $300 million of 
Belarusian  energy  debts  in  return  for  military  favours,  and  furthermore  wrote  off  $470 
million, which had become accrued since 1992. Subsequently, the even larger sum of $1 
billion of Belarusian debts was written off.
557 Perhaps Russia did not have to be quite so 
generous, though, for Belarus did not have other potential providers. By January, 1997, 
Ukraine, too, continued to import  90% of  its oil and 60% of  its natural  gas from Russia, 
which it owed almost $9 billion, according to offici al, Ukrainian estimates. $900 million of 
this debt was due to Gazprom the following year in March.
558 Yet the majority of the Russian 
political and economic elites continued to accept Ukrainian energy debts.  By June, 1997, 
despite repeated restructuring and forgiveness, these debts to Russia and Turkmenistan still 
constituted over $2 billion.
559 What was most interesting was that leniency on these debts 
was provided as much from Gazprom as from the Russian state, if not more so. During 1997, 
Gazprom  even  continued  shipping  low-price gas  to  Belarus,  while Russian  non -paying 
customers were cut off,
560 a policy that hardly had the official support of the Kremlin. By 
February, 1998, Belarus still depended on Russia for about 90% of its energy.  Furthermore, 
Belarus was often reduced to pay through barter for energy deliveries; barter accounted for 
half  the  amount  of  the  total  commodity  turnover  between  the  states ;
561  something 
increasingly untenable in a post-Soviet world. Russian companies wanted the barter to be 
gradually reduced, and instead they wanted to take over Belarusian and Ukrainian energy 
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infrastructure. This was potentially popular among locals, since Russian companies could 
insert a large amount of capital in this infrastructure, at the same time as Belarusian and 
Ukrainian companies during the 1990s remained highly  inefficient, being nine to twelve 
times more energy-intensive than their Western counterparts.
562 By April, 1998, Iukos and 
Lukoil were competing for the Lisichansk and Odesa oil refineries, while in October that year 
Gazprom aimed for gas fields in the Carpathians, together with compression plants and gas 
pipelines.
563 However, the Russian economic crisis had in the meantime prevented this and 
similar acquisitions from being carried out. Despite the pr ecarious state of the Russian 
economy,  though,  in  1999  agreements  on  energy  subsidisation  were  renewed.  Now, 
Belarusian firms only paid the low Russian domestic gas price, resulting in a reduction from 
$40 to $30 per 1,000 cubic metres, while the opening of the Iamal pipeline ensured Belarus 
a place at the centre of Russian energy exports.
564 This was expensive for Gazprom and 
other companies, but Russian economic elites   understood that lower immediate profits 
might entail increased contacts with Belarusian and Ukrainian elites, and increased success 
for  long-term  integration  initiatives ,  including  a  customs  union  that  might  eventually 
facilitate the operations of Russian firms in these states.
565  
 
Nation: Excise duties and energy theft 
Such relatively amicable Russian-led cooperation was not necessarily a given, though, but 
depended on who was in charge in Minsk and Kyiv. By March, 1994, Kravchuk had adopted a 
strongly  critical  stance  towards  Russia  on  most  issues  in  preparation  for  the  Ukrainian 
                                                           
562 Wilson and Rontoyanni, p. 33 
563Puglisi, p. 832; ”Dolg neftegazovykh predpriiatii gosbiudzhety vozros,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 29.10.1998, 
p. 5 
564 Götz, p. 166 
565 Stowe, p. 55 184 
 
presidential election. For instance, the President signed a pipeline agreement with Turkey to 
transport Middle Eastern oil to Europe by ship to Odesa, close by the European pipeline 
system
566  and  circumventing  Russia  completely.  When  Kravchuk  subsequently  lost  his 
position nothing came of these plans, but other Ukrainians might follow them in future. In 
Belarus, too, Parliamentary Speaker Miacheslav Hryb in July, 1994, complained that Russia 
was charging Belarus oil prices at $80 a ton, opposed to $40 a ton for Russian consumers.
567 
These charges were lowered when Lukashenko became President, but  if  he  had been 
removed  Russian  energy companies  would have been  ready to  squeeze Belarus again. 
Conversely, from opposition the Belarusian National Front  advocated using control over 
transit pipelines to strengthen its bargaining power versus Russia.
568  With  this party  in 
power, Russian hopes of acquiring Belarusian energy infrastructure would  decrease. While 
this risk was limited, however, the Russian government wanted to bind the energy sector of 
Ukraine closer to Russia; and through force if necessary. I n 1995, Russia imposed excise 
duties on gas and oil exports to Ukraine, forcing the latter to pay above-market prices. The 
Russian government asserted that the duties would remain until Ukraine joined the customs 
union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan,
569 preventing potential energy cooperation with 
third parties. Throughout the year, El’tsin furthermore constantly used  Ukrainian energy 
debts to pressure the Kyiv elite on a number of non-economic issues, notably concerning 
the  division  of  Soviet  military  assets.
570  As his attention was drawn to the presidential 
election the following year, El’tsin increasingly let his government do the work. In August, 
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1996, it threatened to curtail the supply of fuel to Ukrainian power plants because of alleged 
non-payments  of  supplies  already  provided  during  the  year,
571  ensuring that not even 
nuclear power offered a way out of dependency for Ukraine. At this time Ukraine continued 
to receive subsidised Russian energy, but the threats might be carried through one day. Yet 
when  Kuchma’s  government  alleviated  dependency  through  non-Russian  resources, 
Russians  protested.  Thus,  in  April,  1997,  as  a  minimum  of  oil  arrived  in  Ukraine  from 
Azerbaijan  via  Georgia,
572  commentators  decried  it  as  uneconomical  and  politically 
incorrect, fearing the weakened impact of Russia relative to other Black Sea states and the 
Middle East.
573  Russian energy companies repeated the pattern. I n February, 1998, the 
director  of Gazprom Rem V iakhirev reminded  the  Ukrainian government  that total gas 
indebtedness  as  of  1997  stood  at  $1.2  billion.  Pustovoitenko,  however,  disagreed, 
eventually promising to pay only $750 million.
574 Russian analysts could complain with some 
justification that Pustovoitenko was ungrateful for Russian willingness to extend energy 
credits to Ukraine, in which theft of Russian energy destined for Central and Western 
Europe  was  also  galling:  “The  problem  of  the  gas  debts...has  obtained  a  new 
dimension...due to the huge amount of current indebtedness, which in 1997 has exceeded 
one billion dollars... there are no real guarantees that Ukraine in future shall not be allowed 
to conduct outright theft of gas...”
575 And indeed, Ukrainian authorities did offset debts 
through such thefts. By 1998, almost $5 million worth of gas was being pumped out daily in 
Ukraine without Russian authorisation, translating into $180 million in Russian losses during 
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January and February, alone.
576 If Russians decided to do something about this in future , a 
major dispute might break out. 
 
Economic actors of the Russian Federation in Belarus and Ukraine 
Law: Market needs 
During the early 1990s Belarusians and Ukrainians were perhaps keener on Western than on 
Russian investments. Indeed, until 1994, Russian companies had hardly been able to expand 
abroad. In five years, GDP had fallen by half, a development as poor as that of Ukraine and 
worse  than  seen  in  Belarus,
577  where companies retained some ability and interest to 
remain  separate  from  their  Russian  coun terparts  and  to  seek  foreign  investments 
elsewhere. Certainly, Russian companies had many advantages in capital and equipment 
over Belarusian companies, but the latter increasingly benefitted from having a cheaper 
labour force, as a Russian commentator noted following the signing of the Russo-Belarusian 
Union Treaty of April, 1997: “The suggestion [in the Treaty] to ‘introduce unified standards 
for social security’ can become the basis for assistance to Belarus by Russia: the average 
salary in Russia calculated in dollars is much higher.”
578 Still, ordinary Russians benefitted 
from access to the Belarusian economy. In 1998 and 1999, more than three times as many 
Russians migrated to Belarus than Belarusians to Russia. The regime in Minsk could point to 
some immediate attractions for Russian economic actors following the economic collapse in 
Russia  in  August,  1998.
579  As for Ukraine, resistance to Russian investments generally 
originated within the host state, the politicians of which claimed to defend Ukrainian 
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economic  sovereignty.  Often  this  defence  was  rhetorical  only,  but  in  December,  1999, 
Kuchma did state categorically that Ukraine would not join a Russia-Belarus economic union, 
which,  he  predicted,  would  prove  harmful  for  Russian  actors.
580  This warning was n ot 
ignored  in  Russia;  in  his  memoirs  the  following  year  El’tsin  did  admit  that  economic 
involvement of Russian companies in Belarus might not be beneficial for Russia, while the 
Belarusian economy remained dependent on outside assistance.
581 If El’tsin’s opinion was 
more widely shared in Russia, Russian investments might therefore still have a reforming 
influence in Belarus. 
 
Power: Common procurement orders and programme of economic cooperation 
Yet, El’tsin had not seemed that dissatisfied with the possibilities for Russian investments in 
Belarus  and  Ukraine  during  the  1990s.  Already  in  October,  1994,  he  emphasised  that 
establishing the Interstate Economic Committee within the CIS was one of the few uniformly 
approved acts by the member-states. He even added that the Ukrainian view of integration, 
of Russian influence in Ukraine, was apparently accepted there, since Kuchma had raised no 
objections.
582  El’tsin  was  probably  exaggerating  how  accommodating  Ukrainians  were, 
unlike in Belarus where not only Lukashenko, but 80% of the population in a May, 1995, 
referendum  supported  increased  Russian  economic  influence  in  Belarus  through 
integration.
583 Yet by April, 1996, Ukrainian Prime Minister Evhen Marchuk signed the CIS 
economic integration plan for 1996 -97, allowing for easier access for Russian companies 
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within Ukraine,
584 in a step involving Ukraine in Russian -led multilateral cooperation to a 
higher degree than at any point since the Soviet collapse.   The Council for Foreign and 
Defence Policy in Russia,  including members of the Presidential Council Oleg Kiselev and 
Sergei Karaganov, wanted to use the momentum and in May maintained that Russia should 
try getting unlimited access to the market of goods, services and capital of Ukraine.
585 The 
Council was perhaps not capable of having much effect on investments, and following an 
exhausting  election  and  health  problems  neither  was  El’tsin.  However,  El’tsin  had  now 
gained  important  domestic  allies  in  the  so-called  “oligarchs,”  a  group  of  wealthy 
businesspeople led by Boris Berezovskii. Russian commentators hoped that these highly 
successful actors could further the long-expected economic reintegration with Ukraine by 
taking advantage of the beginning privatisation there.
586 Such optimism was well-founded, 
judged by the widespread interest in the Ukrainian market that not only Berezovskii, but 
many of his competitors and colleagues, too, showed during the late 1990s. Whereas  
Berezovskii  mainly  pursued  his  media  interests,  Vladimir  Potanin  sought  aluminium 
production, while  others  went for Ukrainian banks that were established with Russian 
capital.
587  Belarusian  companies  were  still  less  sought  by  Russian  investors,  since  the 
Belarusian  government,  despite  rhetoric  to  the  contrary,  were  prone  to  economic 
protectionism. Nevertheless,  Belarus had few other places to turn for its imports than 
Russia.  It  was  dependent  on  Russia  for  more  than  half  of  imports  throughout  its 
independent existence until 1998 and imported slightly more towards the end of th e 1990s 
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compared to what it had done half a decade earlier.
588 The military industry was successfully 
integrated. The May, 1997, Charter of the Russo-Belarusian Union framed the planning and 
placing of defence procurement orders, creating a common technical service system for the 
armed  forces:  “Within  the  sphere  of  ensuring  security  the  tasks  of  the  Union 
include...development and investment in a joint defence order...”
589 Ukraine could use that, 
too.  In  February,  1998,  Russia  and  Ukraine  signed  a  ten-year  agreement  on  economic 
cooperation, according to which Ukrainian privatisation was opened to Russian companies. 
Apart  from  the  energy  sector,  defence-industrial  related  areas  of  cooperation  were 
highlighted.
590 El’tsin noted how Russian investments in Ukraine would be beneficial for 
both economies: “...the signed agreement is an event of unparalleled importance both for 
Russia and for Ukraine....as a result of the implementation of the agreement, bilateral trade 
between  the  countries  will  be  doubled.”
591  Certainly,  Russia  still  provided  half  of  all 
Ukrainian imports. Even L’viv region in the west retained Russia as the trade partner for 41% 
of  all  accounts.
592  Tellingly,  even  in  the  midst  of  the  1998  Russian  economic  crisis, 
neighbouring Ivano-Frankivs’k reported 67% import dependence on Russia.
593 Berezovskii 
was convinced that a bit of help from the Ukrainian government could make him dominant 
in  the  Ukrainian  economy,  which  again  would  increase  his  influence  in  Russia.  In  1999, 
Berezovskii promised $150 million to Ukrainian politicians in return for favours that would 
help him to privatise the Ukrainian natural gas transport system, thus gaining influence over 
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Gazprom, gain access to Ukrainian media and telecommunications that could voice his case 
in Russia, as well as the Zaporizhzhia Aluminium Combine.
594  
 
Nation: Customs barriers 
Apparently, Ukrainian and Belarusian markets were well prepared for Russian investments. 
However,  Russian  actors  had  a  history  of  putting  slightly  too  much  pressure  on  the 
neighbouring states. In April, 1994, El’tsin declared that a main task of the Russian security 
services was ensuring Russia free access to the markets of other states. Consequently, in 
Ukraine  alone,  six  Russian  security  and  intelligence  bodies  were  present.
595  For  now, 
Ukrainians and Belarusians had not overly re sisted such a policy; and when the Ukrainian 
government  in  1994  tried  levying  tax  on  Russian  goods  the  resulting  Russian 
countermeasures were severe.
596 For Russian opposition politicians like Zhirinovskii such 
insolence was one of many Ukrainian insults. In May, 1995, he complained about Ukrainian 
exploitation of Russia, through subsidised energy, debt forgiveness and the like. As long as 
Ukraine allegedly continued to oppress Crimean Russians, Russia should deny economic 
support to Ukraine.
597 The Russian government did no such thing and accommodation with 
Kyiv  was  soon  agreed.  But  if  such  accommodation  mirrored  the  Russo -Belarusian 
relationship  maybe  Russian  investors  should  not  be  too  optimistic.  I n  1995,  Russian 
companies had agreed with the Belarusian government to buy the Naftan oil refinery, but 
two years later the agreement was still not honoured by Minsk. Similarly, Belgazprombank 
was intended to be a Belarusian subsidiary of Gazprom, but until November, 1997, Belarus 
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blocked  its  registration.
598  In the meantime, Ukraine again began giving problems for 
Russian investors, as well. Not only was there the above-mentioned dispute over competing 
military exports to South Asia, which in February, 1997, led  the Russian Minister of Foreign 
Economic Relations to block the sale of Russian military components to Ukraine, which he 
accused  of  having  sold  tanks  to  Pakistan  without  consulting  Moscow.
599  The  mooted 
Friendship Treaty was supposed to help preventing such misunderstandings in future, not 
least as the foundation for a bilateral trade treaty. These treaties did indeed appear during 
the following year. However, first the Russian authorities proved a little too eager to put 
pressure  on  Ukrainians  during  negotiations  over  the  Friendship  Treaty,  for  instance 
threatening disruption of energy and other necessary supplies to Ukraine. Furthermore, 
since  goods  moving  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  often  moved  through  Belarus,  one 
measure taken by Russia was the re -opening of customs posts along the Russo -Belarusian 
border, even  though this also damaged Belarusians.
600  The Russian threats were never 
carried through, bilateral treaties were signed, yet Ukrainian politicians might find it more 
difficult to trust the Russian leadership to keep the agreements in future. The Ukrainian 
parliament was not prepared to allow for substantial Russian investments in such a case, 
and in November, 1997, refused to ratify laws allowing foreign acquisition of blue -chip 
Ukrainian companies, even though these laws had already been agreed with Russia.
601 Soon 
Kuchma managed to overcome parliamentary resistance, yet it was easy to see how Russian 
investments in Ukraine might face increasing difficulties in future. 
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Conclusion 
Between  1993  and  1999,  the  paradigm  of  Power  continued  to  dominate  Russian 
perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian economic sovereignty. Russia and Belarus agreed to 
form  an  economic  and  monetary  union  already  in  1994,  and  Belarusians,  as  well  as 
Ukrainians, were in practice economically dependent on Russia, inside or outside a union. 
Thus,  El’tsin  could  note  in  1995  that  Russo-Belarusian  economic  integration  would 
immediately lower food prices in Belarus, while the Russian Communist opposition found 
any  division  between the  post-Soviet  economies  irrational.  Concerning  energy  relations, 
Belarus  and  Ukraine  likewise  continued  to  be  almost  completely  dependent  on  oil  and 
natural  gas  transfers  to  and  through  Russia,  and  their  sovereignty  was  certainly  not 
strengthened by the fact that their companies were still highly energy-intensive. Yet mostly 
Russian  energy  companies  did  not  use  this  dependence  against  neighbouring  states; 
Gazprom supplied Belarus even to the detriment of Russian customers, repeatedly wrote off 
its debts, and willingly trusted Belarusian cooperation by opening the Iamal pipeline through 
Belarus.  Finally,  in  relation  to  Russian  investments  in  Belarus  and  Ukraine  two  notable 
agreements increased the possibilities for Russian companies. The Charter of the Russo-
Belarusian Union was predictably focused on defence procurements, while the subsequent 
Russo-Ukrainian  economic  treaty  was  much  wider  in  scope,  reflecting  that  Ukraine  was 
ultimately the most interesting neighbouring market for Russian investors. On a number of 
occasions  El’tsin  praised  the  mutual  benefits  for  Russians  and  Ukrainians  provided  by 
Russian investments, commentators such as Kiselev and Karaganov agreed, and Berezovskii 
demonstrated the advantages in practice.  
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The  paradigm  of  Law  continued  to  have  some  influence  on  Russian  perceptions  of 
Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  economic  sovereignty.  By  signing  the  Friendship  and  naval 
treaties,  Russia  allowed  Ukraine  to  prevent  political  and  military  issues  from  hijacking 
economic  ones,  and  vice  versa.  As  for  the  Belarusian  economy,  Russian  resistance  to 
subsidisation was waning but still noticeable. While Belarus and Ukraine remained highly 
dependent on Russian energy, economic depression lowered their needs for a time. From 
Russia, at the same time, subsidisation was not always provided without questions. Pressed 
by  needs  in  a  rapidly  decentralising  domestic  economy,  Gazprom  tried  signalling  to 
Belarusians and Ukrainians that they would have to prepare themselves to pay more, and 
even allowed Western agents to pursue the debts of Ukraine. Finally, Russian investments 
abroad  were  temporarily  halted  by  the  domestic  economic  crisis;  even  after  this  had 
seemingly  been  solved  El’tsin  and  others  understood  that  an  unreformed  Belarusian 
economy would not be interesting for Russia. 
 
The paradigm of Nation remained the least important one, although its influence grew. 
Governments  in  Minsk  and  Kyiv  tried  to  steal  market  shares  from  Russia  through  tax 
measures,  and  by  trading  internationally  with  clients  opposed  to  the  clients  of  Russia, 
particularly  in  the  arms  business.  This  could  be  explained  as  slightly  exaggerated 
competitive spirit, yet in the energy sphere measures were more underhanded, including 
the sudden unilateral imposition of excise duties by Russia, and consistent energy theft by 
Belarus  and  Ukraine.  Finally,  Russia  and  Belarus  disagreed  virulently  regarding  Russian 
attempts to take over Belarusian energy infrastructure, indicating that Russian attempts to 
take over infrastructure in Ukraine would be problematic. 
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Constructing cultural sovereignty 
History 
Law: Provoked nationalism 
When Shushkevich tried to construct a Belarusian history it was still doubtful how that 
might be done. Yet already from 1994 Belarusian scholars began to outline how a mediaeval 
“Chronicle names Polatsk as...a city, where there sat knights, who counted their line as older 
than that of Oleg in Kyiv.”
602 That Polatsk was also home to the first printer of the Bible in an 
East Slavic language, Frantsysk Skaryna, helped separating Belarusians from both Novgorod 
and Kyiv. Such emphasis on a Belarusian past separate from those of the neighbouring 
states was one reason why, by the late 1990s, a significant 30% of Russians living in Belarus 
now  viewed  Belarus  as  their  homeland,  signifying  a  historical  connection  and  almost 
equalling the 38% of Russians who similarly identified with Ukraine.
603 The question, though, 
was whether Lukashenko would prove as enthusiastic a supporter of such a Belarusian 
history as his predecessor had been. Little help would be forthcoming from Russia, the 
leaders of which might not disapprove so much of a separate Belarusian history as fail to 
understand the concept. There might be more of a chance that Russians accepted the need 
for a separate Ukrainian history.  Indeed, in 1995  Dmitrii Furman argued that modern 
Ukrainian nationalism,  attempting  to distance Ukraine from Russia, emerged during the 
nineteenth  century  as  a  response  to  the  repressive  policies  of  an  autocratic  Russian 
Empire.
604 Nevertheless, while El’tsin and his government had previously showed similar 
understanding, they failed to respond to Furman’s nuanced argument, which did not fit into 
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the focus on the Russian empire as predecessor of the Russian Federation; a focus that 
El’tsin was increasingly using. 
 
Power: Soviet nostalgia 
El’tsin’s position was increasingly supported by Russians in Ukraine. The Soviet Union had 
previously argued in favour of a joint Russo-Ukrainian historical background. Most Russians 
had believed in this, and the Soviet collapse had only changed perceptions momentarily. By 
January, 1994, a majority of Russians in Ukraine considered the Soviet breakup a tragic 
historic accident; two years later, three-quarters of them had problems accepting Ukrainian 
independence.
605  Even many Ukrainian politicians were forgetting Soviet woes.  In June, 
1994, the leader of the Ukrainian Socialist Party, Oleksandr Moroz, summed up: “Anybody 
who does not regret the collapse of the USSR has no heart.” True, he also spoke against its 
restoration,
606 but preference for  a supra-national, Russian-led history was clear. Such a 
preference  was  even  clearer  in  Belarus,  and  El’tsin  used  this  to  the  advantage  of  an 
integrationist agenda. In February, 1995, he spoke in Minsk about the common historical 
roots  of  Russians  and Belarusians  and  about  the  centuries-old  links  between them, the 
breaking of which would allegedly mock history and violate the two peoples’ fates.
607 Three 
months later, a majority of inhabitants in Belarus duly  voted in favour of adopting Soviet 
symbols and flags for their state.
608 The following April, when Russia and Belarus created 
their  Community  of  Sovereign  Republics  it  was  certainly  not  a  coincidence  that  the 
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abbreviation  of  this  new  entity  became  SSR;  the  similarity  to  the  Russian-language 
abbreviation of the Soviet Union, SSSR, served as a reminder of sought similarities between 
the present and the Soviet past.
609 And Lukashenko added at the time that Russo-Belarusian 
integration was an ideological project to “‘rectify the mistake, committed in 1991’ - the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union.”
610 No alternative reading of history seemed to exist in 
Belarus.  In  November,  1997,  a  reinvigorated  El’tsin  perceived  Ukraine  in  a  similar  light, 
declaring: “It is impossible to tear from our hearts that Ukrainians are our own people. That 
is our destiny – our common destiny.”
611 El’tsin thus emphasised that disruption of Russian 
relations with neighbours was imposed by third parties. Kuchma had no wish to be seen as 
such a third party. Eventually, in February, 1999, he even acknowledged the historical ties of 
Ukraine  to  Russia  and  the  Soviet  Union  by  restoring  the  public  holiday  celebrating  the 
victory of the Soviet Red Army in the Second World War, opposing those Ukrainians who 
argued that German occupation was replaced by a Soviet one.
612 And it seemed prudent for 
Kuchma to focus on Soviet history, for despite the subordinate position of Ukrainians, they 
were more visible to Russians than in the imperial narrative. To illustrate the difference, in 
August,  1999,  while  discussing  partial  military  withdrawal  from  Crimea,  Russians 
commentators remembered  “...the  agreement  struck  with  the  legal  representatives  of 
Turkey,  the  Ottoman  Empire,  in  connection  with the  annexation  of  Crimea  to  Russia  in 
1783....should Russia abandon its claim on Crimea the Ottoman Empire could  claim the 
return  of  the  peninsula  under  its  jurisdiction.”
613  If  eighteenth  century  was  to  be  the 
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historical  ideal  for  Russia,  Ukraine  might  suddenly  be  wholly  ignored  in  the  relations 
between regional great powers, not a risk in the strictly demarcated Soviet template.  
 
Nation: Russian Iaroslav 
Russian commentators had not really intended to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty with 
their above-mentioned comments about the rights of Turkey, yet they still failed to consider 
Ukrainian wishes. Sometimes, however, the actions of the Russian government could not 
easily be explained as thoughtlessness. In May, 1997, while visiting Ukraine Chernomyrdin 
placed flowers on Iaroslav the Wise’s grave; the grave of a medieval prince seen by Russians 
as Russian and symbol of empire. Chernomyrdin did not, though, place flowers on Taras 
Shevchenko’s grave; the grave of a Ukrainian nationalist poet and symbol who had written 
against Russian dominance.
614 This could be seen as a deliberate slight, and, worryingly, 
some Russians felt such slights were appro priate following past exploitation of Russian 
goodwill.  Sergei Karaganov, for instance,  decried how Russia had been treated as an 
“economic  colony”  by  less  developed  parts  of  the  empire  and  the  Union,  unlike  what 
Ukrainians  and  other  peoples  had  mistakenly,  even  maliciously  argued.
615  The Russian 
executive did not go that far, yet Ukrainians from Western Ukraine began to recollect how 
Soviet troops had entered their formerly Polish region  at the end of World War II. This was 
accompanied by executions of local military personnel, deportation of many to Siberia, and 
transferral  of  ethnic  Russians,  derided  by  local s  as  moskali,  into  these  provinces.
616 
Eventually, an increasing proportion of Ukrainians started complaining that  Russians had 
alienated  Ukrainians  from   their  proper,  ethnic  community  through  sustained  cultural 
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repression. This was formulated in a statement presented in March, 1999, by a number of 
leading Ukrainian nationalists, including the perhaps most prominent of all, Ivan Drach.
617 
Although Drach had  no formal powers in the Ukrainian polity, and his informal ones had 
fallen substantially during the 1990s, Russo-Ukrainian disputes over history were apparently 
not going to go away. 
 
Language 
Law: No wish to be defended 
Language laws from the last years of the UkSSR had been tolerant of Russian-speakers’ 
rights.  This  tolerance  mostly  remained  during  the  1990s,  and  legitimised  the  fact  that 
Russian language slightly retreated in Ukraine. In a 1997 survey only 11% of respondents in 
Ukraine approved the preservation of a Russian-language Ukrainian culture, and even less 
claimed a historical and continued existence of such a culture. Even though ideas of a united 
Slavic  culture,  closely  related  to  Russia  were  more  popular,
618  Ukrainian language was 
becoming slightly more widespread in the country. Yet local Russian -speakers in Ukraine 
seldom sought support from the Russian state, nor did Russian-speakers in Belarus. A survey 
from the late 1990s showed that only 9% of those Russians in Belarus, who saw Russia as 
their homeland, wanted the Russian state to defend their linguistic rights. Among Russians 
perceiving Belarus as their homeland, only 4% wanted to be defended. Similar results taken 
from Russians in Ukraine were  9% and 3%, respectively.
619 Consequently, although titular 
languages  might  become  slightly  more  widespread  relative  to  Russian,  local  Russian -
speakers still did not argue that their rights were being infringed on. 
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Power: Promoting Russian language 
Nevertheless, after the Soviet collapse Russian authorities had often found it useful to retain 
Russian as the dominant language in the post-Soviet region. That such a policy might hinder 
the spreading of Belarusian and Ukrainian languages was often ignored. Symbolically, from 
1994  onwards  a number  of  Muscovite newspapers  showed this  by  reverting  to  Russian 
renditions of place-names in Ukraine; similarly, “in Ukraine” became “na Ukraine,” not “v 
Ukraine.”
620 Although the difference between the two expressions was seemingly minor, 
“na Ukraine” denoted an image of Ukraine as peripheral to a centrally run empire and not as 
a fully sovereign state. Those who were primarily Russian-speakers in Ukraine simply saw 
the pejorative preposition as correct grammar; and as of February, 1995, this still accounted 
for over half of the population in Ukraine,
621 while in Belarus only 12% spoke Belarusian 
fluently at the time.
622 This proportion afterwards remained steady. S urveys carried out 
among  the  Belarusian  population  in  1999  showed   only  10%  predominantly  sp oke 
Belarusian. In contrast, 45-50% spoke Russian outright while another 35-40% chose to mix 
Belarusian and Russian,
623  but  certain  that  they remained more proficient in   the latter 
language.  Unsurprisingly, the dominant proportion of Russian -speakers prompted titular 
language-speakers to be tolerant towards Russian. A Ukrainian survey from 1997 showed 
that 83%, including 52% in the western regions, di sagreed that a citizen of Ukraine must 
speak  Ukrainian.  Finally, a  survey from July, 1998, disclosed that 70% of  inhabitants in 
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Ukraine  favoured  official  status  for  Russian  language,  while  36%  favoured  introducing 
Russian as a state language.
624 In Belarus, furthermore, Russian scholar Nikolai Zen’kovich 
claimed  in  1998  that  the  extent  of  Russian  language being  adopted  by  Belarusians  was 
unmatched  among  any  of  the  other  former  Soviet  peoples.  Allegedly,  Belarusians  even 
solicited their authorities en masse to excuse children from studying Belarusian in secondary 
schools.
625 This did not prevent the Russian leadership from promoting Russian language at 
the expense of Belarusian and Ukrainian whenever possible. Most notably, in 1995 taxation 
of the production and export of Russian-language publications was abolished in an attempt 
to retain and promote Russian language in the former Soviet regio n. This challenged the 
Ukrainian-language press in Ukraine
626 although it was welcomed by people used to reading 
in Russian.  
 
Nation: Complaints of discrimination 
The  danger  was  that  Ukrainians  and  Belarusians  might  resist  what  they  saw  as  overly 
aggressive promotion of Russian language; certainly, tendencies of this had existed in the 
early 1990s. Tension was generally absent in Belarus, especially after Lukashenko gained 
power. Somewhat perversely, the only problem might appear due to an inability by the 
Belarusian state to provide sufficient Russian-language education. By 1994, over 230 schools 
in Minsk officially taught in Belarusian. This was well above the percentage of students 
whose parents wanted them to attend these schools, but with Russian-language schools 
being  in  high  demand  many  pupils  were  forced  into  Belarusian-language  schools, 
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heightening  fears  of  forced  Belarusification,
627  even if authorities hardly intended this 
outcome. Such fears were generally not shared in Russia where Ukraine was less trusted. By 
August,  1995,  Russian  commentators  lamented  official  Ukrainian  attempts  of  cultural 
isolation from Russia and from Ukrainian Russians.
628 And indeed, in early 1996 the popular, 
Russia-based ORT television channel was ordered by Ukrainian authorities to broadcast on a 
technically inferior channel, thus losing a third of its audience. The decision was defended 
openly by the Ukrainian state committee responsible by statements displaying antagonism 
towards  the  Russian language.
629  At  the  time,  El’tsin  did  not  become  involved  in  the 
situation,  but  it  proved  ammunition  the  following  year  as  the  details  of  the  naval  and 
Friendship  treaties  were  discussed  and  the  Russian  executive  wanted  to  use  alleged 
Ukrainian language discrimination as a bargaining tool. Indeed, in May, 1997, Iastrzhembskii 
made  clear  that  El’tsin  was  concerned  about  the  alleged  discrimination  against  Russian 
language  and  culture  in  Ukraine.
630  In voicing such concerns, Iastrzhembskii was only 
marginally  more  diplomatic  than  Chernomyrdin  had   been  earlier  that  month.  W hile 
finalising the major Russo-Ukrainian political and military treaties,  he openly complained 
about  an  alleged  Ukrainian  policy  of  squeezing  out  Russian  language  and  culture.
631  
Subsequently, before the treaties were ratified, t he Russian Duma also wanted to voice 
concerns. In November, 1998, its members lambasted Ukraine for linguistic discrimination. 
Protests were voiced against the official minority status of Ukrainian Russians, and members 
of the Duma demanded that  the Russian language become an official state language of 
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Ukraine.
632 This demand was not heeded and most Ukrainians still did not worry overly 
about Russian subversion of their linguistic sovereignty. Still, Ukrainian exceptions to this 
were  becoming  increasingly  fre quent.  In  1999,  former  Ukrainian  D eputy  Minister  of 
Education Anatolii Pohribnyi made clear that Russification of Ukrainians was pointless and a 
superficial, temporary phenomenon, since “...on the level of ethnopsychology, deep down 
[ethnic Ukrainian] Russian-speakers remain Ukrainians.”
633 
 
Religion 
Law: Declining religiosity 
Previously, religious institutions in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine had supported each other 
against a common Soviet adversary. With this adversary gone, mutual support predictably 
lessened, and often apathy took its place. Yet apathy might still increase the willingness of 
Russians to accept Ukrainian religious sovereignty. By 1994, the failure of religion to gain 
widespread support was visible in Ukraine, where less than 30% of respondents declared 
allegiance to any of the traditional churches in the state, the drop being clearest among 
those respondents who came from an Orthodox background.
634 Under such circumstances, 
it was hard for Russians to fear Ukrainian cultural assertiveness, or even to notice it.  
 
Power: An Orthodox community 
Nevertheless, religion had historically been a prominent part of the strategy of consolidating 
and expanding Russian central power. Now, during the elaborate ceremony in April, 1996, 
when  the  Treaty  forming  a  Russo-Belarusian  community  was  signed,  Russian  Orthodox 
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Patriarch Aleksii II walked between El’tsin and Lukashenko and gave his blessing to the 
signing of the Treaty.
635 El’tsin needed such support from the church, for his main threat in 
the  upcoming  presidential  election,  Ziuganov,  repeatedly  emphasised  how  religion 
remained a central part of the “organic unity” binding Russia, Belarus and Ukraine to each 
other.
636 Such rhetoric resonated among Russians not least because many Russians believed 
Orthodoxy was a shared value to be defended from foreign attacks. Notice historian Sergei 
Samuilov’s claim that Western analysts misunderstood the Pereiaslav agreement between 
the  Russian  Emperor  and  the  Ukrainian  Cossacks  in  1654,  as  this  really  was  a  defence 
against  Polish  Catholic  intrusion.
637  Although such comments were mainly intended for 
domestic consumption, they could be used abroad.  In 1998, the Party of Regional Revival, 
officially supported by the Moscow patriarchate, won its highest vote in western regions like 
Volhynia and especially Chernivtsi,
638 where anti-Russian feeling was otherwise strongest. 
 
Nation: Polonialising church 
This did not imply, though, that many Ukrainians in western provinces adhered to Russian 
Orthodoxy. Previously, Ukrainian parliamentarians had obstructed clerical appointments in 
Ukraine in retaliation for perceived Russian aggression against the Uniate church. Then as 
now  disputes  remained  short-lived  and,  despite  the  above  example,  mainly  local.  That 
violence could still appear was clear, however, in July, 1995, when the “Ukrainian National 
Assembly” and its paramilitary wing, the Ukrainian Self-Defence Force, which had previously 
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attempted to storm several Russian Orthodox churches, created mayhem at the funeral of 
Patriarch  Volodymyr  of  the  Ukrainian  Orthodox  Church  (Kyiv  Patriarchate).
639  Ukrainian 
authorities ensured that Ukrainian nationalist groups could not repeat the attack later in the 
decade, but Kuchma could do little about appeals from Russia to combat the Uniates. By 
1997 Russian scholars like Dugin believed religious beliefs divided Ukraine and should be 
acted on: “Here it is most important to build a cultural-denominational border between 
Central Ukraine...and Western Ukraine, to avoid the discordant Central European Catholic or 
Uniate influence on Orthodox territory.”
640 Dugin might have been easily dismissed if it had 
not been for the fact that representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine also 
tended to seek alliance among extremist fringes in Russian politics. In December, 1999, they 
thus officially supported the challenger to Moscow mayor Luzhkov in the mayoral election, 
Dmitrii  Vasil’ev,  the  long-time  leader  of  the  extremist,  at  times  anti-Semitic  Russian 
movement Pamiat’.
641 Vasil’ev was still without a chance in the election, and not even such 
negligible political interference took place from the Russian Orthodox Church in Belarus. 
However,  Dugin’s  and  similar  comments  could still  have  influence  on religious  relations 
here,  since  local  Russians  feared  the  inflow  of  Polish  Catholicism.  In  1996,  Tatstsiana 
Mikulich thus claimed “Catholicism, coming from the Polish, was seen as a trait of the Polish 
nation.” Thus, Catholic Belarusians called themselves Polish, although they had nothing in 
common with Poland apart from their religion.
642 Maybe Mikulich’s warning remained a bit 
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intangible for now, yet it would be straightforward for Russians to use religious differences 
against Belarusians in future. 
 
Conclusion 
Between  1993  and  1999,  the  paradigm  of  Power  continued  to  dominate  Russian 
perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian cultural sovereignty. A number of initiatives were 
undertaken by the Russian leadership that used historical events as a medium to promote 
Russia as an international great power. Notably, El’tsin often referred to a common history 
of Slavs, especially within the Russian Empire, in order to appeal for a recreation of past 
glory. Given that the Communist Party remained his main domestic opponents El’tsin was 
understandably loath to employ the Soviet past in a similar fashion. Concerning linguistic 
issues,  state  programmes  to  spread  and  strengthen  Russian  language  abroad  remained 
prominent, and in Belarus Russian even became an official language again. Conversely, few 
serious  attempts  were  made  by  Belarusians  and  Ukrainians  to  promote  their  titular 
languages,  yet  this  did  not  prevent  the  Russian  government  from  constantly  trying  to 
convince inhabitants in neighbouring states about the advantages that followed use of the 
Russian language. For Russians, and many of their neighbours, Russian language was still 
seen as necessary to retain inter-ethnic equality and peace. Finally, in relation to religious 
issues  the  Russian  Orthodox  Church  had  become  increasingly  close  to  Russian  state 
structures.  Indeed,  when  El’tsin  needed  public  opinion  on  his  side  before  the  1996 
presidential  election,  he  did  not  just  announce  unification  plans  with  Belarus,  but  he 
ensured that Patriarch Aleksii II was present to bless the agreement. While there was little 
doubt  that  Belarus  could  be  retained  close  to  the  central  Russian  Orthodox  Church  in 
Moscow, in Ukraine, too, the Uniate Church was still far weaker than Orthodoxy. 206 
 
 
The  paradigm  of  Law  continued  to  have  some  influence  on  Russian  perceptions  of 
Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  cultural  sovereignty.  Concerning  perceptions  of  history,  some 
Russian commentators by now recognised that the Russian state, if not the Russian people, 
historically forced cultural uniformity on Belarusians and Ukrainians. Concerning linguistic 
issues, no official structures were forcing Belarusians and Ukrainians to speak in Russian, nor 
did  the  Russian  leadership  wish  for  this  to  happen,  although  there  was  reluctance  in 
Moscow to accept that the Russian diaspora had little wish or need to be defended  by 
Moscow. Finally, concerning religious issues disputes between churches in Ukraine and in 
Belarus remained scarce, although this was due to lack of interest in religion more than 
anything else. Nevertheless, the Orthodox Church experienced the most significant drop in 
membership of all churches in Ukraine, leaving religions less connected to Russia with an 
advantage. 
 
The paradigm of Nation remained the least important one, although its influence grew. 
Concerning perceptions of history, some Russians returned to arguments about how the 
RSFSR had been economically exploited by other republics, while even the Prime Minister 
churlishly  ignored  the  grave  of  the  man  symbolising  Ukrainian  nationhood.  In  linguistic 
matters, several members of the executive, again including Chernomyrdin, worried about 
highly  assertive  Ukrainian  policies,  not  least  in  the  media  sphere,  aimed  to  reduce  the 
presence of Russian language. Finally, even in religious matters fights broke out between 
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv patriarchate), Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow 
Patriarchate) and the Uniate Church, although even in Belarus Catholicism and Orthodoxy 
might be unable to co-exist. 207 
 
Chapter 6: Consolidating sovereignty (2000-2004) 
Consolidating political sovereignty 
Territory 
Law: Land borders demarcated 
Under El’tsin, Ukrainian territorial inviolability had twice been guaranteed through official 
treaties, just as most Russians had wished to resolve any disputes in a peaceful manner. In 
January, 2003, Putin and Kuchma continued this development by officially demarcating the 
Russo-Ukrainian  land  border  in  correspondence  with  the  Friendship  Treaty.
643  However, 
Putin provided no further territorial guarantees, and although he made certain to attend the 
tenth anniversary of Ukrainian independen ce in August, 2001,
644 this did not necessarily 
signal respect for Ukrainian territorial sovereignty. Indeed, Putin’s visit was more likely a 
response  to  Kuchma’s  outburst  two  months  before.  Kuchma  swore  that  Ukraine  would 
remain  an  independent  state  and  never  join  the  Belarus-Russian  Union;
645  and  Putin’s 
subsequent visit could therefore be interpreted as a signal that showed  he had not let 
Ukraine  out  of  his  sight.  Certainly,  members  of  the  Russian  leadership  did  not  favour 
territorial integration at any price; in February, 2000, the former Vice-President of Gazprom, 
Petr Rodionov, had complained: “The problem of [energy] debts is even more difficult to 
solve in the case of Belarus, since the factor of the strategic union of the two states and 
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their possible integration is involved.”
646 Furthermore, in the summer of 2001 a popular 
survey showed only 33% support in Belarus for political union with Russia.
647 Putin could 
therefore still find some reasons to resist territorial unification with neighbouring states, if 
he so wished. 
 
Power: Union as prioritised task and the constitutional act 
It was not clear that Putin wanted to resist unification, though. Members of the Russian 
government  had  generally  supported  territorial  integration  during  the  1990s.  And 
immediately after El’tsin had retired, in January, 2000, the Russian State Secretary of the 
Russo-Belarusian Union Pavel Borodin noted: “Naturally, the rapprochement of Belarus and 
Russia requires...common...border protection...”
648 Putin’s tenure was going to be marked 
by territorial reintegration. Such integration might even be used against the West. Although 
Borodin  had  not  mentioned  it,  the  Russian  parliament  had  been  inspired  by  the  NATO 
bombings of Yugoslavia the previous year: “The State Duma declares its support for the 
brotherly Yugoslavian people in its aspiration to defend the independence, sovereignty and 
territorial  integrity  of  its  state...and  underlines  the  high  importance  of  the  idea  of  the 
inclusion of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Union of Belarus and Russia.”
649 Thus, 
parliamentarians viewed Belarus as part of a territorial entity opposing Western aggression 
in  the  Balkans  and  elsewhere.  Even  though  Putin  did  not  agree,  he  and  the  Russian 
government had strongly condemned the NATO operation, as well. It was not inconceivable 
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that the Russian Acting President in future might see Belarus in a similar light. Furthermore, 
Putin  and  Borodin  certainly  agreed  that  other  states  should  join  Russo-Belarusian 
cooperation.  In  April,  Borodin  stated:  “...the  [Russo-Belarus  Union]  is  open  for  other 
participants  that  in  the  nearest  future  –  within  3-4  years...will  include  Ukraine  and 
Kazakhstan.”
650  This  suited  Lukashenko  well.  In  May,  2000,  he  denounced  the  Soviet 
collapse as “the greatest mistake of the past century”
651 and claimed that “...about 90% of 
people in Russia, and...in Belarus, are devoted to our unity...if you give people the freedom 
and the possibility to openly state their opinion in Ukraine...the result will be the same.”
652 
Lukashenko  was  heartened  by  Putin’s  Foreign  Policy  Doctrine  published  the  following 
month. It stated: “The strengthening of the Union of Belarus and Russia as the highest form 
of  integration  between  two  sovereign  states  during  this  stage  is  a  task  of  foremost 
importance.”
653 Putin and Lukashenko were certain that public opinion supported them. 
Surveys taken among the population of Belarus in 1999 and 2002 showed that while 41.8% 
of respondents in 1999 had been prepared to unite [with Russia], now that was the case for 
53.8%. Conversely, while 40.4% wanted to vote against unification in 1999, not more than 
23% wanted that in 2002.
654 For now, similar broad support for reintegration could not be 
found in Ukraine. Yet, in June, 2002,   the Russian Bloc political movement was formed , 
intending to unite all Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians.
655 The movement even managed 
demonstrations in dozens of Ukrainian cities  to  support  its  cause.  And gradually some 
official Ukrainian support for territorial integration could be found, too.  In July, 2002, 
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Oleksandr  Kupchyshyn,  Director  of  the  Treaty  and  Legal  department  of  the  Ukrainian 
Foreign Ministry, stated that border demarcation between Ukraine and Russia would violate 
historic traditions of living together and of coexistence. This statement was conspicuously 
similar to the official policy by the Russian Foreign Ministry.
656 Still, what both Ukrainians 
and Belarusians had to confront was that Putin wanted Russia to be the dominant partner in 
any integrated structure. In September, 2002, he even suggested   that  “...Belarus  could 
accede to Russia as one or several of the regional subjects” of the Federation,
657 which 
would then simply expand. This followed Putin’s plan from the previous month to create a 
unified federal state over eighteen months, complete with popular referenda, and election 
of a supreme president of the united state.
658 Putin would have won such a referendum 
handily. It was therefore hardly surprising that popular surveys taken in Russia during the 
following  year  showed  majority  support  for Rus sian  rapprochement  with  Belarus  and 
Ukraine (as well as Kazakhstan and Moldova).
659 Later, in March, 2003, a Russo-Belarusian 
inter-governmental commission agreed basic provisions for a Union state constitutional act. 
According to Russian parliamentary speak er Gennadii Seleznev, the Union would have a 
joint government, parliament, court, a flag, emblems and other attributes of statehood.
660 
Considering that the Russian parliament was increasingly controlled by Putin it was not 
surprising that support for integration came from this angle, too. 
 
Nation: Tuzla 
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Aggressive territorial demands gained saliency in Russian oppositional politics during the 
1990s.  As  yet,  the  Russian  executive  had  not  really  joined  this  tendency.  Nevertheless, 
Ukraine would have good reason to fear what such a development might entail, particularly 
regarding  Crimea.  Ten  years  after  the  emergence  of  independent  Ukraine,  Crimea 
stubbornly remained the only region with a majority of self-ascribed ethnic Russians. By 
2000,  this  majority  constituted  60%  of  the  local  population,  against  23%  who  were 
Ukrainians.
661  Luzhkov was happy to take advantage.  In July, 2001,  the Moscow Mayor 
challenged  Ukrainian  political  sovereignty  again,  reiterating   that  Crimea  was  rightfully 
Russian territory: “Crimea was, is and will remain for us – Muscovites, Russians [rossiian] – 
an inalienable part of Russia...due to its spirit.”
662 No part of Belarus could conceivably be 
claimed by Russians in a similar fashion, yet this did not mean that territorial disagreement 
was  absent.  By  June,  2002,  Putin  began  criticising  Belarusian  interpretations  of  the 
constitutional act of the Russia-Belarus Union as “legalistic nonsense” while there were 
fears  in  Minsk  that  Belarus  might  become  a  90
th  Russian  region.
663  And  note  how 
Lukashenko two months later feared that  “even Lenin and Stalin never thought of dividing 
Belarus and joining it to the RSFSR or USSR.”
664 Suddenly the prospect that Russians might 
undermine and disintegrate Belarusian statehood was openly discussed. Most likely, Putin’s 
regime did not have such plans, yet Russian observers were increasingly exasperated with 
Belarusian obstructions of territorial unification. Political Scientist Dmitrii Oreshkin for one 
began to dismiss widespread Russian public support for reintegration as mostly emotional, 
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indicating that the Russian leadership would have to overcome Belarusian recalcitrance in a 
much more calculating manner.
665 But at least reintegration was still on the table in the case 
of Belarus. Concerning Ukraine, open territorial conflict broke out for the first time after the 
Soviet  collapse  in  September,  2003,  when  local  authorities  in  southern  Russia  began 
constructing a dam to the Ukrainian island of Tuzla in the Kerch strait. It is inconceivable 
that the project was begun without direct support, or even orders from the Kremlin, and it 
was no coincidence, either, that the status of the Kerch Strait had been the centre of harsh 
disagreement  between  Russian  and  Ukrainian  negotiators  for  some  years.  Eventually, 
negotiations between Prime Ministers Mikhail Kas’ianov and Viktor Ianukovych terminated 
the  building  of  the  dam,
666  but  not  before  the  Ukrainian  parliament  in  October  had 
empowered Kuchma to “...use all means to defend the territorial integrity”
667 of Ukraine, 
and Kuchma had  produced a secret decree outlining  unilateral declaration of the Kerch 
Strait and the Sea of Azov as internal Ukrainian waters, directly contrary to the Russian 
position.
668 The declaration was subsequently not enforced, and it was unclear whether 
Russian parliamentarians would care much about Ukrainian complaints. The parliamentary 
party United Russia, closely connected to Putin, had strongly denounced the Ukrainian 
government during the Tuzla -crisis. Thus, when United Russia had a good result in the 
parliamentary elections of December, 2003,
669 other Russian political forces might see an 
incentive to criticise Ukraine in future. 
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Governance 
Law: Relatively free Russia 
During the 1990s, the Russian leadership had generally respected Belarusian and Ukrainian 
sovereign governance, although Russian unwillingness to criticise the undemocratic ruling 
regime  in  Belarus  increasingly  earned  critique  from  the  West.  Partly  for  this  reason, 
following  his  retirement  El’tsin  straightaway  suggested  that  all  means  must  be  used  to 
ensure  the  gradual  democratisation  of  Belarus  in  order  to  pre-empt  that  Lukashenko’s 
increasingly authoritarian rule might provoke an anti-Russian Belarusian political opposition 
to  revolt.
670  Apparently reasoning similarly, in October, 2000, the former he ad of the 
Belarusian national bank, Tamara Vinnikova, who claimed to have been forced into exile by 
the Belarusian authorities, was allowed to present her view on the main Russian state 
television channel ORT.
671 Vinnikova did not receive Putin’s expressed support, however, 
and  it  might  be  expected  that  Lukashenko’s  rule  would  be  tolerated  as  long  as  it  kept 
Belarus stable. Similarly, although Kuchma’s Ukraine was increasingly undemocratic Putin’s 
attempts  to  democratise  Ukrainian  governance  was  limited  to  a  bilateral  agreement  in 
February, 2001, including a programme for cooperation between the regions alongside the 
common  borders  of  these  two  states.
672  Certainly,  by  2001  Putin’s  Russia  retained 
noticeably freer governance than Belarus on issues concerning civil society, independent 
media, democratisation and more,
673 and as such might by its very presence condition the 
neighbouring  state  to  follow  its  example.  Yet  on  numerous  counts  Putin’s  regime  was 
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already noticeably more authoritarian that El’tsin’s had been, and this inspired Lukashenko. 
During his re-election in September, 2001, Lukashenko added 20% to his winning total, thus 
reaching 76%. This was undoubtedly done in order to best Putin’s manipulated winning 
result in the Russian presidential election the previous year.
674 The tendency, therefore, was 
for increasing Russian authoritarianism to  re-enforce  similar tendencies in Belarus and 
Ukraine, while the Russian political opposition no longer found it likely that democracy 
might take root in these states. Arguing that the population of Belarus had to take some of 
the blame for Lukashenko, Valeriia Novodvorskaia thus complained in August, 2002, that: 
“...Lukashenko  would  not  have  become  President  no  matter  how  he  would  have 
constructed the election results, if no one had voted for him...”
675  
 
Power: Dismissing Tarasiuk 
El’tsin’s professed desire to democratise Belarus and Ukraine had mostly been absent since 
Lukashenko and Kuchma followed Russian wishes. Putin’s first term only reinforced this 
impression.  That  the  Belarusian  administration  would  continue  to  favour  Russia  was 
indicated by its ethnic composition. By 2000, Belarusian local governance in the countryside 
remained dominated by self-ascribed ethnic Russians, although they constituted a minority 
among  the  population  of  Belarus.
676  In  Ukraine,  some  high -ranking  politicians  openly 
opposed to Russia did exist, but Putin quickly persuaded Kuchma to act against them. I n 
August, 2000, Kyiv launched judicial proceedings against anti-Russian Deputy Prime Minister 
Iuliia Tymoshenko according to wishes from the Russian administration , and two months 
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later the pro-Western Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk was dismissed after pressure from 
Putin.
677 To ensure that people like Tymoshenko and Tarasiuk would not return to pow er, 
Putin then appointed former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin as ambassador to Ukraine in 
early 2001. Soon,  Chernomyrdin, Ukrainian Prime Minister  Ianukovych, and  the head of 
Kuchma’s administration Viktor Medvedchuk, were together attending the opening of the 
influential Russian spin-doctor Gleb Pavlovskii’s Russian Club in Kyiv,
678 indicating the close 
links between the Russian and Ukrainian central administrations. Lukashenko was being 
bought off more overtly. Before the  September, 2001, Belarusian president ial election, 
Russian  donors  funded  large  parts  of  Lukashenko’s  campaign  for  re-election  and 
furthermore provided positive media coverage for him, in return for anticipated favours that 
Russian firms operating in Belarus were to subsequently receive from his administration.
679 
Subsequently,  Putin  quickly  congratulated  Lukashenko   on  his  re-election,  just  as  the 
chairman of the Federation Council, Egor’ Stroev saw “...Lukashenko’s victory as necessary 
and  natural,”
680  contrary  to  the  findings  of  numerous  international  organisations.  The 
Russian  political  opposition  mostly  agreed  with  Putin.  In  November,  2001,  Russian 
commentator  Andrei  Okara  argued  that  Lukashenko  was  popular  among  self-ascribed 
Russian “national patriots,” since he fitted their image of the Belarusian-peasant archetype 
that could be subordinated from Moscow as a provincial leader.
681 This was an attractive 
position for Ukrainians, too. A t the  Ukrainian parliamentary election in March, 2002,  all 
political parties with some success, apart from Our Ukr aine openly suggested increasing 
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cooperation  with  Russia
682  and even sent  candidates to Moscow to display pro -Russian 
credentials.
683  Putin was prepared to exploit the situation. In August, 2002, he openly 
suggested that Russia and Belarus might be governed by one parliament by the end of 2003 
and by a joint presidency appearing a few months after,  just when Putin’s Russian tenure 
would end.
684 In preparation, the Russian political elite expected a joint international facade 
with Belarusians. In March, 2003, Mikh ail Khvastou, just before beginning as Belarusian 
ambassador to the USA, met with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgii Mamedov. From 
Belarus  it  was  officially  confirmed  that  Khvastou  went  to  Moscow  to  prepare  for 
Washington.
685  The Belarusian administration was seemingly pleased to be able to use 
Russian international experience, and a similar attraction in Ukraine to Russian political 
capital was shown that autumn when  the Donetsk-based public relations company Social 
Dialogue,  preparing  Ianukovych’s  presidential  campaign  for  the  upcoming  presidential 
election, marketed him as a Ukrainian Putin for Russophone Ukraine, highlighting his image 
as a strongman to solve the problems in the state.
686 In return for their loyalty, Belarusian 
and Ukrainian elites coul d expect Russia to support them internationally. When the EU 
presented criticism in 2004, it was thus easy for the Belarusian government, including 
Foreign Minister Sergei Martynov in February, to accuse the EU and the West in general of 
promoting double standards, and to accept the praise bestowed by Russians.
687  
 
Nation: Calling the Belarusian bluff 
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And yet, criticism of Belarusian and Ukrainian governance had appeared from increasingly 
significant Russian policymakers from the mid-1990s onwards. Their fear was not least what 
would happen in oppositions in Belarus and Ukraine came to power. Indeed, in May, 2001, 
after  Chernomyrdin’s  appointment  as  Russian  ambassador  in  Ukraine,  Tymoshenko, 
recently fired as Deputy Prime Minister, was highly critical: “By appointing Chernomyrdin [as 
Russian ambassador to Ukraine], the Russians have in reality appointed the Prime Minister 
of Ukraine,”
688 so that Russians did not really have to care about Kuchma’s longevity. As 
indicated  above, the  Russian  state prosecutor was  quick  to  attack  her  in  return; in the 
summer  of  2001  Russia  accused  Tymoshenko  of  corruption  allegedly  amounting  to  $60 
million
689 hoping to have her incarcerated for somewhat longer than the weeks she had 
been in jail earlier that year. Many in the Belarusian administration were aware that Russian 
support could not be taken for granted, something that Belarusian  opposition politician 
Leanid  Sinitsyn,  previously  Lukashenko’s  presidential  chief  of  staff  and  an  outspoken 
supporter  of  Russo-Belarusian  integration,  warned  in  September,  2001,
690  while he also 
showed his lack of faith in Lukashenko’s willingness to integrate with Russia by founding his 
own party aiming for Slavic unity.
691 That sort of competition for the favours of Russia were 
welcome in Moscow, not least since Lukashenko had recently bemoaned that Kuchma had 
allegedly received more support than him during the Ukrainian parliamentary election in 
March, 2002, while Lukashenko was supposedly subject to biased election coverage in the 
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Russian media.
692 It would perhaps be reasonable to dismiss these complaints as somewhat 
unfair,  since  concerted  efforts  by  the  Russian  executive  to  intervene  in  Belarusian 
governance had hitherto favoured Lukashenko. But in the summer of 2002, Putin was 
exasperated.  In  June, 2002 , he  openly  accused  the  Belarusian  leader  of  employing  a 
“muddled legal veneer...inappropriate to *the rule of law+” with the aim of recreating the 
Soviet Union with Lukashenko at the pinnacle of power.
693 In return, Putin suggested two 
months later “the construction of a unified state based on the Russian constitution and 
federal principles...[with] a referendum should be conducted in Russia and Belarus in May, 
2003,  concerning  definitive  unification...in  December,  2003,  elections  for  a  unified 
parliament could be conducted, and in Spring [2004]...elections of the head of the unified 
state.”
694 Lukashenko’s answer was venomous. Allegedly, he was defending Belarus against 
Russian domination “...since the suggestion now is not even to include Belarus in Russia as a 
united whole, but...to divide Belarus into seven parts, which will be included in the Russian 
Federation and to give these parts equal rights to the Russian regions, we shall never accept 
this suggestion.”
695 What little trust had existed between Putin and Lukashenko concerning 
unified governance now seemed lost. Putin allowed Russian media to operate in Belarus on 
behalf of the political opposition, and in July, 2003, offices of the Russian television station 
NTV, owned by Gazprom, in Belarus were closed to prevent this. But such steps united 
Russian  politicians  against  Lukashenko;  Irina  Khakamada  of  the  oppositional  Union  of 
Rightist Forces complained that “in Belarus firms are actually taken away from *Russian+ 
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businessmen...[such  as]  with  the  closure  of  the  offices  of  NTV...”
696  In  August,  2003, 
Valiantsin Holubeu of the Belarusian Popular Front then claimed that the Russian elite’s 
stance more generally towards Belarusian domestic politics might be changing following a 
roundtable  in  Moscow,  uniting  Russian  scholars  and  deputies  and  members  of  the 
Belarusian  opposition.
697  The Ukrainian opposition could expect no such invitation, but 
continued to be harassed by Russia. Again in September, 2003, Russian prosecutors  sought 
to question Tymoshenko in Moscow over  an alleged scam with Gazprom and the Russian 
Ministry  of  Defence  conducted  during  the  mid -1990s,  thereby  intending  to  unsettle 
challengers of Ianukovych in the presidential election the following year.
698 This was fine for 
Russians as long as Ianukovych would indeed become president, but contingency plans in 
case of his defeat were sorely lacking. 
 
Ideology 
Law: Right to independence 
El’tsin’s Russia took advantage of sovereign Ukraine to ensure stability in the post-Soviet 
region.  Even  in  retirement,  El’tsin  continued  to  believe  that  while  Belarusians  and 
Ukrainians shared a common identity with Russians wishes for sovereign ideologies in these 
states had to be respected.
699 Yet El’tsin no longer had a say in the official formulation of 
Russian state ideology. And in Belarus members of the political opposition worried that 
Putin’s Russia might soon swallow their unsuspecting state. During the 2001 presidential 
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election campaign exiled politician Zenon Pozniak of the Popular Front warned that “the 
coalition of democratic forces in Belarus must do everything possible to prevent the country 
from becoming the north western governorate of *imperial+ Russia.”
700 It was still possible 
that Belarus and Ukraine could rescue Russia from its imperial past, as argued by Russian 
newspaper editor Alan Kasaev in April, 2001: “Independent from Ukraine, Russia is almost 
an  Asian  country  without  serious  interests  in  Europe,  without  its  actually  only...ally  in 
Europe,  without  a  place  for  its  military  in  Europe.”
701  Still,  this  viewpoint  was  not  very 
common in Russia, and it was not unreasonable for many Ukrainians to believe that Ukraine 
had come further than Russia in constructing a state ideology separate from empire. Indeed, 
in the March, 2002, Ukrainian parliamentary elections two openly pro-Russian, East Slavic 
parties garnered a combined vote of less than 2% throughout the state,
702 but this mattered 
increasingly less in the face of Putin’s imperial momentum. 
 
Power: Limited allies and a Russianised administration 
Such  a  momentum  had  already  existed  under  El’tsin,  and  Putin  readily  continued  to 
consolidate ideology centred on the international power of the Russian state. In June, 2000, 
he  approved  the  Russian  Foreign  Policy  Doctrine,  which  clarified  that  one  of  the  main 
objectives  of  Russia  was  to  “form  a  good-neighbourly  belt  along  the  perimeter  of  the 
borders of Russia.”
703 Belarus was an integral part of such a belt, not least since, following 
the  Kosovo  crisis,  neither  state  had  many  international  allies  apart  from  each  other, 
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especially not in Europe where most Russians saw their home and power base.
704 Kuchma, 
too, was temporarily prompted by domestic scandals to seek Russian support  and even, as 
mentioned above, sacked  the pro-Western Tarasiuk in September, 2000, in  exchange for 
Anatolii  Zlenko,  widely  seen  as  “...a  person,  who  can  find  a  common  language  with 
Moscow...”
705 Ukraine, and certainly Belarus could by January, 2001, be used by Russia to 
oppose Western interference in the post-Soviet region. For so-called Great Russianists such 
as Sergei Baburin, “...Russia, together with the other Slavic members of the CIS...can be 
subjected to open interference from NATO...it is possible to prevent this threat” in unison, 
mirroring the Cold War days.
706 Leaders from other post-Soviet states, too, were inspired by 
the imperial example set by Russia and Belarus.  In February, 2001, Moldovan  president 
Vladimir Voronin sought re-election through the idea that his state could join  the Russo-
Belarusian union.
707 Members of the Russian executive understood that Ukraine would be a 
more important prize, though. In July, 2001, Chernomyrdin thus claimed: “Ukraine is not a 
Western state, but a state of the Slavic civilisation, of the Orthodox culture...No one is 
particularly awaiting neither Russia, nor Ukraine in the West, we will not be accepted in the 
“golden billion” – there is no point in hoping for it.”
708 And if the West was unlikely to accept 
Ukraine,  Lukashenko  knew  odds  were  even  less  for  his  Belarus.  Consequently,  at  the 
independence celebrations in July, 2002, he asserted that Belarusians had rejected foreign, 
meaning  Western,  proposals  for  developing  society,  instead  maintaining  law  and  order, 
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peace  and  creative  labour.  The  Soviet  echoes  in  Lukashenko’s  rhetoric  were  marked.
709 
Similarly, it was not difficult to remember Soviet templates when Putin in January, 2003, 
inaugurated the first ever “Year of Russia in Ukraine,”
710 following the first “Year of Ukraine 
in  Russia”  hailed  by  the  Russian  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  as  “an  internationally 
unprecedented socio-political project, intended to fill the concrete content of the strategic 
partnership between Russia and Ukraine.”
711 Kuchma was happy for such a partnership to 
exist;  and  by  April,  2003,  Viktor  Medvedchuk,  head  of  the  Ukrainian  presidential 
administration, also led the most pro-Russian of the centrist parties, the Social Democratic 
Party  –  United,  which  officially  viewed  Russia  thus:  “...we  have  unbreakable  bonds  of 
culture,  destiny  and  history  with  Russia.  Therefore,  relations  with  Russia  must  be  our 
priority  in  foreign  political  and  foreign  economic  relations.”
712  Russian  ministers happily 
agreed. When Foreign Minister Igor’ Ivanov in May, 2003, met with his Ukrainian colleague, 
he  stated  that  “the  meeting  was  connected  to  the  theme  of  Russo-Ukrainian  strategic 
partnership.”
713 And the following month government policy named Ukraine as a strategic 
partner of Russia, i.e. one of its closest, long-term friends.
714  
 
Nation: Putting pressure on Ukraine 
It was increasingly clear that official Russian policy did not guarantee friendship with Belarus 
and Ukraine, though. The construction of a Russian state ideology opposed to Belarusian 
and Ukrainian statehood was seldom espoused by El’tsin. Putin, on the contrary, quickly 
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began bullying leaders of neighbouring states into submission. For instance, during April, 
2000, he used his first summit with Kuchma to openly link “Ukrainian debts for Russian gas, 
excessively ‘warm relations between Ukraine and NATO,’ *and+ the fate of the Black Sea 
Fleet  in  Sevastopol’.”
715  At  the  same  time,  ordinary  Russians  increasingly  rejected 
multinational identities, indicating that any ideology appealing to a community including 
more than Russians might not retain popular support. In April, 2000, a Russia-wide poll 
showed that 56% of respondents agreed there was “a substantial threat to *the+ security of 
Russia from people of other nationalities living in Russia.”
716 Russians had to be protected, 
also in the Foreign Policy Concept from mid-2000. Here it stated that Russian relations with 
CIS states depended on the readiness of the latter to guarantee the rights of Russians living 
there.
717  For Ukraine, and partly Belarus, the document indicated both that the Putin 
administration could overrule their sovereign governance and that Putin might find  it 
necessary, since he distrusted local treatment of minorities. This had traditionally mostly 
been  the  case  for  Ukraine,  but  Belarusian  elections  also  indicated  the  possibility  of 
ideological  divides.  In  the  2001  presidential  election,  Lukashenko’s  victory  was  never  in 
doubt.  Yet  while  the  incumbent  received 87% of  votes  in  the  Gomel’ district  bordering 
Russia,  he  was  “only”  supported  by  57%  in  Minsk.  Conversely,  Lukashenko’s  opponent, 
Vladimir Goncharik, received 9% of the votes in Gomel’, but gained over 30% of votes in 
Minsk.
718 Ukrainian ideological divisions were more pronounced. In April, 2001, a majority in 
                                                           
715 V. Sokolova, “Ne doplyli...” Izvestiia, 19.4.2000 
716 “Threat from non-Russians in Russia,” Russia Votes on 
http://www.russiavotes.org/president/putin_vote_political.php?PHPSESSID=7464cf5cf5e8c8a4e23ef8
a0be43e1b3 (accessed on 9.5.2009) 
717 “Kontseptsiia vneshnei”; see also R. Allison, “Russia and the New States of Eurasia” in A. Brown, ed., 
Contemporary Russian Politics: a reader, Oxford: OUP, 2001, p. 451 
718 D. Marples, “The Prospects for Democracy in Belarus,” Problems of Post-Communism, 51 (1), 2004, p. 
36 224 
 
seven of eleven Ukrainian regions wanted to prioritise relations with Russia
719 but the rest 
wanted to prioritise relations with the West. The EU saw  a chance to change this in its 
favour. From September, 2002, the EU  began advocating increased relations with Belarus 
and Ukraine as entities separate from  Russia, instead of grouped together with Russia, as 
had previously been the case.
720 The EU was still mostly interested in relations with Russia, 
but Belarus and Ukraine had become more of a priority. For Ukrainians this was a welcome 
change  to  seeming  Russian  neglect.  Even  Kuchma’s  administration  was  increasingly 
becoming  annoyed  by  perceived  Russian  arrogance,  like  in  November,  2002,  when 
Ianukovych was derided in the Russian governmental newspaper as the “very poorest Prime 
Minister” with a petty criminal record, and could only reply in frustration: “Russia is our 
strategic  partner  [but]  relations  with  it  must  be  mutually  beneficial...”
721  Conceivably, 
Ianukovych’s frustrations could damage Russo-Ukrainian relations further in future. 
 
Conclusion 
Between  2000  and  2004,  the  paradigm  of  Power  continued  to  dominate  Russian 
perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian political sovereignty. In territorial issues, the Russia-
Belarus Union officially remained highly prioritised, with negotiators from the two states 
even managing to agree on a Constitutional Act for the future unified state. Putin tried to 
move the plans for such a state forward, ready to incorporate Belarus as part of Russia, and 
signs even appeared that members of the Ukrainian government would find participation of 
their state in such a union natural. In matters of governance, the Russian government was 
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willing to brief ambassadors of Belarus before these were stationed in the West, while 
decision-makers  in  Moscow  continued  to  mould  the  Ukrainian  government  as  they 
preferred, notably dismissing the Western-friendly Tarasiuk. And on the crucial event that 
was Lukashenko’s re-election as President, Putin’s regime continued to have trust in him to 
the extent that the legitimacy of his victory was not only staunchly supported but defended 
against  seeming  intervention  from  abroad.  Finally,  in  matters  of  ideology  programmatic 
documents presented by the Russian government, such as the Foreign Policy Concept, as 
well as government-sponsored events such as the year of Russia in Ukraine, and vice versa, 
demonstrated Russian willingness to keep the neighbouring states close. At the same time, 
significant politicians such as Chernomyrdin openly informed leaders of neighbouring states 
that they would not find allies anywhere else; that nobody awaited them in the West. 
 
By now, however, the paradigm of Nation had become somewhat significant, too, in Russian 
perceptions  of  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  political  sovereignty.  In  territorial  matters, 
Belarusian territorial concerns of being absorbed into Russia were dismissed by the Kremlin, 
while  the  dispute  over  Tuzla  showed  more  Russo-Ukrainian  animosity  and  government-
controlled animosity at that, than anything seen during the 1990s. In matters of governance, 
Tymoshenko  in  Ukraine  warned  against  Chernomyrdin’s  meddling  and  from  Moscow 
warrants for her arrest were presented. In Belarus, Lukashenko feared his domination of the 
Belarusian polity was being undermined by Putin and his reunification plans. This perception 
was  strongly  enforced  by  Putin’s  increasingly  virulent  attacks  on  Lukashenko.  Finally,  in 
matters concerning ideology Russian threats to the Ukrainian economy showed Kuchma 
that Russian friendship with Ukraine might quickly vanish. In return, even Prime Minister 
Ianukovych was beginning to complain of arrogant Russians, something that the Russian 226 
 
Foreign Policy Concept with its implicit lack of trust in Belarusian and Ukrainian statehood 
did not dispel. 
 
Finally, the significance of the paradigm of Law gradually weakened in Russian perceptions 
of Belarusian and Ukrainian political sovereignty. In territorial matters, Russo-Ukrainian land 
borders were finally demarcated, but events surrounding Tuzla made this seem irrelevant. 
In matters concerning governance, Putin’s Russia was quickly moving away from democracy, 
at the same time as Lukashenko’s even less democratic Belarus was seen in Moscow as less 
than a problem for Russo-Belarusian cooperation. Finally, in matters concerning ideology 
Putin did continue to use the multi-national denominator of “rossiiskii,” yet this was not his 
invention and the right to separate Belarusian and Ukrainian statehood seemed somewhat 
irrelevant in the face of Putin’s interest in reinstating Russia as a great power. 
 
Consolidating military sovereignty 
Forces of Belarus and Ukraine 
Law: Strategic returns 
The El’tsin presidency had been marked by a number of agreements concerning Belarusian 
and  Ukrainian  military  forces,  including  nuclear  weapons  and  the  Black  Sea  Fleet. 
Consequently, when Putin became President not much was left for the post-Soviet states to 
negotiate over. Nevertheless, in early 2000 Russia and Ukraine did manage to agree the sale 
of a number of strategic Tu-160 aircraft to Russia, even though the ownership of these 227 
 
airplanes  had  been  disputed  since  Soviet  times.
722  Beyond this success, however, the 
Ukrainian forces mostly wanted to cooperate with the West and in June, 2001, received 
significant recognition as one  of the biennial EU summits for heads of state mentioned 
Ukraine  as a potential partner for European Security and Defence Policy peace support 
operations.
723 Not that Ukrainians should get their hopes up too high, since the European 
Security and Defence Policy had little significant content at this time. Belarusians were even 
more limited in the military assistance they might find in the West. B y mid-2003 the 
Belarusian  Ministry of Defence  still officially  stressed  that:  “Cooperation  between  the 
military departments of the Republic of Belarus and Russia...is based on the principles of 
equality and mutual benefits.”
724 What Belarusians would do if Russians did not heed this 
was unclear, though, as Belarusians could probably find no other military partners. 
 
Power: Military cooperation and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation 
Consequently, Russo-Belarusian military cooperation had grown steadily under El’tsin. And 
even before Putin had been inaugurated as President, in April, 2000, the recently appointed 
commander of the Moscow military district, Colonel General Igor’ Puzanov, announced the 
intention to fully integrate 300,000 Russian and Belarusian military personnel; apparently, 
forces from Belarus had already been incorporated in the Russian nuclear forces.
725 Indeed, 
Minsk  was  the  most  active  post -Soviet  participant  in  implementing  military -technical 
programmes and agreements under the framework Tashkent Treaty from 19 92. As of 
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November, 2001, it had signed 91% of all agreements and treaties reviewed by the CIS 
Council of Defence Ministers.
726 Nothing comparable had taken place with Ukraine yet, but 
from 2000 onwards the Ukrainian armed forces did significantly increase their participation 
in various forms of military exercises   conducted together with Russian   and Belarusian 
forces.
727 Later, in 2002, when the Ukrainian military became embroiled in a scandal over 
the  sale  of  Kolchuga  radar  systems  to  Saddam  Hussein’s  Iraq  that  was  apparently  in 
contravention of existing UN sanctions, Western criticism forced Kuchma’s administration to 
seek succour with Russia once more.
728 In the medium term, Russian military leaders began 
to  envisage  eventual  Ukrainian  membership  in  the  CIS  Col lective  Security  Treaty 
Organisation (CSTO), which was established in October,  2002. This organisation was based 
on the Collective Security Treaty from 1992, but was much more empowered, although its 
founders  only  included  Russia  and  Belarus,  and  some  post -Soviet  states  within 
Transcaucasia and Central Asia.  Military equipment was provided by Russia at domestic 
prices, and Moscow agreed to cover half of all running costs.
729  Belarusians remained 
interested  in  promoting  military  integration  whenever  possible ,  especially  now  when 
Russians  had  again  promised  economic  subsidisation  through  military  equipment .  In 
October, 2003, the Belarusian parliament ratified an agreement on joint logistical support 
for the Russo-Belarusian regional group of forces, including Ru ssian use of Belarusian 
military infrastructure and the creation of joint medical support.
730 Putin was certain that 
even Ukrainian forces would eventually join such cooperation. As a precursor to this, he 
advocated from December, 2003 that warships from third states would only be allowed to 
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pass through the Kerch Strait with the joint permission of Russia and Ukraine.
731 It was 
certainly possible that Putin in future might ask for such joint supervision to be extended 
along the Ukrainian coastline, where the Russian Black Sea Fleet still remained. 
 
Nation: Weakened Ukrainian military 
Unsurprisingly, though, Ukrainians were not prepared to give Russia veto on the use of the 
Kerch Strait. Russian and Ukrainian disputes in connection with the 1997 naval treaties had 
resulted  in  Ukrainian  forces  conducting  manoeuvres  within  the  anti-Russia  GUAM.  The 
Russian authorities had been dissatisfied with this, and in 2001 the subsequent Ukrainian 
First  Deputy  Minister  of  Defence,  Leonid  Poliakov,  observed  that  Ukrainian  problems 
concerning  the  building  of  a  strong,  reformed  military  force  were  more  acceptable  to 
Russians  than  Ukrainian  success  in  this  area.
732  This  was  especially  true  for  Russian 
parliamentarians, who continued to distrust the Ukrainian military. Just as the ea rly 1990s 
had  witnessed  Russian  warnings  of  nuclear  proliferation  via  dishonest  Ukrainians,  i n 
December, 2001, a deputy in the Russian Duma accused the Ukrainian military of having 
supplied the Taliban in Afghanistan with weapons through the Ukrainian busi nessman 
Vadym Rabinovych and the notorious crime lord Semen Mogilevich.
733 Belarusians were not 
accused  by  Russians  parliamentarians  of  endangering  international,  let  alone  Russian 
military security, but this would certainly change should Lukashenko be toppl ed. Indeed, a 
leading member of the Belarusian National Front, Zianon Pazniak, suggested in an open 
letter from August, 2002, “the formation of civilian committees to defend against Russian 
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[rossiiskoi+ aggression...”
734 Admittedly, this was a minority view, and Lukashenko seemed 
safely enthroned. Yet he might, and Kuchma might certainly seek to integrate more with 
Western forces. As I wrote above, chances for this were yet limited, but Ukrainian forces did 
their best to persuade Americans of their use in August, 2003, as the first group of Ukrainian 
peacekeepers were sent to Iraq from their base in Kuwait.
735 Tellingly, this deployment 
ignored  Russian  complaints  that  “...the  Iraqi  crisis  is  being  resolved  militarily  without 
permission from the UN Security Council...”
736 and indicated that Kuchma’s government 
now opposed Russian attempts to confine the USA within multilateral international fora. 
 
NATO 
Law: NATO through Russia 
Belarusian suggestions to become part of a neutral belt between Russia and NATO  had 
continued to exist under Lukashenko. Indeed, although  he seldom personally advocated 
thus, in April, 2000, he did stress: “...It is necessary to secure an active dialogue not only 
with the European Union, but also with the OSCE, NATO and the Council of Europe...We are 
interested  in  normal  relations  with  the  North  Atlantic  alliance  and  have  presented 
commensurate statements in this connection.”
737 In stating this, Lukashenko was mirroring 
Putin’s new, business-like attitude in Russia, where renewed cooperation with NATO was 
increasingly favoured. In January, 2001, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Zlenko, too, hoped that 
“Russo-Ukrainian relations would not be damaged by [relations with the EU and NATO+” and 
that Putin’s pragmatism would “assist Moscow in swallowing the pill of a more Westernised 
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Ukrainian policy more easily.”
738 Zlenko’s hopes might be slightly unrealistic, yet with Russo-
American cooperation becoming de rigueur by the end of 2001 in the context of the “war on 
terror” worries about Belarusian and Ukrainian relations with NATO might be expected to 
become peripheral. Indeed, even before the terrorist attacks on America, in July, 2001, 
Russian ambassador to Ukraine Chernomyrdin had quoted Putin in stating: “If you *in NATO+ 
want to [expand], please accept Russia into NATO.” Chernomyrdin also insisted NATO was 
not “seen as an enemy.”
739 
 
Power: Cooperation treaty 
Yet  Chernomyrdin’s  reassuring  tone  hardly  concurred  with  Russian  opposition  to  NATO 
during  the  1990s.  Russian  military  officials  certainly  continued  to  obstruct  Ukrainian 
cooperation with NATO whenever possible. In January, 2001, Russian Colonel General and 
head of the Ministry of Defence Department of International Cooperation Leonid Ivashov 
claimed  Russia  and  Ukraine  “reached  agreement  on  the  participation  of  Russia  in  the 
planning of multinational military exercises on the territory of Ukraine.” This apparently 
precluded  cooperation  between  Ukraine  and  NATO.
740  And even when Putin expressed 
support for NATO following the terrorist attacks on the USA in 2001,  the Russian military 
disagreed. The chief of the Russian general staff, General Anatolii Kvashnin explicitly stated 
that NATO continued to consider Russia and Belarus as enemies.
741 Kuchma could not have 
overlooked  this comment, yet in November, 2001,  he  suddenly stated that he did not 
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believe  two  military  blocs  existed  any  more  in  Europe.
742  Possibly, Kuchma had been 
convinced by Putin’s swift support for the USA following the terrorist attacks in September, 
but  the  Ukrainian  leader  could  hardly  have  missed  that  Putin’s  support  was  strongly 
opposed in Russia. Thus, it might appear that Kuchma simply sought a pretext to increase 
military cooperation with Russia and Belarus. Belarusians needed no such pretext; their 
military doctrine stated: “...fundamental external threats to [Belarusian] military security 
include...the  enlargement  of  military  blocs  and  unions  endangering the  military  security 
of...Belarus...The  Armed  Forces  [of  Belarus]...ensure  the  strategic  independence 
of...Belarus; ...together with the Russian Federation they help to support military parity and 
geostrategic  stability  in  the  region.”
743  Similarly,  Lukashenko  complained  in  November, 
2002: “We have always interacted with NATO in correspondence with both El’tsin and Putin, 
but today [the Russians] are trying to send us in alone with [NATO]...”
744 thus primarily 
appealing  for  renewed  Russian  guidance  in  the  military  integration  of  Belarus  within  a 
European security framework.  
 
Nation: GUUAM as pro-NATO bloc 
However, whereas Lukashenko had domestic support to oppose NATO, in Ukraine NATO 
was  often  viewed  more  favourably.  Many  politicians  had  long  argued  that  increased 
cooperation with NATO would bring military and other benefits to Ukraine.
745 Now, the 
government  promoted  the  State  Programme  for  Cooperati on,  which   envisaged 
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interoperability  with  NATO,  allowing  for  numerous  Partnership  for  Peace  exercises  in 
Ukraine, such as that conducted in July, 2001.
746 Worse for Russia, such exercises benefitted 
the Ukrainian military more than cooperation with Russia could. Whereas Belarusians were 
mostly not interested in closer cooperation with NATO, as witnessed in the weak showing of 
Vladimir Goncharik in the September, 2001, presidential election after he had championed 
Belarusian membership of NATO,
747 by November, 2001, Russian commentators worried 
that the Ukrainian-led GUUAM might want to interact more with NATO: “Until 1999 major 
military  cooperation  in  the  CIS  was  planned  within  the  framework  of  the  Treaty  on 
Collective  Security,  which  was  signed  by  ten  countries...[including]  Russia  [and] 
Belarus...They are now being opposed by the pro-NATO alternative military-political bloc 
GUUAM,  which  includes  Georgia,  Ukraine,  Uzbekistan,  Azerbaijan  and  Moldova.”
748 
Certainly, GUUAM in itself could not compete with Russia. Yet in July, 2002, Kuchma showed 
his preference for NATO in a decree initiated by the Ukrainian Security Council that stated 
Ukraine should seek to improve cooperation with NATO and eventually join it.
749 With this 
plan, the President who had gained power as an  ally of Russia seemed to have moved 
wholly into the NATO camp. 
 
Forces of the Russian Federation in Belarus and Ukraine 
Law: Peacekeeping forces 
During the 1990s, Russian elites had attempted to formally regulate the presence of Russian 
military forces in Belarus and Ukraine. In the early 2000s the Russian executive saw the 
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matter as relatively closed and thus seldom participated in new negotiations on the subject. 
However, the new administration still wanted to give the impression to the West that Russia 
was a responsible regional great power, and thus in 2002, when  the Collective Security 
Treaty of 1992 was turned into the CSTO, as mentioned earlier, the Russian government 
emphasised that the new organisation would be registered with the UN and specifically 
conduct peacekeeping operations.
750 
 
Power: Union state troops and leasing of missiles 
Yet the Russian executive only neglected to negotiate new treaties for its troops in Belarus 
and Ukraine since it found existing treaties conducive to future military integration between 
the states, as had mostly been the case during the 1990s, too.  On international military 
affairs, the Belarusian administration was particularly keen to support Russia against the 
USA, not least when Putin showed willingness to lead the struggle. Noticeably, in November, 
2000, Russia, Belarus and China together presented a resolution supporting the continued 
existence  of  the  1972  Anti-ballistic  Missile  Treaty  and  winning  the  approval  of  the  UN 
General Assembly against American intentions to unilaterally dissolve the Treaty.
751 The USA 
took little notice of this, yet in Moscow it had been noticed that Lukashenko had been one 
of only two foreign leaders willing to openly defy the USA. Military integration continued 
apace when state troops belonging to the Russo-Belarusian Union were established by April, 
2001.
752 And in April, 2002, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov claimed that “the reform 
and construction of the Russian armed forces is carried out in an increasingly synchronous 
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fashion  with  the  Belarusian  army.”
753  He  furthermore  foresaw  a  common  regional  air-
defence system,
754 which would increase Russian personnel  on existing bases in Belarus.  
Ivanov did not have similar hopes for Russian bases in Ukraine, but he seemed oblivious to 
the fact that the Russians might have to leave Crimea. In July, the Defence Minister claimed: 
“It is always better when the *Black Sea Fleet+ can be based in several places...building of 
the base *in Novorossiisk+ certainly doesn’t...mean that the Russian sailors are preparing to 
leave Crimea. The Treaty on the rental of Sevastopol’ runs until 2017. And it will most likely 
be extended.”
755 If this could be accomplished, Russian forces in Ukraine would be able to 
remain close to the West, an objective also held for Russian troops in Belarus. In October, 
2003, a joint exercise, Clear Sky-2003, employing Russian troops on Belarusian territory,
756 
was followed in November  by an agreement on the leasing of Russian S -300 air defence 
missile  systems  to  Minsk.
757  Accompanying  these  events,  in  October  the  Belarusian 
parliament ratified an agreement on joint logistical support for the Russian -Belarusian 
forces, which included provisions that allowed for  “...integration of legislation concerning 
defence,  conscription  and  social  security  for  servicemen”
758  in  a  move  that  would  help 
Russian troops to get an increased international presence. 
 
Nation: Discrimination as military threat 
However, during the 1990s the Russian government had retained the possibility that Russian 
forces could be used not only against the West, but also against post-Soviet states such as 
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Belarus and Ukraine. Putin’s new military doctrine from April, 2000, underlined this theme 
again, when it counted among “The main foreign threats...discrimination *and+ suppression 
of  Russian  citizens’  rights,  freedoms  and  lawful  interests  in  foreign  states...”
759  Putin 
evidently believed more in combating these threats than El’tsin had done. In 2001, in his 
annual address to the Federal Assembly, the President even widened the term concerning 
people  who  might  be  discriminated  against  to  include  not  just  Russian  citizens,  but 
compatriots, too; a much looser term that could include any Russian-speakers.
760 This threat 
was directed against Ukraine, and maybe Belarus, too. Belarusians could hit back, though. In 
March,  2004,  former  Defence  Minister  Pavel  Kozlovskii  warned  that  “Russia  would  be 
completely  blind  on  its  western  front  without  the  Volga  radar  station  [in 
Belarus+...*Furthermore+  If  Belarus  doesn’t  agree  to  the  operation  of  *the  radar]  on  its 
territory, Russia will be blind within a substantial naval *territory+...”
761 Never before had 
Russian forces so clearly been threatened in Belarus. While Lukashenko hardly wanted to 
use such language himself, he had no problem warning the self-confident Putin that Russia 
would do well not to take Belarus for granted. 
 
Conclusion 
Between  2000  and  2004,  the  paradigm  of  Power  continued  to  dominate  Russian 
perceptions  of  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  military  sovereignty.  In  matters  relating  to 
Belarusian and Ukrainian forces increased military cooperation between Russia and Belarus 
was  particularly  visible,  not  least  through  the  CSTO,  even  if  this  organisation  was  still 
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untested. Although Ukrainian forces did not cooperate this closely with Russia for now, 
Putin was certain that Kuchma’s administration would be alienated from the West and was 
comfortable  deciding  naval  rights  in  the  Kerch  Strait  together  with  Kuchma.  In  matters 
relating to NATO, the Russian political leadership used the Cooperation Treaty with Ukraine 
mainly to keep the Western organisation out of Ukraine, an aim that was not changed by 
the “war on terror.” At the same time Belarus was co-opted against NATO to the extent that 
complaints from Minsk were certain to appear the moment Russia did not fully support and 
protect its neighbour against the allegedly belligerent NATO. Finally, in matters relating to 
Russian military forces stationed in Belarus and Ukraine there were numerous signs that 
Russia was entrenching its position. No signs indicated that Russian vessels or personnel 
were  leaving  the  bases  on  Sevastopol’,  and  in  Belarus  local  military  forces  became  so 
integrated  with  and dependent  on  Russian personnel  and  equipment that  Lukashenko’s 
administration could hardly extract itself again, should it wish to do so at some point in the 
future. 
 
By now, however, the paradigm of Nation had become somewhat significant, too, in Russian 
perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian military sovereignty. The Russian elite were happy 
for Ukrainian forces to be weak so that these could not begin assisting the West against 
Russia,  or  continue  to  do  so  in  Iraq  and  elsewhere.  In  relation  to  NATO,  Putin’s 
administration might have realised that some cooperation remained possible, but while the 
accession of Belarus and Ukraine to NATO was unacceptable to Russians, Kuchma suggested 
that Ukraine could seek membership of NATO in the near future, and this might conceivably 
entice other GUUAM-states to seek membership, too. Finally, in relation to Russian forces 
stationed in Belarus and Ukraine, the new Russian military doctrine and Putin’s belligerent 238 
 
interpretation  of  it  was  accompanied  by  Ukrainian  and  even  Belarusian threats to  evict 
military installations vital to Russia; a threat that Russian forces were certain to resist. 
 
Finally, the significance of the paradigm of Law gradually weakened in Russian perceptions 
of  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  military  sovereignty.  In  matters  relating  to  Belarusian  and 
Ukrainian  forces  Soviet-era  aircraft  might  have  been  returned  to  Russia,  but  it  became 
increasingly obvious that Ukrainian forces were of no use to Russia. In matters relating to 
NATO, Putin’s professed support for the organisation after 2001 was certainly not meant to 
allow Belarus and Ukraine to independently engage with the organisation in any way. And in 
matters relating to Russian forces abroad, professed goals of peacekeeping espoused by the 
CSTO were in no way followed by action. 
 
Consolidating Economic Sovereignty 
Economies of Belarus and Ukraine 
Law: Russian military-technological dependence 
Previously,  some  Russian  politicians  had  warned  against  supporting  the  Belarusian 
economy. The Belarusian economy had not been quite as hopeless during the 1990s as 
some had thought. Most noticeably, Belarusian wages had tripled in dollar terms between 
1994 and 2000, surpassing Ukrainian wages in 1995, and even Russian ones by 1999,
762 
although this changed as the Russian economy picked up pace after the 1998 financial crisis. 
Nevertheless, El’tsin had eventually acknowledged that the Ukrainian economy, too, was 
increasingly  self-sufficient,  enabling  inhabitants  in  Ukraine  to  live  better  lives  and 
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strengthen their economic sovereignty
763 without overt Russian help. Putin never stated 
something similar, yet he could not ignore that by 2002 Ukrainian economic sovereignty was 
buttressed by enduring Russian dependence on Ukrainian  manufacture of high-technology 
equipment, particularly concerning missiles and aircraft. Indeed, 40% to 60% of components 
required in Russia for such equipment continued to come from Ukraine.
764 The Ukrainian 
government seldom dared to use such economic importance assertively. One exception 
came in  August, 2003.  Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatolii Zlenko broke with previous 
foreign economic strategy when announcing that “Ukraine doesn’t intend to coordinate its 
entry into the...*World Trade Organisation, or+ WTO with Russia...”
765 
 
Power: Increased imports by Russia and the Single Economic Space 
Yet,  Zlenko’s  announcement directly  contradicted  Kuchma’s previous  appeal for  Russian 
economic support, and it was unlikely that Ukraine would be capable of entering the WTO 
anytime soon, no matter what. Already, during 2000 trade turnover between Russia and 
Ukraine had continued to rise by 18%. This included a 44% growth of Russian imports of 
Ukrainian goods,
766 understandable given the renewed upswing in the Russian economy, 
but nevertheless noticeable. Following repeated economic crises Ukrainians were therefore 
willing to countenance temporary economic integration with Russia and the CIS for short-
term gains,
767  and  Zlenko’s  announcement  did  not  really  challenge  this.  At  first,  Putin 
focused  more  on  the  Belarusian  economy,  though.  In  January,  2000,  he  addressed  the 
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subject of Russo-Belarusian integration by stating that its “main purpose is...‘improving the 
ordinary citizen’s life – ordinary Russians [rossiiany+ and Belarusians.”
768 Belarusians, at the 
same time, needed to retain access to the Russian market for Belarusian goods. Thus, by 
2002, Belarus retained a customs arrangement with its eastern neighbour and was the only 
former  Soviet  republic  apart  from  Russia  to  remain  within  the  rouble  zone.
769  Russian 
attempts to further cooperation continued in August, 2002 during a press conference with 
Putin and Lukashenko, where the former suggested that a Union rouble be introduced “not 
from 2005 *as previously agreed+, but already from...2004.”
770 And to underline that this 
process should centre on Russia, in February, 2003, Tat’iana Paramonova, Deputy Chairman 
of the Russian Central Bank, stressed that “while the Russian rouble is legal tender on the 
territory  of  Russia  or  other  states,  the  [Russian]  Central  Bank  will  be  the  only  place  of 
issue...”
771 By June, such plans were formally endorsed when the Belarusian government 
agreed to sign “a package of agreements concerning the introduction of the Russian rouble 
from...2005  as  the  only  legal  tender  in  the  Russo-Belarusian  Union  State”
772  with  the 
Belarusian National Bank “either losing the right to issue currency...or partly reserving the 
right,  following  the  model...used  by  England  and  Scotland.”
773  It  was  unsurprising  that 
Belarusians were prepared to abandon their economic sovereignty to this extent, for they 
could not receive assistance from other international actors, such as the EU, which also had 
little interest in expanding cooperation with an economically and politically unreformed 
Ukraine. Consequently, Kuchma had to “set the ‘European choice’ aside for better times and 
                                                           
768 P. Borodin, “Druz’ia, prekrasen nash Soiuz!” Rossiiskaia gazeta, 1.4.2000 
769 Birgerson, p. 31 
770 I. Plugatarev, “Ne ob’’edineniem, tak rublem,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 9.6.2002 
771 “TsB ostanetsia emissionnym tsentrom,” Izvestiia, 20.2.2003 
772 I. Sedykh, “Rubl’ s zaiach’imi ushami,” Rossiiskaia gazeta, 3.7.2003 
773 A. Khandruev, “Nu, ‘zaichik,’ pogodi!” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 25.6.2003 241 
 
worked on the construction of a market for sale of its goods on the territory of the CIS.”
774 
Russians could therefore realistically harbour hopes that Ukrainians might be interested in 
tying their economy closer to that of Russia, and in September, 2003, the Russian leadership 
finally convinced the leaders of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan to enter a Single Economic 
Space (SES); a plan similar to suggested relations between Russia and the EU, although here 
between highly unequal parties.
775  
 
Nation: Monetary postponement 
Still,  what  would  happen  if  Belarusians’  and  Ukrainians’  economic  interests  were 
incompatible with those of Russians; a tendency that had gradually become visible during 
the  1990s?  Lukashenko  had  established  an  authoritarian,  highly  centralised  business 
community in Belarus and he was hardly going to approve when the Russian authorities 
allowed businesspeople opposed to him to establish themselves in Russia. This was the case 
with Iurii Feoktistov, director of the Belarusian Metallurgical Factory until his arrest in 1999. 
By early 2000, he moved to Russia, from where he promised to create a new enterprise that 
would remove his former company from the Russian market.
776 At the same time, Russian 
authorities were tiring of subsidising the Belarusian economy. The latter had long benefitted 
from the lack of customs between Russia and Belarus to re-export goods from third states to 
Russia, but from mid-2000, Russia  began applying the origin principle of levying VAT in 
transactions with Belarusian firms, who consequently lost profits of  $150-200 million per 
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year.
777  Then,  in  January,  2001,  the  Russian  State  Customs  Committee  decreed  that 
companies had “lost the right to tax cargo in Belarus and then export it duty-free to Russia.” 
From previous experience it was clear that such a measure would be popular among Russian 
importers, while Belarusian companies would experience substantially decreased activity.
778 
Belarusian  retaliation  followed.  In  November,  2001,  after  Russo-Belarusian  discussions 
regarding monetary union and the introduction of the Russian rouble as the sole c urrency 
for the two states, Lukashenko threatened to postpone discussions of a Central Bank, 
monetary policies and a common currency.
779 Putin would hear nothing of this. I n June, 
2002, he stated that Russia would no longer bankroll the ineffective Belarusia n economy, 
even  if  this  would  speed  up  efforts  at  reintegration  between  the  two  states.
780 
Subsequently, Putin again stated that  a union would damage the economically stronger 
Russia and opposed formal equality between the states since  “the  Belarusian  economy 
constitutes 3% of the Russian economy and thus Russia should have the right of veto in the 
construction of the Union.”
781 Yet Putin could seemingly not put an end to Lukashenko’s 
procrastination. By July, 2003, the Russian rouble should have been introduced in nominal 
form in Belarus. However, Lukashenko was furious that Russian companies continued to 
highlight Belarusian indebtedness and refused to accept the rouble as common currency 
until  the  Russian  leadership  “extended  credit  *to  Belarus+  in  the  amount  of  4.5  billion 
roubles...”
782  At  the  same  time,  Russian  connections  with  the  Ukrainian  economy  also 
faltered, again partly given Putin’s belligerence. In 2002, mutual protectionism caused a 
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setback in trade relations between Russia and Ukraine. During the first half of this year 
alone, bilateral trade fell by 13%.
783 The problem was not least that Ukrainians increasingly 
feared that Russia was holding the Ukrainian economy back. After the creation of the SES in 
2003, the fear crystallised in the belief that participation in this organisation would deflect 
Kyiv  from  what  was  seen  as  a  much  more  important  economic  objective  of  WTO 
accession,
784  which  eventually  led  Zlenko  to  refuse  cooperation  with  Russia  here,  as 
described above. It is worth stressing, however, on   the background just described that 
Zlenko’s statement should be read less as an announcement of Ukrainian strengths and 
more as a signal to Russians that they could no longer bully Ukrainians into submission; a 
resistance seldom registered in the Ukrainian government during the 1990s. 
 
Energy 
Law: Mutual principles 
During the 1990s Russian authorities had begun attempting to place energy relations with 
Belarus and Ukraine on a formalised, stable footing. Continuing this policy, in December, 
2000, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kas’ianov and his Ukrainian counterpart Iushchenko 
agreed “...to secure uninterrupted supply to Ukraine of Russian gas, uninterrupted transit of 
Russian gas to Europe and the necessary settlement of payment for gas by Ukraine.”
785 
During  the  following  decade,  though,  it  became  increasingly  clear  that  Russo-Ukrainian 
energy  disputes  had  not  disappeared  for  good.  This  was  despite  the  fact  that  such 
normalisation might have benefitted both Russian and Ukrainian economic actors. In Russia, 
Gazprom  Director  Rem  Viakhirev  needed  to  strengthen  his  position  within  Russia,  and 
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Gazprom  itself  needed  to  rectify  lack  of  payments  from  Ukraine  to  increase  its  own 
international credit ranking.
786 To achieve this, Ukraine was offered a reasonable deal by 
Gazprom, which  allowed Ukraine to draw off 30 billion cubic metres per ye ar, which, 
combined with a similar amount of Turkmen gas and 18 billion cubic metres of gas produced 
domestically, provided Ukraine with the  annual amount of 78 billion cubic metres.
787 In 
Ukraine, elites were able to use such Russian concessions to strengthen their negotiating 
position. By May, 2002, the Ukrainian government expanded the oil terminal  near Odesa, 
modernising refineries to create a combined processing potential of 20 milli on tonnes of 
crude. The new pipeline from Odesa to Brody in western Ukraine also became operational, 
doubling annual throughput capacity.
788  Putin ostensibly accepted this state of affairs; 
following a meeting with Kuchma and German Chancellor Gerhard  Schröder in June, 2002, 
he  even claimed that his state really wanted to safeguard European energy security in 
general: “This will not only ensure energy stability in Europe, it’ll promote stable prices for 
consumers.”
789  So,  allegedly,  energy  cooperation  between  formally  equal  partners 
benefitted Russia, Ukraine, and everybody else. Well, almost everybody, since Lukashenko 
disliked that Ukraine received more Russian attention and decided to emphasise Belarusian 
economic sovereignty to remind Russians of his existence. In July, 2003, he thus suddenly 
refused to sell a majority stake in Beltranshaz to Russia, arguing that if Belarus lost control 
of this company, it would sell control of the state, as well.
790 The President did not accuse 
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Russia of any subversive activity, however, and Lukashenko might simply have been inspired 
by Ukrainian attempts to secure their energy sovereignty. 
 
Power: Energy dependence and acquiring energy infrastructure 
Not that Lukashenko’s incessant search for Russian energy subsidies during the 1990s had 
indicated  such  sovereignty,  however.  Members  of  the  Russian  executive  were  certainly 
sufficiently convinced of Lukashenko’s energy dependency, for Borodin in February, 2000, to 
describe Belarus as the “...bridge between Europe and Asia. If we build this bridge, gas and 
oil won’t be stolen from us in Ukraine *and+ the Baltic States won’t fleece us.”
791 Not that 
Ukraine had much option to anger Russians on energy questions, though, since Ukrainian 
energy needs  exceeded  domestic  supply. Even  after oil  consumption had fallen by  57% 
during the 1990s, by 2000 only 25% of domestic demand was covered by its 395 million 
barrels  of  reserves.  Imports  came  primarily  from  Russia  or  through  Russia  from 
Kazakhstan.
792 Additionally, between 2000 and 2002 several Russian companies took control 
over their Ukrainian counterparts. Tatneft and Tatneftprom consolidated their control over 
the Kremenchug oil refinery with 57% of the shares ; Tiumen Oil Company acquired a  67% 
stake in the Lynos refinery; while 52% of the shares in the Odesa refinery went to Lukoil and 
Syntez Oil.
793  The deals received formal Russo -Ukrainian backing at the  February,  2001, 
Dnipropetrovs’k bilateral summit, when Anatolii Chubais of the Russian state-owned Unified 
Energy  Systems  and  Ukrainian  Minister  for  Fuel  and  Energy  Sergei  Ermilov  signed  a 
memorandum for the unification of the energy infrastructure in the two states, particularly 
benefitting Russia. Chubais even triumphantly announced that “the unification...in size even 
                                                           
791 P. Borodin, “‘My zdelaem takoi soiuz, chto NTV pridetsia zakryt’’,” Moskovskie novosti, 1.2.2000 
792 Abdelal, p. 111 
793 Puglisi, p. 839 246 
 
surpassed the Soviet system.”
794 Finally, at the time Putin and Kuchma began to discuss the 
repair of existing gas pipelines in Ukraine, preparing for the expansion of their capacity to 
accommodate  Russian  gas  exports  to  Central  and  Western  Europe.
795  So Ukraine often 
accepted its dependency on Russian energy, unlike what Borodin had feared.  To show their 
appreciation for this, during 2001 the leadership of Gazprom delivered 78 billion cubic 
metres of natural gas to Ukraine as payment for the energy transits to the West across 
Ukraine.
796 This was certainly a profitable arrangement for Ukraine, but one which increased 
its energy dependence. The tendency continued in  October, 2002,  when  Gazprom and 
Naftohaz signed new gas transit deals , which for the first time allowed partial Russian 
ownership of Ukrainian gas infrastructure,
797  allegedly  reducing the  Ukrainian  share  to 
30%.
798 Subsequently, Ukrainian Prime Minister Anatolii Kinakh was replaced with the “even 
more  pro-Muscovite”  Ianukovych  in  November.
799  Yet  Russians  were  not satisfied  with 
controlling the gas resources moving to Ukraine,  but  also wanted to ensure their safe 
transit. In May, 2003, advanced talks thus took place between Putin and Kuchma concerning 
the construction of a consortium controlling the gas infrastructure in Ukraine.
800 In principle, 
the two heads of state agreed to sell large parts of the Ukrainian gas transit system to Russia 
to offset existing debts of approximately $2 billion owed for gas deliveries.
801 Additionally, 
indirect subsidisation of energy deliveries to Ukraine was provided by the introduction of a 
new middleman, RosUkrEnergo, between Gazprom and the Ukrainian state gas company. 
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RosUkrEnergo was half owned by Gazprom and half by unknown, presumably Ukrainian 
investors, leaving observers to wonder what the Ukrainian leadership might gain from an 
arrangement that was increasingly opaque and difficult for Ukraine to extract itself from. 
Possibly,  Kuchma  sought  personal  advantage  from  tying  Ukraine  even  closer  to  Russian 
energy.  At  least,  in  late  2005,  the  head  of  the  Ukrainian  Security  Services  Oleksandr 
Turchynov alleged that RosUkrEnergo had been installed through “an arrangement between 
the  *Kuchma+  leadership  and  Russian  oligarchs”  since  Kuchma,  together  with  Ukrainian 
oligarchs  Viktor  Pinchuk  and  Rinat  Akhmetov,  controlled  half  of  the  new  firm  through 
offshore  entities.
802  Were Lukashenko and his Belarusian allies benefitting from similar 
arrangements? No equivalent of RosUkrEnergo existed for Belarus, yet in April, 2002, the 
Belarusian  government  readily  signed  an  intergovernmental  agreement  with  Russia, 
expanding energy cooperation with Russia.  The agreement stated “...by July, 2003, a joint 
stock  company  shall  be  created...on  the  basis  of  the  Belarusian  gas  infrastructure.”
803 
Gazprom  was  to  receive  25-30%  of  Beltransgaz  in  return  for  writing  off  $80  million 
Belarusian  arrears.
804  It  is  unclear  whether  Lukashenko  gained  personally  from  this 
agreement, but even if this was not the case he could hardly have resisted it, since  Belarus 
was certainly among the post-Soviet states most dependent on Russian energy. By 2003, it 
still depended on its eastern neighbour for 83% of its oil consumption, and as much as 94% 
of its needs in gas.
805 
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Nation: Turning off the gas 
Russian observers feared, though, that Belarusian and Ukrainian elites would attempt to 
escape  Russian  control  whenever  possible;  this  had  happened  during  the  1990s. 
Consequently,  Russian  commentators  continuously  suggested  that  Belarusians  and 
Ukrainians should be forced to accept ever narrower policy options. A typical example of 
this tactic from February, 2000, read: “...it is necessary to pay taxes on *oil+ exports *outside 
the Customs Union]. Thus, it is more profitable for Russian oil companies to send oil to [the 
West]. The solution is for Ukraine to enter the Customs Union...”
806 And Putin readily risked 
the reputation of Russia as a reliable energy provider to ensure compliance with Russian 
wishes. After he in May, 2000, had discussed “the transfer of control over Ukrainian gas 
infrastructure to Russia in return for *the absolution+ of *Ukrainian+ debts”
807 Putin even 
allowed Ukraine to be charged slightly more for gas than Western customers were, and over 
three  times  more  than  Belarus.
808  On the other hand, however, at this time  Ukrainian 
energy elites were still illegally tapping more natural gas from the Gazprom pipelines  than 
they  received in payments from the transited gas.
809  So when the Russian government 
highlighted internationally that irresponsible Belarusians and Ukrainians might endanger 
European energy security it did have a case. Witness  Russian Deputy Prime Minister Viktor 
Khristenko in July, 2000, defending Russian plans to construct gas pipelines circumventing 
Ukraine: “This is an economic issue, which is connected to the energy security of Europe in 
the 21
st century.”
810 However, Russians offered Ukrainians and Belarusians meagre benefits 
because  they  expected  them  to  break  existing  agreements,  anyway.  By  March,  2001, 
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Belarusian  oil  companies  were  thus  formally  only  allowed to  retain 10%  of  re-exported 
Russian oil, although the remaining profits never returned to Russia.
811 The arrangement 
allowed Russian elites the  better of two worlds: Belarusians and Ukrainians could be kept 
happy by unofficially permitted thefts, which Russians could then complain loudly  about 
whenever they wanted international opinion on their side. Russians could furthermore use 
energy thefts to increasingly force concessions or payments of debts from Ukraine, by  
cutting off gas supplies, as was done  on several occasions during the first half of 2001.
812 
Third states unfortunate enough to depend on transit of Russian energy through Belarus 
and Ukraine were in danger, too, as witnessed in Moldova in early 2004.
813 Yet although 
Kuchma understood he could not win the dispute, he did not stop th efts of Russian energy. 
Maybe because the existing system of opaque dependency benefitted him personally, as I 
mentioned above, and certainly because  the illegal export to the West of gas  stolen and 
imported from Russia continued to be highly profitable fo r  Ukrainian  businessmen  who 
constituted Kuchma’s principal domestic supporters. It was estimated that between 2001 
and 2004 alone such activities brought Ukrainian groups up to $1.5 billion in net profits.
814 
Similar arrangements were visible in Belarus, but Lukashenko had previously seemed more 
accommodating than Kuchma towards Russian wishes. Thus, Khristenko and his colleagues 
did not wish to denounce Belarusian energy theft openly if it could be avoided, yet the 
Russian leadership wanted concessions in return. A bilateral gas sector agreement in April, 
2002, suggested registration of a Russo-Belarusian joint company by the following year. 
However, Russians resisted a suggested minority stake, and was only willing to pay a third of 
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Lukashenko’s  suggested  price.
815  For  now,  Lukashenko  continued  to  agree  to  these 
conditions, but it was increasingly clear that  his energy promises could not be trusted.  In 
January, 2003, he announced that he had signed a decree providing for the capitalisation, 
and thus Russification, of Beltransgaz. But five months later,  Lukashenko still claimed that 
the conditions, which had been presented by Russia, were unacceptable.
816 The leadership 
of  Gazprom  was  not  pleased  and  in  September,  2003,  reacted  to  Lukashenko’s 
procrastination regarding energy and monetary union by announcing an end to existing 
energy  subsidisation.
817  Without  such  subsidisation,  though,  Russia  would  have  little 
influence over Lukashenko, and Lukashenko knew this. 
 
Economic actors of the Russian Federation in Belarus and Ukraine 
Law: Attempting binding agreements 
During the 1990s, the Belarusian economy had held the potential to be attractive to outside 
investors,  including  those  from  Russia,  even  if  this  potential  had  not  been  realised. 
Nevertheless,  whereas  Belarusian  exports  to  Russia  by  2000  mostly  consisted  of  value-
added products, over 60% of the imports received by Belarus from Russia consisted of raw 
materials.
818 Still, the Belarusian authorities had long proved reluctant to welcome Russian 
businessmen. Surprisingly, perhaps, Ukrainians were more welcoming, particularly between 
March, 2000, and August, 2001, under Prime Minister Iushchenko. Under this supposedly 
anti-Russian politician, foreign bidders won nearly all privatisation auctions, and in half the 
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cases the victors were large Russian enterprises. Interestingly, the opposite tendency was 
later  displayed  when  supposedly  pro-Russian  Ianukovych  became  Ukrainian  Prime 
Minister.
819  Ianukovych was perhaps worried about the two to three million economic 
migrants leaving Ukraine for Russia during this period.
820  While the Russian authorities 
might thus be praised for offering work to a number of Ukrainians, as well as Russians, they 
also  damaged  Ukraine  by  withdrawing  valuable  members  of  the  workforce  from  a 
continuously weak economy. Belarus, too, was subject to ambiguous Russian assistance. In 
January, 2003, Russia and Belarus agreed to introduce the Russian rouble in Belarus from 
2005. For Belarus, this would mean decreased inflation and a budget in surplus, yet it would 
also force the Belarusian government to carry through reforms similar to those in Russia 
with a freer market open to Russian and other foreign investors.
821  
 
Power: Subsidising through customs losses and the Single Economic Space 
In sum, therefore, Belarusian vulnerability to Russian investors remained as clear as it had 
been during the 1990s. By April, 2000, Russians continued to accept economic losses to lure 
Belarusians into providing Russian companies with unlimited access. The customs union 
alone cost Russia a minimum $600 million annually, and maybe ten times that amount, 
since it was well-known that the majority of household appliances, technology and similar 
products arrived in Belarus via Russia.
822 Control of post-Soviet economies was now more 
important than immediate profit for Russian actors.  This did not just relate to the energy 
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sector. In December, 2000, Russian Minister for the Economy German Gref “...announced 
that agreement had been reached with [Ukrainian authorities] on the conversion of gas 
debts to securities, which would enable Russia to take part in privatisation...[especially] the 
aviation industry.”
823 Indeed, during 2000 alone, Russian companies invested more than 
$200 million by buying companies in Ukraine.
824 During following year, imports from Russia 
still constituted 38% of all imports in Ukraine. Consequently, even ten years after achieving 
political sovereignty, the economic sovereignty of  Belarus and  Ukraine relative to Russia 
remained in question.
825 By 2002, Russian firms were the  largest source of foreign direct 
investment in Ukraine with officially 18% of the total; and probably much more considering 
the numerous legally Ukrainian firms that were fronts for Russian owners.
826 Yet Putin also 
wanted to safeguard Russian investors’ access to Belarusian and Ukrainian markets in the 
longer term. Therefore, at a bilateral summit with Kuchma in November, 2001, Putin stated 
that: “Russia in the very nearest future would agree with...Tajikistan, Ukraine and Belarus on 
establishing free economic zones.”
827 Later, in May, 2003, when meeting Kuchma for an 
informal summit, the nineteenth in two years, Putin advocated a CIS free trade zone and 
cooperation between military-industrial complexes: “Yesterday, we talked more about the 
Common  Economic  Space,  today  [we  talked]  about  bilateral  economic  relations...the 
necessity  of  accelerating...agreements  that  would  underline  the  strategic  aspect  of  our 
relations.”
828 Such economic cooperation would undoubtedly benefit Russian companies the 
most, but Kuchma and Lukashenko agreed to their establishment if Putin helped them out in 
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other issues. In a similar trade-off, during 2002 the Russian government and elements of 
Russian business convinced Lukashenko to privatise several major enterprises in Belarus of 
interest  to  them.  These  enterprises  included  television  manufacturer  Gorizont  and  the 
Gomel’  chemical plant, which  would be  sold  in  return for  official  Russian  blessings  and 
support for Lukashenko’s presidential re-election.
829 The Belarusian leader had little choice 
but to accept the offer, since Russia at the time continued to account for two -thirds of 
Belarusian imports, much more than the 10% coming from the second -largest source, 
Germany.
830 With Kuchma’s and Lukashenko’s support thus ensured, in September, 2003, 
the Russian-led SES appeared. Its provision that “The number of votes to any member state 
depends on its economic potential” empowered Russia. Aims included ensuring free trade 
and other financial services as well as coordination of negotiations by member states with 
the WTO,
831 illustrating how the Ukrainian government had reversed its position on the 
WTO  from  a  few  years  earlier.  Many  Russians  rejoiced.  Chubais  now  advocated  the 
construction  of  a  Russian -led  “liberal  empire,”
832  while  parliamentarian  Vadim  Gustov 
described the SES as “a new superpower.”
833 All this praise appeared for an organisation 
allegedly without much economic rationale.
834 But maybe that was the wrong way to put it; 
the SES might not provide immediate economic advantages, but it could hel p Russian 
companies to acquire strategically important assets. Ukrainians might have little choice, but 
to accept the situation. In December, 2003, Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Mykola Azarov 
realised that Russia through the SES could subsidise Ukraine w ith tax-free energy; thus, 
                                                           
829 “Regional’nyi teletaip,” Sovetskaia Belorussiia, 4.6.2002; Wilson and Rontoyanni, p. 48 
830 Deyermond, “State,” p. 1199 
831 Kontseptsiia formirovaniia edinogo ekonomicheskogo prostranstva (19.9.2003) on 
www.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2003/09/52480.shtml (accessed on 17.7.2009) 
832 B. Gorlin, “Anatolii Chubais vystupil s predvybornoi rech’iu,” Kommersant, 26.9.2003 
833 Bukkvoll, “Private,” p. 16 
834 Ibid 254 
 
Azarov insisted on “the establishment of irreversible and unlimited free trade zones as the 
first step taken by the SES...”
835 although this would benefit Russian companies in Ukraine 
disproportionately. 
 
Nation: Unwanted imports 
It  was  clear  from  the  beginning  of  Putin’s  presidency,  however,  that  Belarusian  and 
Ukrainian administrations did not appreciate the new Russian drive for investments abroad. 
This drive had already caused anxiety during El’tsin’s second term, yet at that time El’tsin, if 
not his allies, had accepted neighbouring regimes needed some time to adjust their laws. 
Putin was not so tolerant. The Belarusian National Bank had long been one of the main 
actors  helping  Belarusian  companies  to  withstand  aggressive  Russian  companies,  and  in 
December,  2000,  an  exasperated  Putin  pushed  hard  for  gaining  control  over  the  Bank, 
complaining “If we want to create a union state, then we have to voluntarily give up some 
sovereignty. We already agreed this one hundred, a thousand times.”
836 Later, throughout 
the  summer  of  2001,  pro-Kremlin  Russian  television  aired  a  number  of  programmes 
criticising Belarusian economic exploitation of Russia and pressuring Minsk towards new, 
economic  deals  more  favourable  to  Moscow.
837  At the same time, p rotracted Russian 
accusations against the allegedly ultra -nationalistic Iushchenko forced  Kuchma to fire his 
Prime Minister, after the latter had finally begun blocking attempted takeovers of Ukrainian 
companies by Russian firms.
838 This claim appeared  despite the fact that Iushchenko, as I 
mentioned earlier, had been relatively amicable towards Russian investments in Ukraine. 
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Yet his removal demonstrated that Kuchma could be bullied into submission by Putin, even 
though Russian investments in Ukraine were mostly of dubious value for the host state. 
Indeed,  some  Russian  imports  directly  threatened  several  aspects  of Ukrainian  security. 
According to the International Migration Organisation in 2002, 47% of detained trespassers, 
75% of weapons, 48% of ammunition, and 81% of drugs seized by Ukrainian border guards 
were  intercepted  on  the  Ukrainian-Russian  border.
839  Lukashenko remained more of a 
problem.  The  above -mentioned  trade-off,  by  which  Russian  companies  would  be 
preferentially  treated  in  Belarus  in  return  for   support  for  Lukashenko’s  re-election 
campaign,
840 did not materialise. Indeed, after victory had been secured Lukashenko readily 
demanded that the Belarusian state retain control with most privatised companies in the 
state.
841  Not  that  Russian  media  were  sudd enly  allowed  to  challenge  Lukashenko .  In 
January, 2003, Belarus stopped retransmitting Russian radio programmes from the Golos 
Rossii, Iunost’ and Maiak stations.
842 And then In June, 2003, the television company NTV, 
owned by Gazprom, was banned from operat ing in Belarus, at the same time as NTV 
correspondent Pavel Selin was expelled.
843  In  Ukraine,  Kuchma’s  government  could  not 
afford  so  blunt  measures,  but  the  opposition  was  more  aggressive.  In  February,  2003, 
parliament was informed by Valentyna Semeniuk, Socialist chairwoman of the Monitoring 
Commission for Privatisation, that: “...as a result of privatisation in Ukraine a number of 
strategic  branches  of  industry  have  been  concentrated  in  the  hands  of  representatives 
of...Russia. This constitutes a threat to national security.”
844 Therefore, if Lukashenko was 
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allowed to harass Russian companies for long, Ukrainians might be inspired to follow his 
example. 
 
Conclusion 
Between  2000  and  2004,  the  paradigm  of  Power  continued  to  dominate  Russian 
perceptions  of  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  economic  sovereignty.  Belarus  and  Ukraine 
remained severely economically dependent on Russia, and this dependency was only set to 
increase  after  a  number  of  agreements  were  struck,  notably  including  monetary  union 
between Russia and Belarus, and culminating in the agreement on the Single Economic 
Space,  an  organisation  that  Belarusians  signed  enthusiastically  up  to,  and  which  even 
Ukrainians  did  not  feel  they  could  avoid.  In  issues  relating  to  energy,  the  same 
overwhelming Belarusian and Ukrainian dependence on Russian deliveries continued to be 
visible. Deliveries were mostly subsidised and Belarusian and Ukrainian leaders seemed to 
benefit personally from this, but in return Russian attempts to acquire energy infrastructure 
abroad  was  becoming  much  more  organised  than  it  had  been  under  El’tsin,  with  Putin 
making clear that he expected Belarusians and Ukrainians to see the wisdom in unifying the 
energy  space  under  Russian  control.  Finally,  in  issues  relating  to  Russian  companies 
operating in Belarus and Ukraine, it became increasingly clear that their interest was rather 
to obtain increasing amounts of control over local markets, as opposed to maximising any 
profits.  The  very  costly  plans  for  customs  unions,  free  trade  zones,  and  acquisitions  of 
unprofitable Belarusian and Ukrainian companies was defended both by Putin, by members 
of his administration, and by his domestic political opponents as a price worth paying for 
such control, exercised especially through the SES. 
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By now, however, the paradigm of Nation had become somewhat significant, too, in Russian 
perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian economic sovereignty. The Belarusian economy 
was  now  thoroughly  mistrusted  by  Russians.  Putin  repeatedly  warned  that  any  Russo-
Belarusian integration should not hurt the Russian economy, plans to create a single Russo-
Belarusian  currency  were  postponed,  and  Belarusian  businesspeople,  who  had  been 
persecuted by Lukashenko, might now receive succour in Russia. Furthermore, disruption of 
Russian  energy  deliveries  was  becoming  increasingly  common,  and  it  was  increasingly 
obvious that these disruptions were meant to force politicians in Minsk and Kyiv to sell 
controlling stakes in local energy infrastructure to Russia. Energy theft was allowed to take 
place, but only because Russians knew this would provide Russia with legitimate reason to 
complain, if necessary. Finally, Russian investments were becoming increasingly disliked by 
the Belarusian and Ukrainian governments. A particular problem was constituted by Russian 
media companies, which were often critical of Lukashenko and consequently suffered legal 
problems in Belarus.  
 
Finally, the significance of the paradigm of Law gradually weakened in Russian perceptions 
of  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  economic  sovereignty.  The  Russian  military-technological 
complex did continue to depend on Ukrainian products for the development of their goods, 
yet this dependence would undoubtedly weaken over time. Likewise, although Gazprom 
and other Russian energy companies were eager to agree long-term contracts with Belarus 
and Ukraine, and although Putin argued this was good for European energy security, such 
Russian  sentiments  mostly  appeared  because  economic  dominance  had  been  achieved. 
Finally, Russian companies allowed onto the Ukrainian market by Iushchenko appreciated 
the open post-Soviet economy, but only to the extent it benefitted them.  258 
 
 
Consolidating cultural sovereignty 
History 
Law: Nationalism as protest 
Russian scholars in the mid-1990s had acknowledged sovereign Ukrainian history-writing as 
legitimate. By the early 2000s, however, Russians increasingly saw such history-writing as 
transitory  in  nature.  In  June,  2000,  Tsipko  did  accept  a  sovereign  Ukrainian  history 
“...because of the extraordinary attachment of the Ukrainian to the all-Russian, to the old-
Russian, to the Russian [and] to the Soviet...Ukraine, in order to become independent, had 
to emphasise what distinguished it and even make this singularity, particularity, specificity 
up.”
845 This, though, described a very instrumental use of history, as opposed to a history 
that was genuinely different from that of Russia. Admittedly, when Kuchma’s supporters 
displaced the left from the leadership in the Verkhovna Rada Russians could not ignore that 
some Soviet symbols disappeared from Ukrainian political life. Indeed, the Communist Party 
of Ukraine was forced to accept the abolition of the October Revolution holiday and the 
removal  of  Soviet  insignia  from  the  parliamentary  building.
846  Yet  new  official 
interpretations of Ukrainian history remained scarce. Similarly, Lukashenko seemed to have 
little interest in establishing a new, sovereign historical interpretation that would focus on 
Belarus alone and not on the Russo -Belarusian relationship. Such an interpretation m ight 
just find support in society. A study conducted in 2002 showed that the historical figure 
recognised by most respondents in Belarus, 62%, as a genuinely Belarusian personality was 
the 16
th  century  scholar  and  Bible  translator  Skaryna.  Yet  although  Lukashenko  and  his 
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government did allow the main street in Minsk to be renamed Skaryna Avenue
847 they 
hardly bothered to use him as a Belarusian symbol.  
 
Power: Blood-kin 
Instead, Belarusian official history was often similar to Russian history, and this pleased the 
Russian leadership. During the 1990s, the El’tsin administration had consistently highlighted 
a  common  Russo-Belarusian  past,  and  El’tsin  had  believed  such  a  past  existed.  In  his 
memoirs,  El’tsin  even  denoted  Belarusians  as  “blood-kin”  to  Russians,  marking  them  as 
especially close relatives beyond their more general membership of the Slav community,
848 
united by historical trajectories for the last 1,000 years. And despite Skaryna, Lukashenko’s 
administration could use such a past, too, not least to vilify the West as the enemy that only 
Lukashenko  could  stand  up  to.  For  example,  before  the  October,  2000  Belarusian 
parliamentary election, the movie An Autumn Fairytale claimed that a happy, prosperous 
Soviet Union had been dismantled by Gorbachev and drunk leaders of sovereign Russia, 
Belarus  and  Ukraine,  to  the  delight  of  Western  actors.
849  At the same time, officially 
sanctioned Belarusian scholars, including Andrei Ekadumau in 2002, emphasised that the 
Imperial and Soviet pasts had influenced Belarusian  identity quite differently. Whereas the 
former period had allegedly been marred by cultural Russification, this had not been a 
problem in the Soviet Union.
850 Lukashenko and Kuchma, too, needed what glory might be 
salvaged from Soviet years in order to obscu re the troubled, impoverished post -Soviet 
history. In October, 2000, Kuchma thus echoed Soviet interpretations of the Second World 
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War, and refused to change these as the post-Soviet years progressed.
851 Similarly, in the 
Ukrainian political opposition, by 2 002 the Communist Party of Ukraine  introduced the 
Kremlin clock tower, formerly a highly prominent Soviet symbol, as its own symbol.
852 Such 
gestures enjoyed widespread popularity, since the Soviet past had by now acquired a rosy 
sheen throughout post-Soviet society. For instance, in a survey conducted in Russia during 
the summer of 2001, 70% of respondents at least somewhat agreed that it  was a great 
misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer existed.
853  
 
Nation: Liberator or occupier, and the winter of war 
Nevertheless, during the 1990s Ukrainian nationalists had begun to understand how pre-
Soviet history might be used as a tool to legitimate opposition to Russia on non-cultural 
issues. While Imperial General Aleksandr Suvorov was revered in Russia as victor over the 
Napoleonic army, Ukrainian historians had long decried him as an occupier.
854 By 2001, 
some Belarusian historians began challenging his status, too.
855 And ever so slowly, anger 
towards Russian behaviour within the Soviet Union was becoming visible, t oo. By 2002, 
some Ukrainians were describing nationalist partisan leaders from the Second World War, 
notably including Stepan Bandera, as heroes for their resistance against the Red Army, 
although precisely such resistance marked  Bandera as a war criminal  in Russia.
856 Kuchma 
did not personally support Bandera, but nor did he denounce him. And even if disagreement 
over one particular historical figure might not damage the bilateral relationship much, 
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elements within the Ukrainian executive were also willing to challenge the fundamentals of 
Russo-Ukrainian historical integration. Following Kuchma’s signature to the SES agreement 
in September, 2003, the Ukrainian ambassador to Romania, Anton Buteiko, resigned, stating 
it was “...worse than...Pereiaslav *Treaty in 1654 when Ukrainian Cossacks swore fealty to 
the Russian Tsar+. Then, Bogdan Khmel’nitskii couldn’t find the strength in his own people to 
defend his state, and he began to look for protectors. But now there’s actually nothing 
pushing on to do it.”
857 Lukashenko had few such pre-Soviet events he could denounce as a 
Russian coup. At the same time, he was unlikely to denounce the Soviet Union as a Russian 
plot, since Lukashenko had bound his political identity closely to the Union. However, he did 
find  a  new  way  to  attack  Russia  through  use  of  Soviet  history  in  February,  2004.  In 
connection  with  the  Russian  disconnection  of  gas  transfers  to  Belarusian  customers 
Lukashenko thus complained that this was “an unprecedented step, which had not been 
taken once since the *Second World War+.”
858 Suddenly, Putin’s Russia was compared to 
Hitler’s Germany; an unprecedentedly aggressive use by Lukashenko of Soviet history. 
 
Language 
Law: Russian with rights 
During the 1990s, Ukrainian and Belarusian authorities had mostly refrained from infringing 
on Russian-speakers’ rights. Nevertheless, in February, 2000, this did not prevent Putin’s 
human  rights  commissioner  Oleg  Mironov  from  continuing  the  critical  line  previously 
presented under El’tsin as he complained about a new Ukrainian law that allegedly aimed to 
promote  Ukrainian  language  relative  to  Russian  within  Ukraine.  Mironov  did,  however, 
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phrase his complaint in the context of international norms, talking of gross violations of 
basic rights and freedoms of citizens in Ukraine.
859 Thus, the Russian administration still 
wanted to dispute language issues on the basis of law. The problem with doing so, though, 
was that Russian language was hardly suppressed in practice in Ukraine.  90% of books sold 
in Ukraine  were in Russian,  as were 62% of literature found in state -supported libraries, 
while  half a million ethnic Ukrainians  continued to be taught in Russian, since Russian-
speakers constituted at least 40% of Kyivans, half of the population in eastern Ukraine, and 
three-quarters of Crimeans.
860 Some Russian commentators even understood the need for 
Ukrainians to actively promote their own language. I n June, 2000, Tsipko  noted: “...it is 
impossible to sow Ukrainian language on the territory of the former UkSSR without ousting 
Russian  language  at  least  from  official  use.”
861  Tsipko  might  even  have  accepted  such 
ousting in Belarus, too, where Russian-speakers were even more privileged. The otherwise 
pugnacious Lukashenko generally avoided any linguistic controversy with Russia. Indeed, in 
November, 2001, he admirably argued that no problem concerning language use existed in 
the state since the population had already decided which language to use.
862 Admittedly, 
such an argument would in practice heavily favour the Russian language, yet Lukashe nko 
was signalling the principle that language-use was a matter of individual choice, in which the 
state should not become involved. 
 
Power: Russian as intergovernmental communication 
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However,  as  events  during  the  1990s  had  demonstrated,  Lukashenko  risked  little  by 
allowing  his  population  to  speak  Belarusian,  since  Russian  language  was  thoroughly 
dominant. The Russian government wanted this dominance to continue. Thus, the Russian 
National Security Concept from January, 2000, declared: “The spiritual renewal of society is 
impossible without the preservation of the role of Russian language as a factor of spiritual 
unity for the peoples of the multinational Russia and the language of inter-governmental 
communication  between  the  peoples  of  the  member-states  in  the  *CIS+.”
863  In  order 
preserve  Russian  as  the  post-Soviet  lingua  franca,  the  language  should  preferably  have 
official  status  in  Belarus  and  Ukraine.  Such  a  status  for  Russian  remained  mostly 
unquestioned in Belarus, while in Ukraine an opinion poll from April, 2000, indicated that 
39% favoured providing official status to Russian in Ukraine, while 38% more were in favour 
of its official recognition on a regional or local basis.
864 Official measures to diminish Russian 
in Ukraine seemed ineffectual. By 2004, m ost schools were supposed by law to teach in 
Ukrainian. However, the majority of students learning Ukrainian did not use it outside the 
classroom. And within some east Ukrainian universities teaching in Russian still remained 
the norm, despite legal complaints by Ukrainian-language students.
865 Still, Ukrainian was 
more widely used even in eastern Ukraine than Belarusian was anywhere in Belarus. By 
2001, the town of Ashmiany remained one of the areas within Belarus where Belarusian was 
spoken most widely. Nev ertheless, all parents of schoolchildren chose Russian as the 
language of teaching for their children. This was not least because institutes of further 
education taught in Russian.
866 Privately, Russian dominated too. A survey in Belarus from 
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2004  asked  which  language  dominated  private  communication.  Only  14%  responded 
Belarusian, while 74% responded Russian, 7% both languages, and 5% neither.
867  
 
Nation: Combating linguistic aggression 
Yet, the remarkable impression was that even with such dominance secured the Russian 
executive continued to fear that Russian language was under threat in Belarus and Ukraine. 
Such fears had been expressed only infrequently by Russian politicians during the 1990s, but 
in  February,  2000,  Putin  immediately  advocated  the  creation  of  a  favourable  linguistic 
environment  for  Russian  compatriots  in  the  CIS.
868  Since compatriots had already been 
designated worthy of Russian state protection, Putin’s comment was a thinly veiled threat. 
Furthermore, the President risked provoking discord in Ukraine. A survey administered by 
the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies in 2001 found that differences in 
perceptions of identity were considerably more marked between Ukrainian- and Russian-
speaking Ukrainians than between self-ascribed Russians and Ukrainians, thus indicating the 
volatility  of  the  language  issue.
869  Unfortunately,  neither  Russian  nor  Ukrainian  elites 
understood the danger. In 2003 Ukraine forba de advertisements in the media from being 
written in Russian. The practical consequence of this was negligible though, as the law was 
widely ignored
870 since it disadvantaged many low-income Ukrainian citizens who had poor 
command  and experience of exposure to  Ukrainian.  Lukashenko was not going to such 
lengths against Russian language, but even he began to show himself as a defender against 
uncontrolled  Russification  of  his  state.  I n  2004,  he  even  condemned  the  omnipotent 
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presence of Russian music on the Belarusian FM station and demanded quotas for local 
performers.
871 That the latter often performed in Russian could not hide that such quotas 
would benefit Belarusian language relatively most.  
 
Religion 
Law: Unnecessary Orthodoxy 
During the 1990s, apathy had mostly helped preserve peaceful religious relations between 
Russia and Ukraine. Gradually, the idea that religion might be used to define citizens of 
Ukraine did appear. However, the idea only partly caught on. A nationally representative 
survey from May and June, 2001, found that only 28% of respondents required members of 
Ukrainian society to be Orthodox believers, while 53% saw religion as an unimportant or 
very unimportant characteristic of citizenship.
872 Similarly, although Orthodox and Catholic 
denominations  might  have  struggled  in  Belarus,  these  churches  seemingly  co -existed 
peacefully, most Belarusians were atheists, and the fastest growing denomination by 2003 
was Protestantism.
873 
 
Power: Soulmates and the Order of Prince Vladimir 
Still, Russian political and religious elites had previously understood how religion might help 
bind Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians together. In June, 2001, the spokesman for the 
Russian Orthodox Church announced the dissolution of the Soviet Union to be a sin, while 
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Aleksii II argued that Russia, Belarus and Ukraine were soulmates, bound to live together. 
He  also  attended  a  meeting  of  Slavic  Peoples  from  Russia,  Belarus  and  Ukraine,  which 
declared that the “creation of the political union is the pledge to our salvation.”
874 Putin did 
not approve of such political interference by the church in Russia, but the church managed 
to find together with Ukrainian communists to praise restoration of past, imperial glory. 
Thus, in June, 2003, Aleksii II presented the Order of Prince Vladimir to the leader of the 
Ukrainian Communist Party.
875 In Belarus, the Orthodox leadership needed no party to help 
welcome Russian advances. Indeed, the Orthodox leader in Belarus during this period, 
Filaret,  was  not  only  ethnically  Russian,  but  born  in  Moscow  as  Kirill’  Vakhromeev  and 
confessed:  “I  serve  Russia!  I  serve  the  Russian  Orthodox  Church!  I  serve  the  Russo-
Belarusian Union!”
876 
 
Nation: Ukraine of the enemies 
The problem was, as had gradually become clearer during the 1990s, that the Ukrainian 
administration  had  become  increasingly  worried  about  any  Russian  support  for  local 
opposition  parties,  even  if  the  latter  could  not  threaten  Kuchma.  Overt  support  from 
Orthodox  communities  of  Russia-friendly  parties  during  the  March,  2002,  Ukrainian 
parliamentary election, was punished when the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice conveyed a 
status of complete autonomy on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate), thus for 
the  first  time  recognising  the  Kyiv  and  Moscow  patriarchates  as  officially  equal.
877  The 
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Russian  Orthodox  Church,  however,  struck  back  that  year  with  an  encyclopaedia  that 
explained how “‘enemies of Russia’ invented the term ‘Ukraine,’ which was popularised 
after 1917 by ‘Jewish Bolsheviks.’” It was allegedly intended “to Polonise and Germanise the 
Russian people.”
878 Belarus was not vilified by the encyclopaedia, and Lukashenko remained 
tolerant  of  the  influence  of  the  Russian  Orthodox  Church.  The  fact  that  the  church 
supported  his  regime,  however,  in  April,  2002,  prompted  two  opposition  parties,  the 
Belarusian  Popular  Front  and  the  Christian  Conservative  Party,  to  accuse  the  Russian 
Orthodox Church of acting as an anti-national force, conducting Russification.
879 And the 
same year, former Belarusian leader Shushkevich lamented: “...the widespread Orthodox 
Russian Church in Belarus, subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate, became a supporting 
force for Communist revanchism and today continues to support the amoral, inhumane, 
dictatorial regime.”
880 As long as that regime belonged to Lukashenko, however, religion 
might not be able to divide Russians and Belarusians to the extent  that it was dividing 
Russians and Ukrainians. 
 
Conclusion 
Between  2000  and  2004,  the  paradigm  of  Power  continued  to  dominate  Russian 
perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian cultural sovereignty. In relation to perceptions of 
history, El’tsin had previously become increasingly keen to mark Belarusians and Ukrainians 
as “blood-kin” of Russians, and on this point Putin seemed to concur. In addition, Putin’s 
glorification of the Soviet and Russian Empires seemed increasingly echoed by the Russian 
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population, and in Minsk and Kyiv, too, where history provided ample sources of legitimacy. 
In relations to linguistic affairs, Putin’s National Security Concept made clear that the spread 
of Russian language, as medium for both inter- and intra-state communication in the region, 
was highly prioritised by Russia. Governments in Ukraine and Belarus could hardly do much 
about this: in Ukraine the legal pre-eminence of Ukrainian was not mirrored in public reality 
in the eastern parts of the state, while in Belarus the titular language still remained as 
primary language for a small minority of the population. In relation to religion, the Russian 
Orthodox Church, the leadership of which had been encouraged by its close connections to 
the  Russian  executive,  was  active  in  fomenting  close  relations  with  Ukrainians  and 
Belarusians, whom Aleksii II named soulmates of Russia. Aleksii II also found it appropriate 
to officially support the Ukrainian Communist Party, thus becoming involved in Ukrainian 
domestic  politics,  while  the  head  of  the  Russian  Orthodox  Church  in  Belarus  openly 
admitted his primary loyalty was to Russia. 
 
By now, however, the paradigm of Nation had become somewhat significant, too, in Russian 
perceptions  of  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  cultural  sovereignty.  Concerning  perceptions  of 
history, Lukashenko indirectly compared Russian energy cut-offs to Nazi German behaviour 
during the Second World War, while Kuchma failed to denounce Bandera, who remained 
anathema  to  Russians.  Concerning  linguistic  issues,  Putin  mentioned  the  right  to  speak 
Russian as inalienable for Russian compatriots abroad, and declared he would defend such 
rights  with  all  means  possible.  This  could  soon  become  necessary,  for  Lukashenko  had 
understood the benefits of encouraging the public use of Belarusian language by law, while 
Kuchma forbade Russian-language advertisements. Finally, in religious issues the Russian 
Orthodox Church sponsored a highly Ukrainophobic encyclopaedia, which denounced any 269 
 
expression  of  the  Ukrainian  nation.  In  return,  the  decision  in  Ukraine  to  provide  legal 
autonomous status to the Kyiv Patriarchate was highly provocative to many Russians, who 
had been combating this option for a decade. 
 
The  significance  of  the  paradigm  of  Law  gradually  weakened  in  Russian  perceptions  of 
Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  cultural  sovereignty.  Concerning  perceptions  of  history,  a  few 
Russians  still  claimed  that  Ukrainian  nationalism  had  originated  in  response  to  Russian 
pressure,  but  this  did  not  mean  such  nationalism  was  condoned.  Concerning  linguistic 
issues, Belarus and Ukraine continued to provide extensive legal rights to Russian-speakers 
in their states, but this did not really seem to influence Russian debate. Finally, in religious 
matters Russian Orthodoxy and its competitors were all losing adherents as atheism and 
plain lack of interest continued to prevail, yet if anything this made religious authorities 
even more hostile towards their religious opponents. 
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Chapter 7: Strengthening sovereignty (2004-2008) 
Strengthening political sovereignty 
Territory 
Law: International legal norms 
Previously, Putin had ensured the demarcation of Russo-Ukrainian land borders, although 
he did not initiate any new guarantees. Such guarantees, however, were sought by most 
Ukrainians. Already before Iushchenko’s presidential inauguration, in September, 2004, an 
opinion poll showed that 75% of respondents supported Ukrainian territorial sovereignty. 
This figure was the second highest reported in similar polls conducted in Ukraine over the 
preceding  twelve  years.
881  Understanding  that  this  represented  a  persistent  trend,  in 
January, 2005, Russian commentator Sergei Dubynin consequently reminded Russians that: 
“There are no influential political or social forces in Ukraine, who would like to engage with 
the task of direct unification with Russia.”
882 Tellingly, such sentiments were increasingly 
visible in Belarus, too, where a survey from December, 2005, showed that only 12% of 
respondents agreed that “Belarus and Russia should become one state, with one president, 
government, army, flag, currency etc.” This proportion had dropped from 21% one year 
before, and 28% in late 2000.
883 Yet it seemed increasingly clear that the Russian leadership 
did  not  make  the  necessary  conclusions  for  such  observations.  Certainly,  at  a  pre ss 
conference  held  jointly  with  Iushchenko  in  December,  2006,  Putin  stressed  that  the 
territorial dispute had to be resolved through international law.
884 Yet this statement was 
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provided more out of necessity than of conviction, and subsequent Russian territorial claims 
indicated that no permanent acquiescence to the Ukrainian position would take place. And 
that  Russians  would  not  listen  to  neighbours’  demands  was  subsequently  indicated  in 
Russo-Belarusian  integration,  too.  In  April,  2007,  the  Russian  Ambassador  to  Minsk, 
Aleksandr  Surikov,  underlined  how  Belarusians  could  not  expect  preferential  economic 
treatment in any future union.
885 This might have made economic sense, but only served to 
reinforce Belarusian disinclination to integrate. 
 
Power: Union State moving forward 
Yet  the  Russian  leadership  was  unwilling  to  abandon  the  idea  of  Russo-Belarusian 
integration. Previously, reintegration with Belarus and Ukraine had commanded support in 
Russian leading circles during Putin’s first presidential term. And during 2004, opinions polls 
among  the  Russian  elite  showed  that  support  for  reintegration  with  Belarus  remained 
strong  among  all  political  groups.  Indeed,  within  governmental  elites  a  34%  increase  in 
favour  of  reintegration  was  discernible  over  the  previous  five  years.
886  Furthermore, 
Russians  understood  that  although  inhabitants  of  Belarus  had  partly  lost  interest  in 
integration this was due to disillusionment with the project, not to any inherent animosity 
towards Russia. Tellingly, a poll from 2004 revealed that twice as many Belarusian-speakers 
opted for unification with Russia than did Russian -speakers themselves. Russian-speakers 
were, on the contrary, much more interested in looking to the EU.
887 It might have been 
expected that Ukrainians would have been much more sceptical of Russians’ intentions after 
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the election of Iushchenko as President in December, 2004. Indeed, a survey from February, 
2006, showed that only 19% of respondents intending to vote for Iushchenko’s Our Ukraine 
electoral bloc wanted to unite with Russia and Belarus. However, at this time former Prime 
Minister  Iuliia  Tymoshenko’s  coalition  had  become  more  successful,  and  among  its 
prospective voters 40% wanted integration with Russia and Belarus.
888 In addition, support 
for territorial integration  was  resistant  to  dissatisfaction  with  the  Putin  administration’s 
criticism of Ukraine and Belarus. While in the former, Tymoshenko’s supporters, and the 
politician  herself,  ignored  previous  Russian  accusations  of  criminal  activity  against 
Tymoshenko, in Belarus, even during the trade war with Russia taking place during 2006-07, 
the question: “Different people are reaching different conclusions on the basis of the gas 
and oil conflict between Belarus and Russia. Which of the following statements do you agree 
with?” elicited 40% support for closer relations or unification with Russia, against 22% for 
the EU.
889 Putin wanted to capitalise on this. In April, 2007, he emphasised: “Russia is open 
for any kind of integration [with Belarus]. We are ready to go as far as our Belarusian friends 
are prepared to.”
890 At the same time, data showing economic progress were also used to 
retain public support for the process. Vasilii Khrol, Deputy State Secretary of the Russia-
Belarus Union State, highlighted that the Union budget had grown one and a half times 
between 2001 and 2006, and that turnover of goods within the Union had increased almost 
threefold.
891  This  provided  seemingly  concrete  proof  that  continued  integration  was 
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worthwhile,  not  only  for  Belarus,  but  also  for  an  increasingly  chaotic  Ukraine.  Thus,  as 
dissatisfaction with Iushchenko’s Westernising project had grown during this period by June, 
2007, a survey taken among inhabitants living throughout Ukraine by the Eurasian Monitor 
International Research Agency showed that 55% of respondents were now willing for their 
state to enter into a union together with Russia.
892 
 
Nation: Taking territory back 
Russian  belligerence  could  easily  change  Ukrainian  opinions,  though.  Already,  a  serious 
Russo-Ukrainian territorial clash had taken place in late 2003. Despite the conflict resolution 
seemingly provided by Kas’ianov and Ianukovych in the aftermath, the risk of Iushchenko’s 
election to President a year later confirmed to Putin that territorial threats might remain 
necessary as a bargaining tool. Mostly, other politicians were left to present the threats. In 
November,  2004,  Luzhkov  thus  attended  a  self-ascribed  separatist  conference  held  in 
Severodonetsk  in  eastern  Ukraine  by  invitation  from  Ukrainian  Prime  Minister  and 
presidential candidate Ianukovych. Luzhkov’s appearance had undoubtedly been approved 
by  Putin  beforehand,  since  the  Moscow  Mayor  used  the  conference  to  present  Putin’s 
support  for  Ianukovych’s  candidacy.
893  Additionally,  the  threat  of  separatism  in  south-
eastern Ukraine at this time had substantial popular backing. After Ianukovych had been 
defeated,  a  popular  survey  conducted  in  the  region  in  December  showed  that  20%  of 
Crimeans and a remarkable 40% in Donetsk wanted their region to separate from the rest of 
Ukraine and join Russia.
894 Although these wishes did not subsequently result in unrest, 
Belarusian observers at the time were sufficiently worried for Lukashenko in May, 2005, to 
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argue  that  the  Russia-Belarus  union  had  reached  an  impasse  because  of  Putin’s  earlier 
proposal that Belarus become part of Russia; a proposal that allegedly would result in a new 
Chechnia  west  of  Russia.
895  Not many people believed Lukashenko, and open military 
territorial conflict remained an unrealistic scenario for the region. Yet di plomatic disputes 
showed no signs of diminishing and by June, 2006, official delegations from Russia and 
Ukraine openly disagreed on border demarcation in the Sea of Azov: “Russia is attached to 
the Kerch agreement from 2003, which was signed by the presidents of the two states. 
[Ukraine] suggests changing the status of the Sea of Azov, declaring the waters not internal, 
but  international.”
896  In  the  case  of  Belarus,  matters  were  different  since  territorial 
integration was, officially, welcomed by both parties. Yet, in October, 2006, Lukashenko 
complained to visiting Russian journalists that the Russian authorities were hindering the re-
unification of Russia and Belarus by offering either nothing more than cooperation like in 
the EU, or, conversely “that *Belarus+ should be incorporated in Russia *and+ ‘Even Stalin did 
not  go  that  far.’”
897  No  Belarusians  were  allowed  to  contradict  Lukashenko,  and  it  was 
perhaps  particularly  ominous  that  the  unquestioned  leader  of  Belarus  was  the  most 
outspoken critic of Russian territorial ambitions. In Ukraine, on the contrary, Iushchenko’s 
administration had no interest in increasing the dispute, but rather reacted to renewed 
provocations  by  Luzhkov.  In  February,  2007,  the  Mayor  went  to  Sevastopol’,  where  he 
declared: “Here in the legendary Sevastopol’, a city of Russian glory, we must talk about the 
developments that tore Sevastopol’ and Crimea away from Russia...These developments 
were  undeserved...”  Not  unreasonably,  Ukrainian  authorities  accused  Luzhkov  of 
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interference in Ukrainian internal affairs.
898 Perhaps they were prudent in doing so as a 
precautionary step, for Luzhkov’s sentiments certainly had supporters within the Russian 
executive. An interview I conducted with a civil servant of the Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs  in  May,  2007,  repeatedly  returned  to  discussion  of  territorial  revanchism  and 
potential  divisions  of  Ukraine.
899  And at the pinnacle of power, Putin provided similar 
threats. Eventually, in April, 2008, he reportedly warned American President George Bush 
that the entry of Ukraine into NATO might prompt Russia to encourage the predominantly 
Russian-inhabited areas, including Crimea and the eastern regions, to break away from the 
rest of the state.
900 Thus, even borders officially agreed on were not secure for the future.  
 
Governance 
Law: Iushchenko in Moscow 
Even under Kuchma by mid-2004 Ukraine was ranked as partly democratic by the respected 
international organisation Freedom House,  which was higher than any other post-Soviet 
state, bar the Baltic States.
901 Russia had certainly lost democratic ground since El’tsin’s 
retirement,  but  this  hardly  seemed  to  concern  the  presidential  administration.  There 
remained a token allegiance to the popular vote. In October, 2004, the Chairman of the 
Russian  Electoral  Commission,  Aleksandr  Veshniakov,  complained  that  the  Belarusian 
referendum  on  constitutional  amendments  allowing  Lukashenko  to  stand  for  President 
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again did not ensure public control and should not be emulated by Russia.
902 However, few 
doubted that Putin planned to stay in control for many years, even if public opinion should 
somehow turn against him. Indeed, the idea of sovereign democracy that was becoming 
such a buzzword in Putin’s Russia was visible in relation to neighbouring states, too. In 
December, 2004, before the re-run of the Ukrainian electoral runoff between Iushchenko 
and Ianukovych, Putin did state that the Ukrainian crisis “can only be solved democratically, 
that is on a legal basis, and not under external or internal pressure according to political 
bias,”
903 but this was primarily a demand for Western actors to refrain from assisting the 
Ukrainian opposition. Iushchenko still won and in January, 2005, the co-chairman of the 
Russo-Ukrainian  inter-parliamentary  commission,  Aleksandr  Lebedev,  had  to  grudgingly 
admit  that  masses  of  Ukrainians  flocking  to  Kyiv  and  protesting  there  had  decided  the 
Ukrainian  election.  It  could  not  be  explained  through  the  concept  of  foreign  plots  and 
financing.
904 Most observers had exactly that opinion, and Iushchenko’s triumph now led 
the Belarusian opposition to criticise the West for not supporting it in similar fashion to 
topple Lukashenko.
905 Putin could certainly not accept the situation, but for the time being 
he had to limit the damage. Thus, when Iushchenko, fully aware  that Russian elites had 
strongly criticised his democratic credentials, suggested that his first trip abroad would be to 
Moscow, Putin happily agreed to seek reconciliation between the two regimes.
906  
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Power: Supporting Ianukovych 
Not that Putin respected Ukrainian sovereign governance, but in a direct continuation of 
previous policy he saw Iushchenko’s visit as an opportunity to increase continued Russian 
influence in Ukraine. Previously, in the run-up to the Ukrainian Presidential election of late 
2004, leading Russian actors had supported Ianukovych with a sum of at least $50 and 
possibly $300 million.
907 That this had not let to the desired outcome was mostly blamed on 
outside  interference.  By  December,  2004,  when  a  swift  election  for  Ianukovych  was 
scuppered, Putin “compared the West with ‘a fellow in a colonial helmet’...*and+ reproached 
Washington for wanting to impose ‘a dictatorship in international affairs under the guise of 
pseudo democratic rhetoric.’”
908 Russian political analysts argued similarly, with Viacheslav 
Nikonov stating: “Ukraine is next in line for the execution of the American plan of ‘velvet 
revolution,’...the secret service operation to replace regimes that have not already been 
tested successes as ‘banana republics’ by the USA, already accomplished in states in Eastern 
Europe  or  Georgia.”
909  And  inside  Ukraine  Ianukovych  sought  to  deflect  the  blame  for 
impending defeat away from himself: “A large number of organisations sponsored by the 
USA have worked in Ukraine for many years. America interferes with the internal affairs of 
Ukraine”
910  or,  at  least,  allegedly  did  so  until  the  mission  was  accomplished  through 
Ianukovych’s  defeat  in  the  repeated  electoral  runoff.  In  Belarus,  there  was  evidently  a 
similar fear of Western influence and pressure for regime change. In late December, 2004, 
twenty opposition youth activists from United Civic Party regional and city organisations 
were  thus  detained  for  participating  in  an  unauthorised  demonstration  celebrating  the 
                                                           
907 Velychenko, p. 5 
908 N. Nugaired, “‘Mond’ (Frantsiia): ‘Vladimira Putina presleduiut neudachi na Ukraine...’” Belgorodskaia 
pravda, 17.12.2004 
909 V. Nikonov, “Banany, dollary i kashtany,” Rossiiskaia gazeta, 1.12.2004 
910 V. Bogdanov, “Lishnie liudi ukrainskoi demokratii,” Rossiiskaia gazeta, 17.12.2004 278 
 
victory of the Ukrainian opposition.
911 Yet the Belarusian and Russian leaderships had to 
accept  that  they  could  not  keep  Iushchenko  from  power.  As  a  second -best  solution, 
however, maybe the new Ukrainian President could be kept from the West? I n January, 
2005, Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov n oted that:  “...not  all  *states+  have  succeeded  in 
getting rid of stereotypes from the past. This is shown by the reaction of some circles in 
Europe and the USA to the political crisis in Ukraine *and by+ declaring that ‘Ukraine must be 
together with the West.’”
912 And after Iushchenko’s regime was soon beset by domestic 
troubles, in 2006 the former  head of the Russian presidential administration, Aleksandr 
Voloshin, went on a semi-official mission to the USA, where he complained that expanded 
American activity had problematised events in Ukraine and elsewhere in the post-Soviet 
region, an area that Russia could rightfully lay claim to.
913 By this time, a recent dearth of 
Western economic and other support for Iushchenko showed Voloshin that the West might 
just be removed again from Ukraine. In Belarus, despite the troublesome Lukashenko, signs 
of this were even clearer. By May, 2007, lack of Western assistance  had finally convinced 
some members of the Belarusian opposition that governance by Moscow would be a les ser 
evil than Lukashenko. Uladzimer Parfenovich and Leanid Sinitsyn duly published a manifesto 
that  favoured  associated  member -status  for  Belarus  in  the  Russian  Federation.
914 
Lukashenko would certainly oppose this, but he was even more averse than Putin to 
Western intervention. Thus, it came as no surprise when Russia, Belarus and other post -
Soviet governments in October, 2007, presented a plan for monitoring all elections in OSCE 
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member-states  equally  and  for  reducing  the  amount  of  monitoring:  “...the  number  of 
*OSCE+ observers *at a given election+ shall not exceed 50 people...” This would prevent the 
OSCE from establishing whether elections were free and fair
915 and would thus reduce the 
risk  that  a  Iushchenko -like  unpleasant  surprise  would  not  be  sprung  on  Putin  and 
Lukashenko in future. 
 
Nation: Disparaging the ambassador 
Still, such measures would not help the Russians to get rid of Lukashenko, who seemed 
increasingly able to gain support in Belarus relative to the Russian leadership. Already, Putin 
had suggested incorporating, and thus neutralising the Belarusian central administration in 
an expanded Russia. Yet this seemed decreasingly popular in Belarus, and not just among 
Lukashenko’s  supporters.  In  November,  2004,  following  suspension  of  Russian  gas  to 
Belarus,  inhabitants  of Belarus  for  the first  time  favoured  Lukashenko  relative  to  Putin. 
Answering the question “If the position of President for Belarus and Russia was established 
whom would you vote for?” 30% supported Lukashenko, against Putin’s 24%.  Putin had 
previously been favoured, notably gaining 51% to Lukashenko’s 14% in April, 2002.
916 Putin’s 
role in the Ukrainian turmoil during this time worried inhabitants of Belarus, who did not 
want similar unrest. Although the Ukrainian election had a peaceful outcome this had not 
seemed  a  certain  outcome,  particularly  after  Ianukovych  in  a  menacing  and  downright 
irresponsible  statement  in  November  had  stated:  “Today  we’re  on  the  edge  of 
catastrophe...When the first drop of blood is spilled, we won’t be able to stop it.”
917 And 
even if Putin had not promoted Ukrainian civil war, parliamentarians in Russia supporting 
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him had been more willing to do so. Luzhkov was now member of United Russia, openly 
supporting  Putin,  and  in  December  the  Moscow  Mayor  visited  eastern  and  southern 
Ukrainian  regions  including  Donetsk,  Luhan’sk  and  Crimea,  which  vowed  to  pursue 
strategies of greater autonomy from the central Ukrainian government through any means 
possible,  should  Iushchenko  win  the  election. As  mentioned  earlier,  Luzhkov  repeatedly 
visiting Severodonetsk to express his support.
918 Lukashenko was unwilling to be similarly 
undermined. In mid-2005, the Kremlin appointed  the governor of Saratov region, Dmitrii 
Aiatskov, as  ambassador to Belarus.  However, after  he  then spoke  disparagingly about 
Lukashenko at a press conference in his hometown,  “...the  Belarusian  *administration+ 
strongly opposed his appointment.” Aiatskov never went to Minsk and by February, 2006, 
Aleksandr  Surikov  became  ambassador  instead.
919  Yet  while  the  Rus sian  government 
deferred  to  Lukashenko  on  this  matter,  Iushchenko’s  regime  was  being  deliberately 
obstructed. Supplies of natural gas to and through Ukraine were halted on January 1, 2006, 
just  when  the  Ukrainian  political  system  was most  vulnerable  as  it  transformed from  a 
presidential to a presidential-parliamentary system.
920 Although no political turmoil ensued, 
the  dispute  showed  Iushchenko’s  political  skills  in  an  unflattering  light,  while  a  Russia-
friendly parliamentary opposition could argue that increased power to them would mean 
less  difficult  relations  with  Russia  in  future.  Iushchenko  had  been  forced  to  cede  some 
presidential power to the parliament in order to come to power, but Lukashenko could not 
be similarly undermined. Russian criticism of Lukashenko was therefore sometimes forced 
to use other means, including slander. In November, 2006, for instance, Russian journalists 
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quoted his family’s neighbour: “...We all drank and we’re going on drinking....the President’s 
uncle...can tell you the recipe for home-brewed alcohol in details’,”
921 while in January, 
2007, even the normally measured analyst Iuliia Latynina denounced Lukashenko as “the 
demonstrative parasite in Minsk.”
922 Still, Lukashenko knew that such comments would be 
resented by inhabitants of Belarus in general, and he was determined to exploit any waning 
in Belarusian public support for the Russian leadership. In January, 2007, dismissing Western 
and Russian interference alike, he thus stated that: “As long as we’re not disturbed *by 
other  states+  our  people  can  figure  out  things  for  themselves.  We  don’t  need  either 
‘coloured’  or  ‘gas  revolutions’!”
923  Putin’s  administration  was  hardly  impressed  and 
continued  to  undermine  Belarusian  governance,  not  least  by  halting  energy  supplies. 
Ukraine could be damaged, too. In September, 2007, following the Ukrainian parliamentary 
elections where Tymoshenko’s bloc had gained 31% of the votes, threats by Gazprom to cut 
supplies to Ukraine were followed by Putin’s announcement that Ukraine should pay a price 
closer  to  the  international  average.
924  Even though Tymoshenko was now much more 
reconciliatory towards Russia than had previously been the case, Putin wanted to ensure 
that she and others knew what challenging Russia would mean.  
 
Ideology 
Law: Ukraine in the EU 
Previously,  Russian  respect  for  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  ideological  sovereignty  had 
decreased  during  the  first  term  of  Putin’s  presidency.  During  the  second  term,  he  did 
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profess his support for Ukrainian membership in international organisations, such as the 
EU,
925 but only because it was December, 2004, when he wanted to persuade Ukrainians to 
vote  for  Ianukovych  in  the  presidential  election,  and  because  Putin  knew,  Ukrainian 
membership of the EU was impossible even in the medium -term. To refuse any  sort of 
sovereign international identity for Ukraine would have forced Putin to specify a Russian 
vision, and this was still not ready. As Russian analysts complained: “...what can we offer 
Ukraine and the other post-Soviet states today? Builders of a ‘new empire’ must have a no 
less weighty domestic ideological foundation and no less serious foreign policy intent. At 
present there is neither one, nor the other.”
926 With a Russian vision absent, Ukrainians 
looked to GUAM, the organisation they had helped found almost a decade earlier, which in 
May, 2006, became the Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development with the 
stated aim to “...secure rule of law *and+ strengthen European integration” among other 
aims, squarely positioning the organisation within established, Western norms.
927 Yet in 
order to achieve these aims, cooperation with democratic states such as the Baltics and 
Romania were in order, and these now thought of little else than their recent membership 
of the EU. Iushchenko’s Ukraine was therefore somewhat left to itself. Belarusians, too, felt 
increasingly peripheral in Russian international affairs. In October, 2006, members of the 
Belarusian political elite argued that the Russian elite no longer viewed Belarus as a priority, 
and that the Belarusian state therefore should seek a different source of inspiration.
928 Yet 
no one any longer knew what that source might be. 
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Power: Modern Russian identity and the spiritual leader 
Putin’s  imperial  ideology  had  been  clear  already  during  his  first  presidential  term. 
Iushchenko’s  election  in  Ukraine  brought  the  momentum  of  this  project  to  a  halt,  but 
Russian  political  analysts  did  not  believe  Ukrainians  could  build  a  separate  ideology  in 
Europe.  In  December,  2004,  Tsipko  rallied:  “Russian  language  and  Russian  culture  is  an 
inseparable part of European civilisation. At the same time, Ukrainian language – which was 
preserved through south-Russian folklore – remains to this day on the fringes of European 
civilisation...”
929 Tsipko and his colleagues would certainly believe that Belarus, too, was 
peripheral in Europe, and inhabitants in Belarus still agreed that their future was close to 
Russia, although, as seen above, not necessarily united with it. A survey in Belarus from 
April,  2006,  showed  that  85%  perceived  Russia  as  one  of  the  five  friendliest  countries 
towards Belarus, as opposed to 1% who perceived that Russia was one of the five most 
unfriendly countries towards Belarus.
930 And according to Anatolii Rubinov, deputy chief of 
the Belarusian presidential administration, in July, 2006, there was no ideological content in 
the oft-repeated phrase calling for a “revival” of the Belarusian nation. Rubinov instead 
argued that the identity of the state was bound to the BSSR.
931 In Ukraine, wistful memories 
of the Soviet Union belonged to the opposition, particularly the Communist party. Yet the 
more general idea of some sort of Eurasian unity together with Russia was much more 
widespread. By 2006  the  controversial  politician  Natalia  Vitrenko’s  political  party,  Blok, 
controlled approximately 1,000 seats in local eastern and southern Ukrainian councils. With 
her close connections to Russian Eurasianists such as Aleksandr Dugin this political presence 
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was  a  significant  boost  for  pro-Russian  ideology  in  Ukraine.
932  However, Ukraine, and 
Belarus, too, had to receive benefits from Russia in order to stay loyal, and this had latterly 
not been the case. The details of economic disputes between Russia and its neighbours are 
outlined elsewhere in this and the previous chapters, but t he outcome was increased 
alienation between the states. And this remained one of the few venues where Russian 
political opposition could criticise Putin. In January, 2007, Aleksandr Prokhanov complained 
that: “There remains one Belarus that is the gateway to Europe, that Gazprom were so 
thoughtlessly prepared to slam, positioning the relationship of our states and peoples on an 
‘economic foundation,’ which preserved ‘Russian state *rossiiskii+ oil’ and the ‘Russian state 
*rossiiskii+ budget.’”
933 Yet, Prokhanov was being unfair towards the state-owned natural gas 
company, for, as I show elsewhere, Minsk was often responsible for energy disputes. The 
Russian executive, on the other hand, had shown itself patient, allowing temporary setbacks 
in the promotion of its expansionist ideology. Iushchenko might have become Ukrainian 
President, inaugurating Westernised international policies, separate from and at times even 
opposed to Russia, but his government was soon beset by infighting. Less than two years 
after his electoral defeat, Ianukovych had thus come back as Prime Minister, and with his 
return Ukraine looked to Russia again. In January, 2007, the new government even ensured 
that Ukrainian Foreign Minister, Borys Tarasiuk, who had been closely identified with a pro-
Western line for more than a decade, was dismissed as he had been in the past,
934 following 
a pattern previously set by Kuchma. Despite worries from the Russian opposition, therefore, 
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powerful indications appeared that Ukraine and Belarus would remain closely aligned with 
Russia. 
 
Nation: Rejecting West Ukrainian leadership 
Yet this would only be the case if Russians would tolerate the right of Belarusians and 
Ukrainians to sometimes take differing opinions, and this had not always been the case. 
Russians’ intolerance to difference was growing, particularly among so-called panslavists, 
who enjoyed a state-tolerated renaissance. In May, 2004, at the first Ukrainian congress of 
the Conference of Slavic Peoples of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus, the leader of the Slavic 
National Patriotic Union, P. Tolochko, stated: “If we wish to survive as a civilisational entity 
then  we  have  to  unite....[if]  we...should  tear  ourselves  away  from  Belarus,  Russia...we 
would...be ‘unravelled.’”
935 The onus here was on Russia to preserve the bond, but it was 
obvious that Lukashenko and other Belarusians criticising Russia would not be tolerated, 
either. Iushchenko was seen by Tolochko and his allies as a straightforward enemy. It was 
therefore  tempting  for  Iushchenko’s  Russian  opponents  to  emphasise  this  animosity, 
framing him as hostile to Russians. In June, 2004, a report allegedly written by Russian spin-
doctor  Marat  Gel’man  appeared  in  Ukraine.  It  advocated  presenting  Iushchenko  as  an 
enemy  of  Crimean  Russians  by  using  unwitting  Ukrainian  nationalists  to  provoke  land 
disputes and Tatar retaliation on the peninsula, showing Iushchenko’s inability to protect 
local  Slavs.
936  This  plan  was  not  successful,  but  the  impression  that  Iushchenko  and 
Ukrainian nationalists were out to hurt Russ ian neighbours was only reinforced as the 
divisive presidential campaign developed towards the end of the year. Already in October, 
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Russian  commentators  were  complaining:  “If  the  ‘west-Ukrainians’  are  used  to  see 
themselves  as  oppressed,  why  should  Ukrainians  in  the  east  accept  such  a  detrimental 
role?...why should the ‘westerners,’ who worship the Polish lord and the American decree, 
declare themselves to be the only real Ukrainians?...”
937 This impression, as I have indicated 
previously,  was  only  reinforced  among  Russians  following  the  election.  Ukrainians,  too, 
could vilify Russia, denouncing it in so many words as barbaric. Notice Tarasiuk’s comment 
while still Foreign Minister in October, 2006: “Russia is the Eurasian outskirts. It won’t enter 
the EU, since it wants to gain the status of a global great power at the centre of a Slavic 
Union.”
938 Although the latter part of Tarasiuk’s statement could be viewed as recognition 
of Russia as a great power, the former part linked Russia to a Tatar past, with Ukraine, 
incidentally, as the bulwark of civilised Europe. Lukashenko was prepared to use similar 
rhetoric in January, 2007, in the wake of yet another energy dispute with Russia: “You know, 
[Belarusians] are an inalienable part of Europe, the heart of Europe...Today has come the 
time  when  Europeans  realized  that...they  also  have  to  link  their  security  with  that  of 
Belarus.”
939 Undoubtedly, Tarasiuk and Lukashenko had gone too far; Russia was in many 
ways as European as the two smaller states. The lack of tolerance went both ways, however. 
In the Russian government Belarus and Ukraine were seldom denounced as alien to Europe 
since Russia, as Tarasiuk had correctly pointed out, was simply not just part of Europe, but a 
special international actor. Yet less prominent Russian politicians did highlight the insular, 
xenophobic nature of Ukraine. This was most forcefully indicated to me in an interview in 
May, 2007, with a member of the Russian Federation Council. Repeatedly, claims appeared 
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that Ukrainians wanted a state purified of Moskali, Muslims and other outsiders.
940 This was 
presented as a disease unique to western Ukraine, whereas the eastern regions had much 
more in common with Russia. To me it was quite clear that the politician in question would 
view a split Ukraine as a natural development and, although the Russian leadership might 
not overtly share this sentiment, it no longer sought to counter it. 
 
Conclusion 
Between  2004  and  2008,  the  paradigm  of  Power  continued  to  dominate  Russian 
perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian political sovereignty. In territorial matters, Putin 
ensured Belarusians that integration would go as far as they were ready for it to go, while 
the Union budget indeed seemed to increase substantially. Furthermore, opinion polls taken 
among executive elites in Russia showed that Putin had strong domestic support for his 
plans  for  integration  with  other  post-Soviet  states.  In  matters  relating  to  governance, 
Russian  elites  openly  and  consistently  supported  Ianukovych  during  the  Ukrainian 
presidential  election.  Putin  complained  about  interference  from  a  colonial  West,  while 
Sergei Ivanov was claiming that past stereotypes continued to dominate thinking in the EU 
and North America. What these and other actors indicated was subsequently confirmed by 
Voloshin, when this former senior aide to El’tsin and Putin told the American administration 
that Ukraine and the rest of the post-Soviet region constituted part of a Russian sphere of 
interest. Finally, in matters relating to ideology prominent Russian commentators such as 
Tsipko portrayed Russia as spiritual leader of the Slavic community and the only medium 
through which peripheral Ukrainians and Belarusians could enter Europe. Many Russians 
believed  their  state  had  a  duty  to  assist  this  development,  for  instance  through 
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unquestioned,  generous  subsidies  or  through  political  alliances  with  dominant  parties 
abroad, such as that existing between Dugin and Vitrenko in Ukraine. 
 
The paradigm of Nation also significantly influenced Russian perceptions of Belarusian and 
Ukrainian political sovereignty, however. In issues concerning territory, Putin showed that 
any  previous  border  agreement  could  be  annulled.  Most  notoriously,  he  threatened 
revanchism against Ukraine if the latter joined NATO, and he endorsed Luzhkov to visit 
eastern Ukraine and support regional separatism. Strongly voiced protests resulted, not just 
from Ukrainians but also from Belarus, where Lukashenko compared Putin with Stalin and 
threatened a new Chechnia. In matters concerning governance, the Russian government 
showed a distinct lack of respect for the Ukrainian democratic choice of Iushchenko. Energy 
and other types of disruption were introduced at the most critical times for the Ukrainian 
polity, such as when this changed from a presidential to a parliamentary system, while the 
Russia-endorsed presidential candidate in Ukraine, Ianukovych, warned of civil war when his 
election  did  not  progress  smoothly.  Finally,  in  issues  concerning  ideology  Russian 
commentators increasingly appealed to Russians in Ukraine, who should rebel against the 
alleged hijacking of their state by West Ukrainian nationalists. Although rumours that a 
Russian spin-doctor in Ukraine tried to provoke inter-ethnic strife to discredit Iushchenko 
were not confirmed, local political elites certainly took offence. If Tarasiuk and Lukashenko 
could agree on one thing, this was apparently that their states were more European than 
Russia. 
 
The paradigm of Law had by now become insignificant. That Russians declared territorial 
disagreements  with  Ukraine  should  be  solved  by  international  law  was  not  shown  in 289 
 
practice, while Iushchenko’s early attempts to mollify Russians by visiting Moscow were not 
appreciated by Putin. Finally, Putin could easily suggest Ukrainian membership of Western 
organisations such as the EU when he knew this would not soon become a possibility. 
 
Strengthening military sovereignty 
Forces of Belarus and Ukraine 
Law: Shielding the EU 
Previously, the El’tsin presidency had seen Belarusian and Ukrainian military forces return 
most  of their  strategic  assets  to  Russia,  while at  the  same  time no  significant  Western 
military seemed prepared to cooperate further with the two states. During Putin’s second 
presidential term, this did not change, although Lukashenko in July, 2004, did reject the 
claim that Belarus was a source of soft security threats to the EU. He argued that “...in terms 
of migration, trafficking in drugs, trade in arms and many, many other illegal things we are a 
barrier for...the EU”
941 and thus envisaged a role for Belarusian military forces in upholding 
regional stability. However, by now only Russia had any interest in what Lukashenko could 
offer. 
 
Power: Joint exercises 
This did not worry Belarusians much, though, since they remained interested in cooperating 
with Russia. By 2006, Russian and Belarusian military integration had progressed to the 
point when joint air defence exercises could begin taking place. In June the Union Shield 
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exercises were conducted,
942 showing that the gradual faltering of integration in other issue 
areas was not quite so prominent regarding military matters.  And by 2007, the Russian 
administration finally understood that for Russia, Belarus and like-minded states the CIS was 
not the way forward. Thus, i n March, the secretary of the  Russian Security Council,  Igor’ 
Ivanov, implied that CIS military functions should be taken over by the CSTO, which also 
included Russia and Belarus.
943 
 
Nation: Terminating cooperation 
However, Ukrainian forces were not in the CSTO and Russians increasingly feared they and 
especially  the  valuable  Ukrainian  military-industrial  complex  should  move  away  from 
Russian control. Thus, during 2005  Russia loudly threatened  Kyiv that Ukrainian military 
cooperation  with  Western  states  would  terminate  Russian-Ukrainian  defence  industrial 
cooperation, accounting for 30% of Ukrainian defence exports.
944 To retaliate, in June, 2006, 
an official statement from the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to Russian 
complaints about impending naval exercises with Western  participation near Crimea, by 
stating that Russia was unlawfully retaining and using naval units that it had not received 
under  existing  agreements ,
945  the  first  time  the  Ukrainian  government  had  officially 
denounced Russian use of the Black Sea Fleet after   1997. Even more controversially, 
Ukrainian forces finally opposed Russia in connection with disputes on a nuclear missile 
defence,  culminating  in  February,  2007,  when  the  US  administration  announced  that 
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Ukraine  was  considered  a  partner  in  the  deployment  of  the  US  missile  defence  that 
remained  anathema  for  Russians.  This,  as  much  as  anything  else,  was  certain  to  divide 
Russians and Ukrainians.
946 
 
NATO 
Law: Relaxed reaction 
Previously, a somewhat relaxed Russian attitude to NATO had been visible in Putin’s early 
presidency. Although Putin continued to accept the idea of Ukrainian NATO-membership in 
principle,  though,  by  May,  2005,  he  made  clear  that  Ukrainian  cooperation  with  NATO 
would jeopardise Russian military assistance to Ukraine: “...if other former Soviet republics 
enter  NATO  our  relations  with  them  will,  in  principle,  remain  the  same...for  now  our 
relations  [with  NATO]  are  such  that  we  cannot  retain  some  sensitive  technology  and 
isolated production in a NATO country (even if we’re here talking about Ukraine).”
947 In 
Russian society more generally, ambiguity concerning NATO dominated. In 2005, 55% of 
respondents in an opinion poll in Russia were either neutral in their attitude, or did not 
know what to answer.
948 Yet it was likely that the majority of these  respondents would 
challenge  NATO  the  moment  Ukrainian  or  Belarusian  membership  was  contemplated. 
Similar ambiguity existed in Ukraine, where even Russia -friendly Ianukovych wanted to 
retain the option of cooperating with both Russia and NATO.  While in opposition he had 
admittedly  voted  against  a  law  permitting  NATO -sponsored  joint  military  exercises  in 
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Ukraine. However, after rejoining government in August, 2006, Ianukovych’s party promptly 
voted for the law,
949 displaying his unwillingness to condemn NATO once and for all. 
 
Power: Union Shield 2006 and aggressive enlargement 
Previously, however, Ukrainians and Belarusians had not seen any signs from NATO that the 
organisation might be prepared to provide funding or equipment to the extent Russia did. 
Russian observers understood that Russia could not afford to lose this advantage. In June, 
2005, they worried that Ukraine had already been lost to NATO, and that Belarus, if similarly 
lured to support the Western organisation, would leave the entire western flank of Russia 
vulnerable to NATO aggression; thus, preventing cooperation between NATO and Belarus 
remained an issue of military security, as well as prestige.
950 Stakes were sufficiently high for 
the Belarusian military to receive plenty of Russian assistance during the following year. The 
Belarusian public, having had their belief in Russian goodwill confirmed, continued to refuse 
NATO. In a survey conducted in April, 2006, the question was asked how people would vote: 
“If today a referendum in Belarus was held on the question of whether Belarus should enter 
NATO.” Only 14% stated they were in favour of membership, while 46% were opposed and 
23%  would  have  abstained  from  voting.
951  Anyway, such a vote remained hypothetical, 
whereas in June that year Russo-Belarusian cooperation advanced very concretely with the 
Union Shield 2006 military exercise .  This  was  even  presented  as  “a  defence  operation, 
connected to the opposed military activity of a country...either the NATO-member Poland or 
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Ukraine, which hungers for entering the alliance.”
952 The Russian government had certainly 
not given up on Ukraine yet, though, but instead considered how best to save Ukrainians 
from NATO. In June, and again in December, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov thus 
warned  that  the  early  entry  of  Ukraine  into  NATO  would  bring  about  a  tremendous 
geopolitical shift and require a revised policy from Russia. The fact that these comments 
were  severely  criticised  by  NATO
953  showed their international impact. Ukrainians, too, 
seemed to take Lavrov’s message to heart. In June, 2006, an opinion poll released in Kyiv 
demonstrated that only 12% of respondents were in favour of NATO membership, whereas 
64%,  almost  two-thirds,  were  directly  opposed.
954  Thus,  the  majority  of  Ukrainians 
continued to reject the idea of assistance from NATO. Lukashenko, too, knew he could 
count on Belarusian public opposition to NATO. Therefore, most Belarusians would certainly 
support him when he promised in September, 2006, that: “...if tanks arrive from over there 
(the West) we shall die here for Russia!”
955 And despite allowing for joint exercises with 
NATO, Ianukovych’s return as Prime Minister in 2006, led to the declaration that “Ukraine is 
not ready to enter NATO...We have to convince the public and that’s the main task...”
956 
And, as highlighted, three months later, the Ukrainian parliament decided to sack the pro-
Atlanticist  Tarasiuk  and  the  equally  pro-Atlanticist  Minister  of  Defence.
957  The Russian 
leadership were on the offensive now, although blame was often placed on NA TO, not 
Belarus  and  Ukraine.  In  February,  2007,  Putin  emphasised  that  he  would  view  the 
membership of Ukraine and Georgia in NATO as a hostile act by the West,  not Ukraine; an 
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act that was directly threatening to Russian security.
958 Russian commentators followed the 
President’s lead; often, Ukrainian initiatives to seek cooperation with NATO were ignored in 
order to rebuke the West and particularly the USA. In April, 2007, Russian commentators 
thus focused on American shenanigans when American President George Bush signed an act 
supporting Ukrainian and Georgian NATO membership: “In recent years the USA has not 
become tired of showing the entire world who is the master of the house.”
959 Ukraine was 
here simply grouped with “the world” and not seen as an active protagonist challenging the 
Russian  great  power.  In  order  to  compete  with  NATO,  Putin’s  government  also  viewed 
further  afield  than  just  Belarus  and  Ukraine,  and  built  up  the  military  capacity  of  the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which also included the military might of China. 
Duma speaker, Boris Gryzlov, for one eyed the possibilities in August, 2007, stating: “The 
*SCO+ is already today an independent factor *promoting+ stability and security...”
960  
 
Nation: Violating airspace 
Given the differences between a Russia- (and China-) centred SCO on the one hand, and 
NATO on the other, it was thus not unreasonable for Ukrainians to hope their cooperation 
with  NATO  might  be  ignored  in  Russia.  Yet,  in  recent  years  members  of  the  Russian 
legislature and others had threatened severe sanctions against Ukraine. In 2004, when the 
Baltic States joined NATO, as the first former Soviet states to do so, the Russian air force 
then repeatedly violated the airspace of the Baltic States, in a warning to them and to 
Ukraine  that  NATO  would  not  be  able  to  protect  them,  while  members  of  the  Russian 
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General Staff complained of “...the disdain for the interests of Russia in the region” shown 
by both NATO and the Baltic States.
961 Another method was for Russians to arrange loc al 
demonstrations against NATO. In August, 2005, such demonstrations against Ukraine-NATO 
joint military exercises marred Sevastopol’. Placards declared “The troops of NATO shall not 
pass”  and  “NATO  is  the  enemy  of  the  Ukrainian  soldier.”
962  Undoubtedly,  Russian  state 
institutions  supported  these  demonstrations,  which  only  served  to  increase  discord 
between inhabitants of Ukraine. When this was not sufficient to prevent similar exercises 
the following year, in June, 2006, Russian ambassador to NATO Konstantin Totskii stated 
that if Ukraine entered NATO “...Russia would be justified in using both diplomatic and 
economic  levers  *which  was+  normal  practice  in  international  affairs.”
963  Iushchenko,  in 
return,  “pledged  the  security  service,  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior  and  border  troops  to 
remove  foreigners,  who  had  participated  in  anti-NATO  demonstrations,  from  the 
country.”
964  Now  that  Iushchenko  had  become  involved,  members  of  the  Russian 
government found it necessary to answer. In December, 2006, Sergei Ivanov even warned 
that “...the consequences of these steps are negative for our bilateral relations...whether 
we want it or not, *rapprochement+ will reflect on our relations.”
965 Ivanov knew that this 
argument resonated strongly in Ukraine. “The authorities ignore their own people’s protest” 
complained Mikhail Dobkin of the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine soon after,
966 while a 
consultative  Crimean  vote  in  December  indicated  that  over  98%  opposed  NATO 
membership among those who voted, which was a respectable 60% of the electorate on the 
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peninsula, while only 1% favoured membership.
967 The distance between Simferopol’ and 
Kyiv had been underlined again. Based on such examples, in May, 2007, Leonid Slutskii of 
the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and First Deputy Chairman of the Committee for 
International Affairs in the Duma, wrote to me that “It would be a serious mistake to decide 
the question of the accession of Ukraine to NATO only in the corridors of power, without 
considering the opinion of the entire Ukrainian people...[otherwise] this can lead to such 
serious destabilisation *of  Ukraine+  that  the unity  of  this  country  is  in  danger.”
968  Putin 
wanted such warnings to appear more often. In 2007, he personally endorsed a new Russian 
manual  on  teaching  Russian  history  after  the  Second  World  War  in  schools;  this  guide 
among other things defended the Russian intervention in the Ukrainian Orange Revolution 
since “Iushchenko *was+ known for his anti-Russian [antirossiiskimi] initiatives (particularly 
calling for inclusion in NATO).”
969  
 
Forces of the Russian Federation in Belarus and Ukraine 
Law: Russian dependence 
During the early 2000s, the Russian executive had assumed that the stationing of Russian 
forces in Belarus and Ukraine had already been definitively agreed on. Stability on the issue 
suited the Russian military well, for the Volga early warning radar at Baranovichi in Belarus 
was central to Russian defence. With its ability to detect ballistic missiles 5,000 kilometres 
away, the radar was the newest, most modern among all Russian military radars.
970 To the 
south, the facilities on Crimea were very important for the Black Sea Fleet and for this 
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reason Ukrainians had to be humoured, too, at least formally. As mentioned previously, 
following Putin’s decree to establish a naval base at Novorossiisk Sergei Ivanov thus focused 
on the construction of such a base during 2004, even though Russians did not want it and it 
would have to contend with a shallower and smaller port than that of Sevastopol’.
971 Yet in 
return for indicating that Ukrainian hospitality would not be exploited, Ivanov ensured by 
March, 2006, that Iushchenko opposed many of his supporters eager to kick out Russian 
troops from Crimea by making clear that “It’s out of the question to revise already signed 
agreements...concerning the length of stay for the *Black Sea Fleet+ in Ukraine.”
972 
 
Power: Retaining bases 
Nevertheless, such a revision was exactly what Russians sought. This aim might be reached 
more easily in a multilateral forum. In June, 2005, at a summit of the CSTO the Russian 
military demonstrated this by presenting plans to conduct exercises for the joint ground 
forces of the organisation in its western region, that is, in Belarus, in 2006.
973 Joint exercises 
would reify the existence of Russian troops in Bela rus; an objective that would enable 
Russians to incorporate the neighbouring state in its centralised military structure.  In May, 
2006, a major Russian newspaper printed a large map with a dividing line separating West 
and East in Europe: “Asia has remained with Moscow, while the formerly Socialist Europe 
has run to the side of America...Russia is now left to strengthen ties with Belarus and Central 
Asia.”
974 Since most Russians also wanted Ukraine to be with the East, it was thus logical for 
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Putin to mention in October, 2006, that “Russia is not rushing to remove its fleet from 
Crimea  ahead  of  schedule,  for  the  treaty  [on  basing  rights]  is  in  effect  until  2017. 
Afterwards, Moscow is prepared to negotiate on extending the stay of the Black Sea Fleet.” 
Ukrainian Prime Minister Ianukovych seconded this, undermining Iushchenko’s position.
975 
As a consequence, by the first half of 2007 Russian forces used facilities in Belarus and 
Ukraine to cover the entire western flank of their state. The 43
rd Communications Hub at 
Vileika and the Independent Radar Node at Gantsevichi in Belarus were paid by Belarus and 
enabled Russia to operate in Central Eastern Europe and the Baltic Sea. Within Ukraine 
remained the Black Sea Fleet, while the Operational Group of Russian Troops in Tiraspol’, 
Moldova, also depended on transport links through Ukraine.
976 It was perhaps to have been 
expected when Russian state television in June, 2007, unexpectedly reported that Ukraine 
had agreed to  extend  the agreement providing for the use by Russia   of the port of 
Sevastopol’ for its Black Sea Fleet for ten years more.
977 This was never confirmed in Kyiv, 
but demonstrated the importance held by the base for Russian authorities.  
 
Nation: The Ialta lighthouse 
At the same time, however, it was increasingly clear that the Russian government would not 
risk the position of its Black Sea Fleet to the whims of the Ukrainian state. As I previously 
described at length, Iushchenko’s election as president had resulted in boisterous Russian 
protests from state officials and private individuals alike, but as long as the Black Sea Fleet 
depended on Ukrainian goodwill there was a limit to how strong criticism Russians could 
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voice. In March, 2005 the head of the Ukrainian security services, Aleksandr Turchinov, had 
bluntly warned: “*Russians+ will insult us as long as we allow them to do so. The presence of 
the Russian Black Sea Fleet on Ukrainian territory contradicts *our+ national interests.”
978 
Afterwards it became clear that Turchinov and his allies were ready to follow threats with 
action.  In  January,  2006,  in  an  unprecedented  dispute  between  Russian  and  Ukrainian 
military  forces,  Ukrainian  troops  occupied  the  Ialta  lighthouse,  claiming  Russians  had 
illegally appropriated it. The lighthouse was central to Russian naval activities in the area 
and  Sergei  Ivanov  immediately  protested:  “‘...when  Ukrainians  say  that  this 
lighthouse...does not appear [in the 1997 allotment of equipment for the Russian Black Sea 
Fleet+ it’s untrue...’” while he also “threatened that Russian soldiers had been given every 
authority to secure *the lighthouse+...”
979 Armed struggle was avoided, but it seemed quite 
obvious that Russia would not easily be allowed to remain in Sevastopol’ for as long as it 
wanted.  Furthermore,  even  Lukashenko  was  no  longer  malleable.  In  April,  2007,  he 
challenged  plans  to  station  Russian  nuclear  missiles  in  Belarus  as  retaliation  for  the 
construction of an American nuclear missile shield nearby: “Most likely, it is simply public 
relations, [and] moreover unfortunate...Apart from the President of Belarus no one has the 
right to introduce normal missiles here, or those with nuclear filling.”
980 On its own, this 
complaint was not unusual for the troublesome Lukashenko, but the latter knew how vexed 
the Russian leadership was about the American missile shield. Openly refusing to help the 
Russian military in this matter was unusually provocative, even for Lukashenko. 
 
Conclusion 
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Between  2004  and  2008,  the  paradigm  of  Power  continued  to  dominate  Russian 
perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian military sovereignty. Concerning Belarusian forces, 
Russia  ensured  that  substantial  military  exercises,  some  of  which  were  larger  than  any 
exercises  hitherto  seen,  were  conducted.  The  Union  Shield  exercise  witnessed  the 
participation  of  a  significant  Belarusian  contingent.  Furthermore,  Igor’  Ivanov  officially 
suggested that CIS military cooperation could be transferred to CSTO aegis, allowing for 
more effective incorporation of Belarusian forces. It was no secret, either, that the purpose 
of  keeping  Belarusian  forces  close  to  Russia  was  often  to  oppose  NATO  and  NATO 
enlargement. The Union Shield exercise was specifically conducted with the relatively new 
NATO-member Poland in mind, while both Putin and Lavrov strongly warned NATO against 
increased  contacts  with  Ukraine.  Ukraine,  however,  had  still  not  been  completely 
abandoned by the Russians, who continued attempting to co-opt the substantial Ukrainian 
forces. Finally, Russian forces in Belarus and Ukraine showed little sign of preparing to leave, 
even though this had sometimes been agreed, not least in the case of the Black Sea Fleet. 
Putin  now  suggested  that  the  Fleet  might  remain  indefinitely  in  Crimea,  to  increase 
Ukrainian as well as Russian security, while Russian communications bases and information 
hubs located in Belarus were if anything becoming of increasing importance for the Russian 
forces. The transfer of military cooperation from the CIS to the CSTO could also be seen in 
this light, since the new framework would make it easier for Russian troops to operate in 
Belarus. 
 
The paradigm of Nation also significantly influenced Russian perceptions of Belarusian and 
Ukrainian  military  sovereignty,  however.  Russia  officially  threatened  to  terminate 
cooperation  with  the  Ukrainian  defence-industrial  complex,  which  would  greatly  have 301 
 
harmed the latter, while the Ukrainian government in return both insisted its troops needed 
the  best  military  facilities  in  the  state  taken  back  from  Russia,  and  promised  to  join 
American plans for a missile defence shield, which Russia vehemently opposed. In relation 
to NATO, Russian military planes harassed the airspace of the Baltic States when they joined 
the Western alliance, and Ukraine would likely experience the same if it joined NATO. Sergei 
Ivanov and others certainly threatened sanctions in such a case, while Russian history as 
endorsed by Putin denounced Ukrainians cooperating with NATO as little short of traitors. 
Finally, Russian troops stationed in Ukraine came closer than ever before to armed conflict 
with their Ukrainian counterparts over the command of local, crucial naval infrastructure. 
Sergei Ivanov threatened all means would be used to defeat Ukrainian resistance, while the 
Ukrainian security services denounced the Russian Black Sea Fleet as a national security 
threat. 
 
The paradigm of Law had by now become insignificant. Lukashenko attempted to make 
Belarusian  forces  more  internationally  respectable,  but  this  threatened  Russia.  Putin 
periodically  seemed  relaxed  about  NATO,  but  only  when  NATO  stayed  out  of  Ukraine. 
Finally, Russian forces depended on facilities in Belarus and Ukraine, but Minsk and Kyiv 
would not be allowed to exploit this.  
 
Strengthening economic sovereignty 
Economies of Belarus and Ukraine 
Law: Attracting FDI 302 
 
The Belarusian economy had on some counts seemed more robust than the Ukrainian and 
even Russian economies at the end of the 1990s, although this tendency had not lasted long 
into Putin’s presidency. By 2004, the Belarusian economy had a little reason for optimism, 
since Belarusian GDP had reached 117% of pre-independence levels, while GDP in Russia 
and  Ukraine  remained  90%  and  67%,  respectively  of  their  pre-1992  levels.
981  However, 
these were largely misleading figures, for the Russian GDP was now fast increasing, while 
the Belarusian economy, as shall be shown below, had lost none of its past dependence on 
Russia. Ianukovych understood that a similar problem existed for the Ukrainian economy, 
and in September, 2006, when he had been reinstated as Prime Minister, Ianukovych 
advocated  a  Ukraine -EU  partnership,  and  eventual  Ukrainian  membership  of  the 
organisation:  “Ukraine  will  not  be  a  ‘cul-de-sac’  in  EU-Russia  relations.  We  will  build  a 
bridge.”
982  Indeed,  Western  interest  might  provide  the  Ukrainian  economy  with  a  small 
chance to relinquish its dependence on Russia. By June, 2007, Ukraine was attracting 19% of 
its GDP in FDI. Proportionally, this was a much higher number than in Russia, where only 7% 
of GDP even now appeared through FDI.
983 Ukrainian economic sovereignty appeared much 
less certain when it was remembered than an increasing proportion of its FDI in fact 
originated in Russia.  
 
Power: Elusive aid and ready subsidies 
Ukrainians were painfully aware of the dependency of their economy on Russia, and had 
already taken the consequence and joined the SES. Membership of the EU, on the other 
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hand, was seen as a partial boon only. Ianukovych argued in October, 2004: “When I’m told 
that we must enter the [EU] straightaway, we understand well that as soon as we do that 
we’ll  be  unable  to  compete  with  our  salaries...As  for  [economic  cooperation  in  the 
CIS+...economic relations contribute to our working to unite our forces.”
984 Furthermore, the 
EU did not appear enthusiastic about cooperating with Ukraine and Belarus. When aid was 
allocated to the CIS in 2005 the two economies did remain potential beneficiaries, but the 
structure  of  the  EU  economic  programme  ensured  that  Belarus  and  Ukraine  would  be 
competing on equal terms not with Russia, but with Russian regions.
985 Partly, EU policy 
reflected the incomparable size difference between the post-Soviet economies. As of 2006, 
Russian GDP thus remained approximately twenty times larger than the GDP of Belarus.
986 
Additionally, products of the Belarusian economy were not competitive on the international 
market, in Russia or elsewhere. Thus, by 2006 Minsk registered a record trade deficit of $2.5 
billion,  which  forced  Lukashenko’s  government  to  ask  its  Russian  counterpart  for  a 
stabilisation loan of $1 billion.
987 That such a loan would increase Russian control over the 
Belarusian economy was welcomed in Moscow. In March, 2007, the Secretary of the Russian 
Security  Council  Igor’  Ivanov  implied  that  the  remaining  economic  functions  of  the  CIS 
should be taken over by the Eurasian Economic Community, which included Russia and 
Belarus and full member-states and had Ukraine as an observer.
988 Belarusians seemed to 
fully  agree,  as  long  as  they  continued  to  receive  Russian  resources  and  materials  at 
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privileged prices, and while Russian credits contributed to about 30% of Belarusian GDP.
989 
Inhabitants of Ukraine had previously hoped that Iushchenko’s presidency would move their 
state closer to the West and dispel the need for Russian subsidies, yet by June, 2007, these 
hopes  had  not  been  fulfilled,  and  a  popular  survey  in  Ukraine  showed  only  35%  of 
respondents  were  satisfied  with  their  lives,  as  opposed  to  65%  in  Belarus  and  51%  in 
Russia.
990 Consequently, Russians might well expect the Ukrainian economy to be linked 
even closer to that of Russia in future. 
 
Nation: Import duties 
However,  an  increasing  proportion  of  Ukrainians  doubted  that  cooperation  with  Russia 
benefitted their economy, and indeed they suspected that Russian actions had mainly been 
harmful toward Ukraine; a suspicion that had eventually led Zlenko to advocate a separate 
Ukrainian bid to enter the WTO. And in June, 2006, it seemed like wilful obstruction when 
the Duma banned imports of allegedly radioactive Ukrainian metal pipes: “...if the import of 
radioactive pipes is not prevented today, then within 10 years Ukraine will supply around [2 
million+ tonnes of radioactive products...” Unsurprisingly, no proof supported the flimsy, but 
damaging allegation,
991 which nevertheless served to mark Ukrainians as “unclean” in a line 
of reasoning that implicitly could be traced to the Chornobyl’ disaster, as well. Somewhat 
surprisingly, perhaps, the Russian political elite did not want Belarusians, either, to be too 
smug concerning their economic sovereignty. In December, 2006, the Russian authorities 
announced that import duties would be imposed on some Belarusian goods from February. 
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The chosen goods were central Belarusian exports, such as foodstuffs and electronics that 
Belarusians could not market outside Russia.
992 And unlike Iushchenko Belarusians could not 
expect  any  sympathy  from  the  liberal  Russian  opposition.  In  January,  2007,  Russian 
journalist Iuliia Latynina complained: “...Belarus wants a union with Russia in the same way 
as...a tapeworm wants a union with a stomach...that is exactly how the ideal union with 
Russia would be for [Lukashenko]. The fact that it is necessary to remove the tapeworm is 
unquestioned...it’s unhygienic to live with it.”
993 In return, in February, 2007, Belarusian 
opposition  leader  Aleksandr  Milinkevich  appealed  to  Lukashenko:  “...[the  trade  war 
conducted by Russian against Belarus] worries people tremendously. They fear a threat to 
their  living  standard...the  loss  of  independence  for  the  country...the  responsibility  for 
preventing this belongs to the elite of [Belarus], both the governing administration and the 
opposition.”
994 Thus, perceived Russian aggression was uniting defiant Belarusians under 
Lukashenko. 
 
Energy 
Law: Towards market prices 
Lukashenko  had  already  briefly  demonstrated  a  desire  to  promote  Belarusian  energy 
sovereignty after Putin’s presidential inauguration. Certainly, during Putin’s second term 
another bilateral agreement was struck in June, 2004. Russia was to sell natural gas for $47 
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per 1,000 cubic metres, while Belarus in return pledged to lower its transit tariff to $0.75. 
Although these provisions constituted de facto subsidisation of Belarus, market principles of 
reciprocity  were  formally  in  place.
995  The  leadership  of  Gazprom  in  February,  2005, 
subsequently insisted that gas sold to Belarus would in future be priced according to market 
terms,
996 irrespective of Belarusian concessions elsewhere. This was a popular refrain from 
the Russian state-owned company. In September, 2005,  Gazprom similarly demanded that 
Ukraine  begin  paying   rates  “corresponding  to  European  standards.”  A  representative 
explained that “When we began to raise this theme a few months back, this indicator was 
around $160*/1,000 cubic metres+, now it’s more like $180, but eventually the price can be 
both higher and lower than this figure.”
997 As I show below, the actions of Gazprom did not 
really follow this rhetoric, yet it did convince the Belarusian and Ukrainian governments to 
seek diverse deliverers of energy to reduce dependence on Russia. In December, 2006, 
“...the presidents of Belarus, Ukraine and Azerbaijan agreed to create a working group to 
study...the  transport  of  Caspian  energy  resources  to  the  European  market.”
998  Already, 
Iushchenko  had  ordered  his  government  to  reverse  the  flow  of  the  pipeline  running 
between Odesa and Brody, which had previously been used to transport oil from Russia. By 
doing so, the pipeline would be able to carry Caspian oil to Western Europe, circumventing 
Russia and thus partly liberating Ukraine from energy dependence on Russia.
999 The Russian 
executive did not directly oppose this plan. Indeed, in February, 2007, Putin was much more 
scathing about Ukrainian and Belarusian demands for energy subsidisation, stating that 
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Russia  “...is  not  obliged  to  subsidise  the  economy  of  other  countries....this  is  not  done 
anywhere  in the  world,  ‘so  why  is  it  demanded  of  Russia?’...support  for  the  Belarusian 
economy within the energy sphere alone was $5.8 billion in 2007, or 41% of the entire 
budget  of  Belarus.”
1000  Indeed,  throughout  the  Russian  polity  there  was  irritation  over 
Belarusian  demands  for  subsidies  and  at  times  even  an  earnest  wish  that  Belarus  and 
Ukraine  would  just  go  away.  An  exasperated  member  of  the  Russian  Duma,  whom  I 
interviewed  in  May,  2007,  put  it  like  this:  “Ok,  so  we  made  an  agreement  *on  energy 
deliveries and transit+ five years ago. But those five years passed” and now Russians would 
like to gain a little more from their own resources.
1001  
 
Power: Covering energy needs in an integrated transit network 
Such rhetorical defiance could not hide, though, that the Russian state seemed as prone 
under Putin as under El’tsin to subsidise the energy deliveries to Belarus and Ukraine. By 
2004, Ukraine depended on Russia for 46% of its energy consumption. However, if it was 
considered that Ukraine furthermore depended on Russian fuel cells and nuclear energy in 
order to use its own nuclear power plants, Ukrainian energy dependency relative to Russia 
was in the range of 70-75%.
1002 Belarus was less dependent on Russian energy transfers 
than Ukraine. Nevertheless, in early 2005, Russia still covered 30% of all Belarusian energy 
needs.
1003 At the same time, the management of Russian companies such as Gazprom knew 
that as long as the USA and other Western actors did not become involved in post -Soviet 
energy relations, Russian companies wou ld easily control their Belarusian and Ukrainian 
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counterparts. By late 2005, Gazprom alone was the ninth largest company in the world 
measured on revenue. Subsequently, after earning $100 billion extra, Gazprom became the 
second largest energy company, and fourth largest company overall by revenue in April, 
2006.
1004 The Russian company could use its strength to control not just Russian energy 
deliveries, but deliveries from Central Asia, too. In January, 2006, Gazprom purchased all 
Turkmen natural gas exports , much of which was re -sold to Ukraine. This development 
ensured that long-term contracts for Turkmen natural gas, which had previously been 
agreed between the Central Asian state and Ukraine, could not conceivably in future be 
used by Iushchenko’s administration to avoid Russian control.
1005 Putin believed this plan 
would work if only the USA was prevented from assisting Ukraine. In May, 2006,  he even 
disparaged the seeming hypocrisy of American foreign policy: “As the saying goes, ‘Comrade 
Wolf knows, whom to eat.’ To eat, and never to listen to. And, seemingly, is not preparing to 
listen to.”
1006 Yet even if Americans were not ready to listen to Russia, they could not ensure 
energy  deliveries  to  Ukraine  and  Belarus  in  any  foreseeable  future.  Belarus  was  slowly 
beginning to feel its dependency. From 2006, Russian control had forced Belarus to pay $47 
per 1,000 cubic metres of gas to Gazprom, as mentioned above. This was an increase on 
previous prices but still significantly lower than what Ukraine or any other state in central 
and Eastern Europe had to pay.
1007 Ukraine had a further problem, since Turkmen pipeline 
capacity was insufficient for existing contracts with Gazprom and Ukraine. By July, 2006, the 
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capacity was 45-50 bcm/year. Gazprom purchased 30 bcm/year while Ukraine ostensibly 
purchased  40  bcm/year  via  the  intermediary  company  RosUkrEnergo,  part-owned  by 
Gazprom. Russians thus ensured that the energy sector of Ukraine was dependent on layers 
of Russian control.
1008 The Ukrainian economy would not be able to a void dependence for 
the foreseeable future. In 2008, official Ukrainian studies showed that, despite the recent 
discovery of several  natural  gas fields, oil and  natural  gas condensate reserves  within 
Ukraine would be exhausted between 2025 and 2030, and na tural gas reserves overall by 
2032.
1009 This was not necessarily to the detriment o f Belarusian and Ukrainian economies 
since governments in these two states could use not just Russian credit, but also the 
substantial amount of Russian professionalism on offer. These advantages Gazprom put to 
good use in January, 2007, when the purchase of 50% of Beltransgaz was, once again, 
agreed, with the first $625 million for 12.5% of stocks to arrive four months later.
1010 Having 
demonstrated its willingness to integrate its energy infrastructure with that of Russia, the 
Belarusian government could then ask for a new credit of $1.5bn the following month, to 
offset the January price increase for Russian gas, and the introduction of a new Russian oil 
export tariff.
1011 At the same time, and despite the statements from Putin and the Russian 
Duma member mentioned above, subsidisation of Belarus  made sense for Russia since half 
of all oil exports and one-fifth of natural gas exports to the EU were now transported across 
Belarus.
1012 
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Nation: Stopping gas deliveries while exploiting Belarus? 
Nevertheless, despite the seemingly mutual benefit derived from energy subsidisation by 
Russia and Belarus, it had been clear since the beginning of Putin’s presidency that energy 
relations were increasingly a source of Russo-Belarusian discord. Gazprom had since 2003 
relentlessly raised energy prices for Belarus. Prices by mid-2004 were still only $47/mcm, 
relatively low in an international context, but had still risen by 235% in one and a half years, 
raising import costs to 3% of Belarusian GDP.
1013 The price rise was intimately linked with 
Lukashenko’s repeated reneging on promises to sell parts of Beltransgaz to Gazprom. In 
June,  2004,  he  even  talked  about  the  dangers that  such  a  development  would  pose  to 
Belarusian  national  security  and  complained  that  “...one  cannot  ‘haggle  about  national 
dignity’...”
1014 Such comments made it unlikely that the above-mentioned sale of 50% of 
Beltransgaz  to  Gazprom  three  years  later  would  proceed  smoothly.  The  Ukrainian 
government was equally unwilling to transfer ownership of energy infrastructure to Russia, 
having already experienced a substantial loss of control with the introduction of the opaque 
RosUkrEnergo.
1015 Indeed, whoever owned this company alongside Gazprom, they certainly 
seemed to favour Russia over Ukraine. In January, 2006, Gazprom suspended gas deliveries 
to and through Ukraine, demanding $230/1,000 cubic metres of gas, as opposed to the 
existing $50. Agreement was subsequently reached that RosUkrEnergo should pay Gazprom 
the new price, while Ukraine should only pay $95 to RosUkrEnergo. Still, this was a 
temporary solution
1016 and in May Iushchenko joined his colleagues in GUAM in declaring 
“the unacceptability of economic pressure and monopolisation of the energy market, and 
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underline the necessity of activating efforts in order to ensure energy security, including the 
diversification of directions for the transport of energy resources...”
1017 Such a statement 
was directed against Russia and the displeasure in Moscow was evident. However, it was 
only in March the following year that Gazprom halved deliveries to Ukraine due to alleged 
unpaid bills, in return for which infuriated Ukrainians threatened to cut off transit of natural 
gas to the EU, although this might jeopardise Western goodwill.
1018 The fact that it had 
taken the Russian administration so long to respond to Iushchenko was not due to any 
increased acceptance of Iushchenko, but to the fact that Russian attention had been taken 
by Belarus. Lukashenko’s regime, previously so pampered by Russia, had now in many ways 
become its enemy in the energy question, despite the previously mentioned formal pledges 
to cooperate. As already stated, disputes often centred on Lukashenko’s unwillingness to 
sell half of Beltransgaz to Russia. Although this was, again, agreed in April, 2006, in return 
for energy subsidisation,
1019 Russian economic and political elites did not trust Lukashenko 
anymore and continued to put pressure on him. By June, Gazprom even suggested Belarus 
could buy natural gas at $200/1,000  bcm, almost five times existing prices.
1020 And even 
more contentiously, in January, 2007,  the Russian state-owned  oil  company Transneft’ 
stopped deliveries to and through Belarus, claiming that Belarus had illegally tapped oil to 
the value of $45 /100 bcm. This tapping had been imposed from Minsk as an increased 
transit duty dating back to the beginning of the year.
1021 A Belarusian delegation now went 
to Moscow to seek him for a compromise, but was simply told “..that there was nothing to 
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discuss...” until Belarusians accommodated Russian wishes.
1022 This demonstrated contempt 
for  the  Belarusian  leadership  unthinkable  in  earlier  years.  Lukashenko  complained  of 
greedy, ungrateful Russians: “During the Second World War we lost almost one third of our 
population...I cannot allow anyone to forget this...We don’t have the resources of other 
states.  And  these  resources  cannot  be  instruments  to  blackmail  our  people.”
1023  Such 
rhetoric showed that the promised sale of half of Beltransgaz by 2010 indicated not so much 
a resolution of Russo-Belarusian energy disputes, as another, future reason for strife. For 
now, agreement was soon reached. But Putin noticed “...that Poland is buying gas from 
Russia at $270/1,000 cubic metres for 2007. ‘This means that the price for Belarus...should 
be around $260. Russia agreed with those, who would sell gas to Belarus for $100/1,000 
cubic metres...”
1024 Russia would thus be justified in squeezing spoiled Belarus again. And, 
indeed, after the Belarusian regime during the first months of 2007 continued to threaten to 
cut off Russian energy deliveries unless more Russian economic assistance was forthcoming, 
a civil servant I spoke to in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was ready to dismiss 
Belarusian behaviour as nothing but “blackmail.”
1025  
 
Economic actors of the Russian Federation in Belarus and Ukraine 
Law: Diversification 
Already,  Ianukovych  had  a  record  of  being  less  than  welcoming  towards  Russian 
investments in Ukraine. Russian business had noted this, and statistics showed that during 
the decade to 2005 the share of Russian exports going to Ukraine declined from 11% to 5%. 
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Although this development was undoubtedly also influenced by increased Russian economic 
activity in the West, China and elsewhere, the decline to Belarus during this period was 
minimal, from 5% to 4%,
1026 indicating that Russian investors  were uninterested in these 
markets. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Tarasiuk was not worried, though, and by January, 
2005, seemed more interested in legalising the ac tivities of remaining Russian companies 
dealing with Ukraine, or, indeed, with Moldova through Ukraine: “For Ukraine Transnistria is 
a black hole in Europe...I’m convinced that the existence of this and *similar+ regimes...is 
also unfavourable for Russia.”
1027 By stating this, Tarasiuk expected that Russian companies 
would come to support the legalisation of their foreign activities, although this hope was 
shared by few in Ukraine or in Russia. 
 
Power: Ukraine in the Single Economic Space 
Russian investors were uninterested in laws governing their activity in Belarus and Ukraine, 
at least not until control over crucial sectors of the economy in these states had been 
secured. Achieving such control had been the overt aim during Putin’s first presidential 
term, too. The SES might be of assistance. In September, 2003, Putin thus explained the 
purpose of the organisation: “...to lower the infrastructural burden on production, transport 
and sale of goods...to increase the competitiveness of our goods on the world market.” It 
was a triumph for Russian exports when the Ukrainian parliament finally ratified the treaty 
in April, 2004.
1028 The Ukrainian economy might also benefit. Despite the overall decade -
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long decline in Russian investments that I mentioned above, 2004 alone saw a year-on-year 
increase  in  Russo-Ukrainian  trade  of  40%,  reaching  $16  billion  overall.
1029  Furthermore, 
although Russian companies might have found markets elsewhere, the share of Russian 
imports in the Ukrainian economy still constituted 42% by 2004, 9 % more than the share 
claimed by EU imports.
1030 Correspondingly, ordinary Ukrainians mostly believed that future 
investments in their economy would come from Russia rather than the EU. This was 
indicated in 2004 and 2006 through opinion polls that showed a majority of respondents in 
Ukraine preferred some sort of union with Russia and Belarus to membership in the EU.
1031 
Russian investors might not all be that enthusiastic about increased economic integration, 
but some types of business used Belarus and Ukraine  well. Notably, by 2005, Russian arms 
exports to unsavoury states such as Iran and North Korea went through neighbouring post -
Soviet states, as Russian companies did not want to be directly connected to these pariah 
states, but still craved lucrative export s.
1032 Such shenanigans would be easier if Russian 
companies controlled facilities abroad. And b y December, 2006, Rosoboroneksport, the 
Russian state intermediary agency for exports and imports of defence-related and dual-use 
products,  technologies  and  servic es,  indicated  its  ambitions  of  acquiring  control  over 
titanium producers in Ukraine ,
1033 a useful front for arms exports as well as a lucrative 
business in its own right.  
 
Nation: Fall in imports 
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However,  Ukrainians  and  Belarusians  were  increasingly  resisting  Russian  investments  in 
their  states.  This  was  not  least  because  Ukrainian  and  Belarusian  businesspeople  were 
themselves becoming increasingly competitive and willing to succeed in competition with 
Russians through means both fair and foul. In June, 2004, Russian companies Severstal’ and 
EvrazHolding wanted to bid for Ukrainian steel producer Kryvorizhstal’. However, bidding 
rules stated that bidders had to have introduced not less than 1 million tonnes of coke on 
the  Ukrainian  market.  This  condition  was,  unsurprisingly,  not  met  by  a  single  foreign 
candidate  since  all  coke-plants  in  Ukraine  remained  state-controlled.
1034  Such  overt 
discrimination  could  not  be  carried  out  indefinitely,  but  another  threat  to  Russian 
investments was being introduced through EU investments, which were increasingly visible 
in Ukraine and Belarus. By 2005, as Belarusian imports of Russian goods were again falling 
by 12% year-on-year, EU products that Russians could seldom compete with were filling out 
the gap.
1035 Russian companies were furthermore hampered by the poor reputation they 
had gained in Belarus and Ukraine, as harsh, highly criminalised, and representing the 
economy of a colonialising state bent on exploiting the Belarusian economy,
1036  which, 
therefore, had to be defended. Predictably, Lukashenko had become particularly interested 
in warding his state against Russian media companies, which might challenge him politically. 
Above, I highlighted how Lukashenko shut down the operations of NTV in Belarus, and in 
July, 2005, he also forced through various agreements involving the Russian channel TVTs 
and  elements  of  local  television.  The  agreements  ensured  joint  broadcasting,  which 
effectively meant the right of Belarusian broadcasters to close unwanted programme; 
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something that had  previously  happened  with ORT  and  RTR,  despite their popularity  in 
Belarus.
1037  Maybe media companies were a special business, but by December, 2006, 
political  analyst  Andrei  Suzdal’tsev  truthfully  complained:  “Over  two  decades  economic 
integration between Russia and Belarus has not resulted in a single solid Russo-Belarusian 
venture...business conditions in Belarus are complicated. The government of the country 
makes  active  use  of  the  ‘golden  share’  including  possibilities  of  unlimited 
nationalisation.”
1038 Ukrainians were also seen by Russians as harassing not only Russian 
companies in Ukraine, but also further abroad. New customs laws between Ukraine and 
Moldova  in  March,  2006,  thus  required  all  exports  from  Transnistria  to  clear  Moldova 
customs  before  they  left  the  state,  thereby  preventing  Russians  from  profiting  on 
smuggling.
1039  That  the  Ukrainians might be entitled to introduce such laws was hardly 
mentioned in Russia. 
 
Conclusion 
Between  2004  and  2008,  the  paradigm  of  Power  continued  to  dominate  Russian 
perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian economic sovereignty. Both the Belarusian and the 
Ukrainian economies continued to receive substantial Russian subsidies, while any aid from 
the  EU  was  difficult  to  come  by.  Economic  realities  favoured  Russian  dominance,  since 
Russian GDP was many times larger than that of its neighbours, and could cover at least 30% 
of the Belarusian GDP. As in military affairs, members of the Russian executive sought to 
move cooperation from the CIS to control neighbouring economies even more. In energy 
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relations Russia also continued to be the far most important provider to both Belarus and 
Ukraine. Ukraine depended on Russia for three-quarters of its energy, a decade and a half 
after the Soviet collapse. Putin complained that the West should stay out of regional energy 
relations, yet since Gazprom was growing to a significant international size, Putin had little 
need to fear loss of Russian control. Finally, Russian investments in Belarus and Ukraine 
were much facilitated by the SES, and members of the Russian executive often reminded 
Belarusians  and  Ukrainians  of  the  boons  that  Russian  companies  could  bring.  Certainly, 
almost  half  of  investments  in  Ukraine  came  from  Russia,  while  Belarus  was  profiting 
significantly from Russian arms transits across its territory. 
 
The paradigm of Nation also significantly influenced Russian perceptions of Belarusian and 
Ukrainian  economic  sovereignty,  however.  Russian  authorities  introduced  new  import 
duties on Belarusian goods, aware that Lukashenko’s regime would have nowhere else to 
sell  them.  Since  Lukashenko  and  Belarusians  more  generally  were  also  harshly  even 
slanderously denounced in Russia, Belarusians from all political sides joined in opposition to 
Russia. Ukrainians were also angry by Russian allegations that radioactively contaminated 
goods  were  being  sold  to  Russians,  a  painful  reminder  of  Chornobyl’.  In  energy  issues, 
Russian authorities lambasted Belarusians for refusing to sell Beltransgaz, while Ukrainians 
were accused on reneging on their debts and stealing gas. The Russian reaction included 
more frequent reductions and terminations of energy deliveries to and through Belarus and 
Ukraine than previously seen. Russian investments in Belarus and Ukraine were increasingly 
obstructed. In Belarus, Russian media companies were harassed by Lukashenko, who feared 
his control over the state might be endangered. In Ukraine, it was more often local oligarchs 318 
 
who rigged the sale of companies against Russian competitors, leading the latter to consider 
how Ukrainian economic actors might be undermined. 
 
The paradigm of Law had by now become insignificant. Belarusian and Ukrainian companies 
attracted some FDI, but this was often Russian. Energy prices moved towards market levels, 
but only when it suited the Russian government. And diversification of Russian investment 
did not change the powerful influence of Russian companies in Belarus and Ukraine. 
 
Strengthening cultural sovereignty 
History 
Law: Recognising historical injustice 
New  official  Ukrainian  interpretations  of  history  remained  scarce.  If  anything,  this 
impression was reinforced from 2004 onwards. In October, 2004, Kuchma did use the 60-
year anniversary of the liberation of Ukraine from Nazi Germany to appeal for conciliation 
between  Red  Army  veterans  and  former  nationalist  partisans,  who  had  fought  for  a 
sovereign Ukraine: “The President stressed that Ukraine will always count all those who 
fought for its freedom during the war as its children...”
1040 Yet Kuchma was not attempting 
to distance Ukraine from its Soviet past, but rather to show this past as inclusive of all 
Ukrainians. Ostensibly, Putin was bolder in April, 2005, declaring that: “*During the 1990s+ 
Russia was faced with the task of...[choosing] a new vector for its historical development. It 
was necessary to decide how...to become a free society of free people. First of all, Russia 
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was, is, and will continue to be one of the largest European nations.”
1041 Yet, crucially, he 
was not talking about a break with the Soviet and Imperial past; he was talking about its 
continuation in a new world. This view was by now widely shared in Russian society. The 
strongest  criticism  of  the  Soviet  past  one  might  expect  appeared  through  piecemeal 
denunciations of specific events. For instance, opinion polls from 2005 and 2006 showed 
47% of university students and teachers in Russia identified “...persons living in West Bank 
Ukraine and western Belarus” among victims of Soviet repression, 27% identified them as 
having  been  victims  of  Soviet  terror,  while  26%  argued  that  they  had  been  victims  of 
both.
1042 Such repression and terror, though, was viewed as having affected Russians, too, 
and as having been instigated by individual  villains, most notably Stalin, not the Soviet 
system as such. In Belarus, the official interpr etation of history remained similar, even 
though the authorities in March, 2007, for the first time recognised the anniversary of the 
short-lived Belarusian state that had existed in 1918, following the lead of the Belarusian 
opposition that had been celebrating the anniversary for years.
1043 However, Lukashenko’s 
regime still argued that this Belarusian state had subsequently integrated voluntarily in the 
Soviet Union, and no signs appeared that the President would change this opinion in future. 
 
Power: Geopolitical catastrophe 
Public opinion in Russia had seen the Soviet collapse as a misfortune during the early 2000s. 
This opinion did not change over the following years in Russia, nor, tellingly, in Iushchenko’s 
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Ukraine.  Between  2000  and  2007  opinion  polls  repeatedly  asked  whether  the  Soviet 
collapse was a disaster. Whereas the proportion agreeing with this  had fallen following 
Iushchenko’s inauguration as presidency, his increasingly disappointing tenure witnessed an 
increasingly significant proportion of the populace regret the Soviet demise once more.
1044 
Interestingly, this nostalgia was stoked by parts of Iushchenko’s administration. Despite an 
avowedly Westernised ideology in the government, the Ministry of Culture thus continued 
to  instruct  history  teachers  to  refer  to  the  Second  World  War  as  the  Great  Fatherland 
War.
1045 In Belarus, Soviet nostalgia was even more pronounced. The official image of the 
Soviet past was still propagated as an economic utopia for the BSSR, which had allegedly 
been transformed from  a backward agricultural republic into an industrially advanced, 
thriving one. Belarusian official media furthermore appropriated any Western scholarship 
that concurred.
1046 Putin, too, retained an imperial and Soviet perspective on past events; a 
perspective he showed little inclination to give up. In April, 2005, he displayed this most 
forcefully when he stated to the Federal Assembly: “Above all, we must acknowledge that 
the collapse of the Soviet Union was the largest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.”
1047 
Russians living in Ukraine were gradually roused by Putin’s rhetoric. By 2005, only 6% of 
Ukrainians in Ukraine counted themselves as “citizens of the Soviet Union.” However, 18% 
of Russians placed themselves within this category.
1048 Predictably, respondents perceiving 
themselves as “citizens of the Soviet Union” were less likely than “citizens of Ukraine” to 
                                                           
1044 White and McAllister, p. 19 
1045 Serbyn, pp. 109, 110 
1046 Such as G. Ioffe, “Ponimanie Belarusi,” Belaruskaia dumka, 6, 2004, pp. 140-48 
1047 Putin, Poslanie (25.4.2005) 
1048 L. Aza, “Diferentsiiuiuchii proiav etnichnosti” in V. Vorona and M. Shul’ha, eds., Ukrains’ke supil’stvo, 
1994-2005, Kyiv: NAN, 2005, p. 341 321 
 
view  Ukraine  as  their  homeland.
1049  Similar  developments  in  Belarus  might  erode 
Lukashenko’s  authority,  yet  he  mostly  chose  the  Russian-linked  past  over  other  foreign 
alternatives. In February, 2007, construction began on a memorial church for Suvorov in 
Brest, thus imposing a central figure unifying Russia and Belarus on a traditionally Polonised 
part  of  Belarus.  Lukashenko  hereby  chose  sides  in  the  above-mentioned  spat  between 
Russian  and  some  Belarusian  historians  concerning  Suvorov’s  role  as  liberator  or 
occupier.
1050  
 
Nation: Anti-Russian campaign 
Still, Lukashenko had in recent years showed an increasing tendency to co-opt the rhetoric 
of  his  opposition  if  he felt this  might  benefit his  popularity  in  Belarus.  As  before,  such 
rhetoric was often directed against Russia and it was increasingly inspired by a combative 
Belarusian diaspora. In 2005 the Belarusian émigré scholar Zianon Paz’niak even equated 
mediaeval Belarus with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Thus, he established the historical 
origins of the state as included in an international actor that had been  opposing Russia 
directly and had been defending Europe against its eastern neighbour.
1051 Ukrainians did not 
have to go this far back to attack Russia. During 2005 Iushchenko repeatedly pushed for a 
Russian apology for the alleged genocide of the artificially provoked famine in the 1930s 
UkSSR. Russian ambassador Chernomyrdin, however, made clear that   no such apology 
would be forthcoming: “If we’re talking about terror in the USSR, then this caused the death 
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of  many  more  Russians,  than  Ukrainians.”
1052  But  this  did  not  prevent  Ukrainian 
parliamentarians in November, 2006, from repeating the allegation of genocide conducted 
against Ukrainians, based on the UN definition of the term, as an attempt to eliminate all or 
part of a population or nationality group. The motion was passed by 233 votes to 1, with 
216 deputies abstaining.
1053 
 
Language 
Law: Supporting national languages 
Hitherto, Russian language had dominated in Ukrainian public life into the 2000s. Under 
Iushchenko, laws were introduced to correct this, albeit with little effect. In January, 2006, 
the parliament changed the television law, stating that 75% of broadcasting had to be in 
Ukrainian, at the same time as around 30% of foreign-language films allegedly had Ukrainian 
dubbing or subtitles.
1054 Knowing that such developments hardly threatened the supremacy 
of  Russian  language,  in  December,  2006,  Putin   promised  Iushchenko  “to  assist  the 
aspirations of people to preserve their national culture and language.”
1055 This was an easy 
promise to make for Putin, since his assistance to the Russian language was hardly needed 
for its continued dominance. Similarly, any spreading of the Belarusian language was very 
local in nature. For example, in March, 2007, a local branch of the Belarusian Language 
Society persuaded transport officials in the town of Baranovichi to switch recorded next-
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stop announcements on local buses from Russian to Belarusian,
1056 hardly a major blow to 
Russian-speakers in the town, let alone in the state as a whole. 
 
Power: Disseminating Russian-language products 
At the same time, although Putin might have told Iushchenko otherwise, official Russian 
policy  still  sought  the  strengthening  of  the  Russian  language  in  neighbouring  states,  as 
outlined  in  the  National  Security  Concept  from  2000.  Before  the  Ukrainian  presidential 
election in late 2004, Ianukovych thus went to Moscow for discussions with Russian Prime 
Minister  Mikhail  Fradkov.  The  outcome  was  that  Ianukovych  would  make  Russian  the 
second official language in Ukraine if he became President.
1057 Even though Ianukovych did 
not  achieve  this,  the  position  of  the  Russian  government  had  been  made  clear . 
Subsequently, suggestions from Russian political commentators supported such a position. 
In May, 2005, Vladimir Frolov wanted the Russian authorities to broaden their definition of 
post-Soviet humanitarian cooperation. Beyond the issue of preserving basic rights to life and 
liberty for the Russian diaspora, Frolov wanted to include issues of education, Russian 
language and media.
1058 This duly happened at the end of the year, when the government 
pledged  to:  “...strengthen  the  statehood,  national  security  and  prestige  of  [Russia]...the 
development  of...integration  within  the  [CIS,  by  approving]  the  presented  federal 
programme on ‘Russian language (2006-2010)’...” Here, 800 million roubles should produce 
and disseminate Russian-language printed and audio-visual products in other post-Soviet 
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states.
1059 Admittedly, this still seemed unnecessary in Belarus, where Russian remained the 
language of choice for most people and in public debate.  In August, 2005, a Belarusian 
sociologist thus recorded the frequency with which major Belarusian- and Russian-language 
websites from Belarus were being used. His study  revealed that almost seven times more 
visitors  appeared  on  the  Russian -language  websites.
1060  As  for  Ukraine,  Ianukovych’s 
electoral defeat did not imply that significant political parties were not prepared to continue 
the  argument  for  introducing  Russian  as  a  second  official  language.  In  July,  2006,  the 
Socialist Party of Ukraine officially advocated this, and joined forces with Ianukovych’s Party 
of  Regions  to  regain  control  of  the  state.  Indeed,  after  Ianukovych  had  become  Prime 
Minister  again,  by  September  the  parties  together  defended  the  Russian  language  on 
Crimea.
1061 
 
Nation: Annihilation of Belarusian 
That the Russian language still had to be defended, however, illustrated that the potential 
for division in Ukraine along linguistic lines remained. Furthermore, they were spreading to 
Belarus.  In  August,  2005,  the  decision  of  the  German  broadcaster  Deutsche  Welle  to 
transmit  in  Russian  to  Belarus  was  called  “shameful”  by  the  leader  of  the  Belarusian 
National  Front,  Vinchuk  Viachorka,  who  denounced  “...*Western+  bureaucrats,  who 
completely  supported  the  politics  of  annihilating  the  Belarusian  language...”
1062  The 
disappointment that Western help for the Belarusian language was not forthcoming was 
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palpable. Linguistic divisions in Ukraine were becoming much more severe, though, as a 
survey from 2006 showed. Whereas 51% reported that Ukrainian was the language of their 
home environment, almost as many, 46%, stated that it was Russian. Furthermore, 76% of 
inhabitants in eastern regions spoke Russian, while 91% in the West spoke Ukrainian.
1063 
After Ianukovych became Prime Minister in 2006, legally proscribed  Ukrainianisation of 
television and movies was only enforced by Ukrainian i nterest groups.  A group of 200 
activists authored a Memorandum insisting on the dubbing into Ukrainian of all foreign 
movies, even Russian ones. 90% of Ukrainian film distributors were convinced or coerced 
into signing the document,
1064 which left Russian-speakers fearing that  some Ukrainians 
were prepared to ostracise their language from the state.  
 
Religion 
Law: Belarus between churches 
So far, atheism, often bred by indifference, had remained the most significant safeguard 
against religious conflict in Belarus during the early 2000s. Attempts to actively place the 
state between religious denominations on a wholly sovereign footing were subsequently 
limited to isolated groups in Minsk. An example of this remained the theatre production 
Tuteishiia, performed by the prominent Ianka Kupala Theatre. The production had been 
running almost continuously since 1990 and through the main character of Mikita openly 
advocated Belarusian religious sovereignty.
1065 But this was not an argument listened to by 
the vast majority of inhabitants in Belarus. Inhabitants of Ukra ine seemed a bit more 
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receptive.  In  a  popular survey  conducted during  2006,  as  many  as  40%  of  respondents 
defined themselves as Ukrainian Orthodox, as opposed to only 26% who answered that they 
were  Russian  Orthodox.
1066  Still, these Ukrainians were still Orthodox, being unable or 
unwilling to espouse a wholly Ukrainian religion. 
 
Power: Orthodox support for Ianukovych 
Previously, though, keeping Ukrainians attached to some sort of Orthodoxy had not been 
good enough for the Russian Orthodox Church, the leaders of which wanted to keep control. 
During the Ukrainian presidential election in late 2004 the Church even openly supported 
Ianukovych’s pro-Russian, regime-supported campaign.
1067 In Belarus, too, Lukashenko used 
Orthodoxy  to  support  his  regime,  in  September,  2004:  “Yes,  we  were,  remain  and  will 
continue  to  be  an  inalienable  part  of  the  pan-European  civilisation...But  Belarus  and 
Belarusians are not native to the Catholic, Protestant western civilisation, but primarily to 
the Orthodox one, in which we have lived together with Russians for centuries.”
1068 Most 
Russian elites wholeheartedly agreed. 
 
Nation: Provoking schism 
Yet, Russians also increasingly used religion to provoke splits within the Belarusian and, 
particularly,  Ukrainian  polities.  In  June,  2004,  a  report  by  Russian  political  campaign 
coordinator Marat Gel’man advocated provoking conflict between the Russian Orthodox 
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Church and the Uniate Church. Following privatisation of the eleventh-century St Antonia 
Caves in Chernihiv by the Orthodox Church, Iushchenko would end in an untenable position 
between the two parties.
1069 This was a risky strategy for the Uniate Church was on the 
march, threatening Orthodox dominance. It was moving beyond the western regions of  
Galicia and Transcarpathia and now commanded parishes in Donbas and Crimea, while 
Uniate Cardinal Liubomir Guzar sought support from the Pope to found a Greek Catholic 
patriarchate centred on Kyiv.
1070 Similar developments were not really possible in Belarus , 
where no national church existed, yet instead Russians were left to fear gradual Belarusian 
conversion  to  the  cause  of  Catholic  Poland:  “...Warsaw  tried  to  convert  the  Poles  in 
Belarus...[allegedly] everything for...the Poles, was the same as for the Belarusians...even 
the Catholic Easter was *claimed to be+ the same holiday as the Orthodox one.”
1071 An 
increasing proportion of Russians seemed willing to believe that Belarusians and Ukrainians 
were allowing Western religious forces onto sacred Russian soil. 
 
Conclusion 
Between  2004  and  2008,  the  paradigm  of  Power  continued  to  dominate  Russian 
perceptions  of  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  cultural  sovereignty.  In  issues  concerning 
perceptions  of  history,  Putin  now  denounced  the  Soviet  collapse  as  a  geopolitical 
catastrophe, in terms stronger than El’tsin had ever used. In Ukraine, public opinion was 
increasingly nostalgic in relation to the Soviet period, particularly as the hopes engendered 
by Iushchenko’s presidential election faded. Lukashenko had always praised Soviet history, 
and now Imperial times were praised, too. Concerning linguistic issues, an official Russian 
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government  project  advocated  disseminating  Russian-language  materials  in  Belarus  and 
Ukraine, even though the position of the Russian language there remained strong. Already 
the Russian Prime Minister had convinced Ukrainian presidential candidate Ianukovych to 
campaign on a promise to have Russian made an official language in Ukraine. The fact that 
Ianukovych lost the election did not convince the Russian government to abandon this goal; 
the above-mentioned government project was an example of this. Finally, in religious issues 
the Russian Orthodox Church openly and consistently supported Ianukovych’s presidential 
candidacy.  The  fact  that  this  was  unsuccessful  did  not  convince  the  Patriarch  or  his 
representatives  in  Ukraine  that  Iushchenko  should  be  supported,  nor,  indeed,  that  the 
Church should in future stay away from Ukrainian politics. The leadership of the Church 
might even soon become interested in taking a similar interest in actively supporting the 
Belarusian leadership, since even the unpredictable Lukashenko was now declaring his state 
to be predominantly Orthodox. 
 
The paradigm of Nation also significantly influenced Russian perceptions of Belarusian and 
Ukrainian cultural sovereignty, however. Concerning perceptions of history Russo-Ukrainian 
relations  were  severely  damaged  by  disputes  over  the  Holodomor.  While  Ukrainians 
denounced this event as genocide perpetrated against their nation by the Soviet Union, and 
thus by Russia, which had become the successor state to the Union, Chernomyrdin curtly 
informed that no Russian apology would be forthcoming. In linguistic issues the Belarusian 
opposition was more worried about annihilation of their language than ever before, and 
something might be said for this. Not only was Russian dominant in Belarus, and forced 
through  by  the  Russian  government,  too,  but  Western  organisations  now  assisted  the 
Russian cause. Finally, in religious issues Russian spin-doctors were allegedly attempting to 329 
 
undermine the Iushchenko presidency by forcing him to take sides and thus exacerbate the 
religious differences in Ukraine. This was unsuccessful, yet such differences seemed certain 
to increase in the near future as the Uniate Church was becoming a serious competitor to 
the Russian Orthodox Church, even in central Ukraine and Kyiv. 
 
The paradigm of Law had by now become insignificant. Putin did acknowledge the need for 
a new start for Russia, but not for a break with the past. Belarus and Ukraine introduced 
laws  supporting  titular  languages,  but  with  little  effect.  Finally,  a  few  groups  suggested 
Belarus might exist between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, but few took any notice. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion: Revanchist Russia 
In this thesis I have argued that between 1990 and 2008 Russian perceptions of Belarusian 
and  Ukrainian  sovereignty  primarily  remained  within  the  paradigm  of  Power;  that  a 
decreasing proportion of Russian perceptions existed within the paradigm of Law; and that 
an increasing proportion existed within the paradigm of Nation. Eventually, the paradigm of 
Nation was almost, if not quite, as influential as the paradigm of Power. In this conclusion, I 
shall  summarise how  this  development  took  place.  Finally,  although this  was  never  the 
primary purpose of my thesis, I shall summarise why the relative influence of the paradigms 
changed as it did during the four chronological periods that my thesis covers. 
 
Political sovereignty 
Between  1990  and  1993,  the  paradigm  of  Power  dominated  Russian  perceptions  of 
Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  political  sovereignty.  Despite  the  Soviet  collapse  historical 
territorial delimitations persisted, Russia and Belarus agreed on joint border protection, 
El’tsin advocated the gathering of Russian lands, while Kozyrev predicted the rapid return of 
Belarus and Ukraine to Russia. Saturating such rhetoric was a multi-national ideology that 
viewed Moscow as a regional centre, just as it had historically been. At the same time, 
though, the paradigm of Law was visible, too. Borders between Russia, Belarus and Ukraine 
might not have changed in form in 1992, but they certainly changed in substance. Within 
the Soviet Union, such borders had been purely administrative in nature, their function 
simply to facilitate Soviet control in the republics. After the Union collapsed, and despite the 
misgivings of most Russians, the borders were suddenly subject to international law. Now, 
the borders were meant to divide Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, instead of uniting them. To 331 
 
their credit, Russians mostly accepted the new reality and seldom advocated changing post-
Soviet conditions through violent means. Indeed, whereas the RSFSR-UkSSR treaty already 
in 1990 had provided notable territorial guarantees between the two republics, a guarantee 
that was repeated under post-Soviet conditions, belligerent Russian threats to Belarusian 
and Ukrainian political sovereignty generally came from insignificant political actors. The 
fate  of  Crimea  and  its  mainly  Russian  inhabitants  might  have  been  expected  to  ignite 
Russian resentment, but this hardly happened, not least since El’tsin resisted this personally 
and with assistance from the UN. 
 
Between  1993  and  1999,  the  paradigm  of  Power  continued  to  dominate  Russian 
perceptions. Most notably, a Community Treaty, a Charter of a Union State, and a Union 
State agreement were struck to facilitate renewed integration between Russia and Belarus; 
integration that aimed to help them regain great power status. El’tsin strongly promoted 
this process and even advocated a referendum on complete Russo-Belarusian integration. 
For  many  Russians  integration  retained  an  air  of  inevitability.  Thus,  Lebed’  expected 
neighbouring states to hand over their territories, while Primakov mentioned a specific road 
to integration with Belarus as well as Ukraine, a view also evident in the Strategic Concept 
for the CIS. The paradigm of Law remained important, too, yet less so than it had previously 
been.  Whereas  the  early  1990s  had  witnessed  overt  Russian  support  for  democratic 
governance, such support later waned, especially in the case of Belarus. Renewed territorial 
guarantees were provided in the Russo-Ukrainian Friendship Treaty, yet both El’tsin and 
Igor’ Ivanov indicated that these guarantees were no longer an end in themselves, but a 
means  to  facilitate  cooperation  on  other  issues.  Conversely,  although  the  paradigm  of 
Nation remained relatively less significant than the other paradigms, a number of potential 332 
 
disputes remained. For a long time, the parliaments of Russia and Ukraine refused to ratify 
agreements on land borders between their states, while a similar agreement on sea borders 
was far from achieved. Furthermore, the fortunes of some members of the Russian political 
opposition, such as Zhirinovskii, had increased partially through criticism of Belarusian and 
Ukrainian sovereignty. 
 
Between  2000  and  2004,  the  paradigm  of  Power  continued  to  dominate  Russian 
perceptions. Putin ensured that Russia-Belarus integration continued to be prioritised, and 
the two states even agreed a Constitutional Act for their future unified state. Putin wanted 
to promote integration under Russian leadership, possibly with Belarus being incorporated 
directly in the Russian Federation. The President and the Russian government were certainly 
interested in Ukrainian participation, as well, in such a project. At the same time, whereas 
El’tsin  had  consistently  advocated  a  Russian  identity  that  identified  with  the  Russian 
Federation,  Putin  was  much  more  interested  in  identifying  present-day  Russia  with 
historical,  multi-national  entities  such  as  the  Russian  Empire  and,  especially,  the  Soviet 
Union. Yet at the same time, the paradigm of Nation was becoming increasingly noticeable. 
Although Putin preferred voluntary Russo-Belarusian integration, he rudely dismissed those 
Belarusian concerns that began to appear.  Between Russia and Ukraine, Tuzla proved a 
much  more  dangerous  experience.  Never  had  Russia  so  crudely  challenged  Ukrainian 
political sovereignty. And the challenge had been tacitly supported if not initiated by the 
Russian  government.  Conversely,  the  paradigm  of  Law  had  gradually  become  the  least 
significant of all paradigms. Although the last parts of the Russo-Ukrainian land borders 
were  finally  demarcated,  the  dispute  over  Tuzla  made  any  formal  agreement  seem 
irrelevant. The Russian government and Putin might intermittently have complained of lack 333 
 
of democracy in Belarus, yet Lukashenko was only criticised when he did not act according 
to Russian wishes. And although Russian support for Belarusian and Ukrainian sovereign 
ideologies remained, it was seldom if ever found within the executive. 
 
Finally,  between  2004  and  2008  the  paradigm  of  Power  again  dominated  Russian 
perceptions. Putin still promoted Russo-Belarusian integration as far as possible, allowing 
the Union budget to substantially increase. It was clear from statements and opinion polls 
taken among other members of the Russian political elite that  the President had broad 
backing for such policies. Russians were also convinced that interference in Belarusian and 
Ukrainian politics was justified. Never was this been clearer than during the 2004 Ukrainian 
Presidential election, which was widely understood among Russians as an event that they, 
but not the West, had a right to influence. Yet by now the paradigm of Nation had also 
become  highly  significant.  Whereas  Russians  mostly  blamed  Western  interference  for 
Iushchenko’s presidential election, Ukrainians, too, were accused of stealing the state from 
Russia and Russians. Later, Putin openly threatened Ukraine with territorial revanchism, 
while even Belarusians suffered felt threatened by Putin’s threat to incorporate their state 
as a mere republic in the Russian Federation. In contrast, the paradigm of Law had by now 
lost almost all of its importance. Declarations from Putin and others that territorial disputes 
ought  to  be  solved  through  international  law  did  not  seem  to  be  mirrored  in  practice. 
Iushchenko’s electoral victory might have been acknowledged in Russia, but it was never 
accepted. And although Putin did at one point accept that Ukraine could join the EU, the 
President only did so because he knew the EU would not accept Ukraine, whereas the 
Russian state ideology Putin was constructing still saw Ukraine as an integral part. 
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Military sovereignty 
Between  1990  and  1993,  the  paradigm  of  Power  dominated  Russian  perceptions  of 
Belarusian and Ukrainian military sovereignty. Until 1992, military forces in the BSSR and 
UkSSR were integrated in all-Union forces. Afterwards, CIS-agreements stipulated similar 
integration for so-called “strategic forces” in Belarus and Ukraine. Integration should rival 
NATO-forces:  provisions  in  the  Collective  Security  Treaty,  signed  by  Russia  and  Belarus, 
directly  mirrored  NATO-provisions  on  collective  defence  against  outside  enemies. 
Furthermore, Russians wanted to retain military bases abroad and sought permission within 
the CIS and from the UN to deploy troops abroad, including in Belarus and Ukraine. The 
paradigm of Law was not insignificant, though. Belarus and Ukraine were allowed to retain 
substantial military contingents, and attempts by Ukraine to keep troops out of multilateral 
cooperation were tolerated in Russia. Similarly, Russians might not have appreciated the 
establishment of neutral Belarus and Ukraine between Russia and NATO, yet Russians never 
berated  their  neighbours  for  this.  Finally,  El’tsin  accepted  in  early  CIS-agreements  that 
Russia should allow Belarus and Ukraine joint command over any Russian strategic forces 
stationed on their territory. In contrast, the paradigm of Nation was insignificant. El’tsin 
might have claimed the Black Sea Fleet returned from Ukraine, but he only did so to co-opt 
and sideline his parliament, proving unwilling to force the matter. Belarusian and Ukrainian 
cooperation  with  NATO  against  Russia  was  simply  not  envisaged  in  Moscow,  where 
Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  suggestions  for  a  new  European  security  regime  were  widely 
ignored. Finally, while the Russian executive did want to retain military presence in Belarus 
and Ukraine, all indications were that this should be accomplished through negotiation, not 
by fiat or threats. 335 
 
 
Between  1993  and  1999,  the  paradigm  of  Power  continued  to  dominate  Russian 
perceptions.  Russian  subsidisation  of  Belarusian  forces  constituted  a  central  part  of  all 
agreements  concerning  integration,  while  even  Ukraine  joined  some  Russian-led 
cooperation,  a  development  supported  by  El’tsin  throughout.  NATO  enlargement  was 
criticised by Belarus and Ukraine as well as Russia, as were the bombings of Yugoslavia, 
which prompted Russia and Belarus to conduct exercises directed against NATO. Finally, 
Russian sought and acquired long leases of Belarusian and Ukrainian bases, widely perceived 
in Russia as enhancing national prestige. The paradigm of Law continued to have some 
significance, too, yet less than previously.  Russia did allow the USA to promise security 
guarantees  to  Belarus  and  Ukraine,  yet  no  protective  mechanisms  were  allowed  to  be 
established. Russia did eventually participate in Ukraine-NATO naval exercises, but did not 
approve of them or trust the intentions of NATO in the Black Sea. Finally, while Russia 
promised to consistently consult Ukraine on use of naval bases in Sevastopol’, in reality the 
1997 naval treaties increased Russian unilateral dominance there. In contrast, while the 
paradigm  of  Nation  remained  least  significant,  worrying  signs  appeared.  In  the  Russo-
Ukrainian naval treaties, Ukraine was deprived both of the majority of its vessels and of 
proper mooring places for the remainder. This would prevent Ukraine from hosting NATO 
vessels in future, a prospect that Russian politicians such as Luzhkov vehemently opposed. 
Ukraine was not trusted to keep NATO at bay, and already indications appeared that Russian 
troops might remain on Crimea even after the agreed lease had expired, despite Ukrainian 
resistance. 
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Between  2000  and  2004  the  paradigm  of  Power  remained  dominant.  Integration  of 
Belarusian  forces  under  de  facto  Russian  command  progressed  within  the  CSTO,  while 
Russians  knew  that  even  the  Ukrainian  leadership  could  find  no  useful  military  allies 
elsewhere. The Russo-Ukrainian Cooperation Treaty was used to keep Ukraine out of NATO, 
while Putin could be sure that Lukashenko would faithfully copy any Russian criticism of the 
Western  organisation.  Finally,  the  Russian  government  assumed  bases  in  Belarus  and 
Ukraine  would  always  be  available,  Sergei  Ivanov  assuming  that  even  the  lease  on  the 
Sevastopol’ facilities would be extended. The paradigm of Nation remained relatively less 
important, but it could no longer be ignored. As long as Ukrainian forces refused to accept 
Russian command, the Russian elite were pleased to see them weakened, not least since 
this also hindered Ukraine and other GUUAM states from cooperating closely with NATO. At 
the same time, Putin’s policy doctrines continued to stress that Russian forces had the right 
to  defend  Russians  abroad,  and  definitions  of  who  these  “Russians”  were  constantly 
widened. In contrast, the paradigm of Law was now rapidly losing influence. Although Russia 
hardly needed the cooperation of Belarusian and Ukrainian forces anymore, these forces 
could integrate nowhere else. Similarly, Putin might have initially had a relaxed attitude 
towards  NATO,  but  he never  indicated  that  Belarus  and  Ukraine  should  be part of this 
organisation.  At  the  same  time, Putin did  claim  in  the  West  that  Russian  troops  would 
behave responsibly abroad, yet the President was never ready to listen to Belarusian and 
Ukrainian complaints regarding Russian troops stationed on their territories. 
 
Finally, between 2004 and 2008 the paradigm of Power again dominated. Belarusian forces 
continued to be intimately involved in Russian-led exercises, which increasingly moved from 
the moribund CIS to the more effective CSTO. Putin remained strongly opposed to NATO, 337 
 
following NATO enlargement into the post-Soviet region, and Belarus continued to present a 
joint front with Russia on this question. Finally, Putin’s regime more clearly than  before 
showed  its  intention to  have  Russian forces  remain  indefinitely  in  Belarus  and  Ukraine, 
ostensibly  to  enhance  regional  security.  Yet,  the  paradigm  of  Nation  had  by  now  also 
become quite influential. Sections of the Ukrainian military remained highly dependent on 
Russian  equipment,  and  now  the  Russian  government  was  openly  threatening  that 
cooperation  could  be  terminated.  The  prospect  of  Ukrainian  membership  of  NATO 
prompted  Putin  to  directly  threaten  territorial  revanchism,  while  Russian  forces  had 
previously  indicated  willingness  to  harass  post-Soviet  NATO  member-states.  Finally, 
unprecedented  conflict  appeared  between  Russian  and  Ukrainian  forces  over  military 
infrastructure  on  Crimea.  Sergei  Ivanov  even  authorised  Russian  troops  to  use  military 
means to win the dispute. In contrast, the paradigm of Law had now become insignificant. 
Russians showed no interest in letting Belarusian and Ukrainian forces cooperate with the 
West, instead ensuring that these forces remained highly dependent on Russian goodwill. 
Putin might have stated that Ukraine could enter NATO in an unforeseen future, yet he did 
so only when knowing that Ianukovych’s presidency would not prompt rapid Westernisation 
of Ukraine. Finally, Russian forces might still have been somewhat dependent on facilities in 
Belarus and Ukraine, yet as Sergei Ivanov indicated this dependency was not something 
Lukashenko and Iushchenko could exploit. 
 
Economic sovereignty 
Between  1990  and  1993,  the  paradigm  of  Power  dominated  Russian  perceptions  of 
Belarusian and Ukrainian economic sovereignty. The economies of the BSSR and UkSSR had 338 
 
depended on the RSFSR to purchase their goods, and this continued with substantial Russian 
subsidies  after  1991.  Energy  dependency  had  been  even  more  pronounced,  particularly 
since the Union centre had forced the UkSSR to use natural gas, which had to come from or 
through the RSFSR. Finally, both Belarus and Ukraine had historically provided transit areas 
for Russian goods to the world market; following 1991, the Russian government sought to 
continue this policy. The paradigm of Law was noticeable, too, though.  El’tsin appeared 
intent  on  forcing  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  economies  to  reform,  abandoning  monetary 
union  when  this  was  seen  to  be  damaging  to  the  Russian  economy.  Russian  energy 
companies, including state-owned Gazprom, did suggest that Belarus and Ukraine should 
pay market prices for what they received; an unprecedented signal even if one that was not 
yet enforced. Finally, Russian investors were not primarily focused on Belarus and Ukraine; 
instead they were moving to the West and would only go to neighbouring economies if 
these  conducted  effective  market  reforms.  In  contrast,  the  paradigm  of  Nation  was 
insignificant.  Russo-Ukrainian  disagreement  over  the  fate  of  Soviet  assets  and  debts 
remained muted and did not obstruct economic cooperation more generally. Ukraine might 
have periodically been threatened with reduced energy deliveries and price increases, but 
Russian energy subsidies always appeared when they were needed. Similarly, threats that 
discrimination against Russians might prevent Russian investments in Ukraine were never 
echoed  in  practice  or  by  El’tsin,  whose  demands  of  local  economies  were  strict,  but 
economically rational. 
 
Between  1993  and  1999,  the  paradigm  of  Power  continued  to  dominate  Russian 
perceptions. The government sought to re-integrate the Belarusian economy; a policy El’tsin 
vocally  supported,  while  he  and  the  Russian  parliamentary  opposition  also  wanted 339 
 
increased economic support for Ukraine. Energy subsidies continued as before; the Russian 
government and Gazprom knew such subsidies enabled them to largely control Belarus and 
Ukraine  the  economies  of  which  remained  highly  energy-intensive.  And  with  increased 
prominence in Russia after El’tsin’s re-election in 1996, numerous oligarchs tried to establish 
themselves, too, in Belarus and Ukraine where an increasing number of industries were 
opening up to foreign control. Still, the paradigm of Law also remained visible, if less so than 
before.  Russian  ministers  consistently  demanded  Belarusian  economic  reforms,  while 
territorial  and  other  guarantees  in  the  Friendship  Treaty  indicated  that  the  Ukrainian 
economy might no longer be hostage to  Russian non-economic demands. Gazprom and 
other Russian companies attempted to hold Ukraine responsible for its energy debts and to 
gradually  increase  prices  to  world  market  levels,  although  these  attempts  were  mostly 
unsuccessful. Finally, El’tsin remained aware that Russian investors in the longer run needed 
reformed Belarusian and Ukrainian economies, although presently citizens of Russia took 
advantage of high Belarusian salaries. All this could mostly be addressed amicably, though 
the paradigm of Nation was slowly gaining a little significance. Chernomyrdin was annoyed 
with Belarusian calls for subsidies, while tax wars and arms export disputes with Ukraine 
only just remained within the limits of normal economic competition. When Russia imposed 
excise duties on energy deliveries to Ukraine relations were further damaged, albeit Russian 
analysts justifiably indicated that reduced energy theft by Ukrainians would improve energy 
relations. Finally, Russia did re-open customs barriers partly in protest against obstruction of 
Russian investments in Ukraine, yet at this time Kuchma managed to mollify Russians. 
 
Between 2000 and 2004, the paradigm of Power again dominated. The establishment of the 
SES, vigorously promoted by Putin, tied the economies of Belarus and Ukraine closely to 340 
 
Russia, which remained an important market for Belarusian and Ukrainian goods. Russian 
companies  acquired  energy  infrastructure  particularly  in  Ukraine,  while  Putin  became 
directly involved in Russo-Ukrainian negotiations concerning expansion of transit pipelines 
through Ukraine to Central Europe. Furthermore, Putin championed the creation of costly 
free economic zones and Lukashenko’s re-election, giving Russians privileged access to the 
sale  of  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  companies.  Simultaneously,  though,  the  paradigm  of 
Nation  had  become  more  noticeable.  Putin  loudly  derided  the  Belarusian  economy  as 
unreformed and weak; a statement halting Russo-Belarusian integration and scaring the 
Ukrainian  government,  too.  Energy  deliveries  were  increasingly  turned  off  following 
Ukrainian  energy  thefts,  while  Putin  and  Gazprom  now  openly  threatened  that  future 
energy  subsidies  required  Russian  ownership  of  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  energy 
infrastructure.  Putin  chided  the  Belarusian  National  Bank  for  organising  resistance  to 
Russian  energy  and  other  types  of  investments  in  Belarus,  while  Lukashenko  in  return 
harassed Russian media companies. Conversely, the paradigm of Law became less important 
than  it  had  been  under  El’tsin.  The  Russian  military-industrial  complex  might  still  have 
needed some Ukrainian products, but Ukrainian companies and Kuchma’s government were 
unwilling and unable to use this dependency to defend Ukrainian sovereignty. Putin might 
occasionally  have  advocated  stable  energy  prices  and  European energy  security,  but  he 
seldom  kept  these  principles  in  mind  when  dealing  with  Belarus  and  Ukraine.  Finally, 
although  Iushchenko  as  Ukrainian  Prime  Minister  temporarily  facilitated  Russian 
investments  in  the  state,  Putin  and  the  Russian  government  never  concealed  their 
preference for Ianukovych, who, despite supporting Ukrainian oligarchs, was preferred in 
Moscow for political reasons. 
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Eventually,  between  2004  and  2008,  the  paradigm  of  Power  dominated  again.  Despite 
Iushchenko’s presidency, the EU remained reluctant to subsidise the Ukrainian economy, 
leaving  this  state  and  Belarus  reliant  on  Russia  and  its  Eurasian  Economic  Community. 
Gazprom  used  RosUkrEnergo  to  better  control  transit  networks  in  Ukraine,  while  Putin 
complained that the USA should stay away from internal post-Soviet affairs. At the same 
time, the Ukrainian parliament ratified participation in the SES, which would favour the 
inflow of Russian goods to Ukraine and Belarus. Yet by now, the paradigm of Nation had 
become more significant than ever before. The Russian government placed import duties on 
goods central for the Belarusian economy, while Lukashenko was widely derided in Russia as 
parasitical. Disruptions to energy deliveries were more frequent and longer lasting than 
previously,  with  the  Russian  government  and  Gazprom  increasing  their  demands  of 
neighbouring  states  whenever  winter  approached,  in  the  process  ignoring  previous 
agreements. Russian investors were openly discriminated against in Ukraine and Belarus, 
where  Russian  businessmen,  not  always  without  reason,  were  depicted  as  criminal, 
aggressive  colonisers.  On  the  contrary,  the  paradigm  of  Law  had  become  insignificant. 
Although Ukraine attracted increasing amounts of FDI this often originated in Russia or from 
Russian-controlled  companies.  Putin  and  other  members  of  the  Russian  political  elite 
complained that energy subsidisation must stop, as it had done elsewhere in the world, yet 
only increased prices whenever it could hurt Belarus and Ukraine the most. Finally, albeit 
some  diversification  of  Russian  investments  took  place,  indicating  that  Belarusian  and 
Ukrainian markets were seen as increasingly less important, this did not imply that Russians 
were ready to accept competition against their companies in these two states. 
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Between  1990  and  1993,  the  paradigm  of  Power  dominated  Russian  perceptions  of 
Belarusian and Ukrainian cultural sovereignty. The Soviet claim of historical union between 
Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians remained at the inauguration of the CIS, and El’tsin 
ordered imperial flags hoisted over vessels in Ukraine. Russian language remained dominant 
in both Belarus and Ukraine, and it gained official pre-eminence in the CIS, too. Russian 
Orthodoxy was seen by Russians as a unifying factor between Russia, Belarus and Ukraine; 
an impression supported by Aleksii II. However, the paradigm of Law was significant, too. 
El’tsin visited Kyiv, acknowledging historically unprecedented Russo-Ukrainian equality, and 
his state-building project inspired Russian scholars to claim Novgorod as the new founding 
city for Russia. States in the CIS pledged to secure the linguistic rights of all their inhabitants, 
a pledge mirrored in domestic laws of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. And following Soviet 
repression of religions in general, Aleksii II appealed to free choice of denomination for 
post-Soviet parishioners; a policy Russians could see mirrored in Ukrainian law. In contrast, 
the  paradigm  of  Nation  was  insignificant.  El’tsin  implicitly  accused  Shushkevich  and 
Kravchuk  of  abandoning  the  Soviet  Union,  but  only  sought  to  deflect  blame,  whereas 
intended  attacks  on  Ukrainians’  historical  role  were  left  to  outsiders  like  Limonov. 
Gorbachev worried unnecessarily for the Russian language in the UkSSR, and in independent 
Ukraine  only  isolated  local  politicians  discriminated  against  Russian-speakers.  Finally, 
disagreements between Russian and Ukrainian clergy did appear, but they never escalated 
despite of religious terminology by some Russian politicians, notably including Rutskoi.  
 
Between  1993  and  1999,  the  paradigm  of  Power  continued  to  dominate  Russian 
perceptions.  El’tsin  repeatedly  highlighted  the  common  imperial  links  of  Russians, 
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before  El’tsin’s  re-election,  reminded  observers  of  Soviet  cooperation.  Russian  language 
continued to effortlessly dominate in Belarus and Ukraine; even so, Russian government 
policy  continued  subsidisation  of  Russian-language  publications  in  these  two  states. 
Furthermore,  El’tsin  had  Aleksii  II  bless  Russo-Belarusian  integration,  just  as  Ziuganov 
emphasised  the  central  place  of  Russian  Orthodoxy  for  post-Soviet  integration.  The 
paradigm of Law remained noticeable, but less so than before. Russian scholars such as 
Furman acknowledged that Russia had historically provoked Ukrainian nationalism, yet the 
Russian elite did not respond. Similar elite ignorance appeared in linguistic issues. Whereas 
Russian-speakers in Belarus and Ukraine did not want to be defended by Russia, the Russian 
government continued to interfere. And although religious tension remained infrequent, it 
now appeared to be less the result of conscious compromises, and more of religious apathy 
among  Russians,  Belarusians  and  Ukrainians  in  general.  Still,  the  paradigm  of  Nation 
remained  relatively  weakest.  Chernomyrdin  honoured  Iaroslav  the  Wise  and  not  Taras 
Shevchenko,  yet  this  was  perhaps  thoughtlessness  more  than  a  deliberate  slight,  while 
complaints  that  Russia  had  historically  been  exploited  never  came  from  the  Russian 
executive. Through Iastrzhembskii, El’tsin did complain of discrimination against Russian-
speakers,  but  language  was  used  primarily  as  a  bargaining  tool,  not  as  a  subject  for 
perceived  genuine  grievances.  Finally,  the  fact  that  some  members  of  the  Russian  and 
Ukrainian Orthodox Churches chose to support revanchist political parties only highlighted 
that such clergy was marginalised. 
 
Between 2000 and 2004, the paradigm of Power remained dominant. El’tsin transferred an 
image  of  Belarusians  and  Ukrainians  as  “blood-kin”  to  Putin’s  administration,  while  the 
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Concept  highlighted  the  role  of  Russian  language  in  regional  integration,  while  nothing 
indicated that Belarusian and Ukrainian language could challenge the dominance of Russian 
language.  The  Russian  Orthodox  Church,  increasingly  connected  to  Putin’s  regime, 
professed Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians to be soulmates and in both Belarus and 
Ukraine openly supported integrationist actors. Yet by now, the paradigm  of Nation had 
become somewhat important, too. Russians complained about the elevation of Ukrainian 
nationalist Bandera to war hero, while interpretations of imperial history differed, too. Putin 
threatened  to  actively  defend  the  rights  of  Russian-speakers  against  alleged  forced 
conversion  to  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian,  while  Lukashenko  and  others  noticed  domestic 
political  potential  in  such  discrimination.  And  the  Russian  Orthodox  Church  supported 
denunciations  of  Ukrainian  statehood,  while  interference  in  Ukrainian  politics  grew.  In 
contrast,  the  paradigm of  Law  had by  now  become  mostly  insignificant.  That  Ukrainian 
nationalism had originated due to Russian provocations never gained the attention of the 
Russian executive, while Lukashenko had little interest in distinguishing Belarusian history 
from that of Russia. Putin’s administration did attempt to defend Russian-speakers’ rights 
on a legal basis, but quickly tired of this since such rights were generally not infringed on in 
Belarus  and  Ukraine.  Finally,  religious  apathy  continued  diminishing  disputes  between 
denominations, yet religion had not been chosen by Belarusian and Ukrainian elites as a 
topic around which sovereignty could be built. 
 
Finally, between 2004 and 2008 the paradigm of Power again dominated. Putin now named 
the  Soviet  collapse  a  singular  “geopolitical  catastrophe,”  and  this  nostalgia  was  echoed 
within  Russia,  Belarus  and  Ukraine,  alike.  Proliferation  of  Russian-language  materials  in 
Belarus, Ukraine and elsewhere in the CIS was budgeted by the Russian government, while 345 
 
Ianukovych was persuaded to introduce Russian as state language in Ukraine whenever 
possible.  The  Russian  Orthodox  Church  supported  his  presidential  candidacy,  while 
Lukashenko’s  claim  that  Belarus  was  an  Orthodox  state  showed  an  interest  in  similar 
support. By now, though, the paradigm of Nation was stronger than ever before. Russian 
and Ukrainian politicians fought over responsibility for the Holodomor, with Chernomyrdin 
notably  dismissive  of  Ukrainian  allegations.  Iushchenko’s  presidential  election  had  given 
Ukrainian-speakers  increased  strength  to  increase  the  spread  of  their  language;  a 
development the Belarusian opposition now focused their efforts on, too. And whereas 
Gel’man and other Russians inside Ukraine sought to undermine Iushchenko’s presidency on 
religious grounds, the Russian Orthodox Church openly did so from Moscow. In contrast, the 
paradigm  of  Law  had  become  insignificant.  Putin  did  not  advocate  constructing  a  new 
Russia, but adjusting historical Russia to a new world. He agreed with Iushchenko to protect 
their languages, but this gave Putin another tool with which to defend existing Russian 
linguistic  dominance.  And  while  a  few  Belarusians  continued  to  advocate  a  sovereign 
Belarusian between Orthodoxy and Catholicism they still had no plan for how this could be 
done, and little if any support in society. 
 
Revanchist Russia: freedom, order and justice 
In this thesis I have argued that between 1990 and 2008 certain Russian perceptions of 
Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  sovereignty  waxed  and  waned  in  importance  relative  to  each 
other. Whereas the paradigm of Power remained dominant throughout, the paradigm of 
Law  became  increasingly  less  influential,  whereas  the  paradigm  of  Nation  became 
increasingly more influential. As I mentioned in the introduction, since I define both the 346 
 
paradigm of Power and that of Nation as “revanchist” in nature, I argue that we can talk 
about “revanchist Russia” in relation to Belarus and Ukraine. The examples I have provided 
were intended to empirically support this argument. Yet there remains the question of why 
the significance of perceptions waxed and waned as they did. This was never the primary 
focus of my argument; nevertheless, I believe that a final discussion of this question might 
help  to  illuminate  my  argument  from  another,  analytically  fruitful  angle.  In  chapter  1  I 
outlined  the  different  sets  of  assumptions  inherent  in  each  of  the  three  paradigms,  I 
identified: Law, Power, and Justice. Each of these sets of assumptions must ultimately rest 
on an unquestioned ideal for how the world should work. In chapter 1, I briefly named these 
as  the  ideals  of  freedom,  order  and  justice,  respectively.  Now,  in  the  final  part  of  my 
conclusion, I shall expand on this topic, using the identification of these ideals to understand 
the changes in the relative significance of the three paradigms between 1990 and 2008. 
 
Between  1990  and  1993,  the  paradigm  of  Power  dominated  because  of  both  material 
circumstances  and  the  personal  circumstances  of  significant  Russian  actors.  Within  the 
Soviet Union many factors assisted multi-national cooperation. Oil and gas pipelines kept 
the republics dependent on the Union, as did the all-Union military forces, and the fact that 
the  RSFSR  shared  numerous  institutions  and  a  capital  with  the  Union.  Furthermore, 
republican leaders including El’tsin, Kravchuk and Shushkevich all had their careers within 
this system. Although El’tsin rebelled against the Soviet centre he had nonetheless spent the 
majority of his career adjusting to and rising within the Soviet system. Chaotic post-Soviet 
reality became an abrupt contrast to this, and it is quite understandable that many looked 
nostalgically at the ordered affairs of the past and tried to re-create some such stability in 
the present. However, the paradigm of Law was also favoured to some extent given the 347 
 
substantial increase in freedom that had taken place since the mid-1980s. Gorbachev had 
inadvertently provided El’tsin and other republican elites with the freedom of speech and 
organisation to further policies, which ultimately led to the collapse of the Union. The new 
Russia, which was built on this background, needed a new identity, which could hold the 
Soviet centre as its antithesis. This identity became founded in law, through El’tsin’s as well 
as  Gorbachev’s  and  others’  efforts.  The  Soviet  collapse  provided  Russians  with  the 
possibility to completely reform their sovereign statehood through laws that could further 
democracy, construct a new economy based on the principles of a fair market, and allow all 
to speak their language of choice and worship in the manner of their choosing. Conversely, 
the paradigm of Nation suffered from the fact that few significant Russian actors after 1991 
could claim the Soviet collapse had been unjust against Russia. Chaotic it certainly was, and 
its consequences might have led to unacceptable poverty for many individuals. Yet it was 
difficult for Russian elites to blame Belarusians and Ukrainians for the situation, since it was 
El’tsin more than anyone, who had initiated the Soviet collapse. Consequently, the only lack 
of justice that Russians might use to criticise Belarus and Ukraine concerned isolated issues 
such as Crimea, which in themselves could not command general opinion. 
 
Between 1993 and 1999, the situation remained much the same. The paradigm of Power 
retained  its  dominance,  since  post-Soviet  reality  generally  failed  to  stabilise.  When  it 
seemed as if economic wealth was gradually being rebuilt, the crisis of 1998 brought back all 
the insecurity of the early 1990s, just as persistent speculation about El’tsin’s health and 
potential successors made Russians long for the past. El’tsin understood how this could 
benefit him, and while his role in the Soviet collapse prevented him from overly praising the 
Soviet  Union,  he  could  reinvigorate  imperial  order  to  buttress  his  regime.  In  this  order 348 
 
Belarus and Ukraine remained essential components. At the same time, elites in Minsk and 
Kyiv generally failed to liberate their states from integration with Russia. Lukashenko and 
Kuchma continued to prefer subsidies to grappling with actual economic reforms, just as 
they saw the benefits in participating in Russian-led military cooperation. Conversely, the 
paradigm  of  Law  was  now  losing  influence  despite  the  unprecedented  expansion  of 
freedom, which had taken place following the Soviet collapse. In a sense, the expansion of 
freedom had almost been too successful. Since there was no longer any Soviet regime, 
which  could  be  opposed,  perceptions  within  the  paradigm  of  Law  depended  for  their 
continued influence on a positive programme for the development of Russia. It was no 
longer  sufficient  to  say  what  Russia  was  not;  and  the  identification  with  the  Russian 
Federation, which El’tsin championed, soon turned out to lack content. The construction of 
Belarusian  and  Ukrainian  sovereignty  suffered  from  a  similar  problem.  Conversely,  the 
paradigm of Nation gained nourishment from the increasing resentment felt by Russians 
against  other  post-Soviet  peoples.  Whereas  anger  over  Belarusian  and  Ukrainian 
participation in the Soviet collapse had previously been downplayed due to the assumption 
that the two states would return to Russia any moment, several years had passed, and elites 
in  Minsk  and  Kyiv  were  defending  their  sovereignty  against  Russian  encroachment. 
Suddenly, it mattered that Russia was losing money on its energy deliveries to Belarus and 
Ukraine,  and  that  Crimea  remained  a  part  of  Ukraine,  for  even  the  Russia-friendly 
Lukashenko  and  Kuchma  liked  to  govern  sovereign  states.  Still,  Russians  could  for  now 
continue to blame delays in integration on obstruction from nationalists, whom regimes in 
Minsk and Kyiv could be expected to overcome in the near future. 
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Between 2000 and 2004, Putin built much of his legitimacy on the ability to recreate a 
stable, strong and ordered Russia. The new President had never opposed the Soviet system 
in a way comparable with his predecessor and was therefore more able to take advantage 
of elements of the Soviet system without fear of self-contradiction. Compared to using the 
Russian Imperial past, Putin’s focus on the Soviet past had the benefit that while its flaws 
had been mitigated for many after a decade of post-Soviet hardships, they had experience 
of Soviet integration and could thus identify with it. Furthermore, if Putin was to recreate 
Russian great power status quickly, material factors still favoured a unified energy system, 
joint military exercises and the like, with the direct participation of Belarus and Ukraine. Yet 
Putin had also acquired the presidency through his opposition to non-Russians, particularly 
in the Caucasus, and he never presented himself as a conciliator in the mould of El’tsin. This 
assisted  the  continued  increase  in  the  influence  of  the  paradigm  of  Nation.  While 
Belarusians and Ukrainians were certainly not the prime target of Putin’s ire, he and his 
allies were not prepared to allow plans for integration be disrupted in Minsk and Kyiv. 
Lukashenko particularly infuriated the new Russian regime, for he did something worse than 
opposing Russia; he took advantage of it by constantly demanding more economic subsidies 
and assistance against domestic and Western opponents. Kuchma at least appeared less 
needy, but when Russian elites looked back on the post-Soviet period, Ukraine had not 
often accommodated Russian wishes. The Black Sea Fleet would eventually have to leave 
Ukraine, worries in Moscow about NATO were not respected in Kyiv, and Kuchma’s regime 
was beginning to rehabilitate historical figures, who had virulently opposed Russia. All this 
increased Russian resentment. In contrast, the paradigm of Law suffered from the maladies 
mentioned above, only more so. With El’tsin retired, Putin had little interest in constructing 
an identity for a Russia that was much smaller and weaker than he planned for it to be. If 350 
 
Russia  had  already  been  constructed,  Putin’s plans  for  great  power  status  would  prove 
impossible. At the same time, the freedom, which had facilitated the prominence of this 
paradigm, now had a poor reputation among Russians, who had lived through the difficult 
1990s.  Putin’s  intention  to  promote  a  business-like  administration,  ostensibly  ready  to 
compete with and beat the West on its own terms, was the only reason why the paradigm 
of Law still held some influence. 
 
Between  2004  and  2008,  the  paradigm  of  Power  remained  dominant.  Putin’s  plan  to 
recreate Russian international power seemed to have been successful, and in the post-
Soviet region Russian supremacy was mostly unchallenged. The population of Russia was 
gradually becoming more secure, financially and also conceptually as there seemed to be a 
plan for the further development of Russia, domestically and abroad. Inhabitants of Belarus 
and Ukraine could look to such relative successes and demand that their own governments 
either achieved the same on their own or at least had the good sense to cooperate more 
closely  with  Russia.  At  the  same  time,  the  so-called  “war  on  terror”  including  troubled 
occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan seemed to confirm to many Russians, Belarusians and 
Ukrainians that whereas Putin could create stability and order, the West was no longer 
capable of or interested in this. With rising energy prices and de facto nationalisations of 
energy companies, such as Iukos, improving the economic might of Russia considerably, 
Putin seemed able to keep not only Belarus and Ukraine, but at times even much of Europe 
under control. Thus, it was remarkable that the paradigm of Nation became even more 
important than previously. How could Russians resent Belarusians and Ukrainians, when 
events seemed to have provided Russia with so many advantages? The problem was that 
the stronger Russia was becoming, the more obvious was the fact that Belarus and Ukraine 351 
 
would never be integrated into Russia again. Energy flows to Belarus might be repeatedly 
halted, yet Lukashenko only increased his complaints against Russia and his attempts to 
curry favour with Western investors. Ianukovych might be supported openly by Russia in his 
presidential bid, yet he still lost the Ukrainian presidency to Iushchenko and Tymoshenko. 
Western influence might explain part of the latter case, but eventually Russian elites had to 
accept that Belarusians and Ukrainians simply did not want to give up their sovereignty. 
Thus, actors perceiving Russia as a great power faced an unsolvable contradiction: they 
expected,  and  needed,  Belarusians  and  Ukrainians  to  support  the  Russian  project,  but 
Belarusians and Ukrainians did not do so. From such observations many Russians found it 
easy to conclude that Belarusians and Ukrainians had betrayed them, and it was therefore 
not impossible that the paradigm of Nation might eclipse the paradigm of Power in future. 
Conversely, the paradigm of Law seemingly had little future. The centre was no longer the 
enemy  against  which  a  free  Russia  could  position  itself.  Instead,  El’tsin’s  attempt  to 
construct a new sovereignty for Russia had failed, not because it had been an impossible 
project, but because important Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian actors at key moments in 
time had chosen not to identify with the project, a failure of which Putin was merely the 
most prominent example. 
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